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SWEDIAUR, F. X.

THE
Philosophical
DICTIONARY.

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THE
Philosophical
DICTIONARY,

COMPRISING

THE OPINIONS OF ALL THE BEST WRITERS ON MORAL,

POLITICAL AND THEOLOGICAL SUBJECTS,

SUCH AS

Locke, Hume, Helvetius, Adam Smith, Voltaire,
ROUSSEAU, DAVID WILLIAMS, BAYLE, D'ALEMBERT, DIDEROT,
MONTESQUIEU, CONDORCET, FILANGERI, BECCARIA,
PRIESTLEY, GODWIN, AND OTHERS,

*Who have written in favour of the Liberties and Happiness
of Mankind.*

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1822.

Philosophical

DICTIONARY

Containing

THE OPINIONS OF ALL THE GREAT WRITERS ON MORAL

POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL SUBJECTS

FROM THE

Works of the following Authors, &c.

ARISTOTLE, PLATO, ALEXANDER, &c.

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P R E F A C E

TO THE FIRST EDITION.



THE following Work is compiled from the writings of the most eminent philosophers in Europe. It was undertaken originally with no other view but to serve as a Common-place Book for private use. If the publication of it can add to the amusement of travellers who carry few books with them, or satisfy the curiosity of those who cannot purchase many books, or have little time to read them, it will answer every purpose the Editor could expect.

There are some articles in it which have been the subject of controversy amongst ancient as well as modern philosophers : on these subjects, the arguments on both sides of the question are, in ge-

neral, extracted for the satisfaction of the reader. If the Work meets the approbation of the Public, the defects of it may be amended in a Supplement or future Edition.

A love of truth, and warm wishes for its diffusion, under respectable authorities, were the sole objects of the Editor in this Publication.

F. S———, M. D.

*London,
January, 1786.*

P R E F A C E

TO THE SECOND EDITION.



The Compiler of this Work, within two years after its original publication, wishing to make a present of some copies to his friends, applied to his publisher, and to his astonishment was informed that it was out of print. The Bookseller stated that from the manner in which the Work had disappeared, he suspected it had been bought up with a view of suppressing it. Many years having passed since that period, and the Philosophical Dictionary having become extremely scarce, the Editor has given Mr. Benbow permission to reprint it, and has added many new articles, some of which are selected from eminent authors who have written since the publication of the former

edition, and others are original. It is but justice to add, that a few very dry and abstruse articles have been omitted, as being neither intelligible nor interesting to the generality of readers.

Further improvements are in contemplation, should the present undertaking meet the approbation of the Public.

F. S——, M. D.

March, 1822.

CONTENTS

OF THE

Philosophical Dictionary, alphabetically arranged.

A.

Abraham
Abuses
Actions
Adam
Adultery
Ambition
America
Ancestors
Animals
Animals, reason of
Apostacy
Art and Nature
Arts and Sciences
Assassination
Ditto of Princes
Assent
Athanasius's Creed
Atheism
Ditto and Superstition
Atheist

B.

Babel
Bankruptcy, national
Beasts
Being
Belief
Ditto or Disbelief
Bigotry, religious
Bible Societies

C.

Calvinistic Divinity
Capet, Hugh
Catechism
Cause, existence of
Celibacy
Ceres Eleusina
Certainty
Chain of Events
Chance and Causes
Character
Ditto, National
Charles I.
Chastity, the merit of
Christian Religion
Christianity
Civil Commotions
Climates, influence of
Ditto, difference of
Commerce
Conciliation
Confucius

Conscience
Ditto, liberty of
Controversy
Controversies, religious
Corn, exportation of
Corruptions, religious and political
Country
Courtezans
Creation
Credulity and Authority
Crimes
Crown, influence of
Customs, origin of

D.

Darkness
Death in Battle
Ditto, punishment of
Debt, National
Deity
Ditto, to discover a
Ditto, belief of the
Ditto, worship of the
Delicacy
Deliriums
Deluge
Destiny
Discretion
Divisibility of Matter
Divorce and Repudiation
Dotage
Dreams
Dress, female
Duration

E.

Ecclesiastical Power
Ditto, Civil Power, &c.
Economy
Education
Ditto of Children
Ditto of Common People
Empire
English Constitution
Ennui
Enthusiasm
Equality
Ditto, what it means
Ditto, benefits of
Establishments, religious
Evidence
Ditto, historical
Evil, the origin of

CONTENTS.

Evil, observation on, natural and moral
Experience
External Objects

F.

Fabulous stories
Facts, matter of
Ditto, nature of
Faith
Ditto and Reason
Fame
Ditto, the love of
Fanaticism
Ditto, punishment of
Filial Affection
Final Causes
Flattery
Friendship
Ditto, real
Future Punishment
Ditto Rewards and Punishment
Ditto State

G.

Gallantry
Genius
God
Ditto, knowledge of
Good
Government, resistance to
Ditto, civil
Ditto, just
Ditto, principles of

H.

Habit
Ditto, influence of
Ditto, moral
Happiness
Ditto of different stations
Hell
Hereditary Succession
Ditto in Government
History
Hospitals, founding
Humanity
Hypocrisy

I.

Idea of Body
Ideas, what derived from
Ditto of Sensation
Ditto, association of
Ditto, origin of
Idolatry
Ill Humour
Imagination
Indians
Infants, exposition of
Ingratitude
Injury, do none
Intentions

J.

Justice
Ditto, virtue of

Justice, the origin of
K.

Knowledge, historical
Ditto, of Existence
Ditto, necessary

L.

Labour
Ditto, national
Law of Nature
Laws,
Ditto civil
Ditto, interpretation of
Ditto, continuance of
Legal Restraints
Legislature, its omnipotence
Ditto, power of
Ditto, omnipotence of every
Liberty
Ditto, general idea of
Ditto, civil, and political
Ditto, different sorts of
Ditto, political
Love, cause of
Luxury
Ditto and refinement
Ditto, effects of
Luxurious ages most happy
Luxury favourable to governments

M.

Madmen and Idiots
Madness
Mahometanism
Manufacturers
Marriage
Ditto, object of
Marriage, degrees of
Ditto, between relations
Ditto, with Brother's widow
Matter

Matters of fact
Melancholy
Men, different races of
Ditto, Inferiority of
Ditto, no distinction in
Mind, strength of

Miracles

Ditto, Birth of
Ditto, Violation of laws of nature
Ditto of Religion
Ditto, proof of,
Ditto, Mysterious and imposing
Ditto over death
Morality and Religion not the same
Miracles, human testimony of no proof of
divine original
Ditto, surprise and wonder favourable to
Ditto never proved by human testimony

Monks, principles of
Morality

CONTENTS.

Moral rules
 Ditto rules, duty of
 Ditto sense
 Ditto systems
 Morality, different systems of
 Moral virtue

N.

National characters
 Nations, the character of, and cause of difference
 National faith
 Nature, pupil of
 Necessity and liberty
 Ditto origin of
 Ditto, Philosophical
 Ditto and liberty, a dispute of words
 Ditto, Philosophical
 Ditto, liberty of the will is
 Ditto and liberty
 Ditto in man
 Ditto, Philosophical, and liberty of indifference
 Ditto, Philosophical, essential to business
 Ditto essential to morality and religion
 Novelty, origin of

O.

Oaths
 Obstinaey
 Occult qualities
 Opinion depend on interest
 Opinions, speculative
 Oracles
 Orthodoxy

P.

Pain and Pleasure
 Ditto and Terror
 Parable against Persecution
 Pardon of Criminals
 Parental Affection
 Parliament of Britain
 Passions, different
 Ditto source of error
 Patriotism
 Peasants and Savages
 Philosophers, Christianity rejected by the ancient
 Philosophy
 Ditto, of Ancient Greeks
 Ditto Modern
 Physiognomy
 Pleasure, the love of
 Polytheism
 Ditto, the cause of
 Ditto primary religion of mankind
 Ditto not primary religion of mankind
 Poor, Relief of the
 Populace, the
 Popular Opinion
 Population
 Populousness of Ancient Europe
 Power, origin of

Practice of Christianity, contrasted with precept
 Prayer
 Prejudice
 Ditto, Virtue and Vices, of
 Ditto, religious
 Provisions, price of
 Priests
 Primogeniture, contrary to the interests of families
 Probability, grounds of
 Prodigality, effects of
 Professors in Universities
 Promises and their obligations
 Property
 Ditto, the Origin of
 Prophecies
 Protestantism
 Providence and a future state
 Public spirit
 Ditto works
 Punishments, Power of
 Ditto Capital
 Ditto the intent of
 Ditto, immediate
 Ditto, infamous
 Ditto, mild

R.

Reason, meaning of
 Ditto and faith
 Ditto and faith not opposite
 Ditto and nature sufficient to teach Morality
 Reformation, the
 Ditto, and its effects
 Ditto national
 Religion
 Ditto, the inconvenience of
 Ditto, motives of attachment to different
 Ditto, the truth or falsity of
 Ditto, true, not to be discovered without examination
 Ditto, Christian founded on faith
 Ditto natural
 Ditto, of the first man
 Ditto, and Toleration of the Romans
 Ditto, the influence of, on mankind
 Religious principles, the influence of on Man
 Religion, (state of) in Pennsylvania
 Ditto, Universal
 Religious Opinions
 Religions, the bad influence of
 Ditto, barbarity
 Religious Terror
 Revelation
 Revelation not admissible against reason
 Revenues, state of the
 Ditto of the church
 Right, whatever is, is
 Ditto and wrong, of

CONTENTS.

Roman republic	Testimony, human
Ditto Church	Theocracy
Ditto Church, Power and decline of	Thinking is the action, not the essence of the soul
S	Times, reflections on the good old
Science and virtue	Tithe in England, the origin of
Security, Political	Toleration the spirit of, in ancient Rome
Sensation	Ditto, reasons for and against
Sense, Common	Ditto, not a primary virtue
Slave, (the labour of) dearer than that of free men	Ditto, the chief cause and origin of
Slaves and Slavery, Considerations on	Tradition
Sleep	Tyranny
Society, the first principles of human	V.
Ditto and government, the origin of	Vicious, no action, unless injurious to society
Sovereign, the Duties of a	Virtue
Soul, the origin of the	Virtuous man
Ditto, popular opinion concerning the	Virtues, Falsity of human
Ditto, the	U.
Ditto, immortality of the	Union of body politic
Ditto, the immateriality of the	Unity of the deity, the
Ditto, the doctrine of the, among the ancient philosophers, Barbarians and Jews	W.
Ditto, immortality of the	War, Calamities of
Ditto, the, thinks not always	Wars, religious, are a less fatal scourge than that of the Inquisition; with a succinct history of this tribunal
Spirits knowable, the existence of	Wicked and wickedness
Substance, the word	Witnesses, credibility of
Suicide	Women
Superstition	Worship
Sumptuary laws superfluous	Worship, corruptions of the Christian
Sympathy, the principle of, and antipathy, not a proper standard of right and wrong	Worship, idolatrous
T.	Z.
Taxes, their source and properties	Zeal, fanatical
Testimony, hearsay	

DIRECTIONS FOR THE BINDER.

Through a mistake of the Printer, it will be necessary to place signature

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3 P. after 2 Q. and
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PHILOSOPHICAL DICTIONARY.

ABR

ABRAHAM.—We must not suppose that Abraham was known only to the Jews; he is revered all over Asia, even in India. This name, which signifies *father of a nation*, in more than one Oriental language, was given to an inhabitant of Chaldea, from whom several nations boast of being descended. The care which the Arabians and the Jews took to derive their descent from this Patriarch, proves that such a person had existed.

The Jewish books make him son of Thane, and the Arabians say that this Thane was his grandfather, and that Azar was his father, in which they have been followed by several Christians. Among the commentators, there are forty-two different opinions as to the year in which he was born, and I shall not venture a forty-third. It appears, even from the dates, that he lived sixty years longer than the text allows him.

Philon the Jew, and Suidas, relate, that Thane, father or grandfather of Abraham, who lived at Ur in Chaldea, was a poor man, who gained his livelihood by making little idols, and that he was an idolater.—If so, the an-

ABR

cient religion of the Sabeans, who had no idols, and who worshipped the heavens, was perhaps not then established in Chaldea, or if established in a part of that country, idolatry might at the same time prevail in another part of it. It appears, that in those days every petty nation had its own religion. All kinds were allowed, and all were quietly tolerated, in the same way as were the particular customs of each family among themselves. Laban, Jacob's father-in-law, had his idols. Every *clan* thought it right that its neighbouring clans should have its own gods; and each was satisfied with thinking its own the most powerful.

The Scripture says, that the God of the Jews who destined for them the land of Canaan, ordered Abraham to leave the fertile country of Chaldea to go towards Palestine, and promised to him, that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed. It belongs to theologians to explain, by means of allegories and mystical meanings, *how* all nations could be blessed, in a seed from which they did not spring. Some time

after these promises, Abraham's family was afflicted with famine, and went into Egypt to get corn.

Abraham, who was very old, performed this journey with Sarah his wife, who was sixty-five years of age. She was very beautiful, and Abraham, fearing that the Egyptians,—struck with her charms, would kill him, in order that they might enjoy this rare beauty, proposed to her to pass herself off as his sister. Human nature must, in those days, have been possessed of a vigour which is no longer to be found in these degenerate times. What Abraham had foreseen took place: the young men of Egypt thought his wife charming, notwithstanding her sixty-five years: the King himself became enamoured of her, and placed her in his seraglio, although he had probably younger women in it; but the Lord afflicted the king and all his court with great plagues. The text does not say how the king learned that this dangerous beauty was Abraham's wife, but in short he did learn it, and sent her back to her husband.

Sarah's beauty must have been unchangeable; for twenty-five years afterwards, being big with child at upwards of ninety years of age, and travelling with her husband in the territory of a king of Phenicia, called Abimelech, Abraham, who had not corrected himself, again made her pass for his sister. The Phenician king was as amorous as the king of Egypt: God appeared in a dream to Abimelech, and threatened him with death if he touched his new mistress. We must confess that the conduct of Sarah

was equally as strange as the duration of her charms.

From both of these kings the complaisant Abraham received large presents of sheep, oxen, asses, camels, and men and women servants, which proves, that there were populous and powerful kingdoms at the time that the Jewish nation consisted of only a single family. It proves, also, that they had laws, for without them, no kingdom could exist, and, consequently, that the laws of Moses, declared long after, could not be the first. Indeed, with respect to it, it would have appeared much more conformable to the feeble lights of our reason, that God, having himself a law to give, should have given it at once to the whole human race, instead of to a petty horde of barbarians, wandering in a desert.

The rest of the history of Abraham is subject to great difficulties, to be removed only by faith and resignation. God, who appears to him often, and who makes several covenants with him, sends to him one day three angels in the valley of Mamre. The Patriarch sets before them bread, a calf, butter, and milk.—The three Spirits dine, and afterwards, Sarah is sent for, and one of the angels, whom the text calls "the Lord," promises to her that she shall have a son. Sarah, who was then ninety-four, and whose husband, according to one version, was a hundred and forty-three, fell a laughing at the idea, seeing "it had ceased to be with her after the manner of women." And she said to herself, "After I am

waxed old, shall I have pleasure, my lord being old also?" Which proves from Scripture itself, that human nature was then not very different from what it is at present. However, this old woman, when with child, the following year, charms the king Abimelech, as we have already seen.

All this appears to us very strange, and we are at a loss how to reconcile such things to our feeble reason, as well as the promise which the Lord makes to Abraham in the 13th chapter of Genesis, to give to him and his seed *for ever, in sempiternum*, all the land which he sees to the northward and southward, and eastward and westward! On another occasion (chap. 15), he promises to him all the land, from the Nile to the Euphrates, and that his seed shall be as the dust of the earth, "so that if the dust of the earth can be numbered, then shall his seed be numbered." Now, critics have asked, how God could promise to the Jews that immense country, which they have never possessed; and how he bestowed on them, *for ever*, that small part of Palestine, *from which they have been expelled so long ago!* As to their numbers, the same critics insist, *that there are not at present four hundred thousand Jews in the whole world!* They are also astonished that a stranger, who came to pasture his flocks near Sodom, should, with three hundred and eighteen servants, have defeated *four kings*, and pursued them as far as Damascus, which is more than a hundred miles from Sodom. However, such a victory is by no

means impossible, for there are several instances equally wonderful, witness Gideon, who, with three hundred men armed, with 300 pitchers and 300 lamps, defeats a whole army.—Witness Sampson, who, with his own hand, kills a thousand Philistines with the jaw-bone of an ass.

It is farther worthy of remark, in the history of this Patriarch, who is looked upon as the father of the Jews and of the Arabians, that his principal children are Isaac, miraculously born of his aged wife Sarah, and Ishmael, born of his servant maid, Hagar,—That it is in Isaac that the race of the Patriarch is blessed, notwithstanding of which, Isaac was the father of a wretched and despicable nation, long time slaves, and latterly dispersed all over the face of the earth. That Ishmael, on the contrary, is the father of the Arabians, who founded the empire of the Caliphs, one of the most powerful and extensive in the world.—*Abridged from Voltaire.*

ABUSES.—When abuses become so frequent or common as to be oppressive and intolerable, and to threaten the destruction of Government itself, then it is that the last remedy must be applied; that the free spirit of the people must put into action their natural powers to redress those grievances, for which they have no peaceable means of redress, and assert their indefeasible right to a just and equitable government. No man can deny that cases may occur in which the people can have no choice but slavery or resistance: no man can hesitate to say what their

choice ought to be; and it is the best wisdom of every Government not to create a necessity for resistance, by depriving the people of legal means of redress.—*C. Fox.*

ACTIONS.—My sentiment is, that the State has no right to enquire into the opinions of people, either political or religious: in my mind they have a right to take cognisance of their actions.—*C. Fox.*

ADAM.—So much has been said and written about Adam, his wife, pre-Adamities, &c., that I shall not lose time in repeating all the reveries of the Rabbins and others, but I shall venture an idea as to Adam, which, so far as I know, is new. It is no less than the *profound secresy* which was observed with respect to him, all over the habitable world, except in Palestine, till the period when the Jewish books began to be known in Alexandria, when they were translated into Greek under one of the Ptolomys. Even then they were very little known: books were scarce and dear, and, moreover, the Jews of Jerusalem were so enraged at those of Alexandria for having translated their *Bible*, or book, into a prophane language, that these latter concealed their translation as much as possible. It was in fact kept so secret, that no Greek or Roman author mentions it till the time of the Emperor Aurelian.

It is certain, that the Jews had written and read very little: that they were profoundly ignorant of astronomy, geometry, geography, and physical science; that they knew nothing of the history of other nations; and

that the language was a barbarous mixture of the ancient Phenician and corrupted Chaldean, and extremely poor withal.

Farther, that as they did not communicate to any stranger their books or titles, nobody in the world except themselves had ever heard of Adam or Eve, or Abel or Cain, or Noah. Abraham alone was known to the Oriental nations; but none of them allowed that this Abraham or Ibrahim was the stock from which the Jews were descended.

Such are the secrets of providence, that the father and the mother of the human race were wholly unknown to the human race, to such a degree, that the names of Adam and Eve are not to be found in any ancient author, either of Greece or Rome, of Persia or of Syria, or even among the Arabians, till about the time of Mahomet. God was pleased to allow that the title deeds of the great family of the world should be preserved only among the smallest and most wretched part of the family.

How did it happen that Adam and Eve were wholly unknown to their children: that neither in Egypt nor in Babylon was the smallest trace of our first parents to be found? Why do neither Orpheus nor Sinus nor Thaminis mention them? For if they had done so, the notice would have been taken up by Hesiod, and above all, by Homer, who speaks of every thing except of the authors of the human race.

Clement, of Alexandria, who relates so many ancient testimonies, would not have failed to cite any passage in which men-

tion had been made of Adam and Eve. Eusebius, in his *Universal History*, has collected even the most doubtful testimonies; and he certainly would not have passed over the slightest hint, the smallest probability in favour of our first parents. I assert, then, that they were wholly unknown among the Gentiles.

The Phenician Sanconiathon, who certainly lived before Moses, and who is cited by Eusebius as an authentic author, gives ten generations of the human race, the same as Moses does down to the time of Noah; but among them he does not mention either Adam or Eve, or any of their descendants, not even Noah.—We do not find the name of Adam or of Noah in any of the ancient dynasties of Egypt, nor among the Chaldeans. In a word, the whole world is silent respecting them.

It must be acknowledged, that such a concealment is without example. Every nation has attributed to itself an imaginary origin; not one has hit upon the true one. It is difficult to understand how the father of all mankind remained so long unknown: one would have thought that his name would naturally have flown from mouth to mouth, from one end of the world to the other.

Let us humble ourselves before the decrees of Providence, which has permitted this astonishing piece of forgetfulness. All has been mysterious and secret in the nation conducted by God himself, and which prepared the way for Christianity; which has been the wild olive on which the fruit-bearing olive

has been grafted. That the names of the parents of the human race should have been unknown to their descendants, certainly ranks among the greatest mysteries.

I dare affirm, that nothing short of a miracle could thus have stopped the eyes and ears of all nations, so as to make them lose all remembrance of their first parent. What would Cæsar, Anthony, Cressus, Pompey, Cicero, Marcellus, Metellus, have thought, if a poor Jew pedlar, while selling them some balm, had said, "We are all descendants from the same father, named Adam?" All the Roman Senate would have exclaimed, "Show us your genealogical tree." Then the Jew would have unrolled his ten generations down to Noah, with the secret of the general deluge. The Senate would have asked; how many persons there were in the Ark, to feed all the animals during ten whole months, and during the following year, which could not produce any food.—The sweeter of coin would have answered, "We were eight, Noah and his wife, their three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet, and their wives, all descended from Adam, in a straight line." The Senate would have laughed, and would have caused the poor Jew to be flogged; so much are people blinded by their prejudices.

It is difficult to know at what time the book called Genesis, in which Adam is mentioned, was written, as it is to know the date of the Viedam, the Shan-crit, and other ancient Asiatic

books. The Jews were not permitted to read the first chapter of it till they were 25 years of age. This ignorant and barbarous nation, secluded in a small corner of the globe, which they believed to be long, narrow, and flat, had no difficulty in believing that all mankind, of whom they knew nothing, were descended from Adam, and they could not know that the Negroes, whose conformation is so different from ours, inhabited immense countries in Africa: still less did they dream of America. Upon the whole, as our reason is apt only to mislead us in these matters, our best way is to lay it aside, to have abundance of faith, to be humble, and to adore.—*Abridged from Voltaire.*

ADULTERY is a crime which, politically considered, owes its existence to two causes, viz. Pernicious laws, and the powerful attraction between the sexes. This attraction is similar in many circumstances to gravity, the spring of motion in the universe. Like this, it is diminished by distance; one regulates the motion of the body, the other that of the soul. But they differ in one respect: the force of gravity decreases in proportion to the obstacles that oppose it; the other gathers strength and vigour as the obstacles increase.—Adultery proceeds from an abuse of that necessity which is constant and universal in human nature; a necessity anterior to the formation of society: whereas, all other crimes tend to the destruction of society, and arise from momentary passions, and not from a natural necessity. It

is the opinion of those who have studied history and mankind, that this necessity is constantly in the same degree in the same climate. If this be true, useless or rather pernicious must all laws and customs be, which tend to diminish the sum total of the effect, of this passion; such laws would only burden one part of the society with the additional necessities of the other: but on the contrary, wise are the laws which, following the natural course of the river, divide the stream into a number of equal branches, preventing thus both sterility and inundation.—Conjugal fidelity is always greater in proportion as marriages are more numerous and less difficult. But when the interest or pride of families, or paternal authority, not the inclination of the parties, unite the sexes, gallantry soon breaks the slender ties, in spite of common moralists, who exclaim against the effect, whilst they pardon the cause.—The act of adultery is a crime so instantaneous, so mysterious, and so concealed by the veil which the laws themselves have woven, a veil necessary indeed, but so transparent as to heighten rather than conceal the charms of the object; the opportunities so frequent, and the danger of discovery so easily avoided; that it were much easier for the laws to prevent this crime, than to punish it when committed.—To every crime which from its nature must frequently remain unpunished, the punishment is an incentive. Such is the nature of the human mind, that difficulties,

if not insurmountable, nor too great for our natural indolence, embellish the object and spur us on to the pursuit; they are so many barriers that confine the imagination to the object, and oblige us to consider it in every point of view. In this agitation the mind naturally inclines and fixes itself to the most agreeable part, studiously avoiding every idea that might create disgust.
—*Beccaria*.

ADULTERY.—(2d Article.) Adultery signified in Latin alteration, adulteration, one thing substituted for another, forgery, false keys, false contracts, false seals, (*adulteratio*.) Hence a man who stepped into another man's bed was called *adulter*. The greatest evil resulting from this crime is the burdening a man with children which are not his. By these means we have seen families of heroes wholly debased. Their wives, through a depraved taste, or in the weakness of the moment, have submitted to the embraces of an ill-made dwarf, or of a mean, spiritless valet. Both mind and body have suffered from it. Little, monkey-like, creatures have been heirs to some of the first names in Europe. They have in their halls the portraits of their pretended ancestors, six feet high, handsome, well-made, covered with a coat of mail, which the present race could hardly lift. Often an important station is held by a little man who has no right to it, and of whom neither the head, the heart, nor the arms are calculated for the burden.—*Voltaire*.

ADULTERY.—(3d Article.) England; so far as we know, is the

only country in Europe in which a compensation in money, awarded by a Jury, is supposed to heal the wounds of a *cornuted* husband.—*Vonspiegle*.

AMBITION.—Those great objects of self-interest, of which the loss or acquisition quite changes the rank of the person, are the objects of the passion properly called Ambition; a passion which, when it keeps within the bonds of prudence and justice, is always admired in the world, and has even sometimes a certain irregular greatness, which dazzles the imagination when it passes the limits of both these virtues, and is not only unjust but extravagant. Hence the general admiration for heroes and conquerors, and even for statesmen, whose projects have been very daring and extensive, though altogether devoid of justice; such as those of the Cardinals of Richelieu and of Retz. The objects of avarice and ambition differ only in their greatness. A miser is as furious about a halfpenny, as the man of ambition about the conquest of a kingdom.—*A. Smith*.

AMERICA, (how peopled). As there is no end to systems respecting the manner in which America has been peopled, we shall continue to insist, that he who produced flies in that country, also produced in it *men*. However much we may be inclined to dispute, we must admit that the Supreme Being, who exists through all nations, has placed in the latitude of Paris, two-legged animals, without feathers, whose skin is a mixture of white and red, with long brownish

beards; in Africa, negroes, or black men, with beards, and wool on their heads, and others with coarse hair on their heads, and no beards, while in the same country he has placed Albinos, that is to say, animals which are quite white, with reddish eyes, and having neither wool nor hair on their heads, but something resembling white silk.

We can see no good reason why God should not have placed on another continent, a kind of animals of the same species, copper coloured, and without beards, or hair on their bodies.

How far does the fury of systems, joined to the tyranny of prejudices, carry us? We see these animals, we admit that God *could* have placed them where they are, and yet we deny he *has* placed them there. The same people who admit that the beavers are original inhabitants of Canada, pretend that men could not get the erbut by means of a boat, and that Mexico could have been peopled only by some descendants of Magog. As well might they say, that if there are men in the moon, they must have been carried thither by Astolpho on his flying horse, when he went to fetch the bottle in which Orlando's senses were contained.

As soon as a new island is discovered, the first question among the learned is, "How was it peopled?"—while, at the same time, they never doubt for an instant that the trees, the turtle, and the parrot, are original productions of the island. Do these wise men imagine that God's

power was exhausted by making one couple of human beings; or that it was more difficult for him to make twenty couple or twenty thousand, to enjoy this beautiful world which he had created?—*Voltaire*.

ANCESTORS.—(Wisdom of our.)—

This is a phrase, of which, from prescriptive use, nobody seems to doubt the propriety; but if we examine it a little, we shall perhaps be inclined to alter our opinion.

What were our ancestors? They were extremely ignorant, extremely superstitious, and consequently extremely barbarous:—few of them, except the priests, could either read or write; and when, at a later period, the higher classes did begin to study a little, their learning was confined to the worse than useless metaphysical jargon of the schools. On the most important of all sciences, that of Government, they were miserably ignorant; and it is not too much to say, that the meanest mechanic now-a-days knows more of it than the greatest statesmen did, two centuries ago.

In the mechanical arts; they were deplorably deficient; for, had you talked to them of the wonders of the steam engine, of iron rail-ways, of canals, of steam boats, of safety lamps, and a thousand other modern inventions, they would have stared at you in ignorant astonishment. It appears to me, that this absurd phrase has taken its rise from confounding the wisdom of *old people* with the wisdom of our ancestors. It is a valuable auxiliary to those who wish to sup-

port and perpetuate ancient abuses, not because they are ancient, but because they are profitable to them. It would be strange indeed, if, with the advantage of knowing all that they knew, *and all that has been learned since*, we were not wiser than our ancestors; in the same way that our descendants will undoubtedly be wiser than us.

Let us, therefore, hope, now the absurdity of the phrase has been pointed out, that it will quietly find its way to the tomb of all the Capulets; and that, as we have made our houses more comfortable, and our dress more convenient, we may also be allowed to ameliorate our institutions, instead of perversely clinging to those which no longer suit us, although we derive them from the *wisdom of our ancestors*.—S.

ANIMALS, ORIGIN OF INFERIORITY TO MAN.—All the feet of animals terminate either in horn, as those of the ox and the deer; or in nails, as those of the dog and the wolf; or in claws, as those of the lion and the cat. Now this different organisation of the feet of animals from that of our hands, deprives them, as Mr. Buffon asserts not only of all claim to the sense of the touch, but also of the dexterity requisite in handling an instrument, in order to make any of the discoveries which suppose the use of hands.—2. The life of animals, in general, being of a shorter duration than that of man, neither permits them to make so many observations, nor consequently to acquire so many ideas.—3. Animals being better

armed and better clothed by nature than the human species, have fewer wants, and consequently ought to have less invention. If the voracious animals are more cunning than others, it is because hunger, ever inventive, inspires them with the art of forming stratagems to surprise their prey.—4. The animals compose only a society that flies from man; who, by the assistance of weapons, made by himself, is become formidable to the strongest among them. Besides, man is the most fruitful animal upon earth: He is born and lives in every climate; while many of the other animals, as the lion, the elephant, and the rhinoceros, are found only in a certain latitude. And the more a species of animals capable of making observations is multiplied, the more ideas and genius it possesses.—But some may ask, why monkeys, whose paws are nearly as dexterous as our hands, do not make a progress equal to that of man? Because they are inferior to him in several respects; because men are more multiplied on the earth! because, among the different species of monkeys, there are but few whose strength can be compared to that of man; because the monkeys being frugivorous, have fewer wants, and therefore less invention than man; because their life is shorter, and they form only a fugitive society with regard to man, and such animals as the tyger, the lion, &c.; and, finally, because the organical disposition of their body, keeps them, like children, in perpetual motion, even after

their desires are satisfied. Monkeys are not susceptible of lassitude; which ought to be considered as one of the principles of the perfection of the human mind. By combining all these differences between the nature of man and beast, we may understand why sensibility and memory, though faculties common to man and other animals, are in the latter only sterile faculties. If nature, instead of hands and flexible fingers, had terminated our wrist with the foot of a horse, mankind would have been totally destitute of art, habitation, and defence against other animals. Wholly employed in the care of procuring food, and avoiding the beasts of prey, they would have still continued wandering in the forests like fugitive flocks. It is therefore evident, that according to this hypothesis the police would never have been carried in any society to that degree of perfection to which it is now arrived. There is not a nation now existing, but, with regard to the action of the mind, must have continued very inferior to certain savage nations, who have not two hundred different ideas, nor two hundred words to express those ideas; and whose language must consequently be reduced, like that of animals, to five or six different sounds or cries, if we take from it the words bow, arrow, nets, &c., which suppose the use of hands. From whence I conclude, that without a certain exterior organisation, sensibility and memory in us would prove two sterile faculties.—*Helvetius.*

ANIMALS, THE REASON OF.—It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience, and infer that the same events will follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually, from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire, water, earth, stones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old, who have learned, by long observation, to avoid what hurts them, and to pursue what gives ease and pleasure. A horse accustomed to the field will not attempt what exceeds his force or ability. An old greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; this sagacity is founded on observation and experience.—This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals; which, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. Is it not experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him? Is it not experience which makes him answer to his name? It is custom alone which engages animals, from every object that strikes their senses, to infer its usual attend-

ant, and carries their imagination from the appearance of one to expect the other. But though animals learn much of their knowledge from observation, they derive also much from the original hand of nature; which greatly exceeds their share of capacity on ordinary occasions, and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest practice and experience. These we call *instincts*.—*Hume*.

APOSTACY.—Apostate, a term of reproach. In religion, the changing from one form of religion to another. A man who has hitherto professed himself a Christian becomes a Mahometan—the Christian says he is an *apostate*—the Mahometans a *convert*. If he has changed from conviction that the Mahometan form of religion is better than the Christian form, he is a *convert*. Has he changed for a sum of money, for power, for privilege, in short, from interested motives, he is an *apostate*. Philosophers pretend that if he acts the part of an honest man, and never does to others that which he would not wish they should do unto him, it is of little consequence in which of the forms he continues.

Apostate in politics—a man, who having professed one set of political opinions, and supported one party, changes, or pretends to change his opinions, and gives his support to the opposite party: a Whig who becomes a Tory, a case of frequent occurrence, especially among the lawyers; and *vice versa*, a Tory who becomes a Whig, a case of very rare occurrence. Has he changed place from interested motives—from the

gift or expectation of a place, a pension or a title? Verily, he is an apostate. Has he changed from conviction that his former opinions were wrong? he is not an apostate—he is a man who has made use of his reason, and who, thinking his former opinions erroneous, rejects them, and avows his change of sentiments.

When the author of *Wat Tyler* condescends to write in the *Quarterly*, to abuse like a true renegade, all those who retain the opinions he formerly professed, and to tell us that the only thing wanting to make us completely happy, is to double our taxes, we naturally are induced to inquire into the cause of such a change; and when we find that Robert Southey has been appointed Poet Laureate, with his butt of malmsey to inspire him, and sundry pensions besides, we set down the said Robert Southey as an apostate, a vile apostate, compared to whom Jack Ketch is a respectable gentleman. We have heard of a Mr. Goldsmith, who may safely be placed in the same line. The bar also furnishes numerous examples.—*Bowbridge*.

ART and NATURE.—(The sufferings produced by.)—The sufferings produced by art, that is to say, by bad government, ignorance, superstition, and folly, are much greater than those produced by Nature. Nature is all beautiful; but, to judge from the effects, one would be inclined to suppose, that the object of all governments had hitherto been to counteract, as much as possible, her benevolent intentions, the interest and happiness of the

immense majority having been generally sacrificed to the pleasure and aggrandizement of a few.

Let us hope that the morning of a new era has at length dawned; and that with truly representative governments, the interest and happiness of all will be truly attended to.—*S. S.*

ARTS AND SCIENCES, FREE GOVERNMENTS ALONE FAVOURABLE TO THE RISE OF THE.—Though a republic should be barbarous, it necessarily, by an infallible operation, gives rise to law, even before mankind have made any considerable advances in the other sciences. From law arises security; from security curiosity; and from curiosity knowledge. The latter steps of this progress may be more accidental; but the former are altogether necessary. A republic without laws can never have any duration. On the contrary, in a monarchical government, law arises not necessarily from the forms of government. Monarchy, when absolute, contains even something repugnant to law. Great wisdom and reflection can alone reconcile them. But such a degree of wisdom can never be expected, before the great refinements of human reason. These refinements require curiosity, security, and law. The first growth, therefore, of the arts and sciences can never be expected in despotic governments. There are other causes which discourage the rise of the refined arts in despotic governments; though the want of laws, and the delegation of full powers to every

petty magistrate, seem to be the principal. Eloquence certainly springs up more naturally in popular governments: emulation, too, in every accomplishment, must there be more animated and enlivened; and genius and capacity have a fuller scope and career. All these causes render free governments the only proper nursery for the arts and sciences.—*Hume.*

ASSASSINATION OF PRINCES.

—The maxim, which forbids assassination in every case whatever, is the result of prudent reflection, and has a tendency to allay the jealousy, and to mitigate the cruelty, of persons who, by violent usurpations which laws cannot restrain, have incurred the resentment of mankind. Even tyrants, it is supposed, are cruel from fear, and become merciful in proportion as they believe themselves secure: it were unwise, therefore, to entertain maxims which keep the powerful in a continual state of distrust and alarm. This prudential morality, however, was entirely unknown in the ancient republics, or could not be observed without surrendering the freedom for which the citizens contended. Amongst them the people were obliged to consider, not what was safe, but what was necessary; and could not always defend themselves against usurpations, neither by legal forms, nor by open war. It was thought allowable, therefore, to employ artifice, surprise, and secret conspiracy, against an usurper. And this was so much the case at Rome, that no names were

held in greater veneration than those of citizens who had assassinated persons suspected of views dangerous to the commonwealth; or who, by any means whatever rendered abortive the projects of adventurers who attempted to arm any party against the legal constitution of their country. The sacrifice of Cæsar to the just indignation of his country, was a striking example of what the arrogant have to fear in trifling with the feelings of a free people; and at the same time a lesson of jealousy and of cruelty to tyrants, or an admonition not to spare in the exercise of their power those whom they have insulted by usurping it.—*Ferguson*.

ASSASSINATION OF PRINCES.—(2d Article.)—In those countries where the laws afford protection to all, and where justice is fairly and impartially administered, the assassination of princes, or of their ministers, hardly ever occurs. In despotic countries, or in those where the laws have been strained from their purpose so as to afford protection only to the few, while the many are oppressed, assassinations are not unlikely to occur; because, when people find that they are at the mercy of a tyrant, or of his agents, or that the laws do not afford them redress when they have been wronged; they are apt to become desperate, and to seek revenge, if not relief, by depriving of life those who they think are the authors of their calamities. In former times, religious fanaticism often led to assassination: it was it which caused the death of Henry

the fourth, the only good king that France has ever had.

Religious fanaticism having spent its fury, political fanaticism seems now likely to occupy its place. It was to it that the insolent and unworthy descendant of Henry the Fourth owed his death in 1820. His fate should be a lesson to princes: but will they take it?

In the Bible we find several instances of assassination, some of them very atrocious, but which do not seem to have been viewed in that light by God's chosen people: among others, that committed by Jael, who, having decoyed the poor discomfited Sisera into her tent, pins him to the ground while asleep, by driving a nail (it must have been a very long one) through his temples; and for this action the angel of the Lord says, "she shall be blessed above women!" The angel of the Lord must, of course, be right; but were it to occur now, we should probably view it in another light.—S.

ASSENT DERIVED FROM TESTIMONY AND EXPERIENCE.—In things that happen indifferently, as that a bird should fly this or that way, that it should thunder on a man's right or left hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is vouched by the concurrent testimony of unsuspected witnesses, there our assent is unavoidable. Thus, that there is such a city in Italy as Rome; that about one thousand seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man called Julius Cæsar; that he was a general, and that he won a battle against another

called Pompey; this, though in the nature of the thing, there be nothing for, nor against it; yet being related by historians of credit, and contradicted by no one writer, a man cannot avoid believing it; and can as little doubt of it, as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof he himself is a witness.

Thus, far, the matter goes on easy enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe, or disbelieve, as a demonstration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. The difficulty is, when testimonies contradict common experience, and the reports of history and witnesses clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another; there it is, where diligence, attention, and exactness are required, to form a right judgment, and to proportion the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing; which rises and falls according as those two foundations of credibility, viz. common observation in like cases, and particular testimonies in that particular instance, favour, or contradict it. These are liable to so great a variety of contrary observations, circumstances, reports, different qualifications, tempers, designs, oversights, &c. of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce into precise rules the various degrees wherein men give their assent. This only may be said in general, that as the arguments and proofs for and against, upon

due examination, nicely weighing every particular circumstance, shall to any one appear, upon the whole matter, in a greater or less degree, to preponderate on either side; so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainments, as we call belief, conjecture, guess, doubt, wavering, distrust, disbelief, &c.—*Locke.*

ASSENT TO BE REGULATED BY THE GROUND OF PROBABILITY.

—I cannot but own, that men's sticking to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great obstinacy in error and mistake. But the fault is, not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged; *but because they judged before they had well examined.* May we not find a great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have formed right judgment of several matters; and that for no other reason, but because they never thought otherwise? who imagine themselves to have judged right, only because they never questioned, never examined their own opinion? which is, indeed, to think they judged right, because they never judged at all: and yet these of all men, hold their opinion with the greatest stiffness; those being generally the most fierce and firm in their tenets who have least examined them. What we once know, we are certain is so: and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undiscovered, which may overturn our knowledge or bring it in doubt. But in matters of proba-

bility, it is not in every case we can be sure that we have all the particulars before us that any way concern the question; and that there is no evidence behind, and yet unseen, which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that at present seem to preponderate with us.—*Locke.*

ATHANASIUS (Creed of St.) There are many curious things published by Priests, and this Creed is not one of the least curious among them. In it we are told, that unless a person believes doctrines which, at the same time are acknowledged to be *incomprehensible*, he cannot be saved.

Now it appears to me, that before a person can believe anything, he must first comprehend it; for, to say that he believes a thing which he does not understand, is either to tell a lie, or to say that he is a fool. For what purpose was our reason given to us? Surely that we might exercise it on every proposition that is made to us, and not swallow blindly every doctrine, however contrary to reason, that designing priests, ignorant of every thing except their own interest, wish to cram down our throats. When I make use of my reason, it is impossible for me to understand how three different persons can be one and the same person. **I**, therefore, do not believe it, because belief is not voluntary, but depends upon conviction.

Well, it don't signify; but because *I cannot* believe that one incomprehensible being and three incomprehensible beings are one and the same, this worthy Saint

tells me, that "without doubt I shall perish everlastingly!" He also tells me, that "it is necessary to everlasting salvation that I believe rightly the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ." Here, again, the more I make use of my reason to investigate this proposition, the less can I believe so strange a story: first, I cannot believe that the all-merciful Creator condemned all mankind to perpetual punishment, because their first parents ate an apple: for granting it to be a crime, it is utterly repugnant to reason that we should suffer for a crime, in which, as it was committed before we were born, we could not possibly have any hand.

Secondly, I cannot comprehend how, if I have committed a crime, the putting to death an innocent person should atone for my crime. Thirdly, I cannot comprehend how a virgin should conceive and bring forth a child, she still remaining a virgin. In short, the more I make use of my reason to investigate these matters, the less can I comprehend them, and, of course, I cannot believe them. Believe, or you will be damned, says St. Athanasius. Good father, answer I, I am very *willing* to believe, but *I cannot*. Then, replies he, expect no mercy. What, no mercy from the great God of mercy! From you, good father, I see I need expect none: you would think roasting before a slow fire too good for me: but *maugre* your authority, I shall continue to make use of the reason which God has given me, and expect mercy, notwithstanding.—*S.*

ATHEISM.—Why is a society of Atheists thought impossible?—Because it is thought that men, under no restraint, could never live together; that laws avail nothing against secret crimes; and that there must be an avenging God, punishing in this world or the other, those delinquents who have escaped human justice. Though Moses's law did not reach a life to come, did not threaten any punishment after death, and did not leave the primitive Jews the least insight into the immortality of the soul; still the Jews, so far from being Atheists, so far from denying a divine vengeance against wickedness, were the most religious men on the face of the earth.—They not only believed the existence of an eternal God, but they believed him to be ever present among them: they dreaded being punished in themselves, in their wives, in their children, in their posterity to the fourth generation; and this was a very powerful restraint.

But among the Gentiles, several sects had no curb: the Sceptics doubted of every thing; the Epicureans held that the Deity could not concern himself about human affairs, and, in reality, they did not allow of any Deity; they were persuaded that the soul is not a substance, but a faculty born and perishing with the body; consequently, their only check was morality and honour. The Roman senators and knights were downright Atheists; as neither to fear or expect any thing from the gods, amounts to a denial of their existence: so that the Roman se-

nate, in Cæsar's and Cicero's time, was, in fact, an assembly of Atheists.—*Voltaire.*

ATHEISM.—(2d Article.) Plutarch thinks unworthy opinions of the Deity more criminal than Atheism. But, with submission to Plutarch, nothing can be more evident, than that it was infinitely better for the Greeks to stand in awe of Ceres, Neptune, and Jupiter, than to be under no manner of awe. The sacredness of oaths is manifest and necessary; and they who hold that perjury will be punished, are certainly more to be trusted than those who think that a false oath will be attended with no ill consequence.—It is beyond all question, that in a policed city, even a bad religion is better than none. But fanaticism is certainly a thousand times more dangerous than Atheism: there is in Atheism no temptation to those sanguinary proceedings, for which fanaticism is notorious; if Atheism do not suppress crimes, fanaticism incites to the commission of them. The fanatics committed the massacre of St. Bartholomew. Hobbes was accounted an Atheist; yet he led a quiet harmless life, whilst the fanatics were deluging England, Scotland, and Ireland with blood. Spinoza was not only an Atheist, but taught Atheism; yet, who can say he had any hand in the juridical murder of Barneveldt? It was not he who tore the two De Witts to pieces, and broiled and eat their flesh: Atheists for the most part, are men of study, but bold and erroneous in their reasonings; and, not comprehending the creation, the origi-

nal of evil, and other difficulties, have recourse to the hypothesis of the eternity of things and of necessity. The sensualist and ambitious have little time for speculation, or to embrace a bad system; to compare Lucretius with Socrates, is quite out of their way. It was otherwise with the senate of Rome, which almost totally consisted of Atheists both in theory and practice, believing neither in a Providence, nor a future state. It was a meeting of philosophers, of votaries of pleasure and ambition; all very dangerous sets of men, and who, accordingly, overturned the republic. I would not, willingly, lie at the mercy of an Atheistical prince, who might think it his interest to have me pounded in a mortar: I am very certain that would be my fate. And, were I a sovereign, I would not have about me any Atheistical courtiers, whose interest it might be to poison me. So necessary is it both for princes and people, that their minds be thoroughly imbibed with an idea of a supreme Being, the Creator, Avenger, and Rewarder. What are the inferences from all this? That Atheism is a most pernicious monster in sovereign princes, and likewise in statesmen, however harmless their life be, because from their cabinet they can make their way to the former. That if it be not so mischievous as fanaticism, it is almost ever destructive of virtue. I congratulate the present age on there being fewer Atheists now than ever; philosophers having discovered, that there is no vegetable without a germ,

no germ without design; and that corn is not produced by putrefaction. Some unphilosophical geometricians have rejected final causes; but they are admitted by all real philosophers; and, to use the expression of a known author, a catechism makes God known to children, and Newton demonstrates him to the learned.—*Voltaire.*

ATHEISM AND SUPERSTITION.—

If superstition, in every degree of it, be founded in error, and if it counteract the effects of knowledge and goodness, it is a positive and active evil: whereas, Atheism being the effect merely of ignorance, is rather a misfortune, and its effects are the harmless ones which usually follow upon mere ignorance. The wise and able moralist, Plutarch, said, it was much better men should even disbelieve and deny the existence of a God, than believe him to be ill-disposed and of an immoral character. All quibbles which have been brought to obviate the consequences of this proposition; the appeals to prudence, expedience, and interest, may do very well in modern politics, and in the schemes of legislators and priests, whose only aim is to keep the people like cattle in those tracks where they may be most serviceable to them; but will be despised by every one who apprehends, and judges, and feels like a man.—To see the difference between ignorance and error in all possible cases, take a child totally unacquainted with truth, and take a good old lady who is, as she supposes, just going to heaven loaded with points of faith

and principles of religion; and you will have proofs as many as you can wish, as clear and convincing as any mathematical conclusions, of the great and important difference between ignorance and error. Take a savage uncorrupted by European commerce; take a simple savage who, in the compass and variety of his knowledge, is little above a brute; take a religious savage, millions of which we may have in Europe; and in attempting to instruct both, we shall have more convincing proofs of the very important difference between ignorance and error. The former we may easily benefit; the latter we seldom or never can.—*Williams*.

ATHEIST.—There were formerly among Christians many more Atheists than there are now. This may, at first sight, appear paradoxical: but, on examination, will be found to be true. When the first fathers of the church disputed among themselves as to the nature and substance of God, as to whether his son was alike to him or not; in what manner the Holy Ghost proceeded from the two; whether the son, while on earth, united in his person the nature of God and of man; in short, when those who should have known best were at variance upon almost every point relating to the nature and attributes of God, it became allowable for reasoning people to doubt of the existence of any such person.

But, when knowledge became more general; and when philosophy, founding its reasoning on experience, pointed the im-

possibility of the universe, with all its glorious combinations, existing without a creative and superintending guide; when the simple and sublime laws of the motion of the celestial bodies were explained; when the hand of the Creator was recognized in all his works, the doubts of Atheism were forced to disappear before the lights of philosophy, and the Atheist was obliged to acknowledge that **THERE IS A GOD.**—*Abridged from Voltaire.*

BABEL.—Commentators have been much puzzled as to the height of the famous tower of Babel. St. Jerome makes it 20,000 feet: the ancient Jewish book, entitled Jacult, makes it 81,000. It is not its dimensions alone that have exercised the ingenuity of the learned, for they have been at a loss to understand how the children of Noah, "having divided the isles of the Gentiles in their lands; every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations;" and having established themselves in different countries, (Geneses, chap. 10.) came afterwards all to meet in a plain in the land of Shinar, and all of the same mind to build a mighty tower, saying, "let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth."—(Chap. 11.)

Genesis speaks of the different kingdoms which the sons of Noah had founded, and it appears odd that the inhabitants of a part of Europe, Africa, and Asia, should all meet at Shinar to build a tower! The Vulgate places the deluge in the year of the world, 1656, and the building of the

tower of Babel in the year 1771, only 115 years after the destruction of the human race, excepting the family of Noah, Men must then have multiplied with astonishing celerity, and all the arts must have revived in a wonderfully short time, when we consider the great number of crafts requisite for carrying on so stupendous a work.

Babel is no other than Babylon, which was founded, according to the Persian historians, by a prince called Tamurath.

It is distressing to think, that among all the profane historians, there does not exist the most distant hint of this tower of Babel, nor of the confusion of tongues caused by the building of it. This occurrence, so very remarkable, was equally unknown to the whole world, as the names of Noah, Methusalem, Cain, Abel, Adam, and Eve. Herodotus, who travelled so much, does not say a word of either Noah, Shem, Cush, Phut, or Nimrod. Amidst all this darkness of antiquity, our only guide must be our faith in the Bible! a book so long unknown to all the world, but happily displayed to us as an infallible and unerring guide.—*Abridged from Voltaire.*

BANKRUPTCY, NATIONAL.—It will scarcely be asserted, that no bounds ought ever to be set to national debts; and that the public would be no weaker, were twelve or fifteen shillings in the pound land-tax, mortgaged with the present customs and excises. There is, however, a strange supineness from long custom crept into all ranks of men with regard to

public debts, not unlike what divines so vehemently complain of with regard to their religious doctrines. We all own, that the most sanguine imagination cannot hope either that this or any future ministry will be possessed of such rigid and steady frugality, as to make a considerable progress in the payment of our debts; or that the situation of foreign affairs will, for any long time allow them leisure and tranquility for such an undertaking. *What then is to become of us?* Were we ever so good Christians, and ever so resigned to Providence, this, methinks, were a curious question, even considered as a speculative one, and what it might not be altogether impossible to form some conjectural solution of.

The events here will depend little upon the contingencies of battles, negotiations, intrigues, and factions. There seems to be a natural progress in things which may guide our reasoning. As it would have required but a moderate share of prudence when we first began this practice of mortgaging, to have foretold, from the nature of men and of ministers, that things would necessarily be carried to the length we see; so now, that they have happily reached it, it may not be difficult to guess at the consequences. It must indeed be one of these two events; *either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation.* It is impossible they can both subsist after the manner they have been hitherto managed in this as well as in some other countries.

It has been computed, that all the creditors of the public, natives and foreigners, amount only to 17,000*. These make a figure at present on their income; but in case of a public bankruptcy, would in an instant become the lowest as well as the most wretched, of the people. The dignity and authority of the landed gentry and nobility is much better rooted, and would render the contention very unequal if ever we come to that extremity. One would incline to assign to this event a very near period, such as half a century, had not our fathers' prophecies of this kind been found fallacious by the duration of our public credit so much beyond all reasonable expectation. When the astrologers in France were every year foretelling the death of Henry IV. "These fellows," says he, "must be right at last." But, however, it is not altogether improbable, that, when the nation become heartily sick of their debts, and are cruelly oppressed by them, *some daring projector may arise with visionary schemes for their discharge.* And as public credit will begin by that time to be a little frail, the least touch will destroy it, as happened in France during the regency; and in this manner it will *die of the doctor.*

But it is more probable, that the breach of national faith will be the necessary effect of wars, defeats, misfortunes, and public calamities; *or even, perhaps, of victories and conquests.* Let the time come, and surely it will

come, when the new funds, created for the exigencies of the year, are not subscribed to, and raise not the money projected. Suppose, either that the cash of the nation is exhausted, or that our faith which has been hitherto so ample, begins to fail us. Suppose that in this distress the nation is threatened with an invasion; a rebellion is suspected or broken out at home; a squadron cannot be equipped for want of pay, victuals, or repairs; or even a foreign subsidy cannot be advanced, What must a prince or minister do in such an emergency? The right of self-preservation is unalienable in every individual, much more in every community. And the folly of our statesmen must be greater than the folly of those who contracted the debt, *or, what is more, than the folly of those who trusted or continue to trust this security,* if these statesmen have the means of safety in their hands, and do not employ them. The funds created and mortgaged will, by that time, bring in a large yearly revenue, sufficient for the defence and security of the nation. Money is, perhaps, lying in the Exchequer, ready for the discharge of the quarterly interest; Necessity calls, fear urges, reason exhorts, compassion alone exclaims. The money will immediately be seized for the current service, under the most solemn protestations, perhaps, of being immediately replaced. But no more is requisite. The whole fabric, already tottering, falls to the ground, and buries thousands in its ruins. And this is called

* At present about 200,000.—1820.

the *natural death* of public credit: for to this period it tends as naturally as an animal body to its dissolution and destruction.—The public is a debtor whom no man can oblige to pay. The only check which the creditors have on her, is the interest of preserving credit; an interest which may easily be overbalanced by a great debt, and by a difficult and extraordinary emergence, even supposing that credit irrecoverable. Not to mention that a present necessity often forces states into measures which are, strictly speaking, against their interest.

Those two events supposed above are calamitous, but not the most calamitous. Thousands are hereby sacrificed to the safety of millions. But we are not without danger, that the contrary event may take place, and that millions may be sacrificed for ever to the temporary safety of thousands. Our popular government, perhaps, will render it difficult and dangerous for a minister to venture on so desperate an expedient as that of a voluntary bankruptcy. And though the House of Lords be altogether composed of the proprietors of lands and the House of Commons chiefly, and consequently neither of them can be supposed to have great property in the funds: yet the connexions of the members may be so great with the proprietors, as to render them more *tenacious of public faith than prudence, policy, or even justice, strictly speaking, requires*. And perhaps our foreign enemies may be so politic as to discover

that our safety lies in despair, and may not, therefore, show the danger, open and barefaced, till it be inevitable. The balance of power in Europe, our grandfathers, our fathers and we, have all esteemed too unequal to be preserved without our attention and assistance. But our children, weary with the struggle, and fettered with incumbrances, may sit down secure, and see their neighbours oppressed and conquered; till at last they themselves and their creditors lie both at the mercy of the conqueror. And this may be denominated the *violent death* of our public credit.—These seem to be events which are not very remote, and which reason foresees as clearly almost as she can do any thing that lies in the womb of time.—*Hume*.

BANKRUPTCY, NATIONAL.—That a national bankruptcy, either total or partial, must take place sooner or later, is as certain as that the sun will continue to shine and to give light. The precise time when it will take place, no man can foretell, no more than he can foretell the hour of his natural death; but the one event is just as certain as the other. The national debt, or rather the borough-monger debt (for the *nation* had nothing to do with the contracting of it) owes its origin to William the Dutchman, who had married Mary, the oldest daughter of the *legitimate* bigot, James the second; in whose person we have a fine practical instance of the cashiering of kings, when they think proper to attempt to play the tyrant. William, fan-

eying himself a hero, had a great mind to humble the pride of the French king, Louis XIV. and this he could not do without getting more money than the annual revenue of the kingdom afforded him: he, therefore, fell upon the notable expedient of borrowing money, of which it was optional in the borrower to repay the principal, but of which the lender could demand only the interest. This invention, which is called *funding*, has caused more wars, bloodshed, and misery, than any thing with which the human race has ever been afflicted, excepting only religious persecution.

Before this infernal *invention*, it was impossible that wars could last long, because, as soon as the money of one of the belligerents was exhausted, he was under the necessity of making peace, as he best could. But, when gulls were got in plenty, who were foolish enough to lend their money to government, on condition of being paid the interest only, then kings and their ministers, being no longer under the necessity of repaying what they had borrowed, gave a loose to their ambition and extravagance. We accordingly find that from the year 1688, when Dutch William did us the favour to come over to govern us, till the death of George III. in 1820, being a period of 132 years, *seventy-one years were spent in war, and only 61 in peace!* Is it not a most melancholy consideration, that more than one half of that long period has been spent in murderous wars, begun through the pride or folly of our

rulers, continued through their obstinacy, or love of power, and productive of nothing but bloodshed, misery, and desolation?

All this we owe to the *funding system*, and the consequent facility of borrowing money; for, as wars, however oppressive to the people, are really the harvest of the government, by the pretences which they afford for drawing immense sums from the nation: the principal business of ministers has been to look out for pretences for plunging us into *just and necessary wars*; and, with the good will with which they have always set about the work pretences have never been wanting. In 1688, we had no debt: in 1819, the annual charge on account of the debt, was *forty-eight millions three hundred and ninety-five thousand two hundred and seventy-two pounds!* This enormous sum, drawn from the industrious classes, is paid to people who do nothing. It is this which has paralyzed the industry of the most active and intelligent nation in the world. It is this which has reduced the free-born Englishman to a state compared to which, the lot of a West-India slave was happiness. It is this, in short, which has produced more real misery and suffering than any other nation was ever yet afflicted with.

The question will finally come to be, shall the nation continue to submit to such an affliction, or shall they at once relieve themselves from the whole or a part of the intolerable load which oppressed them? Shall 39 people out of every 40 continue

steeped in misery, in order that the fortieth may not be deprived of any of his wonted luxuries? Shall the immense majority of a nation, the active, the industrious, continue to suffer, in order that the very small minority of drones may continue to enjoy? It is in vain that interested hypocrites or designing knaves will tear their lungs, crying out, "A breach of faith! A breach of faith!" In the case of an individual who has become bankrupt, and who, being unable to pay twenty shillings in the pound, pays ten, whoever thinks of accusing him of a breach of faith? Where, may be asked, is the difference in the case of the nation? The public creditor has been foolish enough to lend his money, on the faith of being paid only the interest of it *out of the produce of the taxes*; for it would puzzle him exceedingly to shew any other fund from which he has a right to draw his interest. Well; the taxes do not produce enough to enable the Government to pay him his interest *in full*; for the amount of his interest is greater than the whole produce of the taxes. What, then, is to be done? Government, alarmed at the empty clamour about a breach of faith, has continued to pay the interest *in full*, as long as it could by any means do so; nay, much longer than it ought to have done it; for a great part of the taxes have of late years been paid, *not from income, but from capital*.

At last, finding that it is impossible for this state of things to continue longer, ministers will

be obliged to say to the public creditor, "We cannot any longer pay you your interest in full, because we have not the means of doing it, but we are still willing to pay you as much as we can afford, consistently with the relief of the people and the safety of the State." This would be no breach of faith, for there can be no such thing as an *involuntary* breach of faith. A debtor who has the means and who refuses to pay, is guilty of a breach of faith: but he whose means enable him to pay only a half, and who pays that half, is not guilty of a breach of faith. With him it is not a matter of *choice*, but of *necessity*. Therefore, the public creditor may lay his account, and that at no very distant period, with seeing his interest reduced one-fourth, one-third, one-half; in short, *to such an extent as shall be consistent with the relief of the people and the safety of the State*; for, undoubtedly, without the former, the latter would not be of long duration.—S.

BEASTS.—Is it possible any one should say, or affirm in writing, that beasts are machines void of knowledge and sense, have a sameness in all their operations, neither learning nor perfecting any thing, &c.? How! this bird who makes a semicircular nest when he fixes it against a wall; who, when in an angle, shapes it like a quadrant, and circular when he builds it in a tree; is this having a sameness in its operations? Does this hound, after three months teaching, know no more than when you first took him in hand?

Your Canary bird; does he repeat a tune at first hearing? or rather, is it not some time before you can bring him to it? Is he not often out, and does he not improve by practice? Is it from my speaking that you allow me sense, memory, and ideas? Well; I am silent—but you see me come home very melancholy; and with eager anxiety look for a paper, open the bureau where I remember to have put it, take it up and read it with apparent joy. You hence infer, that I have felt pain and pleasure, and that I have memory and knowledge.

Make, then, the like inference concerning this dog, which, having lost his master, runs about every where with melancholy yellings, comes home all in ferment, runs up and down, roves from room to room, till at length he finds his beloved master in his closet, and then expresses his joy in softer cries, gesticulations, and fawnings. This dog, so very superior to man in affection, is seized by some barbarian virtuoso, who nail him down on a table, and dissect him while living, the better to show you the meseraic veins. All the same organs of sensation which are in yourself, you perceive in him.—Now, mechanist, what say you? Has he nerves to be impassible? For shame! charge not Nature with such weakness and inconsistency. But the scholastic doctors ask what the soul of beasts is? This is a question I do not understand. A tree has the faculty of receiving sap into its fibres, of circulating it, of unfolding the buds of its leaves

and fruits. Do you now ask me what the soul of a tree is? It has received these properties, as the animal above has received those of sensation, memory, and a certain number of ideas. Who formed all those properties, who has imparted all these faculties? He who causes the grass of the field to grow, and the earth to gravitate towards the sun. The souls of beasts are substantial forms, says Aristotle, the Arabian school, the Angelic school, and the Sorbonne. The souls of beasts are material, cry other philosophers; but as little to the purpose as the former. When called upon to define a material soul, they only perplex the cause: they must necessarily allow it to be sensitive matter. But from whence does it derive this sensation, from a material soul; which must mean, that it is matter giving sensation to matter: beyond this circle they have nothing to say. According to others equally wise, the soul of beasts is a spiritual essence dying with the body: but where are your proofs? What idea have you of this spiritual being, which, with its sensation, memory, and its share of ideas and combinations, will never be able to know so much as a child of six years? What grounds have you to think that this incorporeal being dies with the body? But still more stupid are they who affirm this soul to be neither body nor spirit. By spirit we can mean only some thing unknown, which is not body; the soul of beasts, therefore, according to this system, is neither body, nor something

which is not body. Whence can so many contradictory errors arise? From a custom, which has always prevailed among men, of investigating the nature of a thing before they knew whether any such thing existed. The sucker or clapper of a bellows, is likewise called the soul of the bellows. Well, what is the soul? Is it only a name I have given to that sucker or clapper, which falls down lets in air, and, rising again, propels it through a pipe on my working the bellows. Here is no soul distinct from the machine itself; but who puts the bellows of animals in motion? I have already told you; he who puts the heavenly bodies in motion. The philosopher, who said, *est Deus anima brutorum*, should have added, *Quod Deus est anima mundi.*—*Voltaire.*

BEING, A COGITATIVE, HAS EXISTED FROM ETERNITY.—There is no truth more evident, than that something must be from eternity. I never yet heard of any one so unreasonable, or that could suppose so manifest a contradiction, as a time wherein there was perfectly nothing: this being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing, the perfect negation and absence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence.

If then there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being it must be. And as to that, it is very obvious to reason, that it must necessarily be a cogitative being. For it is as impossible to conceive, that ever bare incogitative matter should produce a thinking intelligent being, as

that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose any parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it, in itself, able to produce nothing. For example, let us suppose the matter of the next pebble we meet with to be eternal, closely united, and the parts firmly at rest together; if there were no other being in the world, must it not eternally remain so, a dead inactive lump? Is it possible to conceive, it can add motion to itself being purely matter, or produce any thing? Matter, then, by its own strength, cannot produce in itself so much as motion; the motion it has must also be from eternity or else be produced and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter; matter, as is evident, having not power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too; yet matter, incogitative matter and motion, whatever changes it might produce of figure and bulk, could never produce thought: knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of nothing or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily perceive matter produced by nothing, as thought to be produced by pure matter, when before there was no such thing as thought, or an intelligent being existing? Divide matter into as minute parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the figure

and motion of it as much as you please; a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder, &c. whose diameters are but 1,000,000th part of a gry, will operate no otherwise upon other bodies of proportionable bulk than those of an inch or foot diameter; and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge by putting together, in a certain figure and motion, gross particles of matter, as by those that are the very minutest that do any where exist. They knock, impel, and resist one another just as the greater do, and that is all they can do. So that if we will suppose nothing first or eternal, matter can never begin to be: if we suppose bare matter without motion eternal, motion can never begin to be: if we suppose only matter and motion first or eternal, thought can never begin to be. For it is impossible to conceive matter, either with or without motion, could have originally in and from itself sense, perception and knowledge; as is evident from hence, that then sense, perception and knowledge, must be a property eternally inseparable from matter and every particle of it. Not to add, that though our general or specific conception of matter makes us speak of it as one thing, yet really all matter is not one individual thing, neither is there any such thing existing as one material being, or one single body that we know or can conceive. And therefore, if matter were the eternal first cogitative being, there would not be one eternal infinite cogi-

tative being, but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative beings, independent one of another, of limited force and distinct thoughts, which could never produce that order, harmony and beauty, which are to be found in nature. Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal being, must necessarily be cogitative; and whatsoever is first of all things, must necessarily contain in it, and actually have at least, all the perfections that can ever after exist; nor can it ever give to another any perfection that it hath not, either actually in itself, or at least in a higher degree; it necessarily follows, that the first eternal being cannot be matter.—If therefore it be evident, that something necessarily must exist from eternity, it is also as evident, that that something must necessarily be a cogitative being: for it is as impossible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being, as that nothing, or the negation of all beings, should produce a positive being or matter.—*Locke.*

BELIEF.—We believe a thing, because we see it, we perceive it, or understand it. It is not possible for our belief to go further. The credit we give to the testimony of another, is quite a different principle from the persuasion of our own mind; and has been confounded with it only to serve the purposes of artful men in imposing on the ignorant. The art of believing what is above our comprehension and reason, and not contrary to it, is a sophism with the advantage

of a jingle upon words, invented for the same purposes. There is just as much good sense and truth and possibility of believing what is above our understanding, as in seeing what is beyond our sight, hearing what is out of hearing, or feeling what is totally out of reach. We cannot, in truth, be said to believe further than we understand.—Those who pretend to see mysteries, and to believe them, talk idly; for no man ever did, or ever could, believe a mystery, any more than he could see what was transacted in any invisible world. The complaisance and deference to authority, by which men are led to pretend to believe, is like the servility of those who, though their eyes are imperfect and faulty, always see as we do, or hear as we hear. This being the case, it is not easy immediately to understand why men should ever have been blamed or punished because they could not believe. Believing is an act of the mind, upon considering a fact or proposition; as seeing is an act in consequence of turning the eye on an object. Men are influenced in both these actions exactly alike; by the strength and goodness of their natural organs; by their situation and point of view in which they consider things. Every object, every fact, and every principle may appear, in some circumstances, different to different persons. Why, then, if we punish a man for not discerning truths as we discern them, do we not punish him for not seeing as we see? There is no distinc-

tion between these cases, which is founded in truth and common sense; but there is, in the artifices of policy and the wiles of priestcraft. If men be taken early enough, they may be induced to give up the faculties of their minds; but they must use their bodily senses. It has been said, that a right faith is the consequence of being well and properly disposed. It is very true, that a man may dispose himself; *i. e.* he may warp and bias his mind so as to make any doctrine or principle suit it: But all kinds of pre-disposition and pre-arrangement are injuries to the judgment; and it would be as difficult for the mind to determine fairly on a fact or the truth of a principle, when it was so pre-disposed, as it would be for a judge to determine fairly in a cause, on one side of which he was bribed. Our faith is meritorious only as it is a proof that we use our intellectual faculties in the pursuit of truth; just as seeing is a proof that we use our eyes, or hearing that we use our ears. And the common insolence, rage, and cruelty of zealots, on account of faith, is owing to their extreme ignorance, or extreme wickedness; for they in fact must have the least real faith of all mankind. They have taken every thing for granted, without examination or judgment; and have consequently nothing which they truly believe. Their faith is the faith of devils: they believe and tremble under an almighty power which they dread: they believe every thing which is enjoined them, from a fear of dam-

nation; and have no principle, but what may be common to them with all the evil spirits in the universe.—*Williams*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—According to some philosophers, is independent of our interest. These philosophers are right or wrong, according to the idea they attached to the word *belief*. If they mean by it a clear idea of the matter believed; and that they can, like the geometricians, demonstrate the truth of it; it is certain that no error is believed, that none will stand the *examen*, that we form no clear idea of it, and that in this sense there are few believers. But if we take the word in the common acceptation, and mean by a believer an adorer of the bull Apis; if the man who, without having a clear idea of what he believes, believes by imitation, who, so to say, believes he believes, and maintains the truth of his belief at the hazard of his life; in this sense there are many believers. The Catholic church boasts continually of its martyrs; but I know not wherefore. Every religion has its own. "He that pretends to a revelation ought to die in the maintenance of what he asserts; that is the only proof he can give of its truth." It is not so with the philosopher: his propositions must be supported by facts and reasonings: whether he die or not in the maintenance of his doctrine, is of little importance: his death would prove only that he was obstinately attached to his opinion; not that it was true. As for the rest, the belief of fanatics, always founded on imaginary, but powerful

interest in heavenly rewards, constantly imposes on the vulgar; and it is to those fanatics that we must attribute the establishment of almost all general opinions.—*Helvetius*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—Nothing is more free than the imagination of man; and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses, it has unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing these ideas, to all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events with all the appearance of reality, ascribe to them a particular time and place, conceive them as existent, and paint them out to itself with every circumstance that belongs to any historical fact which it believes with the greatest certainty. Wherein, therefore, consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea, which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent, and which is refused to every known fiction. For, as the mind has authority over all its ideas, it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction, and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases; contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can, in our conception, join the head of a man to the body of a horse; but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed. It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief, lies in some sentiment, or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the

former, and which depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive the object which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this consists the whole nature of belief. For as there is no matter of fact which we believe so firmly, that we cannot conceive the contrary, there would be no difference between the conception assented to, and that which is rejected, were it not for some sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a billiard-ball moving towards another on a smooth table, I can easily conceive it to stop upon contact. This conception implies no contradiction; but still it feels very differently from that conception by which I represent to myself the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another. Were we to attempt a *definition* of this sentiment, we should, perhaps, find it a very difficult, if not an impossible, task; in the same manner as if we should endeavour to define the feeling of cold, or passion of anger, to a creature who never had an experience of these sentiments. Belief is the true and proper name of this feeling; and no one is ever

at a loss to know the meaning of that term; because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment; in hopes we may, by that means, arrive at some analogies which may afford a perfect explication of it. I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence to the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the thing, it is needless to dispute about the terms. The imagination has the command over all the ideas, and can join and mix and vary them in all the ways possible. It may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time; it may set them in a manner before our eyes in their true colours, just as they might have existed: but as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever of itself reach *belief*, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life; and in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of judgment from the fictions of the imagination; it gives them more weight and in-

fluence: makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our actions. I hear at present, for instance, a person's voice with whom I am acquainted; and the sound comes as from the next room. This impression of my senses immediately conveys my thought to the person, together with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existing at present with the same qualities and relations of which I formerly knew them possessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are very different to the feeling, and have a much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleasure or pain, joy, or sorrow. The sentiment, therefore, of belief, is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination; and this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses.—*Hume.*

BELIEF OR DISBELIEF of any Religion can neither be a virtue nor a crime in any one using the best means in his power for information.

If we take a survey of that variety of sects which are scattered over the face of the earth, and who mutually accuse each other of falsehood and error, and ask which is the right; every one of them in their turns will answer *theirs*; we know our sect is in the right, because God hath declared so. "All of them," says Charron, "pretend

that they derive their doctrine, not from men, nor from any created being, but from God. But to say truth, without flattery or disguise, there is nothing in such pretensions; however they may talk, they owe their religion to human means; witness the manner in which they first adopt it. The nation, country, and place where they are born and bred, determine it. Are we not circumcised or baptized, made Jews, Turks, or Christians, before we are men?" Our religion is not the effect of choice, but of accident; and to impute it to us, is unjust; it is to reward or punish us for being born in this or that country. If the method taken by him who is in the right, and by him who is in the wrong, be the same, what merit or demerit hath the one more than the other? Now, either all religions are good, and agreeable to God; or if there be one which he hath dictated to man, and will punish him for rejecting, he hath certainly distinguished it by manifest signs and tokens as the only true one. These are common to all times and places, and are equally obvious to all mankind. If natural religion be insufficient, it is owing to the obscurity in which it necessarily leaves those sublime truths it professes to teach. It is the business of revelation to exhibit them to the mind in a more clear and sensible manner, to adapt them to the understandings of men, in order that they may be capable of believing them. True faith is assured and confirmed by the understanding; and the best of all religions is undoubtedly

the clearest. If there be only one religion in the world which can prevent our suffering eternal damnation, and ensure our title to future happiness; and there be on any part of the earth a single mortal who is sincere, and is not convinced of its evidence; the God of that religion must be a cruel tyrant. Would we seek the truth, therefore, in sincerity, we must lay no stress on the place and circumstances of our birth, nor on the authority of fathers or teachers; but appeal to the dictates of reason and conscience concerning every thing taught us in our youth. It is to no purpose to bid me subject my reason to the truth of things of which it is incapacitated to judge; the man who would impose on me a falsehood, may bid me do the same. It is necessary, therefore, I should employ my reason even to know when I ought to submit.—*Rousseau.*

BIBLE SOCIETIES.—In order to counteract the torrent of what is called *blasphemy*, innumerable Bible Societies have of late years been established; bibles, prayer books, and religious tracts of all descriptions have been thrust into the hands, or crammed into the pockets of every one who would receive them; and that the rich might not take to themselves the sole merit of this goodly work, penny-a-week societies have been every where *got up*, to enable the poor half-starved labourers to tax themselves for the same purpose.

If the Bible were really the excellent book it is called, if it were an useful treatise to

teach mankind morality, there would be no harm in all this; but when we reflect upon the number of strange stories which are told in it, and which it is impossible to reconcile to reason; when we recollect, that the history of God's chosen people is a tissue of the most horrid cruelties, infamous vices, and atrocious villainies that ever a nation was disgraced with, we should pause before we give our money for the purpose of circulating such a book.

It is not my intention here to enter into an investigation of the contents of this far-famed and widely-circulated book, because, notwithstanding of its divine origin, and its invulnerability to human attacks, Mr. Attorney-General might possibly think fit to *refute* my arguments by an ex-officio information.—Strange infatuation! To think that the word of God himself should require the assistance of a lawyer's wig and gown to defend it.—All I ask is, that people should lay down their prejudices, and make use of their *reason* in examining it. As to the morality taught in what is called the Old Testament, I should be glad to know what sort of a treatise on morality *that* is, which a man dare not put into his daughter's hands without the risk of teaching her every thing that she should not know! A treatise which no man could venture to read straight through before any company of decent women! Yet this is the book, in order to circulate which, many hundred thousand pounds have been taken from the people.

Pause, ye subscribers to Bible societies—*examine well the book* for the circulation of which, ye are giving your money. Make use of your *own* reason and of your *own* eyes, and no longer suffer yourselves to be led by a set of interested priests or hypocritical knaves, whose sole object is to keep you in the dark. *Examine before ye believe; and do not, as hitherto, believe without examining.* Read your Bibles, the oftener you read them, the better; but while you read, make use of your *reason* at the same time. For what purpose did the All-wise Creator bestow upon you the gift of reason? Undoubtedly, that you should make use of it. If you do not make use of it, in what respect are you superior to the brutes that perish? Again I say *examine* your Bibles; not with blind faith, but with reason for your guide; *examine*—and if upon examination you continue to think it meritorious to contribute to the circulation of this book to all the corners of the earth, continue your subscriptions; but if you shall have any doubts upon the matter, keep your pennies to yourselves. Depend upon it you will find many equally useful ways of bestowing them.—S.

BIGOTRY, RELIGIOUS.—A violent contention about external forms and ceremonies of religion is an indication of ignorance, superstition, and barbarity. It was carried to excess in some of the darker ages of the church; and has always been the characteristic of absurd and illiterate sectaries: but as men have become better acquainted with the

Scriptures, and the spirit and genius of Christianity; as they have improved in liberal arts and sciences, in politeness, and a knowledge of the world; they have likewise become more candid and moderate in their religious controversies, and the persecution of reputed heretics. It is indeed painful to every humane and benevolent spectator, to see men furiously abusing and persecuting one another for some trifling difference in their dress, their forms of devotion, their canonical ceremonies, and their theological speculations, without the least regard for the most sacred obligations of Christianity. Whenever, therefore, we see a man of this temper, that is, an angry bigot, we can entertain no favourable opinion of his head and heart.—**

CALVINISTIC DIVINITY.—What strange ideas, says he, would an Indian or a Chinese philosopher have of our holy religion, if they judged by the schemes given of it by our modern free-thinkers, and Pharisaical doctors of all sects? According to the odious and too vulgar systems of these incredulous scoffers, and credulous scriblers, the God of the Jews is a most cruel, unjust, partial, and fantastical being. He created, about 6000 years ago, a man and a woman, and placed them in a fine garden in Asia, of which there are no remains. This garden was furnished with all sorts of trees, fountains, and flowers. He allowed them the use of all the fruits of this beautiful garden except of one, that was planted in the midst thereof, and that had in it a

secret virtue of preserving them in continual health, and vigour of body and mind, of exalting their natural powers, and making them wise. The devil entered into the body of a serpent, and solicited the first woman to eat of this forbidden fruit; she engaged her husband to do the same. To punish this slight curiosity and natural desire of life and knowledge, God not only threw our first parents out of Paradise, but he condemned all their posterity to temporal misery, and the greatest part of them to eternal pains, though the souls of these innocent children have no more relation to that of Adam than to those of Nero and Mahomet; since, according to the scholaristic drivellers, fabulists, and mythologists, all souls are created pure, and infused immediately into mortal bodies as soon as the foetus is formed. To accomplish the barbarous partial decree of predestination and reprobation, God abandoned all nations to darkness, idolatry, and superstition, without any saving knowledge or salutary graces; unless it was one particular nation, whom he chose as his peculiar people. This chosen nation was, however, the most stupid, ungrateful, rebellious, and perfidious of all nations. After God had thus kept the far greater part of all the human species, during near 4000 years, in a reprobate state, he changed all of a sudden, and took a fancy for other nations beside the Jews. Then he sent his only begotten Son to the world, under a human form, to appease his wrath,

satisfy his vindictive justice, and die for the pardon of sin. Very few nations, however, have heard of this gospel; and all the rest, though left in invincible ignorance, are damned without exception, or any possibility of remission. The greatest part of those who have heard of it, have changed only some speculative notions about God, and some external forms in worship: for in all other respects the bulk of Christians have continued as corrupt as the rest of mankind in their morals; yea, so much the more perverse and criminal as their lights were greater. Unless it be a very small select number, all other Christians, like the Pagans, will be for ever damned; the great sacrifice offered up for them will become void and of no effect; God will take delight for ever in their torments and blasphemies; and though he can by one fiat change their hearts, yet they will remain for ever unconverted and unconvertible, because he will be for ever unappeased and irreconcilable. It is true, that all this makes God odious; a hater of souls, rather than a lover of them; a cruel vindictive tyrant, an impotent or a wrathful demon, rather than an all-powerful, beneficent father of spirits: yet all this is a mystery. He has secret reasons for his conduct that are impenetrable; and though he appears unjust and barbarous, yet we must believe the contrary, because what is injustice, crime, cruelty, and the blackest malice in us, is in him justice, mercy, and sovereign goodness. Thus the

incredulous free-thinkers, the Judaizing Christians, and the fatalistic doctors, have disfigured and dishonoured the sublime mysteries of our holy faith; thus they have confounded the nature of good and evil, transformed the most monstrous passions into divine attributes, and surpassed the Pagans in blasphemy, by ascribing to the Eternal Nature, as perfections, what makes the most horrid crimes amongst men. The grosser Pagans contented themselves with divinizing lust, incest, and adultery; but the predestinarian doctors have divinized cruelty, wrath, fury, vengeance, and all the blackest vices.

Chevalier RAMSAY'S Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion.

CAPET, HUGH.—Was the ancestor of the Bourbon family, and usurped the crown from the *legitimate* royal family, the descendants of Charlemagne.—Dante, in his purgatories, represents him as acknowledging himself to be the son of a Paris butcher, which is certainly not very polite in the poet. Whether Hugh Capet was the *son* of a butcher, or not, is, at this time of day, a matter of very little moment; but it is sincerely to be regretted that he proved the *father* of so many butchers!—**

CATECHISM.—Every church has its *Catechism*, or summary of its doctrines, in which it endeavours to inculcate whatever it thinks most conducive to its own interest. Both the English and Scotch churches have their catechisms, in which many unintelligible things are rendered, if

possible, still more unintelligible by the attempts to explain them. But this is not peculiar to *them*; for all history shows that, in all ages and nations, priests have endeavoured to render their doctrines as obscure as possible, for the same reason that lawyers generally make modern acts of parliament a jumble of unintelligible nonsense—namely, that they may reap the profit of explaining them! In examining the doctrines of any church, it is *faith* that is wanted, not *reason*; and this is the cause that the Catechism of the church of England in particular, requires abundance of *faith*, whilst its doctrines shrink from the text of *reason*, as the sensitive plant does from the touch. After the able exposition of it, by Bentham, it is impossible to add any thing to what he has said upon the subject; but, unfortunately, his treatise is in such a form as to be beyond the reach of most people; and, therefore, a short outline of it becomes desirable.

The 1st question of this curious performance of our *excellent* church is asking the child's name. The 2d, "Who gave you that name?" To which the child is made to reply, "My God-fathers and my God-mothers, in my baptism, wherein *I was made* a member of Christ, the child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of Heaven."—Now, supposing all this to be true, how can a child, just beginning to articulate, know any thing about the *effects* of baptism? Yet, here he is made to state positively, that his baptism

made him a member of Christ, a child of God, and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven! Is not this teaching him a lesson of insincerity, in making him assert his persuasion of the truth of a circumstance, of which it is impossible that he could entertain any persuasion or opinion at all? Then, as to the *fact*, where, but in this priestly composition, do we find that baptism is to have any of the effects which the poor child is made to say it has? Christ was, indeed, baptized by John, but he himself never baptized any one, nor did he ever, during his life time, order any one to be baptized. Are not all men equally the children of God, and are they not all, if virtuous, equally "inheritors of the kingdom of heaven," whether they be baptized or not? Is a virtuous man to be rejected by his merciful Creator, because his parents neglected to cause some water to be sprinkled on his face by a priest, and some words to be muttered at the same time? But more of this anon.

The 3d question is, "What did your God-fathers and God-mothers then for you?" Answer, "They did promise and vow three things, in my name; 1st. That I should renounce the Devil and all his works, the pomps and vanity of this wicked world, and all the sinful lusts of the flesh: 2dly. That I should believe all the articles of the Christian faith: and 3dly. That I should keep God's holy will and commandments and walk in the same all the days of my life." "*The Devil and all his works!*" Exists there any where

any real being to whom this name is applicable? If yes, is there any sufficient reason for supposing that he ever made his appearance upon this earth?—Who ever saw him? Where did they see him? In what shape did he exhibit himself? If these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, is it not reasonable to suppose, that this terrific personage is merely allegorical, as representing Evil; and that he really exists no where but in the terrified imaginations of the credulous? "*The pomps and vanities of this wicked world!*" Why wicked world? Is not the world exactly as God made it? And would it not be blasphemous to say that it is otherwise than he intended it should be? As to the *vanity* of the world, as it is not easy to attach any meaning to it, so the child may very safely renounce it. But as to the *pomps*, why is he to renounce them? Do the Archbishops and Bishops, the Archdeacons and Deacons, with all the inferior servitors of God, do *they all* renounce the pomps of this world? The amiable and humble founder of their religion certainly renounced them, but do *they* follow *his* example? Do *they* "provide neither gold nor silver nor brass in their purses?" Do they not, on the contrary, strive to the uttermost to provide as much as they can of all these things, that they may enjoy, as much as possible, of the *pomps* of this *wicked* world? Look at my Lord the Archbishop going to the House of Peers! Look at my Lords the Bishops going to Court to soli-

cit a translation to a richer see! Look at their magnificent equipages; their splendid armorial bearings; the number of their servants—all clothed in purple! If these are not *pomps*, of what does *pomp* consist? "*The sinful lusts of the flesh!*" What can the poor child, of three years old, know of the lusts of the flesh, sinful or not sinful? Are *all* the lusts of the flesh sinful, or are there some that are not sinful? On this point, our *excellent* church gives us no farther information. "*That I should believe all the articles of the Christian faith.*" What! *all* the articles, including, of course, that abominable performance, the Athanasian creed! Must he believe that Jesus was conceived, of the Holy Ghost; that he was born of a *virgin*; that he descended into hell, [where is it?] and staid there three days? Must he believe in the communion of Saints, [what is it?] in the Holy Catholic Church, and all the articles which that Church chooses to say are articles of the Christian faith? Must he *believe*, without presuming to exercise his reason? *Can* a man believe, whether he will or not? and if, while hesitating, while venturing to *doubt*, he says he believes, is he not guilty of deliberate falsehood?

But to attempt to analyze all this Jesuitical composition, would be a wearisome and disgusting task: we shall therefore pass on to the 11th question, which is, "How many sacraments hath Christ ordained in his church?" Answer, "Two only, as necessary to salvation: that is to say,

Baptism and the Supper of the Lord." Now, from this answer, would not any one suppose that Christ had positively instituted these two *sacraments*, as they are called, as a part of his religion; and that, in so distinct a way, that it would be impossible to mistake his meaning, or to doubt his intention? Well, let us see how the fact stands: It appears that Baptism, which is derived from a Greek word, signifying *immersion*, was practised as a religious ceremony by many nations, besides the petty Jewish nation. Among the Indians, it was, and still is, a constant practice. It likewise prevailed in Egypt. It was easy for ignorant men, always led by their external feelings, to suppose that that which cleansed the body likewise cleansed the soul. The practice was adopted by the Jews, who baptized all strangers who came to settle in Palestine. They were not obliged to submit to be circumcised, but by the ceremony of baptism, they were understood to renounce sacrificing to any strange Gods. The Jews themselves wished to be baptized by the prophets, who were most esteemed by the people, and we accordingly find John baptizing "Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region round about Jordan, *confessing their sins;*" from which last expression, it is evident that they looked upon this ceremony as one that washed away the pollution of their sins. Christ, himself, although he had no sins, submits to this ceremony; for after all the above had been baptized, he

presents himself to John also, and is baptized; but so far from *ordaining it as a sacrament*, he himself never baptized any body, nor during his life time, when he was giving his disciples so many instructions, does he say one word about baptism being "*necessary for salvation*," or for any other purpose? After his resurrection, two out of the four Evangelists make him speak of baptism, but the other two are wholly silent upon the subject. Matthew, in his last verse but one, makes him say, when addressing the remaining eleven disciples, "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them, &c." Not a word about baptism being "*necessary for salvation*." Mark, indeed, goes farther; for he makes him say, (chap. xvi, ver. 16,) "He that believeth, and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned." He does not make him say, "he that is not baptized shall be damned;" but only, "he that *believeth not* shall be damned." Luke and John say not a word about baptism. Now, if, as our *excellent church* tells us, "*baptism be really necessary for salvation*," is it not passing strange, that two out of the four Evangelists totally neglect the mention of so important a ceremony; and a third merely says it was ordered to be done, without annexing to it any consequences, good or bad? Had Christ really intended that "*baptism should be necessary for salvation*," would he not have distinctly said so, and would not *all* the Evangelists have repeated it after

him, instead of only one of them mentioning it in an obscure and doubtful way? And here it may be permitted to observe, that, as to Mark, who does thus obscurely mention it, nobody knows who he was, when his history was written, or how he came by the knowledge of what he relates.

From all that has been stated, it may safely be inferred, in spite of the assertions of *excellent church*, that Christ never did ordain baptism, as being necessary for salvation; and, therefore, that those who are not baptized have just as good a chance for happiness hereafter, as those who have had that ceremony performed upon them, whether by sprinkling or by immersion.

As to the "*Supper of the Lord*" being "*necessary for salvation*," it is a still more hopeless case; for not even one of all the four Evangelists give the slightest hint of its being necessary for that purpose; nor is there the smallest reason for supposing that there was the slightest wish that the melancholy ceremony with which Jesus took leave of his disciples at the *last supper*, should ever be communicated by them to any other persons. "This do in remembrance of me," says he, meaning, it is to be presumed, "After my death, when ye break bread, remember this frail body; and when ye drink wine, remember the blood which has been spilt for your and the world's salvation." In short, "Remember him, who, while alive, was always your indulgent master and kindest friend."

Not the smallest hint do we find given that this melancholy ceremony should be performed by any but the disciples themselves; nay, neither do we find that it should even be mentioned to any others! How then, in the name of wonder, came it to be reckoned by *excellent church a sacrament necessary to salvation*, seeing that Christ never ordained any such thing? Why, holy Roman Catholic Church introduced it among her mummeries, for reasons best known to herself, and her rebellious daughter, our *excellent church* of England, continued it and baptism, two out of seven of Catholic mother church's *sacraments*, for reasons best known to herself. There is, however, this difference between mother and daughter; that the priests of Catholic mother keep the wine to themselves, giving to the people the bread only; while Protestant daughter gives, or, at least, professes to give, both the bread and the wine to all alike.

Some persons have started objections to this ceremony on other grounds. They say the Christian religion, although originally communicated to a very small and barbarous nation, in a distant province of the Roman empire, is undoubtedly intended to be the universal and only religion of mankind; as a proof of which, we find that eighteen hundred years after its introduction, nearly a twentieth part of the human race have adopted it. Now, there are many parts of the world in which bread is not at all used, and there are still more in which there are no

grapes, and in which, consequently, there is no wine, unless what may happen to be brought from distant countries, at a great expence. How, then, is this ceremony, which is declared by *Excellent church*, to be "*necessary for salvation*," to be performed in these countries? And is it likely that the divine founder of the Christian religion would institute, as a part of his religion, a ceremony, which it was nearly impossible for a great part of mankind to perform! It may, therefore, be safely concluded, notwithstanding the high authority of *Excellent church*, that there is no proof whatever that either baptism, or the supper of the lord, were ever "ordained by Christ, as necessary to salvation."

Is there, after all, no road to heaven but through *ceremonies*? Must we, at any price, have a ceremony? Well, then, let foot-washing, mutual foot-washing, be that ceremony; and as the water-sprinkling ceremony has got a Greek name, let the foot-washing have a Greek name also; let it be called *Podolysis*. Compare, then, the two ceremonies, and see how greatly the latter has the advantage. First, as to the *source*; it is the same in the one case as in the other. 2dly, From that same sacred source, for the bread-eating and wine-drinking ceremony, there is nothing stronger to be found than *solicitation* or *recommendation*: to expression of desire, to which, with propriety, can be given the appellation of *command*. For the foot-washing, there is not only a positive com-

mand, but an example of it, and that a most striking one, exhibited, and the command, accompanied with words by which it is anxiously enforced. "If, then, your Lord and Master have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet, for I have given you an example that ye should do as I have done to you."---John, c. 13, v. 14-15. From the wine-bibbing ceremony no morally useful lesson ever has been, or can be deduced. From the feet-washing ceremony, an excellent and morally useful lesson may be deduced, that is, *humility*, a virtue with which Excellent Church's ministers are not in general overburdened. Then, as to the facility of performance, wherever man exists, water is to be found, and that without any expence: consequently, in all parts of the globe, this ceremony could at all times be easily performed. Why, then, has this simple and ordained ceremony been given up, and another one, not ordained, substituted in its place? The reason is not difficult to discover. Of the lesson, which, in the original scene was intended to be given, suppose the imitation to have had its proper and full effect upon all, upon spectators as well as actors, *equality* would long ago have been the result, and *hierarchy* no where visible but in history. This would not at all have suited Excellent Church, and, therefore, the costly wine-bibbing ceremony has been got up, and will be continued to be used till men shall condescend to make use of their own understandings, and learn to esteem

things, not because they are covered with the dusty cobwebs of antiquity, but because they are agreeable to reason and to common sense.—We shall here close our analysis of this *venerable* performance, and refer those who wish to make themselves masters of the subject, to "Bentham's Church - of - Englandism, and its Catechism Examined," in one volume, thick octavo, a book which has shaken Excellent Church's foundations to the centre, and which will one day lay her and all her *pomps* prostrate in the dust, and "great will be the fall thereof."—*Bowbridge*.

CAUSE, EXISTENCE OF A FIRST —Liberty, as it is understood by many schoolmen, is in fact an absurd chimera. If they will pay the least attention to reason, and not be satisfied with mere words, it will be evident, that whatever exists, or is self-created, is necessary; for if it was not necessary, it would be useless. The respectable sect of Stoics thought so; and, what is very singular, this truth may be found in a hundred places of Homer, who makes Jupiter submit to fate.

There exists a something, which must be eternal, as is demonstrated; otherwise we should have an effect without a cause. Thus all the ancients, without a single exception, believed matter to be eternal.

It is not the same of immensity, nor of an Almighty power. I cannot see the necessity of all space being filled; and I do not comprehend the reasoning of Clarke, who says, that "*what-ever necessarily exists in one*

place, ought necessarily to exist in every place." Wherefore is it impossible that there should be more than a determined quantity of beings? I can much easier conceive a bounded nature, than an infinite nature.

Upon this article I can only have probabilities, and I can only submit to the strongest. By the universal agreement in every thing which I know of nature, I perceive a design: this design shows that there must be a first cause; that cause is undoubtedly very powerful; but simple philosophy does not teach me to believe that this great artist is infinitely powerful. A house forty feet high proves to me that there must have been an architect; but reason alone cannot convince me that this architect could build a house ten thousand leagues high. Perhaps his powers did not admit of his building one more than forty feet high. My reason alone does not tell me, that in the immensity of space there is but one architect; and if a man was to allege that there were a great many similar architects, I do not see how I could convince him of the contrary.—*Voltaire.*

CELIBACY.—Vows of celibacy are a crime against nature. Insulted nature triumphs, and always will triumph in the long run, over all the foolish attempts of man, to thwart her. If the absurd and gloomy doctrines of the priests had prevailed, where at present would have been the human race, and what would have been the state of the earth? Men, if guided by them, would have continued to have cut one

another's throats; on account of religious opinions of no importance, as they did for so many centuries, and the earth would have been a desert occupied only by wild beasts! Oh! priests! priests! Much have ye to answer for.—*Schiller.*

CERES ELEUSINA.—(The mysteries of.)—In the chaos of popular superstition, which would have made almost the whole globe one vast den of ferocious animals, there was a salutary institution, which prevented one part of the human species from degenerating into an entire state of brutality: this consisted of mysteries and expiations. Philosophers endeavoured to bring men back to reason and morality. Those sages made use of superstition itself to correct its enormous abuses.

The mysteries of Zoroaster are no longer known: we know but little of those of Isis: but we cannot doubt that they foretold the grand system of a future state; for Celsus says to Origines, book 8, "You boast of believing in eternal punishments; and did not all the mystical ministers preach them to their initiated?"

God's unity was the principal dogma of all the mysteries.—Apuleius has preserved for us the prayer of the priestesses of Isis: "The celestial powers serve thee; the infernal regions are submitted to thee; the universe revolves in thine hand; thy feet trample upon Tartarus; the planets answer to thy voice; the seasons return to thy order; the elements obey thee."

The mystical ceremonies of Ceres were in imitation of those of Isis. Those who had committed crimes, confessed them and expiated them; they fasted, purified themselves, and gave alms. All the ceremonies were held sacred by solemn oaths to make them more venerated. The mysteries were celebrated at night; certain species of tragedies were represented to describe the happiness of the just, and the punishments of the wicked.

Some very learned men have proved, that the sixth book of the *Æneid* is only a picture of what was practised in those secret and famous representations. The mysteries of Eleusina became the most celebrated. One very remarkable thing is, that they read the beginning of the theogony of Sanchoniathon the Phœnician. This is a proof that Sanchoniathon had preached one supreme God, creator and governor of the world. It was then that this doctrine was unveiled to the initiated, instructed in the belief of Polytheism. Those who participated of the mysteries assembled in the temple of Ceres; and the Hierophanta taught them, that instead of adoring Ceres, leading Triptolemus upon a car drawn by dragons, they should adore that God who nourished men, and permitted Ceres and Triptolemus to render agriculture so honourable.

This is true, that the Hierophanta began by reciting the ancient verses of Orpheus:—*Walk in the path of justice; adore the sole master of the uni-*

verse; he is one, he is singly by himself; to him all beings owe their existence; he acts in them, and by them; he sees all, and never was seen by mortal eyes.

The greatest discretion was necessary, not to shock the prejudices of the multitude. Bishop Warburton observes after Plutarch, that the young Alcibiades having assisted at these mysteries, insulted the statues of Mercury in a party of pleasure, and that the people in their rage insisted upon Alcibiades's being condemned. Alexander himself having obtained leave in Egypt of the Hierophanta of the mysteries, to acquaint his mother with the secrets of the initiated, at the same time conjured her to burn his letter after reading it, that she might not irritate the Greeks.

Those who have imagined that the mysteries were only infamous debaucheries, ought to be undeceived by the word which answers to *initiated*. It signifies that they entered on a new life. Not that it is to be doubted that in all these mysteries, the ground work of which was so sensible and useful; many censurable superstitions were introduced. Superstition led to debauchery, which brought on contempt.

But it indubitably appears, that the primary intention of these mysteries was to inspire virtue, from the set form with which the assembly was dismissed. Amongst the Greeks, the two ancient Phœnician words, *koff omphet*, "*watch and be pure*," were pronounced. We

may produce an additional proof, that the emperor Nero, who was guilty of his mother's death, could not be admitted to these mysteries when he travelled in Greece; the crime was too enormous; and as great an emperor as he was, the initiated would not receive him amongst them. Zozimus also says, that Constantine could find no Pagan priests who would purify him, or absolve him of parricide.—According to Tertullian, the ceremony of regeneration was very ridiculous. It was necessary that the initiated should seem to be re-born: this was the symbol of the new kind of life he was to embrace. He was presented with a crown, and he trampled upon it. The Hierophanta held the sacred knife over his head; the initiated, who feigned to be struck with it, fell as if he were dead; after which he appeared to regenerate.

There was (amongst all the shameful customs, trifling ceremonies, and ridiculous doctrines, which the people and priests followed in honour of some imaginary gods, who were despised and detested by the sages) a pure religion, which consisted in acknowledging the existence of a supreme God, his providence and justice.—*Voltaire.*

CERES ELEUSINA.—(2d Article).—

The mysteries of Eleusis were celebrated twice a-year, at seed-time and harvest; and the festival continued nine days. Each day had its peculiar ceremonies. The first was consecrated to the preliminaries of the festival. On the second, the initiated, or

mystæ went in a kind of procession to the sea, where reservoirs of salt-water, sacred to Ceres and Proserpine, were set apart for their purification. The third was passed in fasting, affliction, and mysterious lamentations, which represented the complaints and groans of Ceres and Proserpine: though something not of the *afflicting kind*, seems to have been also represented by the *mystic beds*, surrounded with bands of purple, which were employed to convey an idea of the situation of Proserpine on her arrival in the infernal regions. The fifth was set apart for a sacrifice, in which the greatest care was observed to avoid touching the genitals of the victim; and the offering was accompanied with mystic dances in a meadow enamelled with flowers, about the spring of Callichorus. The sixth day was distinguished by the procession of torches, of which there is a representation still to be seen on a *bassa-relievo*, discovered by Spon and Wheler. In this procession, the initiated marched two by two, with a solemn pace, in deep silence, to the Eleusian temple of Ceres, and were supposed to be purified by the odour which exhaled from the torches. The young Iacchus, represented with a myrtle crown and a torch in his hand, was carried in pomp from the Ceramicus to Eleusis. The mystical van, which was an emblem of the separation of the *initiated* from the *prophane*, the *calathus*, a branch of laurel, a kind of wheel, and the *phallus*, followed the beautiful marble statue of the god

and the cries of *Io Bacche* were loudly repeated during the procession: Iacchus was invited to take a part in the dances and pleasures of the day, and to be an intercessor with Ceres in favour of the Athenians. In their hymns and invocations, they beseeched the goddess to procure for those who were admitted to the mysteries, an abundance of diversions and dancing, to grant them the talents of wit and pleasantry, and the power of surpassing others in jokes and sarcasms. The inhabitants of the adjacent places came in crowds to see this *holy* troop; which, on its arrival at the bridge of the *Cephisus*, they saluted with volleys of satirical witticisms and buffooneries, which the *initiated* answered in the same style, and retorted with the same spirit. Those among the *initiated*, who gained the victory in this singular conflict, were here applauded and adorned with fillets of purple. The *eighth* day was employed in a repetition of the initiation, which was originally occasioned by a particular mark of respect paid to Æsculapius, who having come to Eleusis to be initiated after the ceremony was over, was favoured with a repetition of the mysteries. This repetition became a constant practice. The *ninth* and last day seems to have been distinguished by no other ceremony than the filling of two vases with water, and pouring out the contents of the one towards the east, and of the other towards the west, and pronouncing, during this act, several mysterious

words and phrases, with their eyes alternately turned to the *heavens* and the *earth*, considered as the common father and mother of all beings. It seems that this ceremony was rather of a doleful and melancholy complexion, and that the libations usual in the celebration of funeral rites, were employed in this concluding day of the Eleusinian mysteries.

The secret of these mysteries seems to have consisted principally in a particular manner of teaching the doctrine of future rewards and punishments; by which the rewards were supposed to regard the *initiated* alone, and the punishments only the *profane*, or those who were not initiated. This is confirmed by many authorities; and, among others, by that shrewd observation of Diogenes Laertius: *What? Shall the future state of the robber Paræcion be happier, because he is initiated, than that of Epaminondas?* Upon the whole, it does not appear that the unity of the Supreme Being was a part of the secret doctrine here in question.—*De St. Croix.*

CERTAINTY.—Had you, in Copernicus's time, asked all the world, Did the sun rise, did the sun set, to-day? They would one and all have answered, That is a certainty; we are fully certain of it: thus they were certain, and yet mistaken.—Witchcraft, divinations, and possessions, were for a long time universally accounted the most certain things in the world.—What numberless crowds have seen all these fine things, and have been certain of them! but at present such cer-

tainty begins to lose its credit.---A mathematical demonstration is a very different certainty from these: they were only probabilities, which, on being searched into, are found errors; but mathematical certainty is immutable and eternal.---I exist, I think, I feel pain; is all this as certain as a geometrical truth? Yes. And why? because these truths are proved by the same principle, that a thing cannot at the same time be and not be.---I cannot at one and the same time exist and not exist, feel and not feel. A triangle cannot have and not have a hundred and eighty degrees, the sum of two right angles.---Thus the physical certainty of my existence and my sensation, and mathematical certainty, are of a like validity, though differing in kind.---But this is by no means applicable to the certainty founded on appearances, or the unanimous relations of men.---*Voltaire.*

CHAIN OF EVENTS.—It is an old supposition, that all events are linked together by an invincible fatality; this is destiny, which Homer makes superior to Jupiter himself.---The system of necessity and fatality has, according to Leibnitz, been struck out by himself under the appellation of *sufficient reason*; but it is in reality of very ancient date, that no effect is without a cause; and that often the least cause produces the greatest effects, is what the world is not to be taught at this time of day.---My Lord Bolingbroke owns, that the trivial quarrel between the Duchess of Marlborough and

Mrs. Masham, put him upon making the separate treaty between Queen Anne and Lewis XIV. This treaty brought on the peace of Utrecht. This peace settled Philip V. on the Spanish throne: Philip dispossessed the house of Austria, of Naples, and Sicily. Thus the Spanish prince, who is now king of Naples, evidently owes his sovereignty to Mrs. Masham: he would not have had it, perhaps he would not so much as have been born, had the Duchess of Marlborough behaved with due complaisance towards the Queen of England: his existence at Naples depended on a few follies committed at the court of London. Inquire into the situations of all nations on the globe, and they all derive from a chain of events, apparently quite unconnected with any one thing, and connected with every thing. In this immense machine all is wheel-work, pully, cords, and spring. It is the same in the physical system. A wind, blowing from the south of Africa and the Austral seas, brings with it part of the African atmosphere, which falls down again among the valleys of the Alps; and these rains fructify the lands. Again, our northern wind wafts our vapours among the negroes. Thus we benefit Guinea, and are benefitted by it; and this chain reaches from one end of the universe to the other.—*Voltaire.*

CHANCE AND CAUSES, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN.—The best general rule to help us in distinguishing between chance and causes, is the following: *What depends upon a few persons, is,*

in a great measure, to be ascribed to chance, or secret and unknown causes: what arises from a great number, may often be accounted for by determinate and known causes.

Two natural reasons may be assigned for this rule: First, if you suppose a dye to have any bias, however small, to a particular side, this bias, though perhaps it may not appear in a few throws, will certainly prevail in a great number, and will cast the balance entirely to that side. In like manner, when any *causes* beget a particular inclination or passion at a certain time, and among a certain people, though many individuals may escape the contagion, and be ruled by passions peculiar to themselves, yet the multitude will certainly be seized by the common affection, and be governed by it in all their actions.—Secondly, Those principles or causes which are fitted to operate on a multitude, are always of a grosser nature, less subject to accidents, and less influenced by whim and private fancy, than those which operate on a few only. The latter are commonly so delicate and refined, that the smallest incident in the health, education, or fortune of a particular person, is sufficient to divert their course, and retard their operation; nor is it possible to reduce them to any general maxims or observations. Their influence at one time will never assure us concerning their influence at another, even, though all the general circumstances should be the same in both cases. To judge by this rule, the domestic and the

gradual revolutions of a state, must be a more proper subject of reasoning and observation than the foreign and the violent, which are commonly produced by single persons, and are more influenced by whim, folly, or caprice, than by general passions and interests. The depression of the Lords, and rise of the Commons, in England, after the statutes of alienation, and the increase of trade and industry, are more easily accounted for by general principles, than the depression of the Spanish, and rise of the French monarchy after the death of Charles V. Had Henry IV., Cardinal Richelieu, and Louis XIV. been Spaniards, and Philip II., III., and IV., and Charles II. been Frenchmen, the history of these two nations had been entirely reversed.

For the same reason, it is more easy to account for the rise and progress of commerce in any kingdom, than for that of learning; and a state which should apply itself to the encouragement of the one, would be more assured of success than one which should cultivate the other. Avarice, or the desire of gain, is an universal passion, which operates at all times, in all places, and upon all persons. But curiosity, or the love of knowledge, has a very limited influence; and requires youth, leisure, education, genius, and example, to make it govern any person. You will never want booksellers while there are buyers of books: But there may frequently be readers where there are no authors. Multitudes of people, necessity, and liberty, have begot commerce in Holland: But study and appli-

cation have hardly produced any eminent writers.

We may, therefore, conclude, that there are subjects in which we must proceed with caution in tracing their history, lest we assign causes which never existed, and reduce what is merely contingent to stable and universal principles.—*Hume.*

CHARACTER.—This term comes from a Greek word, signifying impression and graving. It is what nature has engraven in us: Then can we efface it? This is a weighty question. Religion and morality lay a check on the force of a natural temper, but cannot extirpate it. A sot, when in a convent, reduced to half a pint of cyder at each meal, will no longer be seen drunk, but his love of wine will ever be the same.—Age weakens the natural character; it is a tree which only produces some degenerate fruits; still are they of one and the same nature. It grows knotty and over-run with moss, and worm-eaten; but amidst all this it continues what it was, whether oak or pear tree. Could a man change his character, he would give himself one; he would be superior to nature. Can we give ourselves any thing? What have we that we have not received? Endeavour to raise the indolent to a constant activity, to freeze the impetuous into an apathy, to give a taste for poetry or music to one who has neither taste nor ears; you may as well go about washing the blackmoor white, or giving sight to one born blind. We only improve, polish, and conceal what nature has put into us; we have nothing of our own

putting. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque redibit.*—*Voltaire.*

CHARACTERS, NATIONAL.—No species of government, religion, opinion, or moral cause, can make any material alterations in the people of countries situated in the extremes of heat and cold. Heat deprives the body of all vigour and strength, and the imbecility is communicated to the intellectual faculties: the inclinations are all passive; indolence constitutes the utmost happiness. In cold countries the inhabitant finds a sufficient task in screening himself from the severity of the season, and in providing a subsistence; not that the nature of man is altered or impaired, either in the quality or number of its faculties: but these capabilities are not suffered to exert themselves. There can be no vigorous applications, no long watchings, nothing of that progressive and accumulated improvement of ages and generations linked together, which is indispensably necessary to the perfection of arts and sciences.—*Chattelur.*

CHARLES I., DEFENCE OF THE PUNISHMENT OF.—Charles I., whatever he was in his private character, which is out of the question here, was certainly a very bad king of England. During a course of many years, and notwithstanding repeated remonstrances, he governed by maxims utterly subversive of the fundamental and free constitution of this country; and, therefore, he deserved the severest punishment. If he was misled by his education or his friends, he was

like any other criminal in the like circumstances, to be pitied, but by no means to be spared on that account. From the nature of things, it was necessary that the opposition should begin from a few, who may, therefore, be styled a faction: but after the civil-war (which necessarily ensued from the King's obstinacy, and in which he had given repeated instances of dissimulation and treachery), there was evidently no safety, either for the faction or the nation, short of his death. It is to be regretted, that the situation of things was such, that the sentence could not be passed by the whole nation, or their representatives, solemnly assembled for that purpose. I am sensible, indeed, that the generality of the nation, at that time, would not have voted the death of their Sovereign; but this was not owing to any want of a just sense of the wrongs he had done them, but to an opinion of the sacredness of kingly power, from which very few of the friends of liberty in those times, especially among the Presbyterians, who were the majority, could entirely divest themselves. Such a transaction would have been an immortal honour to this country; whenever that superstitious notion shall be obliterated: a notion which has been extremely useful in the infant state of society; but which, like other superstitions, subsists long after it hath ceased to be of use.—*Priestly.*

CHASTITY, THE MERIT OF, DERIVED FROM ITS UTILITY.—The long and helpless infancy of man requires the combination of pa-

rents for the subsistence of their young; and that combination requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the marriage-bed. Without such an *utility*, it will readily be owned, that such a virtue would never have been thought of. An infidelity of this nature is much more pernicious in women than in men: hence the laws of chastity are much stricter over the one sex than the other. These rules have all a reference to generation, and yet women past child bearing are no more supposed to be exempted from them than those in the flower of their youth and beauty. General rules are often extended beyond the principle whence they first arise; and this in all matters of taste and associations of ideas which, though they arise at first from the judgment, are not easily altered by every particular exception that occurs to us. To which we may add, in the present case of chastity, that the example of the old would be pernicious to the young; and that women, continually foreseeing that a certain time would naturally bring them the liberty of indulgence, would naturally advance that period, and think more lightly of this whole duty so requisite to society. Those who live in the same family, have such frequent opportunities of license of this kind, that nothing could preserve purity of manners, were marriage allowed among the nearest relations, or any intercourse of love between them ratified by law and custom. *Incest* therefore being *pernicious* in a superior degree has also a superior turpitude, and moral deformity annexed to it.—

What is the reason why, by the Athenian law, one might marry a half-sister by the father but not by the mother? Plainly this: The manners of the Athenians were so reserved, that a man was never permitted to approach the women's apartment, even in the same family, unless where he visited his own mother. His step-mother and her children were as much shut up from him as the women of any other family; and there was as little danger of any criminal correspondence between them. Uncles and nieces, for a like reason might marry at Athens; but neither these nor half-brothers and sisters, could contract that alliance at Rome, where the intercourse was more open between the sexes. Public utility is the cause of all these variations.

—*Hume.*

CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ITS PROGRESS AND ESTABLISHMENT IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE.—Religion in man is the effect of a sense of his misfortunes, and of the fear of invisible powers. Most legislators have availed themselves of these motives to govern the people, and still more to enslave them. Some of them have asserted, that they held the right of commanding from heaven itself; and it is thus that theocracy has been established. If the religion of the Jews has had a more sublime origin, it has not always been exempt from those inconveniences which necessarily arise from the ambition of priests in a theocratic form of government. Christianity succeeded the Jewish institution. The subjection that Rome, mistress of the world, was under to the most savage tyrants;

the dreadful miseries which the luxury of a court and the maintenance of armies had occasioned throughout this vast empire, under the reign of the Neros, the successive irruptions of the barbarians, who dis-membered this great body; the loss of provinces either by revolt or invasion; all these natural evils had already prepared the minds of men for a new religion; and the changes in politics must probably have induced an innovation in the form of worship. In Paganism, which had existed for so many ages, there remained only the fables to which it owes its origin, the folly or the vices of its gods, the avarice of its priests, and the infamy and licentious conduct of the kings who supported them. Then the people, despairing to obtain relief from their tyrants upon earth, had recourse to heaven for protection.

Christianity appeared, and afforded them comfort, at the same time that it taught them to suffer with patience. While the tyranny and licentiousness of princes tended to the destruction of Paganism, as well as to that of the empire, the subjects, who had been oppressed and spoiled, and who had embraced the new doctrines, were completing its ruin, by the examples they gave of those virtues which always accompany the zeal of new-made proselytes. But a religion that arose in the midst of public calamity, must necessarily give its preachers a considerable influence over the unhappy persons who took refuge in it. Thus the power of the clergy commenced, as it were, with the gospel.

From the remains of Pagan superstitions and philosophic sects, a code of rights and tenets was formed, which the simplicity of the primitive Christians sanctified with real and affecting piety; but which at the same time left the seed of debates and controversies, from whence arose a variety of passions, disguised and dignified under the name of zeal. These dissensions produced schools, doctors, a tribunal, and a hierarchy. Christianity had begun to be preached by a set of fishermen, destitute of every knowledge but that of the gospel; it was entirely established by bishops, who formed the church. After this it gained ground by degrees, till, at length, it attracted the notice of the emperors. Some of these tolerated Christianity, either from motives of contempt or humanity; others persecuted it. Persecution hastened its progress, for which toleration had paved the way. Connivance and proscription, clemency and rigour, were all equally advantageous to it. The sense of freedom, so natural to the human mind, induced many persons to embrace it in its infancy, as it has made others reject it since it has been established. This spirit of independency, rather adapted to truth than to novelty, would necessarily have induced a multitude of persons of all ranks to become converts to Christianity, if even the characters it bore had not been calculated to inspire veneration and respect.—*Raynal*.

CHRISTIANITY, NOT ADAPTED TO
MAKE A CONSTITUTIONAL PART
IN ANY SYSTEM OF LEGISLA-

TION.—Christianity is in its principles an universal religion; having nothing exclusive, nothing local, nothing peculiar to one country any more than to another. Its Divine Author, embracing all mankind in his boundless charity, came to remove those barriers that separated the nations from each other, and to unite all mankind in a people of brethren: such is the true spirit of the gospel.

Those, therefore, who would make Christianity to be a national religion, and introduce it as a constitutional part in a system of legislation, have been guilty of two faults; the one pernicious to religion, and the other to the state. They have departed from the spirit of Jesus Christ, whose kingdom is not of this world; and, confounding our sublunary interests with those of religion, have sullied its celestial purity; converted it into a scourge in the hands of tyrants, and an instrument of persecution.// They have done no less injury to the salutary maxims of policy; as, instead of simplifying the machine of government, they have rendered it more complicated; they have added to it foreign and superfluous resources, and by subjecting it to two different and frequently contrary motions, have occasioned those convulsions which are felt in all Christian states, in which religion hath entered into the political system. Perfect Christianity is an universal social institution; but not a political establishment, nor doth it concur to the support of any good particular institution. All hu-

man establishments are founded on human passions, and are supported by them: whatever combats and destroys the passions, therefore, is by no means proper to strengthen those establishments. How can that which detaches our hearts from the things of the world, induce us to interest ourselves more strongly in what is doing here? How can that which engages our thoughts only towards another country attach us more powerfully to this? Christianity, by making men just, moderate, and peaceable, is very advantageous to society in general: but it weakens the force of the political spring; it renders the movements of the machine more complex: it breaks the unity of the body moral; and, being insufficiently appropriated to the purposes of government, must either degenerate, or remain a detached and embarrassing subject. The science of salvation and government are very different. To insist that the former includes all others, is the fanaticism of a narrow mind. Such a way of thinking is like that of the alchymists, who, in the art of making gold, conceive they also see that of the universal medicine; or, like that of the Mahometans, who pretend that all arts and sciences are to be found in the Alcoran. The doctrines of the gospel have but one object in view, which is the universal salvation of mankind. Their liberties and properties here below have nothing to do with it. The gospel inspires humanity rather than patriotism, and tends rather to the forming of men than citi-

zens. Patriotism and humanity are two virtues incompatible with each other in any great degree, and particularly in a whole people. The legislator who would unite them both, will obtain neither one nor the other. Their union never was, nor ever will be, known; because it is contrary to nature, and because it is impossible to give two objects to one passion.---*Rousseau.*

CIVIL COMMOTIONS.—Always to throw, without distinction, the blame of all disorders in the state upon the prince; would introduce a fatal error in politics, and serve as a perpetual apology for treason and rebellion: as if the turbulency of the great, and madness of the people, were not, equally with the tyranny of princes, an evil incident to human society, and no less carefully to be guarded against in every well-regulated constitution. We must not, therefore, imagine, that all the ancient princes, who were unfortunate in their government, were also tyrannical in their conduct, and that the seditions of the people proceeded always from some invasion of their liberties and privileges by the monarch. Men, instead of complaining against the manners of the age and the form of constitution, are very apt to impute all errors to the person who has the misfortune to be intrusted with the reins of empire.---*Hume.*

CIVIL COMMOTION.—(2d Article.) It would be equally wrong always to throw the blame of civil commotions upon the people; for all history shows that a nation never has recourse to violence against its rulers, except

in self-defence ; and that, in general, the people submit to oppression, till it becomes so intolerable as to render them desperate. For this there are two reasons ; first, the uncertainty of whether their situation may be benefited by a change, or whether, bad as it is, it may not be rendered still worse. Secondly, the risk which the first movers of resistance to any established government always run of losing their liberty, their property, or even their lives, from the want of the general support of their countrymen, arising from the difficulty of acting in concert against the concentrated power of the government. Thus, we may safely conclude, that civil commotions amounting to resistance to established governments, always take their rise in the oppression exercised by the governors, and that it is hardly possible for them to occur, till the people have become unable longer to bear their burdens.

When symptoms of disaffection, or a wish to resist, make their appearance, it is a sure sign that some of the machinery of government presses too hard, and it would be wise in it to reduce the pressure as much as possible. Unfortunately, governments very seldom adopt this plan : mistaking the *power* for the *right*, they generally have recourse to force, which, although it may answer their purpose for a time, never fails, in the end, to render the concussion, when it does come, much more violent than it would have been, had they listened, in time,

to the voice of the people.—*Bowbridge.*

CLIMATE, THE INFLUENCE OF.—

If the greater or less strength of mind depended on the different climate of countries, it would be impossible, considering the age of the world, but that what was in this respect most favoured, should by its progress have acquired a great superiority over all others. The esteem which different nations have by turns obtained, with respect to science, and the contempt into which they have successively fallen, prove the little influence climates have on the mind. The superiority of certain nations over others in the arts and sciences, can only be attributed to moral causes ; there are no people privileged in point of virtue, genius, and courage : Nature, in this respect, has not made a partial distribution of her favours.—*Helvetius.*

CLIMATES, THE DIFFERENCE OF MEN IN DIFFERENT.—

A cold air constricts the extremities of the external fibres of the body, (this appears in the countenance ; in cold weather people look thinner) : this increases their strength, and favours the return of the blood from the extreme parts to the heart. It contracts those very fibres ; of course it increases their force and elasticity. People are, therefore, more vigorous in cold climates : here the action of the heart and the re-action of the extremities of the fibres are better performed ; the circulation goes on much brisker ; the heart has more power. This superiority of

strength must produce various effects; for instance, a greater boldness, that is, more courage; a greater sense of superiority, that is, less desire of revenge; a greater opinion of superiority, that is, more frankness, less suspicion, policy, and cunning. In short, this must be productive of very different tempers. Put a man into a close warm place, and, for the reasons above given, he will feel a great faintness. If under this circumstance you propose a bold enterprise to him, you will find him very little disposed towards it: his present weakness will throw him into despondency; he will be afraid of every thing, being in a state of total incapacity. The inhabitants of warm countries are, like old men, timorous; the people in cold countries are, like young men, brave.

The nerves that terminate from all parts in the surface of the body, form each a nervous bundle or papilla. In warm climates, where the skin is relaxed, the ends of the nerves are expanded, and laid open to the weakest actions of the smallest objects. In cold countries the skin is constricted, and the papillæ compressed: the sensation does not reach the brain, but when it is very strong. Now, imagination, taste, sensibility, and vivacity, depend on an infinite number of small sensations.

The outermost part of a sheep's tongue, to the naked eye, seems covered with papillæ. On these papillæ are seen through a microscope, small filaments like a kind of down; between the papillæ are pyramids, shaped to-

wards the end like pincers. Very likely, these pyramids are the principal organs of taste.

I caused the half of a tongue to be frozen, and observing it with the naked eye, I found the papillæ considerably diminished; even some rows of them were sunk into their sheath. The outermost part I examined with the microscope, and perceived no pyramids. In proportion as the frost went off, the papillæ seemed to the naked eye to rise, and with the microscope the miliary glands began to appear.

This observation confirms what I have been saying, that in cold countries the cutaneous glands and the nervous papillæ are less expanded: they sink deeper into their sheaths, or they are sheltered from the action of external objects; consequently, they are less capable of lively sensations. In cold countries, people have very little sensibility for pleasure; in temperate countries, they have more; in warm countries, their sensibility is exquisite. As climates are distinguished by degrees of latitude, we might distinguish them also in some measure by those of sensibility. I have been at the opera in England and in Italy, where I have seen the same pieces and the same performers: and yet the same music produces such different effects on the two nations; one is so cold and phlegmatic, and the other so lively and enraptured, that it seems almost inconceivable.

It is the same with regard to pain. The fibres of the people of the north are stronger, and

less capable of irritation and sensibility, than those of the inhabitants of warm countries ; consequently, they are less sensible of pain. You must flay a Muscovite alive to make him feel. From this delicacy of organs peculiar to warm climates, it follows that the mind is most sensibly moved by whatever relates to the union of the two sexes: here every thing leads to this object. In northern climates, scarce has the animal part of love a power of making itself felt. In temperate climates, love, attended by a thousand appendages, endeavours to please by things that have at first the appearances, though not the reality, of this passion. In warmer climates, it is liked for its own sake ; it is the only cause of happiness ; it is life itself. In southern countries, a machine of a delicate frame, but strong sensibility, resigns itself either to a love which rises, and is incessantly laid, in a seraglio ; or, to a passion which leaves women in greater independence, and is consequently exposed to a thousand inquietudes. In northern regions, a machine, robust and vigorous, finds a pleasure in whatever is apt to throw the spirits into motion ; such as hunting, travelling, war, wine. If we travel towards the north, we meet with people who have few vices, many virtues, and a great share of frankness and sincerity. If we draw near the south, we fancy ourselves entirely removed from the verge of morality: here the strongest passions are productive of all manner of crimes, each man endeavouring, let the

means be what they will, to indulge his inordinate desires. In temperate climates, we find the inhabitants inconstant in their manners, as well as in their vices and virtues ; the climate has not a quality determinate enough to fix them.

The heat of the climate may be so excessive as to deprive the body of all vigour and strength. Then the faintness is communicated to the mind ; there is no curiosity, no enterprise, no generosity of sentiment ; the inclinations are all positive ; indolence constitutes the utmost happiness ; scarcely any punishment is so severe as mental employment, and slavery is more supportable than force and vigour of mind necessary for human conduct.—*Montesquieu.*

COMMERCE, FAVOURABLE TO CIVILIZATION AND PEACE.—There are many things which, in themselves, are morally neither good nor bad ; but they are productive of consequences which are strongly marked with one or other of these characters. Thus commerce, though in itself a moral nullity, has had a considerable influence in tempering the human mind. It was the want of objects in the ancient world which occasioned such a rude and perpetual turn for war. Their time hung on their hands without the means of employment. The indolence they lived in afforded leisure for mischief ; and being all idle at once, and equal in their circumstances, they were easily provoked or induced to action.

But the introduction of commerce furnished the world with objects, which in their extent reach

every man, and give him something to think about, and something to do; by these his attention is mechanically drawn from the pursuits which a state of indolence and an unemployed mind occasioned; and he trades with the same countries which former ages tempted by their productions, and too indolent to purchase them, would have gone to war with. The condition of the world is materially changed by the influence of science and commerce; it is put into a fitness not only to admit of but to desire an extension of civilization. The world has undergone its divisions of empire, the several boundaries of which are known and settled. The idea of conquering countries like the Greeks and Romans, does not now exist; and experience has exploded now the notion of going to war for the sake of profit. In short, the objects of war are exceedingly diminished, and there is now left scarcely any thing to quarrel about, but what arises from the demon of society, prejudice, and the consequent sullenness and untractableness of the temper.—*Paine.*

CONCILIATION, THE ONLY WAY TO GOVERN MANKIND.—Here seems to be no way for governing mankind but by conciliation; and, according to the forcible way which the Irish have of expressing their meaning, I know of no mode of governing the people, but by letting them have their own way.—*Charles Fox.*

CONFUCIUS.—The writings of Confucius, his philosophy and patriotism, have justly entitled his name to immortality, and his memory to gratitude. Born in

an age when both religion and morality were neglected, he endeavoured to reform the conduct of the sovereign, and of the people; not by pretended revelations, but by a simple exposition of the principles most conclusive to the well-being of society. The mode in which he connected his doctrine with the *kings*, or sacred books, is a proof of his knowledge of our nature, ever yielding to authority, and more especially to antiquity, that which would be refused to reason.

Confucius, in the application of his maxims to the conduct of life, and in his method of teaching, resembled Socrates. It appears that the maxims of government and the principles of moral conduct, in order to influence practice, must receive the sanction either of divine revelation, or of human laws. The former are, however, after a certain lapse of time, little attended to (as far as history instructs us), and the only useful works on such subjects, are those that apply *general* principles to the *particular* circumstances of different societies.—*Ellis, Lord Amherst's Embassy to China.*

CONSCIENCE.—All the morality of our actions lies in the judgment we ourselves form of them. All the rules of morality are written in indelible characters on the heart of man, I have only to consult myself to know what I ought to do; all that I feel to be right is right, whatever I feel to be wrong is wrong. Conscience is the ablest of all casuists, and it is only when we are trafficking with her that we have recourse to the subtleties of reason. It is pretended, that

every one contributes to the public good for his own interest; but whence comes it that the virtuous man contributes to it to his prejudice? Can a man lay down his life for his own interest? The chief of our concerns, indeed, is that of ourselves; yet, how often have we been told by the monitor within, that to pursue our own interest at the expence of others would be to do wrong! Which is most agreeable for us to do, and leaves the most pleasing reflection behind it, an act of benevolence or of mischief? For whom are we most interested at our theatres? Do we take pleasure in acts of villany? or do we shed tears at seeing the authors of them brought to punishment? It has been said, that every thing is indifferent to us in which we are not interested: the contrary, however, is certain, as the soothing endearments of friendship and humanity console us under afflictions; and even in our pleasures we should be too solitary, too miserable, if we had nobody to partake them with us. If there be nothing moral in the heart of man, whence arise those transports of admiration and esteem we entertain for heroic actions, and great minds? What hath this virtuous enthusiasm to do with our private interest? Wherefore do I rather wish to be an expiring Cato, than a triumphant Cæsar? Of what hurt is the wickedness of a Cataline to me? Am I afraid of falling a victim to his villany? Wherefore do I then look upon him with the same horror as if he was my cotemporary? We

do not hate the wicked only because their vices are hurtful, but also because they are wicked.

Amidst all the inhuman absurd forms of worship, amidst all the prodigious diversity of manners and characters, you will every where find the same ideas of justice and honesty, the same notions of good and evil. Antient Paganism adopted the most abominable deities, which it would have punished on earth as infamous criminals; deities that presented no other picture of supreme happiness than the commission of crimes, and the gratification of their passions. But vice, armed even with sacred authority, descended in vain on earth; moral instinct influenced the human heart to revolt against it. Even in celebrating the debaucheries of Jupiter, the world admired and respected the continence of Zenocrates; the chaste Lucretia adored the impudent Venus. There exists, therefore, evidently in the heart of man, an innate principle of justice and goodness; by which, in spite of our own maxims, we approve or condemn the actions of ourselves and others. To this principle I give the appellation of *conscience*. But we are told by some philosophers, that there is nothing in the human mind but what is instilled by experience; nor can we judge of any thing but from the ideas we have acquired. To confute this opinion, we need only to distinguish between our acquired ideas and our natural sentiments; for we are sensible before we are intelligent; and as we do not learn to desire our own good, and to

avoid what is evil, but possess this desire immediately from nature; so the love of virtue and hatred of vice, are as natural as the love of ourselves. The operations of conscience are not intellectual, but sentimental: for though all our ideas are acquired from without, the sentiments which estimate them arise from within; and it is by these alone that we know the agreement or disagreement which exists between us, and those things which we ought to seek or shun.

To exist, is, with us, to be sensible; our sensibility is incontestably prior to our intelligence; and we were possessed of sentiment before we formed ideas. Whatever was the cause of our being, it hath provided us with sentiments agreeable to our constitution; nor can it possibly be denied that these, at least, are innate. These sentiments are, in the individual, the love of himself, aversion to pain, dread of death, and the desire of happiness. But if, as it cannot be doubted, man is, by nature, a social being, or at least formed to become such, his sociability absolutely requires that he should be furnished with other innate sentiments relative to his species; for, to consider only the physical wants of men, it would certainly be better for them to be dispersed than assembled.

Now it is from this moral system, formed by its duplicate relation to himself and his fellow-creatures, that the impulse of conscience arises. To know what is virtuous, is not to love virtue. Man has no innate knowledge of virtue; but no sooner

is it made known to him by reason, than conscience induces him to love and admire it. This is the innate sentiment I mean.—*Rousseau.*

CONSCIENCE.—(2nd Article.)—

The conscience is not an original infallible guide appointed by God in our breasts; it is formed as reason, imagination, and the other powers of the mind, by education, habits, examples, principles, and laws; and it differs greatly, according as we have been differently affected by those circumstances. A person who has been taught to consider happiness as the end of life, and to acquire real knowledge and virtue as the means of that happiness, has a virtuous sensibility formed, which will ever direct him right, and will make him always happy. By a process something similar, an infinite variety of false consciences are formed. A man who has been taught to consider interest as the end of life, and industry, attention, servility, as means, makes his experiments and trials with that object in view; and his understanding and conscience will be totally different from the former. Religion, that first and best of blessings, has been misinterpreted and misunderstood, so as to furnish an infinite variety of false principles of conduct. The intent and purpose of it is to lead men by virtue to happiness. But there is no species of vice which men have not committed on one or more of those false systems, which they have denominated true religion. The reason of this is obvious. A man is brought up to his religion as he

is brought up to his trade. He is told of what articles and doctrines it is to consist: and that if he does not induce his mind to believe and practise it, he will lose the good opinion of his friends; he will make them his implacable enemies; his fortune will be injured; his person punished; and after he has been tormented in this world, he will be consigned to the devil in the next. Thus are most religions taught; thus are the consciences of men formed to every species of villainy and cruelty: for the genuine principle of a bigot is hatred of all his fellow-creatures beyond the inclosures of his own party. And yet he not only imagines he has a good conscience, but triumphs in its execrable testimony.

If we descend into the common walks of life, and consider the difference of men's apprehensions on the subject of right and wrong, we shall see that the satisfaction arising from the testimony of their consciences must be extremely different. A scale might be formed on the customs and principles of trade and commerce, graduated from dishonesty and fraud to the extreme points of honour and justice. Men's consciences, in their various employments, are adjusted on this kind of scale; and we may generally judge of the nature of a man's understanding, the elevation of his mind, and the delicacy and genuineness of his moral sensibility, from the nature of his employment.

False consciences, when they are formed with care on some political, moral, or religious pre-

possessions, are incurable sources of ill. They are like many disorders in the animal economy, where the patient is sensible of his danger; where temporary and fallacious gratifications render him secure and satisfied; and where no remedies can be applied, because his own concurrence and his own endeavours are requisite, and he cannot see the necessity of them.—It is to be hoped no person will be so puerile as to say, that if men think themselves right, they must be so; and the utmost that can be expected of them, is to act on their opinions. It may be a desirable matter, that men should proceed thus far in the path of morality, and act sincerely and honestly on those principles which they profess, whether good or evil. Hypocrisy, added to ignorance and vicious principles, increases the mischief of them; and yet we find it generally attending them. Men have not only false ideas and false consciences given them; but they are also taught to wear masks, whenever they think proper to act contrary even to their wretched principles. If we remove this hypocrisy, it is true we remove an evil. We should only then have errors to encounter with, which might either be prevented by a rational and just education, or by a diligent and careful attention to the nature and happiness of man. Persons, ill-educated, ill-formed, and with false and delusive consciences, are, however, in a much worse state than common and flagrant sinners, whose actions are in opposition to their minds, and who

are often restored to virtue by experiencing the miseries of vice. It is not uncommon to see those who have been led into excesses by their passions recover themselves, and become regular and happy. It is very uncommon to see a man in any profession acting above the prepossessions of it. It is very uncommon to see a charitable sectary, or a person who has had his mind formed on narrow gloomy cruelty, recover any degree of liberality, good nature, and humanity. Men in this situation are like lunatics, the main-spring of whose minds is a false and insufficient one. And we might as well say lunatics are as they ought to be, because they think so; as that men who act ill on religious or political principles are right, because they are of that opinion. The proper and real happiness of man, as an individual, as a member of society, and a part of the universal empire of God, is to be procured only by real knowledge and virtue. It is, therefore, as much our duty, in every case, to consider and examine our principles, as it is honestly to act on them when we are satisfied they are right.

—*Williams.*

CONSCIENCE, LIBERTY OF.—We can comprehend things no otherwise than as they present themselves to our perceptions; nor is it possible for any one to restrain his mind from receiving a variety of propositions either as true or as false, when clearly understood. It is not in our power to think or judge according to the opinions of another; nor are we at liberty, in any case, to believe or dis-

believe, or suspend our assent, just as humour or fancy may direct, or others command. In these particulars, we must be guided by that light which arises from the nature of things, so far as it is perceived; and by those evidences and arguments which may appear to the mind, and convince the judgment. No one can give a rational assent to any thing but in the use of his reason. How, then, is it possible he should receive as reasonable what appears to him to be unreasonable? or that he should receive as a certain truth what does not come to his own mind with clear and convincing evidences? Nor can those arguments which may be urged, although valid in themselves, ever produce an alteration in opinion, if they do not appear to his own judgment obvious in their connexion, and sufficient for that purpose.—*Fell.*

CONTROVERSY.—Where is the opinion, so rational, and so plausible, that the spirit of controversy cannot shake it? Can any position be so absurd, as to render specious arguments incapable of supporting it? when a person is once convinced, either of the truth or of the falsity of any thing, he immediately, from a passion or disputation, becomes attached to his own idea, and soon seeks solely, to acquire a superiority over his adversary, by dint of the powers of imagination and by subtilty; especially when some obscure question, involved by its nature in darkness, is the point in debate.—*Arnobius.*

CONTROVERSIES, RELIGIOUS. Two men, travelling on the high-

way, the one east, the other west, can easily pass each other, if the way be broad enough. But two men, reasoning upon opposite principles of religion, cannot so easily pass without shocking; though one should think that the way were also, in that case, sufficiently broad, and that each might proceed without interruption in his own course. But such is the nature of the human mind, that it always takes hold of every mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully fortified and corroborated by an unanimity of sentiments, so it is shocked and disturbed by any contrariety. Hence the eagerness which most people discover in a dispute; and hence their impatience of opposition, even in the most speculative and indifferent opinions.

This principle, however frivolous it may appear, seems to have been the origin of all religious wars and divisions. But as this principle is universal in human nature, its effects would not have been confined to one age, and to one sect of religion, did it not there concur with other more accidental causes, which raise it to such a height as to produce the greatest misery and devastation. Most religions of the ancient world arose in the unknown ages of government, when men were as yet barbarous and uninstructed, and the prince as well as peasant was disposed to receive with implicit faith, every pious tale or fiction, which was offered him. The magistrate embraced the religion of the people, and entering cor-

dially into the care of sacred matters, naturally acquired an authority in them, and united the ecclesiastical with the civil power. But the Christian religion arising, while principles directly opposite to it were firmly established in the polite part of the world, who despised the nation who broached this novelty; no wonder that, in such circumstances, it was but little countenanced by the civil magistrate, and that the priesthood were allowed to engross all the authority in the new sect. So bad a use did they make of this power, even in those early times, that the persecutions of Christianity may, perhaps, in *part*, be ascribed to the violence instilled by them into their followers; though it must not be dissembled that there were laws against external superstition amongst the Romans, as ancient as the time of the twelve tables; and the Jews, as well as Christians, were sometimes punished by them; though, in general, these laws were not rigorously executed. Immediately after the conquest of Gaul, they forbid all but the natives to be initiated into the religion of the Druids; and this was a kind of persecution. In about a century after this conquest, the Emperor Claudius, quite abolished that superstition by penal laws; which would have been a very grievous persecution, if the imitation of the Roman manners had not, before hand, weaned the Gauls from their ancient prejudices. (*Suetonius in vita Claudii.*) Pliny ascribes the abolition of Druid superstitions.

to Tiberius, probably because that emperor had taken some steps towards restraining them. This is an instance of the usual caution and moderation of the Romans in such cases; and very different from their violent and sanguinary method of treating the Christians. Hence we may entertain a suspicion, those furious persecutions of Christianity were in some measure owing to the imprudent zeal and bigotry of the first propagators of that sect; and ecclesiastical history affords us many reasons to confirm this suspicion. After Christianity became the established religion, the principles of priestly government continued; and engendered a spirit of persecution, which has ever since been the poison of human society, and the source of the most inveterate factions in every government.—There is another cause (besides the authority of the priests, and the separation of the ecclesiastical and civil powers) which has contributed to render Christendom the scene of religious wars and divisions. Religions, that arise in ages totally ignorant and barbarous, consist mostly of traditional tales and fictions, which may be very different in every sect, without being contrary to each other; and even when they are contrary, every one adheres to the tradition of his own sect, without much reasoning and disputation. But as philosophy was widely spread over the world at the time when Christianity arose, the teachers of the new sect were obliged to form a system of speculative opinions!

to divide with some accuracy their articles of faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and defend with all the subtilty of argument and science. Hence naturally arose keenness in dispute, when the Christian religion came to be split into new divisions and heresies. And this keenness assisted the priests in their policy, of begetting a mutual hatred and antipathy among their deluded followers. Sects of philosophy, in the ancient world, were more zealous than parties of religion; but in modern times, parties of religion are more furious and enraged than the most cruel factions that ever arose from interest and ambition. The civil wars which arose some years ago in Morocco, between the blacks and whites, merely on account of their complexion, are founded on a pleasant difference. We laugh at them: but were things rightly examined, we afford much more occasion of ridicule to the Moors. For what are all the wars of religion which have prevailed in this polite and knowing part of the world? They are certainly more absurd than the Moorish civil wars. The difference of complexion is a sensible and real difference: But the difference about an article of faith, which is utterly absurd and unintelligible, is not a difference in sentiment, but a difference in a few phrases and expressions, which one party accepts of without understanding them, and the other refuses in the same manner.—*Hume.*

CORN, THE EXPORTATION OF.—In inland high countries, remote from the sea, and whose rivers are small, running *from the* country, and not *to it*, as is the case of Switzerland, great distress may arise from a course of bad harvests, if public granaries are not provided and kept well stored.—Anciently, too, before navigation was so general, ships so plenty, and commercial connections so well established, even maritime countries might be occasionally distressed by bad crops: But such is now the facility of communication between those countries, that an unrestrained commerce can scarce ever fail of procuring a sufficiency for any of them. If indeed any government is so imprudent as to lay its hands on imported corn, forbid its exportation, or compel its sale at limited prices, there the people may suffer some famine, from merchants avoiding their ports. But wherever commerce is known to be always free, and the merchant absolute master of his commodity, as in Holland, there will always be a reasonable supply.—When an exportation of corn takes place, occasioned by a higher price in some foreign countries, it is common to raise a clamour, on the supposition that we shall thereby produce a domestic famine. Then follows a prohibition, founded on the imaginary distress of the poor. The poor to be sure, if in distress, should be relieved; but if the farmer could have a high price for his corn from the foreign demand, must he, by a prohibition of exportation, be compelled

to take a low price, not of the poor only, but of every one that eats bread, even the richest? The duty of relieving the poor is incumbent on the rich; but by this operation the whole burden of it is laid on the farmer, who is to relieve the rich at the same time. Of the poor, too, those who are maintained by the parishes, have no right to claim this sacrifice of the farmer; as, while they have their allowance, it makes no difference to them whether bread be cheap or dear. Those working poor, who now mind business only five or four days in the week, if bread should be so dear as to oblige them to work the whole six required by the commandment, do not seem to be aggrieved, so as to have a right to public redress. There will then remain, comparatively, only a few families in every district, who, from sickness, or a great number of children, will be so distressed by a high price of corn, as to need relief; and they should be taken care of by particular benefactions, without restraining the farmer's profit.—Those who fear that exportation may so far drain the country of corn as to starve ourselves, fear what never did, nor ever can happen. They may as well, when they view the tide ebbing towards the sea, fear that all the water will leave the river. The price of corn, like water, will find its level. The more we export, the dearer it becomes at home; the more is received abroad; the cheaper it becomes there: and as soon as these prices are equal, the exportation stops of course. As the seasons

vary in different countries, the calamity of bad harvest is never universal. If, then, all ports were always open, and all commerce free, every maritime country would generally eat bread at the medium price or average of all the harvests; which would probably be more equal than we can make it by our artificial regulations, and therefore a more steady encouragement to agriculture. The nation would all have bread at the middle price; and that nation which at any time inhumanly refuses to relieve the distresses of another nation, deserves no compassion when in distress itself.—*Franklin*.

CORRUPTION, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL.—The name of religious corruption is given to all kinds of libertinism, and principally to that of men with women. This species of corruption is not incompatible with the happiness of a nation. The people of different countries have believed, and believe still, that this corruption is not criminal. It could not be criminal in any state, if women were in common, and their offspring declared the children of the state: this crime would then, in a political view, be attended with no danger. In fact, if we take a survey of the earth, we shall see different nations of people, among whom what we call *libertinism* is not only considered as no corruption of manners, but is found authorised by the laws, and even consecrated by religion. What innumerable evils, will it be said, are annexed to this kind of corruption? May it not be answered: That dissoluteness is then

only politically dangerous in a state, when it contravenes the law of the country, or is blended with some other defect of government. It is in vain to add, that the nations where such dissoluteness prevails, are the contempt of the world. What nation ever excelled the Greeks? a people which to this day is the admiration and honour of human nature. Before the Peleponesian war, an æra fatal to their virtue, what nation, what country, produced so many virtuous and great men? Yet the taste of the Greeks for the most indecent and unnatural lust is well known; and the most virtuous of the Greeks, according to our ideas of morality, would have been looked upon in Europe as most wicked and contemptible debauchees. This kind of corruption of manners was in Greece carried to the utmost excess, at the very time that country produced such great men of every kind as made Persia to tremble. We may therefore observe, that religious corruption does not seem incompatible with the greatness and felicity of a state; but political corruption is preparative to the fall of an empire, and presages its ruin. With this a people is infected when the bulk of the individuals separate their interest from that of the public. This kind of corruption, which sometimes is blended with the preceding, has led many moralists to confound them: if the question be only of the political interest of a state, the latter would perhaps be the most dangerous. A people, however pure its manners might have been at

first, when this corruption becomes common, must necessarily be unhappy at home; and little feared abroad: the duration of such an empire is precarious; it is chance which either delays or hastens the fall of it. The public happiness or misery depends solely on the agreement or opposition of the interest of individuals with the general interest; and the religious corruption of manners may, as history abundantly proves, be often joined with magnanimity, elevation of soul, wisdom, abilities; in fine, with all the qualities which form great men. There are two different species of bad actions; some vicious in every form of government; others, which in a state are pernicious, and consequently criminal only, as those actions are contradictory to the laws of those countries.—*Helvetius*.

COUNTRY.—A country is composed of several families; and as self-love generally leads us to stand up for and support our particular families when a contrary interest does not intervene; so, from the like self-love, a man stands up for his town or village; which he calls his native home.—The more extended this native home is, the less we love it: it is impossible in nature to have a tender love for a family so numerous as scarce to be known.—The candidate, amidst his ambitious intrigues to be chosen *Æbile*, Tribune, Prætor, Consul, Dictator, makes a noise about his love for his country; whereas it is only himself that he loves. Every one is for securing to himself the freedom of lying at his

own home, and that it shall be in no man's power to turn him out; every one is for being sure of his life and fortune. Thus the whole society coinciding in the like wishes, private interest becomes that of the public; and an individual in praying only for himself, prays in effect for the whole community.—Every state on the whole earth indisputably has originally been a republic; it is the natural progress of human nature: a number of families at first entered into an alliance to secure one another against bears and wolves; and that which had plenty of grain, bartered with another which had nothing but wood.

On our discovery of America, all the several tribes throughout that vast part of the world were found divided into republics; but there were only two kingdoms. Of a thousand nations, only two were subdued.—*Voltaire*.

COURTESANS.—Courtesans were more honoured by the Romans than by us; and more than either by the Greeks. All the world have heard of the two *Aspasias*, one of whom instructed even *Socrates* in politics and eloquence; of *Phyrne*, who, at her own expence, built the walls of *Thebes*, destroyed by *Alexander*, and whose lewdness repaired, in some measure, the evil done by that conqueror, of *Lais*, who captivated so many philosophers, even *Diogenes*, whom she made happy, and of whom *Aristippus* said, "I possess *Lais*, but *Lais* does not possess me:" a good maxim for every man of sense. But the

most celebrated of all was Leontium, who wrote books of philosophy, and was beloved by Epicurus and his disciples. The famous Ninon l'Enclos may be looked upon as the modern Leontium: but how few others have resembled her! Nothing is more uncommon than philosophical ladies of pleasure: perhaps it is a profanation to join the former to the latter term. We will not enlarge on this article; but it may be proper to observe that independent of our religion, viewing it only in a moral light, a passion for *common women* equally enervates the soul and the body, and is attended with the worst of consequences, with regard to fortune, health, repose, and happiness. On this occasion, we may recall the saying of Demosthenes, "I will not buy repentance at so dear a price;" and also that of the Emperor Adrian, who, on being asked why Venus was painted naked, replied, *Quia nullos dimittit*.

But are not false and coquetish women more contemptible in one sense, and more dangerous to the heart and understanding, than courtesans? This question we shall leave others to determine.

A celebrated philosopher, (Buffon) now living, examines in his natural history, Why love makes the happiness of all other beings, and the misery of man? He answers, "That the only thing valuable in that passion is the instinctive attraction (*le physique*), and that the moral sentiment (*le moral*) which accompanies it, is good for nothing."

This philosopher does not maintain that the moral adds nothing to the physical pleasure; for here experience would be against him: nor that the moral is only an allusion (which is the case), but destroys not the veracity of the pleasure. His meaning is, undoubtedly, that from the moral sentiment proceed all the evils of love: and here one cannot be of his opinion.

From this, let us only infer, that if a light superior to our reason did not promise us a happier state, we might well complain of Nature, who, with one hand presenting us the most alluring of pleasures, would seem with the other to push us from it, in surrounding it with so many rocks and shelves, and placing it in a manner on the brink of a precipice between grief and privation.

Qualibus in tenebris, vitæ quantique periclis

Degitur hoc ævi quodcunque est!

D'Alembert.

CREATION.—We have no ideas of matter being created and endued with the qualities which it possesses. Things having certainly very much the appearance which they might have had, if we could suppose a certain portion of space occupied by a confused mass of such materials as form this world; and if we could suppose Almighty God immediately employed in keeping this mass from universal dissipation till the laws of motion, attraction, and gravitation took place: then, from the motion of this substance, we can account for the present form of the earth; the constituent parts of it; the

beds or strata and laminae of which it is composed; the subsiding of those heavier matters; the raising water to the surface; of the air above it; and of that ether, that pure electric fire, which seems to be the last and simplest of our elements. In the disposition of these things, we find most eminently those qualities which we admire; Wisdom, Power, Goodness. These qualities uniformly co-operate with each other; we therefore refer them to one great principle, which we call God. Whether this great Almighty Being produced matter, and gave it principles and laws, it would be impious assurance in us either to assert or deny; because it is a subject on which we can have no conceptions, no ideas: But that the materials of this world have been brought into such order, and have such effects either with or without the industry of man, as to show wisdom, power, and goodness in the great principle which uniformly and constantly actuates it;—this we understand.—

Williams.

CREDULITY AND AUTHORITY.—

Nations in general are made more for feeling than thinking. The greatest part of them never had an idea of analysing the nature of the power by which they are governed. They obey without reflection, because they have the habit of obeying. The lover of power has no other fulcrum than opinion. The origin and the object of the first national associations being unknown to them, all resistance to government appears to them a crime. It is

chiefly in those states where the principles of legislation are confounded with those of religion, that this blindness is to be met with. The habit of believing favours the habit of suffering. Man renounces not any object with impunity. It seems as if nature would revenge herself upon him who dares thus to degrade her. The servile disposition which she stamps upon his soul, in consequence, extends itself throughout. It makes a duty of resignation as of meanness; and, kissing chains of all kinds with respect, trembles to examine either its doctrines or its laws. In the same manner that a single extravagance in religious opinions is sufficient to make many more to be adopted by minds once deceived, a first usurpation of government opens the door to all the rest. He who believes the greater, believes the less; he who can do the greater, can do the less. It is by this double abuse of credulity and authority, that all the absurdities in matters of religion and policy, have been introduced into the world, for the harassing and the crushing of the human race.—

Raynal.

CRIMES, THE DEGREE OF.—Crimes are only to be measured by the injury done to society.—They err, therefore, who imagine that a crime is greater or less according to the intention of the person by whom it is committed: for this will depend on the actual impressions of objects on the senses, and on the previous disposition of the mind; both which will vary in different persons, and even in the same

person at different times, according to the succession of ideas, passions, and circumstances. Upon that system it would be necessary to form, not only a particular code for every individual, but a new penal law for every crime. Men, often with the best intention, do the greatest injury to society; and with the worst, do it the most essential services.—

Others have estimated crimes rather by the dignity of the person offended, than by their consequences to society. If this were the true standard, the smallest irreverence to the Divine Being ought to be punished with infinitely more severity than the assassination of a monarch.—Others have imagined, that the greatness of the sin should aggravate the crime. But the fallacy of this opinion will appear, on the slightest consideration of the relations between man and man, and between God and man. The relations between man and man are relations of equality. Necessity alone hath produced, from the opposition of private passions and interests, the idea of public utility; which is the foundation of human justice. The degree of sin depends on the malignity of the heart, which is impenetrable to finite beings. How, then, can the degree of sin serve as a standard to determine the degree of crimes? If that were admitted, men may punish when God pardons, and pardon when God condemns; and thus act in opposition to the Supreme Being.—*Beccaria*.

CROWN, THE INFLUENCE OF THE, IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.

—The influence of the crown

has perhaps not been industriously augmented in a view to undermine the fabric of civil liberty: it appears rather to have insensibly arisen to its present pitch, from the increase of empire and commerce, from the augmentation of our armies, navies, debts, and revenues. But refer its origin to what cause you please, its existence is certain, and its tendency obvious. In the hands of a wise and good prince, this influence may not be prejudicial; *but the freedom of a people should not depend on the accidental good disposition of the prince*. It is our duty by social compact to be loyal; it is our right by nature to be free. When the servility of the Roman Senate had given up to Augustus the liberties of the state, the people enjoyed under him a mild and moderate government; but did they do the same under Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, and many other weak and wicked princes who succeeded him? Rome was once free. France heretofore had the three estates which were the guardians of its liberty. Spain had many rights and privileges, of which nothing now but the shadow remains. Denmark and Sweden had once constitutions something like that of England; but all these countries have been enslaved by their own corruption.—* *

CUSTOMS, THE ORIGIN OF BARBAROUS AND RIDICULOUS, IN VARIOUS AGES AND NATIONS.—Some maintain, that we have an idea of virtue absolutely independent of different ages and government; and that virtue is always one

and the same. Others maintain, on the contrary, that every nation forms a different idea of virtue, and consequently that the idea of virtue is merely arbitrary. These two philosophical sects are deceived; but they would both have escaped error, had they, with an attentive eye, considered the history of the world. They would then have perceived, that time must necessarily produce, in the physical and moral world, revolutions that change the face of empires; that in the great catastrophes of kingdoms, the people always experience great changes; that the same actions may successively become useful and prejudicial, and, consequently, by turns, assume the name of virtuous and vicious: for by the word *virtue* can only be understood, a desire of the general happiness, and the object of virtue is the public welfare, and the actions it enjoins are the means it makes use of to accomplish that end: and, therefore, the idea of virtue is not arbitrary, but, in different ages and countries, all men, at least those who live in society, ought to form the same idea of it: and, in short, if the people represent it under different forms, it is because they take for virtue the various means they employ to accomplish the end.—However stupid we suppose mankind, it is certain, that, enlightened by their own interest, they have not, without motives, adopted the ridiculous customs we find among some of them: the fantasticalness of these customs proceeds, then, from the diversity of the interests of different na-

tions; and, in fact, if they have always, though confusedly, understood by the word *virtue* the desire of the public happiness; if they have consequently given the name of *virtuous* only to actions of public utility; and if the idea of utility has always been secretly connected with the idea of virtue, we may assert, that the most ridiculous, and even the most barbarous customs, have always had for their foundation either a real or apparent utility.—Theft was permitted at Sparta: they only punished the awkwardness of the thief. By the laws of Lycurgus, and the contempt for gold and silver in that country, few things could be stolen; and these thefts inured the Lacedemonians to a habit of courage and vigilance, who could only oppose these virtues to the ambition of the Persians and the treachery of the Ilotes. It is, therefore, certain, that theft, which is always prejudicial to rich people, was of use to Sparta.

At the end of winter, when hunger calls the savage to the chase, there are some savage nations who massacre all the old and infirm men, who are unable to sustain the fatigues of hunting: were they left in their cabins or in the forests, they would fall a prey to hunger or the wild beasts; they, therefore, choose rather to preserve them from those dreadful misfortunes, by a speedy and a necessary parricide. And this execrable custom originates from the same principle of humanity, that makes us look upon it with horror.—But, without having recourse to sa-

vage nations, let us direct our views to China: if it be asked why an absolute authority is there given to fathers over the lives of their children? we find that the lands of that empire, how extensive soever they are, cannot sometimes furnish subsistence for the numerous inhabitants. Now, as the too great disproportion between the multiplicity of men and the fertility of the lands, would necessarily occasion wars fatal to that empire, we see, that in time of famine, and to prevent an infinite number of murders and unnecessary misfortunes, the Chinese nation, humane in its intentions, but barbarous in the choice of the means, has, through a sentiment of humanity, though a mistaken one, considered the permission to murder their infants as necessary to the repose of the empire. We sacrifice, say they, for this purpose, some unfortunate victims, from whom infancy and ignorance conceal the horrors of death, in which, perhaps, consist its most formidable terrors.—It was equally a motive of public utility, and the desire of protecting modest beauty, that formerly engaged the Swiss to publish an edict, by which it was not only permitted, but even ordained, that each priest should provide himself a concubine.

These examples might be multiplied without end; and all would concur to prove, that customs, even the most foolish and barbarous, have always their source in the real or apparent utility of the public. But it is said, that these customs are not,

on this account, the less odious or ridiculous. It is true, but it is only, because we are ignorant of the motives of their establishment; and because these customs, consecrated by antiquity and superstition, subsist, by the negligence or weakness of governments, long after the causes of their establishment are removed. All the customs that procure only transient advantages, are like scaffolds that should be pulled down when the palaces are raised. The interest of states, like all human things, is subject to a thousand revolutions. The same laws and the same customs become successively useful and prejudicial to the same people; from whence we may conclude, that those laws ought, by turns, to be adopted and rejected, and that the same actions ought successively to be named virtuous and vicious: a proposition that cannot be denied, without confessing that there are actions which, at one and the same time, are virtuous and prejudicial to the state, and, consequently, without sapping the foundations of all government and all society.—*Helvetius.*

DARKNESS, LOCKE'S OPINION CONCERNING, CONSIDERED.—It is Mr. Locke's opinion, that darkness is not naturally an idea of terror; and that though an excessive light is painful to the sense, that the greatest excess of darkness is no ways troublesome. He observes, indeed, in another place, that a nurse or an old woman, having once associated the idea of ghosts and goblins with that of darkness,

night ever after becomes painful and horrible to the imagination. The authority of this great man is doubtless as great as that of any man can be. But it seems that an association of a more general nature, an association which takes in all mankind, may make darkness terrible: for in utter darkness it is impossible to know in what degree of safety we stand; we are ignorant of the objects which surround us; we may every moment strike against some dangerous obstruction; we may fall down a precipice the first step we take; and if an enemy approach we know not in what quarter to defend ourselves. In such a case strength is no sure protection; wisdom can only act by guess; the boldest are staggered; and he who would pray for nothing else towards his defence, is forced to pray for light.

Ζεν πάρε, ἀλλὰ συρροῖται ἀπ' κροστίας Ἀχαιῶν
Ποιοῖσι δ' αἰθρὴν, δὸς δ' οφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδεῖσθαι
Εὐ δὲ φασὶ καὶ οἰκιστῶν.

As to the association of ghosts and goblins, surely it is more natural to think, that darkness, being originally an idea of terror, was chosen as a fit scene for such terrible representations, than that such representations have made darkness terrible. — The mind of man very easily slides into an error of the former sort; but it is very hard to imagine that the effect of an idea, so universally terrible in all times and in all countries, as darkness, could possibly have been owing to a set of idle stories, or to any cause of a nature so trivial, and of an operation so precarious.

Perhaps it may appear, on inquiry, that blackness and darkness are, in some degree, painful, by their natural operation, independent of any associations whatsoever. It must be observed, that the ideas of darkness and blackness are much the same; and they differ only in this, that blackness is a more confined idea. Dr. Cheselden has given us a very curious story of a boy who had been born blind, and continued so until he was thirteen or fourteen years old. He was then couched for a cataract; by which operation he received his sight. Among many remarkable particulars that attended his first perceptions and judgments on visual objects, Cheselden tells us, that the first time the boy saw a black object it gave him great uneasiness; and that some time after, upon accidentally seeing a negro woman, he was struck with great horror at the sight. The horror, in this case, can scarcely be supposed to arise from any association. The boy appears, by the account, to have been particularly observing and sensible for one of his age; and, therefore, it is probable, if the great uneasiness he felt at the first sight of black had arisen from its connection with any other disagreeable ideas, he would have observed and mentioned it: for an idea, disagreeable only by association, has the cause of its ill effect on the passions, evident enough at the first impression. In ordinary cases it is, indeed, frequently lost; but this is because the original association was made very early, and the consequent im-

pression repeated often. In this instance, there was no time for such an habit; and there is no reason to think that the ill effects of black on his imagination were more owing to its connection with any disagreeable ideas, than that the good effects of more cheerful colours were derived from their connection with pleasing ones. They had both probably their effects from their natural operation.

It may be worth while to examine, how darkness can operate in such a manner as to cause pain. It is observable, that still as we recede from the light, nature has so contrived it, that the pupil is enlarged by the retiring of the iris, in proportion to our recess. Now, instead of declining from it but a little, suppose that we withdraw entirely from the light: it is reasonable to think, that the contraction of the radial fibres of the iris is proportionably greater; and that this part, by great darkness, may come to be so contracted, as to strain the nerves that compose it, beyond their natural tone, and, by this means, to produce a painful sensation. Such a tension, it seems, there certainly is, whilst we are involved in darkness; for in such a state, while the eye remains open, there is a continual nixus to receive light: this is manifest, from the flashes and luminous appearances which often seem in these circumstances to play before it, and which can be nothing but the effect of spasms produced by its own efforts in pursuit of its object. Several other strong impulses will produce the idea of light in the eye,

besides the substance of light itself, as we experience on many occasions. Though the circular ring of the iris be in some sense a sphincter, which may possibly be dilated by a simple relaxation; yet, in one respect, it differs from most of the sphincters of the body, that it is furnished with antagonist muscles, which are the radial fibres of the iris. No sooner does the circular muscle begin to relax, than these fibres, wanting their counterpoise, are forcibly drawn back, and open the pupil to a considerable wideness. But though we were not apprised of this, every one, it is to be presumed, will find, if he opens his eyes, and makes an effort to see in a dark place, that a very perceivable pain ensues. It hath also been a complaint of some ladies, that after having worked a long time upon a ground of black, their eyes were so pained and weakened, they could hardly see. It may, perhaps, be objected to this theory of the mechanical effect of darkness, that the ill effects of darkness or blackness seem rather mental than corporeal: and it is true that they do so; and so do all those that depend on the affections of the finer parts of our system.

The ill effects of bad weather appear no otherwise than in a melancholy and dejection of spirits; though, without doubt, in this case, the bodily organs suffer first, and the mind through these organs.—*Burke.*

DEATH, IN THE FIELD OF BATTLE.

—Death, in the field, is not always glorious. Socrates says, it can be so only when one dies for

one's relations, one's children, or one's country. The death of a soldier, fighting in a bad cause, never can be glorious. He may have performed the most heroic actions, have shown proofs of the most undaunted courage; yet, if he has fallen in any cause except that of the defence of his country, or of the weak oppressed by the strong, his death cannot have been glorious. The cause in which he fought must have been *just*: without that, glory is out of the question.---S. ---

DEATH (PUNISHMENT OF).—Many philosophers have doubted the propriety of punishing any crimes with death, while others who agree with them as to abolishing it for all other crimes, would still retain it for that of murder. These last, when questioned as to the reasons on which their opinion is founded, can give none, but satisfy themselves by referring to the law of Moses, in which it is said, "He who smiteth a man so that he die, shall surely be put to death." —But, with all submission to them, if they are to adopt one law of a savage barbarian, like Moses, why not adopt the whole of his bloody code? Why not put a man to death for compounding an oil like that which was poured upon Aaron (Exodus, chap. 30), or for eating blood puddings (Leviticus, chap. 17), and for twenty other things equally absurd! I confess I do not see upon what rational ground the punishing a man with death can be defended. If it is intended as an example and a warning to deter others, the inefficacy of it in this respect, in those coun-

tries where it is most practised, shows how fruitless it is: Why, then, persist in destroying men, who, if allowed to live and properly taken care of, might in time become useful members of society? I suspect the following is the cause of it: the hanging or beheading of a criminal costs very little trouble; but the keeping of him in safe custody, and in such a way as would tend to render him a useful member of society, is a tedious and troublesome process. Therefore, governors, who in general wish to have as little trouble as possible, prefer the former way; and I confess they have in their favour that, which with many people would warrant any absurdity under the sun; viz. the sanction of *antiquity*.

"But," exclaim the advocates for hanging, "how then would you punish criminals?" Answer, "By disgrace, by privations, by hard labour, by imprisonment, for a longer or shorter period, in proportion to the atrocity of the crime committed." "Well, granting that all this might do for ordinary crimes, what, then, would you do with a murderer?" —Answer, "I would imprison him for life; I would burn him on the forehead with the letter *M*: I would make him work hard, and I would feed him sparingly. I would exhibit him in the market place once a year, on the anniversary of the day on which he committed the murder, along with the implements with which he accomplished it, and with a label mentioning all the circumstances of his crime."

The pain of dying is nothing ; a few minutes and it is over, and in a few days the man and his crime are alike forgotten by the people. But, to be made to live, in the way above stated, would be worse than death to the individual, while at the same time it would operate much more powerfully in the way of example to deter others ; the great object of all punishment in civilized societies. To all criminals except the murderer, I would hold out the prospect of the period of their confinement being shortened, in proportion to their good behaviour ; and even to the murderer I would hold out the prospect of his situation being ameliorated on the same conditions, within the prison ; but none that he should ever be again allowed to join that society whose laws he had so grossly violated.—S.

DEBT, NATIONAL.—The National Debt in England originated in the knavery of those who borrowed, and in the folly of those who lent ; perpetuating taxes that take money from industrious people, in order to give it to those who are idle. The liberty enjoyed by England has enabled it to flourish beyond any other society (hitherto known) in the world ; not as some writers have foolishly asserted, because it has a National Debt, but in spite of so great an evil.—A. *Young's Tour in France.*

DEITY.—A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes every where the most careless thinker ; and no men can be so hardened in absurd systems as at all times to reject it.—*That nature does nothing in vain*, is a maxim estab-

lished in all the schools, merely from the contemplation of the books of nature, without any religious purpose : and from a firm conviction of its truth, an anatomist, who had observed a new organ or canal, would never be satisfied till he had discovered its use and intention.—One great foundation of the Copernican system is the maxim, *that nature acts by the simplest methods, and chooses the most proper means to any end* : and astronomers, without thinking of it, often lay this strong foundation of piety and religion.—The same thing is observable in other parts of philosophy : and thus all the sciences almost lead us insensibly to acknowledge a first intelligent Author ; and their authority is often so much the greater, as they do not directly profess that intention.—It is with pleasure I hear Galen reason concerning the structure of the human body.—The anatomy of a man, says he, discovers above 600 different muscles ; and whoever duly considers these will find, that in each of them nature must have adjusted, at least, ten different circumstances, in order to attain the end which she proposed ; proper figure, just magnitude, right disposition of the several ends, the upper and lower position of the whole, the due insertion of the several nerves, veins, and arteries ; so that in the muscles alone, above 6000 several views and intentions must have been formed and executed.—The bones he calculates to be 284.—The distinct purposes aimed at in the structure of each above forty.—What a prodigious display of ar-

tifice even in these simple and homogeneous parts. But if we consider the skin, ligaments, vessels, glandules, humours, the several limbs and members of the body, how must our astonishment rise upon us, in proportion to the number and intricacy of the parts so artificially adjusted? The further we advance in these researches, we discover new scenes of art and wisdom; but descry at a distance further scenes beyond our reach, in the fine internal structure of the parts, in the œconomy of the brain, in the fabric of the seminal vessels.---All these artifices are repeated in every different species of animal, with wonderful variety and with exact propriety, suited to the different intentions of nature in framing each species.---And if the infidelity of Galen, even when these natural sciences were still imperfect, could not withstand such striking appearances; to what pitch of pertinacious obstinacy must a philosopher in this age have attained, who can now doubt of a Supreme Intelligence? Could I meet with a man of this kind, I would ask him, Supposing there were a God who did not discover himself immediately to the senses; were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of Nature? What, indeed, could such a divine being do, except copy the present economy of things; render many of his artifices so plain, that no stupidity could mistake them; afford glimpses of still greater artifices, which demonstrate this prodigious superiority above our narrow apprehensions; and con-

ceal altogether a great many from such imperfect creatures? Now, according to all rules of just reasoning, every fact must pass for undisputed, when it is supported by all the arguments which its nature admits of; even though these arguments be not very forcible or numerous: how much more in the present case, where no human imagination can compute their number, and no understanding estimate their cogency? The comparison of the universe to a machine is so obvious and natural, and is justified by so many instances of order and design in nature, that it must immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions, and procure universal approbation.---That the works of nature bear a great analogy to the productions of art, is evident; and, according to all the rules of good reasoning, we ought to infer, if we argue at all concerning them, that their causes have a proportional analogy. But as there are also considerable differences, we have reason to suppose a proportional difference in the causes; and in particular ought to attribute a much higher degree of power and energy to the Supreme Cause than any we have ever observed in mankind.---Here, then, the existence of a Deity is plainly ascertained by reason: and if we make it a question, Whether, on account of these analogies, we can properly call him a Mind or Intelligence, notwithstanding the vast difference which may reasonably be supposed between him and human minds; what is this but a mere verbal contro-

versy? No man can deny the analogies between the effects: to restrain ourselves from inquiring concerning the causes is scarcely possible. From this inquiry the legitimate conclusion is, that the causes have also an analogy: and if we are not contented with calling the first and supreme cause a God or Deity, but desire to vary the expression, what can we call him but Mind or Thought, to which he is justly supposed to bear a considerable resemblance? So that this controversy is a dispute of words.
—*Hume.*

DEITY, TO DISCOVER A.—To discover a Deity, mankind must open the sacred volume of God's works; consider the obvious fitness of every cause to produce its effect; the proof which this affords of intention and design; the harmony and order which prevails wherever we have clear and perfect views; and the invariable certainty with which virtue and happiness arise to individuals, and nations, from the laws of this order. Let them go one step, and one step only, into the region of analogy and imagination; let them suppose these great qualities—these intentions, this design, this goodness, not to be scattered through the universe, but to belong to one being who actuates it; and they will know all that can possibly be known of God. Beware of trusting your imagination one moment longer. She has soared her utmost height: and every effort she makes will be towards the earth, and will generate error and absurdity. You are to glance only by the utmost exertion of

your abilities at that Being who is incomprehensible; and you are to be satisfied with few and general ideas on so great a subject. When a man has obtained general proofs, that the universe is replete with the effects of wisdom, directed to the happiness of its inhabitants, he has all the knowledge he can ever have of God. All his further enquiries, when judiciously made, will only furnish additional evidence to the same general truth. But whether he be Nature itself, or a principle distinct from and animating it; whether he consist of matter or spirit; whether he be infinite space or a mathematical point; whether he be undefinable and have no form, or have any determinate figure; and reside in a particular place. These are ridiculous and mischievous questions; because, we have no possibility of being informed on the subjects of them; because they mislead us from truth, the principle of virtue, to visions and errors, the principles of vice; they create differences, generate divisions, and destroy the general harmony and benevolence, which were designed to reign through the whole universe.—All nature is an altar to the unknown God.—*Williams.*

DEITY, BELIEF OF A.—The belief of an invisible, intelligent Power, has been very generally diffused over the human race, in all places and in all ages; but it has neither, perhaps, been so universal as to admit of no exceptions, nor has it been in any degree uniform in the ideas which it has suggested. Some nations have been discovered,

who entertain no sentiments of religion, if travellers and historians may be credited; and no two nations, and scarce any two men, have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiments. It would appear, then, that this pre-conception springs not from an original instinct, or primary impression of Nature; since every instinct of that kind must be absolutely universal in all nations and ages, and must have always a precise determinate object which it inflexibly pursues. The first religious principles, therefore, are secondary; such as may easily be perverted by various accidents and causes, and whose operation, too, in some cases, may, by an extraordinary concurrence of circumstances, be altogether prevented.—*Hume*.

DEITY, THE WORSHIP OF THE.—To know God, says Seneca, is to worship him. All other worship is, indeed, absurd, superstitious, and even impious. It degrades him to the low condition of mankind, who are delighted with intreaty, solicitation, presents, and flattery. Yet is this impiety the smallest of which superstition is guilty. Commonly, it depresses the Deity far below the condition of mankind; and represents him as a capricious dæmon, who exercises his power without reason and without humanity! And were the Divine Being disposed to be offended at the vices and follies of silly mortals, who are his own workmanship, ill would it surely fare with the votaries of most popular superstitions. Nor would any of the human race merit his favour, but a very few, the philosophical

Theists, who entertain suitable notions of his divine perfections: as the only persons entitled to his compassion and indulgence would be the philosophical Sceptics, a sect almost equally rare; who, from a natural diffidence of their own capacity, suspend, or endeavour to suspend, all judgment with regard to such sublime and such extraordinary subjects.—*Hume*.

DELICACY, OF TASTE AND OF PASSION.—Some people are subject to a certain delicacy of passion, and others enjoy a delicacy of taste. The first quality makes them extremely sensible to all the accidents of life, and gives them a lively joy upon every prosperous event, as well as a piercing grief when they meet with misfortunes and adversity. Favours and good offices easily engage their friendship; while the smallest injury provokes their resentment. Any honour or mark of distinction elevates them above measure; but they are sensibly touched with contempt.

Delicacy of taste much resembles this delicacy of passion, and produces the same sensibility to beauty and deformity of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations and injuries. When you present a poem or a picture to a man possessed of this talent, the delicacy of his feeling makes him be touched very sensibly with every part of it; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more exquisite relish and satisfaction, than the negligences or absurdities with disgust and uneasiness. A polite and judicious conversation affords him the highest enter-

tainment; rudeness or impertinence is a great punishment to him. Delicacy of passion gives us more lively enjoyments, as well as more pungent sorrows, than are felt by men of cool and sedate tempers; but when every thing is balanced, there is no one who would not, perhaps, rather be of the latter character, were he entirely master of his own disposition. Good or ill fortune is very little at our disposal; and when a person, that has this sensibility of temper, meets with any misfortune, his sorrow or resentment takes entire possession of him, and deprives him of all relish in the common occurrences of life; the right enjoyment of which forms the chief part of our happiness. Not to mention, that men of such lively passions are apt to be transported beyond all bounds of prudence and discretion, and to take false steps in the conduct of life, which are often irretrievable. Delicacy of taste has also the same effect as delicacy of passion: it enlarges the sphere, both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as well as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind. A delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining our choice to few people, and making us indifferent to the company and conversation of the greatest part of mankind. Mere men of the world, whatever strong sense they may be endowed with, are seldom very nice in distinguishing characters, or marking those insensible differences and gradations which make one man preferable to another. Any one that has

competent sense is sufficient for their entertainment. But one that has well digested his knowledge, both of books and men, has little enjoyment but in the company of a few select companions. He feels too sensibly, how much all the rest of mankind fall short of the notions which he has entertained.

How far delicacy of taste and that of passion are connected together, in the original frame of the mind, it is hard to determine. However, there appears a very considerable connection between them; but, notwithstanding this connection, delicacy of taste is as much to be desired and cultivated, as delicacy of passion is to be lamented, and to be remedied, if possible. The good or ill accidents of life are very little at our disposal; but we are pretty much masters what books we shall read, what diversions we shall partake of, and what company we shall keep.—*Hume.*

DELIRIUMS.—Deliriums sometimes attend diseases, especially acute ones. In these, a disagreeable state is introduced into the nervous system by the bodily disorder, which checks the rise of pleasant associations, and gives force and quickness to disgusting ones; and which, consequently, would, of itself alone, if sufficient in degree, vitiate and distort all the reasonings of the sick person. But, besides this, it seems that in deliriums attending distempers, a vivid train of visible images forces itself upon the patient's eye; and that either from a disorder of the nerves, and blood vessels of the eye itself, or from one in the brain, or one in the

alimentary duct; or, which is most probable, from a concurrence of all these. It seems also, that the wild discourse of delirious persons is accommodated to this train in some imperfect manner; and that it becomes so wild, partly from the incoherence of the parts of this train, partly from its not expressing even this incoherent train adequately, but deviating into such phrases as the vibrations excited by the distemper in parts of the brain, corresponding to the auditory nerves, or in parts still more internal, and consequently the seats of ideas purely intellectual, produce by their associated influence over the organs of speech.

That delirious persons have such trains forced upon the eye from internal causes, appears probable from hence; that when they first begin to be delirious and talk wildly, it is generally at those times only when they are in the dark, so as to have all visible objects excluded: for, upon bringing a candle to them, and presenting common objects, they recover themselves, and talk rationally till the candle be removed again. From hence we may conclude, that the real objects overpower the visible train, from internal causes, while the delirium is in its infancy; and that the patient relapses as soon as he is shut up in the dark, because the visible train from internal causes overpowers that which would rise up, were the person's nervous system in a natural state, according to the usual course of association and the recurrent recollection of the place and circumstances in which he is situa-

ted. By degrees the visible train, from internal causes, grows so vivid, by the increase of the distemper, as even to overpower the impressions from real objects; at least frequently and in a great degree, and so as to intermix itself with them, and to make an inconsistency in the words and actions: and thus the patient becomes quite delirious.

Persons inclining to be delirious in distempers, are most apt to be so going to sleep, and in waking from sleep; in which circumstances the visible trains are more vivid than when we are quite awake.

It casts also some light on this subject, that tea and coffee will sometimes occasion such trains; and that they arise in our first attempts to sleep after those liquors.

As death approaches, the deliriums attending diseases abound with far more incoherencies and inconsistencies than any other species of alienations of the mind, the natural result of the entire disorder of the nervous system. However, there are some cases of death, where the nervous system continues free from disorder to the last, as far as by-standers can judge.—*Hartley*.

DELUGE.—When people undertake to defend any system of theology, there is nothing, however absurd or improbable, that they will not attempt to vindicate. Nay, let the thing be absolutely impossible, according to the laws of nature, "A miracle!" they exclaim, and the thing is resolved at once; as if the all-wise author of nature had no way of carrying on his work but by

every now and then thwarting and interrupting the laws which he himself, in the plenitude of his wisdom, had established. When a man has made a piece of machinery which he finds does not answer his intention, he alters and tries to make it more perfect; but, to suppose that the omniscient Creator should not have foreseen and provided for all possible contingencies that might happen to his work, is to judge of the Almighty from ourselves, and to ascribe to him the weaknesses of the frail beings whom he has deigned to create.

The deluge is one of those circumstances mentioned in the Jewish books, which it is impossible could have happened without a total subversion of the laws of nature. The writer or compiler of these books, which were so long concealed from all the world by the miserable horde of barbarians, among whom they were compiled, shows, in almost every instance, his utter ignorance of the laws by which the universe is governed. In his account of the Creation of the "*Heaven and the earth*," as he calls it (Genesis vi. 1.) he makes day and night to exist during the three first days, although the sun is not created *till the fourth day*. The sun, which is 10,000 times larger than this globe, is made solely for the use of it, without any reference to the eight or ten additional planets of which it is the common centre. He makes what he calls a *fir-mament*, and divides the waters which were under it from those which were above it. He then makes the waters under the fir-

mament be gathered into one place; as if, from the natural laws of fluids, the waters would not have sought their own level! After this, he makes the sun and moon "*to rule the day and night*," and then the stars "*to give light upon the earth*! He then says that the Creator made man after his own image, and gave him dominion over all the earth; but sometime afterwards, "when men began to multiply on the face of the earth, and had daughters born unto them, the sons of God (who were they?) saw that the daughters of men were fair; and they took them wives of all which they chose; and there were giants in the earth in those days, and after that, when the sons of God came in unto the daughters of men, they bare children to them, and the same became mighty men, men of renown;" (Genesis, c. vi. v. 1, 2, and 4.)

Well, after this story about the sons of God marrying the daughters of men; the giants, and the men of renown; the wickedness of man becomes so great, that the writer tells us, "the Lord repented that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart: and he said, I will destroy man whom I have created, from the face of the earth; both man and beast, and the creeping thing, and the fowls of the air; for it repenteth me that I have made them." (v. 6 and 7.) He therefore resolves to destroy them all by drowning them; though it must appear difficult to reconcile to our ideas of justice, the drowning of the poor beasts and birds, which had

certainly not sinned, while the fishes, which were in the same predicament, were not only not destroyed, but were allowed to gambol all over the world!

Fortunately, he relents, and consents to spare a breed of these same wicked men, and of all the inferior animals, by means of a large floating hulk which one Noah is desired to build, and into which they all creep in the greatest order, and with all the quietness imaginable. Well, then, after they are all in, and the door shut, "the fountains of the great deep are broken up, and the windows of the heaven (or firmament) are opened" and down again comes all the water that had been placed above the firmament; so that the waters at length "*prevail*" 15 cubits, or about 26 feet above the tops of the highest hill, and, consequently, drown every animal that lived upon the earth, excepting only those that were snug in the ark with Noah.

To the barbarous and ignorant horde of the Jews, this wild story might appear possible enough; for they knew nothing of the real shape of the earth, but fancied it was long, narrow, and flat like a table: they thought the firmament was made of brass, and that on the top of it rested an immense quantity of water; so that when the "*windows*" of it were opened, the water of course came gushing down, till the windows were "*stopped*" again. Had the writer of this romance known that the earth revolved on its own axis once in 24 hours; that there are hills upon it upwards of

25,000 feet high: he would have paused before he had written such nonsense. Where was all the water to come from to cover the whole of the earth at one and the same time, to the depth of upwards of five and twenty thousand feet? How was it disposed of, where did it *return* to, after it had served to drown all the inhabitants of the earth? Where was the lower level found to drain it off to?—Then, as to the Ark, which was 300 cubits long, 50 broad, and 30 high; or, in our measure, about 525 feet long, $87\frac{1}{2}$ broad, and $52\frac{1}{2}$ high, or about 3004 tons register, could it possibly contain seven pair of all the clean beasts, and one pair of all the unclean ones, with seven pair of each kind of birds, besides all the reptiles and insects, together with their provisions for twelve months? On what were the carnivorous animals fed all this time, and for a long time after they were put ashore seeing that there was nothing upon the earth to feed them with? How did Noah get the Ark built? Did he and his three sons build it; and if so, how long would they be about it? Did none of their neighbours ask them what they were going to do with such a sheer-hulk, and if they learned their intention, would not others have built ships for themselves also? These questions must be left to be answered by the first learned bishop who thinks it worth his while.

One thing more, and we have done. Had God really been the capricious being here represented, as "having repented him of

having made man, &c." could he not have destroyed his creation without the clumsy expedient of a deluge? Would not a single word from him have sufficed for that purpose? But we may rest assured that God is *not* a fickle and capricious being;—that he did *not* "*repent*" him of what he had done; and that he never did alter or suspend his wisely ordained and immutable laws, in order to drown men because they were exactly what he himself had made them.—*Bow-bridge.*

DELUGE.—That ever the whole globe was at one time totally overflowed with water, is physically impossible. The sea may have covered all parts successively one after the other; and this could be only in a gradation so very slow, as to take up a prodigious number of ages. The sea, in the space of five hundred years, has withdrawn from Aiguemortes, from Frejus, and from Ravenna, once large ports, leaving about two leagues of land quite dry. This progression shows, that to make the circuit of the globe, it would require two millions two hundred thousands years. A very remarkable circumstance is, that this period comes very near to that which the earth's axis would take up in raising itself again, and coinciding with the equator. A motion so far from improbable, that for these fifty years past some apprehension has been entertained of it; but it cannot be accomplished under two millions three hundred thousand years.—The strata or beds of shells every where found, sixty, eighty, and

even a hundred leagues from the sea, prove, beyond all dispute, that it has insensibly deposited those maritime products on ground which was once its shores: but that the water at one and the same time covered the whole earth, is a physical absurdity, which the laws of gravitation, as well as those of fluids, and the deficiency of the quantity of water, demonstrates to be impossible. The universal deluge was a miracle.—*Voltaire.*

DESTINY.—The world subsists either by its own nature, by its physical laws, or a Supreme Being has formed it by his primitive laws. In either case these laws are immutable; in either case every thing is necessary. Heavy bodies gravitate towards the centre of the earth, and cannot tend to remain in the air; pear-trees can never bear pine-apples; the instinct of a spaniel can never be the instinct of an ostrich; every thing is arranged, set in motion, and limited. Man can have but a certain number of teeth, hair, and ideas; and a time comes when he necessarily loses them. It is a contradiction that what was yesterday has not been, and what is to-day should not be: No less a contradiction is it, that a thing which is to be should not come to pass. If thou couldst give a turn to the destiny of a fly, I see no reason why thou mightest not as well determine the destiny of all other flies, of all other animals, of all men, and of all nature; so that at last thou wouldst be more powerful than God himself. It is common for weak people to say, Such a physician has cured

a person of a dangerous illness ; he has added to his life ten years. Others as weak, but in their own opinion very wise, say, The prudent man owes his fortune to himself. But the prudent man oftentimes is crushed by his destiny, instead of making it: it is their destiny that renders men prudent. The physician has saved a person; allowed: But herein he certainly did not reverse the order of nature; he conformed to it. It is evident that the person could not hinder his being born in such a town, and having a certain illness at such a time: that the physician could be no where but in the town where he was; that the person was to send for him; and that he was to prescribe those medicines which effected the cure. A peasant imagines that the hail which is fallen in his ground is purely matter of chance; but the philosopher knows that there is no such thing as chance; and that by the constitution of the world, it must necessarily have hailed that day in that very place.

Some, alarmed at this truth, say, there are necessary events, and others which are not so: but it would be odd indeed that one part of this world were fixed and not the other; that some things which happen were to happen, and that others which happen were not necessarily to happen. On a close examination, the doctrine which opposes that of destiny must appear loaded with absurdities, and contrary to the idea of an eternal Providence. But many are destined to reason wrongly; others not to reason at all; and

others to persecute those who do reason.—*Voltaire.*

DISCRETION.—The quality the most necessary for the execution of any useful enterprize is *discretion*; by which we carry on a safe intercourse with others; give due attention to their own and to their character; weigh each circumstance of the business which we undertake; and employ the surest and safest means for the attainment of any end or purpose. To a *Cromwell*, perhaps, or a *De Retz*, discretion may appear an alderman-like virtue, as Dr. Swift calls it; and being incompatible with those vast designs to which their courage and ambition prompted them, it might really in them be a fault or imperfection. But in the conduct of ordinary life, no virtue is more requisite, not only to obtain success, but to avoid the most fatal miscarriages and disappointments. The greatest parts without it, as observed by an elegant writer, may be fatal to their owner: as Polyphemus, deprived of his eye, was only the more exposed, on account of his enormous strength and stature.

The best character, indeed, were it not rather too perfect for human nature, is that which is not swayed by temper of any kind, but alternately employs enterprize and caution, as each is useful to the particular purpose intended. Such is the excellence which St. Evremond ascribes to *Mareschal Turenne*, who displayed, in every campaign as he grew older, more temerity in his military enterprizes; and being now, from long experience, perfectly

acquainted with every incident in war, he advanced with greater firmness and security in a road so well known to him. Fabius, says Machiavel, was cautious; Scipio enterprising: and both succeeded; because the situation of Roman affairs, during the command of each, was peculiarly adapted to his genius; but both would have failed had these situations been reversed. He is happy whose circumstances suit his temper; but he is more excellent who can suit his temper to any circumstances.—*Hume*.

DIVISIBILITY OF MATTER.—In matter we have no clear ideas of the smallness of parts, much beyond the smallest that occurs to any of our senses: and, therefore, when we talk of the divisibility of matter *in infinitum*, though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility, and have also clear ideas of parts made out of a whole by division; yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles, or minute bodies so to be divided, when by former divisions they are reduced to a smallness, much exceeding the perception of any of our senses: and so all that we have clear and distinct ideas of, is, of what division in general or abstractedly is, and the relation of *totum* and *pars*: But of the bulk of the body, to be thus infinitely divided after certain progressions, I think we have no clear nor distinct idea at all. For I ask any one, whether taking the smallest atom of dust he ever saw, he has any distinct idea (bating still the number which concerns extension) betwixt the 100,000th, and the 1,000,000th part of it?

Or, if he thinks he can refine his ideas to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of these numbers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable to be supposed; since a division carried on so far brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first division in two halves does. I must confess, that I have no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those bodies; having but a very obscure one of either of them. So that I think, when we talk of division of bodies *in infinitum*, our ideas of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes, after a little progression, to be confounded and almost lost in obscurity. For that idea which is to represent only bigness, must be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big but only by number: so that we have clear distinct ideas, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct ideas of two such extensions. It is plain, from hence, that when we talk of infinite divisibility of body, or extension, our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers.—*Locke*.

DIVORCE AND REPUDIATION.—

There is this difference between a divorce and a repudiation, that the former is made by mutual consent arising from a mutual antipathy; while the latter is formed by the will and for the advantage of one of the two parties, independently of the will and advantage of the other.

The necessity there is sometimes for women to repudiate,

and the difficulty there always is in doing it, render that law very tyrannical which gives this right to men, without granting it to women. A husband is the master of the house; he has a thousand ways of confining his wife to her duty, or of bringing her back to it: so that, in his hands, it seems as if repudiation could be only a fresh abuse of power. But a wife who repudiates, only makes use of a dreadful kind of remedy. It is always a great misfortune for her to go in search of a second husband, when she has lost the most part of her attractions with another. One of the advantages attending the charms of youth in the female sex is, that in advanced age the husband is led to complacency and love, by the remembrance of past pleasures.

It is, then, a *general rule*, that in all countries where the laws have given to men the power of repudiating, they ought also to grant it to women. Nay, in climates where women live in domestic slavery, one would think that the law ought to favour women with the right of repudiation, and husbands only with that of divorce.

When wives are confined in a seraglio, the husband ought not to repudiate on account of opposition of manners; it is the husband's fault if their manners are incompatible.

Repudiation, on account of the barrenness of the women, ought never to take place but where there are many: this is of no importance to the husband.

The law of the Maldivians permitted them to take a wife whom

they had repudiated. A law of Mexico forbade their being re-united, under pain of death. The law of Mexico was more rational than that of the Maldivians: at the time even of the dissolution, it tended to the perpetuity of marriage. Instead of this, the law of the Maldivians seemed equally to sport with marriage and repudiation.

The law of Mexico admitted only of divorce. This was a particular reason for their not permitting those who were voluntarily separated be ever re-united. Repudiation seems chiefly to proceed from a hastiness of temper, and from the dictates of passion; while divorce appears to be an affair of deliberation,

Divorces are frequently of great political use: but as to the civil utility, they are established only for the advantage of the husband and wife; and are not always favourable to their children.—

Montesquieu.

DOTAGE.—The dotage of old persons is oftentimes something more than a mere decay of memory: for they mistake things present for others; and their discourse is often foreign to the objects that are presented to them. However, the imperfection of their memories, in respect of impressions just made, or at short intervals of past time, is one principal source of their mistakes. One may suppose here, that the part of the brain which receives ideas is decayed in a peculiar manner, perhaps from too great use; while the parts appropriated to the natural, vital, and animal motions, remained tolerably perfect. The sinuses of the brain

are probably considerably distended in these cases, and the brain itself in a languishing state; for there seems to be a considerable resemblance between the inconsistencies of some kinds of dotage and those of dreams. Besides which, it may be observed, that in dotage the person is often sluggish and lethargic; and that, as a defect of the nutritive faculty in the brain, will permit the sinuses to be more easily distended, so a distension of the sinuses from this or any other cause may impede the due nutrition of the brain. We see that in old persons all the parts, even the bones themselves, waste and grow less. Why may not this happen to the brain, the origin of all, and arise from an obstruction of the infinitely small vessels of the nervous system; this obstruction causing such a degree of capacity, as greatly to abate, or even destroy, the powers of association and memory? When old persons relate the incidents of their youth with great precision, it is rather owing to the memory of many preceding memories, recollections, and relations, than to the memory of the thing itself.—*Hartley.*

DREAMS.—We have many striking instances of dreaming in men and animals. The poet versifies, the mathematician views figures, the metaphysician reasons, and the dog hunts in his dreams. Is this the action of the body's organs, or is it merely the soul, which, now freed from the power of the senses, acts in the full enjoyment of its properties? If the organs alone produce our dreams by night, why not our ideas by

day? If it be merely the soul acting of itself, and quiet by the suspension of the senses, which is the only cause and subject of all our sleeping ideas; whence is it that they are almost ever irrational, irregular, and incoherent? Can it be that, in the time of the soul's most abstract quietude, its imagination would be the most confused? Is it fantastical when free? Were it born with metaphysical ideas, as some writers, who were troubled with waking dreams, have affirmed, its pure and luminous ideas of being, of infinitude, and of all the primary principles, naturally should awake in her with the greatest energy when the body is sleeping, and men should philosophise best in their dreams.—Whatever system you espouse, however you may labour to prove that memory stirs the brain, and your brain your soul; you must allow that, in all your ideas in sleep, you are entirely passive; your will has no share in those images. Thus it is clear, that you can think seven or eight hours on a stretch, without having the least inclination to think, and even without being certain that you do think. Consider this, and tell me what is man's compound? Superstition has always dealt much in dreams; nothing, indeed, was more natural. A man deeply concerned about his mistress who lies ill, dreams that he sees her dying; and the next day she actually dies: then, to be sure, God had given him previous knowledge of his beloved's death.—A commander of an army dreams much of gaining a battle; gains it: then the Gods had inti-

mated to him, that he should be conqueror.—It is only such dreams as meet with some accomplishment that are taken notice of; the others we think not worth remembrance. Dreams make full as great a part of ancient history as oracles.

*Somnia quæ ludunt animos volitantibus umbris,
Non delubra deum, nec ab æthere numina mittunt,
Sed sua quisque facit.*

Voltaire.

DRESS, FEMALE.—It is well known, that a loose and easy dress contributes much to give both sexes those fine proportions of body, that are observable in the Grecian statues, and which serve as models to our present artists; nature being too much disfigured among us to afford them any such.

---The Greeks knew nothing of those Gothic shackles, that multiplicity of ligatures and bandages, with which our bodies are compressed. Their women were ignorant of the use of whalebone stays, by which ours distort their shape, instead of displaying it. This practice, carried to so great an excess as it is in England, must, in time, degenerate the species, and is an instance of bad taste. - Can it be a pleasing sight to behold a woman cut in two in the middle, as it were, like a wasp? On the contrary, it is as shocking to the eye as it is painful to the imagination. A fine shape, like the limbs, hath its due size and proportion; a diminution of which is certainly a defect. Such a deformity, also, would be shocking in a naked figure; wherefore, then, should it be esteemed a beauty in one that is dressed?

—Every thing that confine and lays nature under a restraint is an instance of bad taste: this is as true in regard to the ornaments of the body as to the embellishments of the mind. Life, health, reason, and convenience, ought to be taken first into consideration. Gracefulness cannot subsist without ease; delicacy is not debility; nor must a woman be sick in order to please. Infirmary and sickness may excite our pity; but desire and pleasure require the bloom and vigour of health.---*Rousseau.*

DURATION.—It is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another, in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas, one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of *succession*: and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call *duration*. For whilst we are thinking, or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our mind, we know that we do exist, and so we call the existence, or the continuation of the existence of ourselves, or any thing else, commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the *duration* of ourselves, or any other thing co-existing with our thinking.

That we have our notion of *succession* and *duration* from this original, viz. from reflection on the train of ideas, which we find to appear one after another

in our own minds, seems plain to me, in that we have no perception of *duration*, but by considering the train of ideas that take their turns in our understanding. When that succession of ideas ceases, our perception of duration ceases with it, which every one clearly experiences in himself whilst he sleeps soundly, whether an hour, or a day, or a month, or a year; of which duration of things, whilst he sleeps, or thinks not, he has no perception at all, but it is quite lost to him; and the moment wherein he leaves off to think, until the moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no distance. And so I doubt not but it will be to a waking man, if it were possible for him to keep only one *idea* in his mind, without variation, and the succession of others. And we see, that one who fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing, so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind, whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation, lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration, and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration, it is because during that time we have no succession of ideas in our minds. For if a man, during his sleep, dreams, and a variety of ideas make themselves perceptible in his mind one after another, he hath, then, during such a dreaming, a sense of *duration*, and of the length of it, by which it is to me very clear, that men derive their ideas of duration from their *reflection on the train*

of the ideas they observe to succeed one another, in their own understandings; without which observation they can have no notion of *duration*, whatever may happen in the world.—

Locke.

ECCLESIASTICAL POWER AND ITS INFLUENCE. — In all Christian churches the benefices of the clergy are a sort of freeholds, which they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life or good behaviour. If they held them by a more precarious tenure, and were liable to be turned out upon every slight disobligation, either of the sovereign or of his ministers, it would, perhaps, be impossible for them to maintain their authority with the people; who would then consider them as mercenary dependents upon the court, in the sincerity of whose instructions they could no longer have any confidence. But should the sovereign attempt, irregularly, and by violence, to deprive any number of clergymen of their freeholds, on account perhaps of their having propagated, with more than ordinary zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine; he would only render, by such persecution, both them and their doctrine ten times more popular, and therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous than they had been before. Fear is, in almost all cases, a wretched instrument of government, and ought in particular never to be employed against any order of men, who have the smallest pretensions to independency. To attempt to terrify them, serves only to irritate their bad humour, and, to

confirm them in an opposition, which more gentle usage perhaps might easily induce them either to soften or to lay aside altogether. The violence which the French government usually employed, in order to oblige all their parliaments, or sovereign courts of justice, to enregister any unpopular edict, very seldom succeeded: The means commonly employed, however, the imprisonment of all the refractory members, one would think, were forcible enough. The princes of the house of Stuart, sometimes employed the like means, in order to influence some of the members of the Parliament of England; and they generally found them equally intractable. The Parliament of England is now managed in another manner; and a very small experiment, which the Duke of Choiseul made about twelve years ago upon the Parliament of Paris, demonstrated sufficiently, that all the Parliaments of France might have been managed still more easily in the same manner. That experiment was not pursued. For though management and persuasion are always the easiest and the safest instruments of government, as force and violence are the worst and the most dangerous; yet such, it seems, is the natural insolence of man, that he almost always disdains to use the good instrument, except when he cannot or dare not use the bad one. The French government could and durst use force, and therefore disdained to use management and persuasion. But there is no order of men, it appears, I believe, from the ex-

perience of all ages, upon whom it is so dangerous, or rather so perfectly ruinous, to employ force and violence, as upon the respected clergy of any established church. The rights, the privileges, the personal liberty of every individual ecclesiastic, who is upon good terms with his own order, are, even in the most despotic governments, more respected than those of any other person of nearly equal rank and fortune. It is so in every gradation of despotism, from that of the gentle and mild government of Paris, to that of the violent and furious government of Constantinople. But though this order of men can scarce be ever forced, they may be managed as easily as any other; and the security of the Sovereign, as well as the public tranquillity, seems to depend very much upon the means which he has of managing them; and those means seem to consist altogether in the preferment which he has to bestow upon them.

In the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy, and of the people of the Episcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and while they did retain it, they almost always acted under the influence of the clergy, who in such spiritual matters appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found it easier to elect their own bishops themselves. The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the

monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of abbeys. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended within the diocese were collated by the bishop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church preferments were in this manner in the disposal of the church. The sovereign, though he might have some indirect influence in those elections, and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his consent to elect, and his approbation of the election, yet had no direct or sufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not so much to his sovereign, as to his own order, from which only he could expect preferment.

Through the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himself, first, the collation of almost all bishoprics and abbeys, or of what were called Consistorial benefices; and afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices, comprehended within each diocese; little more being left to the bishop than what was barely necessary to give him a decent authority with his own clergy. By this arrangement, the condition of the sovereign was still worse than it had been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a sort of spiritual army; dispersed in different quarters, indeed, but of which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform

plan. The clergy of each particular country might be considered as a particular detachment of that army, of which the operations could easily be supported and seconded by all the other detachments, quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependent upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all the other detachments.

Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the ancient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety, both of princes and private persons, had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were established of the same kind with those of the great barons; and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace, without the support or assistance either of the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there, without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their parti-

cular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the King's courts, as those of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords; and therefore, liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy possessed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues arising from both those species of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures, for the produce of which they could exchange the surplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the ancient clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They not only maintained almost all the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the hospitality of

the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were often as numerous as those of the greatest lay lords; and the retainers of all the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay lords. There was always much more union among the lay lords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority: The latter were under no regular discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been less numerous than those of the great lay lords, and their tenants were probably much less numerous; yet their union would have rendered them more formidable. The hospitality and charity of the clergy, too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increased very much the weight of their spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest respect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people; of whom many were constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or relating to so popular an order, its possessions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of the common people; and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest act of sacrilegious wickedness and profaneness. In this state of things, if the Sovereign frequently found it difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the great nobili-

ty, we cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the united force of the clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances, the wonder is, not that he was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he ever was able to resist.

The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us who live in the present times appear the most absurd), their total exemption from the secular jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit of clergy, were the natural or rather the necessary consequences of this state of things. How dangerous must it have been for the Sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were disposed to protect him, and to represent either the proof as insufficient for convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion? The Sovereign could, in such circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts, who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes or even from giving occasion to such gross scandal, as might disgust the minds of the people.

In the state in which things were, through the greater part of Europe, during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that period,

the constitution of the church of Rome may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed, against the authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind, which can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them. In that constitution, the grossest delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner, by the private interests of so great a number of people, as put them out of all danger from any assault of human reason: because, though human reason might perhaps have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of superstition; it could never have dissolved the ties of private interest. Had this constitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, it must have endured for ever. But that immense and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was, by the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed; and is now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins altogether.

The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed, in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy,

like the great barons, found something for which they could exchange their rude produce; and thereby discovered the means of spending their whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. Their retainers became consequently less numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy, too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their landlord estates, in order to spend it, in the same manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by granting leases to their tenants; who, thereby, became in a great measure independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and dissolved. They were even broken and dissolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to the great barons: because the benefices of the church being, the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which they had

once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced through the greater part of Europe to what arose from her spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened, when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity, luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor.

In this situation of things, the sovereigns in the different states of Europe endeavoured to recover the influence which they had once had, in the disposal of the great bodies of the church, by procuring to the deans and chapters of each diocese, the restoration of their ancient right of electing the bishop, and to the monks of each abbacy that of electing the abbot. The re-establishing of this ancient order was the object of several statutes enacted in England, during the course of the fourteenth century, particularly of what is called the Statute of Provisors; and of the Pragmatic Sanction established in France in the fifteenth century. In order to render the election valid, it was necessary that the Sovereign should both consent to it before-

hand, and afterwards approve of the person elected; and though the election was still supposed to be free, he had, however, all the indirect means which his situation necessarily afforded him, of influencing the clergy in his own dominions. Other regulations of a similar tendency were established in other parts of Europe. But the power of the Pope in the collation of the great benefices of the church seems, before the Reformation, to have been no where so effectually and so universally restrained as in France and England. The Concordat afterwards, in the sixteenth century, gave to the kings of France the absolute right of presenting to all the great, or what are called the Consistorial, benefices of the Gallican church.

Since the establishment of the Pragmatic sanction, and of the Concordat, the clergy of France have in general shown less respect to the decrees of the Papal court than the clergy of any other Catholic country. In all the disputes which their Sovereign has had with the Pope, they have almost constantly taken party with the former. This independency of the clergy of France upon the court of Rome, seems to be principally founded upon the Pragmatic sanction, and the Concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy, the clergy of France appear to have been as much devoted to the Pope as those of any other country. When Robert, the second Prince of the Capetian race, was most unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own servants,

it is said, threw the victuals which came from his table, to the dogs, and refused to taste any thing themselves which had been polluted by the contact of a person in his situation. They were taught to do so, it may very safely be presumed, by the clergy of his own dominions.

The claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim, in defence of which, the court of Rome had frequently shaken, and sometimes overturned, the thrones of some of the greatest sovereigns in Christendom, was in this manner either restrained or modified, or given up altogether, in many different parts of Europe, even before the time of the Reformation. As the clergy had now less influence over the people, so the state had more influence over the clergy. The clergy, therefore, had both less power, and less inclination, to disturb the state. The authority of the church of Rome was in this state of declension at the time of the Reformation.—*A. Smith.*

ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL POWERS, THE ADVANTAGE OF UNITING THEM IN EVERY GOVERNMENT.—
The union of the civil and ecclesiastical powers serves extremely in every civilized government to the maintenance of peace and order, and prevents those mutual encroachments which, as there can be no ultimate judge between them, are often attended with the most dangerous consequences. Whether the supreme magistrate who unites these powers, receives the appellation of Prince, or Prelate, it is not material.—

The superior weight which temporal interests commonly bear, in the apprehensions of men, above spiritual, renders the civil part of his character most prevalent; and, in time, prevents those gross impostures, and bigotted persecutions, which, in all false religions, are the chief foundation of clerical authority.—*Hume*.

ECONOMY.—The pursuit of the objects of private interest in all common, little, and ordinary cases, ought to flow rather from a regard to the general rules which prescribe such conduct, than from any passion for the objects themselves. To be anxious, or to be laying a plot either to gain or save a single shilling, would degrade the most vulgar tradesmen in the opinion of all his neighbours. Let his circumstances be ever so mean, no attention to any such small matters, for the sake of the things themselves, must appear in his conduct. His situation may require the most severe economy, and the most exact assiduity; but each particular exertion of that economy and assiduity must proceed, not so much from a regard to that particular saving or gain, as from the general rule which to him prescribes, with the utmost rigour, such a tenor of conduct. His parsimony today must not arise from a desire of the particular three-pence which he will save by it; nor his attendance in his shop from a passion for the particular ten-pence which he will acquire by it: both the one and the other ought to proceed solely from a regard to the general rule, which prescribes, with the most un-

relenting severity, this plan of conduct to all persons in his way of life. In this consists the difference between the character of a miser and that of a person of exact economy and assiduity. The one is anxious about small matters for their own sake; the other attends to them only in consequence of the scheme of life which he has laid down to himself.—*A. Smith*.

EDUCATION.—The time which we usually bestow on the instruction of our children in principles, the reasons of which they do not understand, is worse than lost: it is teaching them to resign their faculties to authority; it is improving their memories instead of their understandings; it is giving them credulity instead of knowledge; and it is preparing them for any kind of slavery which can be imposed on them. Whereas, if we assisted them in making experiments on themselves; induced them to attend to the consequence of every action, to adjust their little deviations, and fairly and freely to exercise their powers; they would collect facts which nothing could controvert. These facts they would deposit in their memories as in secure and eternal treasures; they would be materials for reflection, and, in time, be formed into principles of conduct, which no circumstances or temptations could remove. This would be a method of forming a man who would answer the end of his being, and make himself and others happy.—*Williams*.

EDUCATION.—If men were educated to use the powers of their minds freely; to investigate, by their own industry, all the prin-

ciples they want; to consider nothing as an intellectual acquisition but in consequence of such investigation: this knowledge would be a sure foundation of virtue, and human life would have few crimes or miseries to infest it. Instead of this, they are educated to take almost every thing from others, and to suffer their own powers to lie inactive. Most of the vices of the world have arisen from the habit men have so long been in of believing, instead of inquiring. A mind that is trained to inquiry, is trained in a kind of activity which will lead to virtue. A mind in which this activity is suppressed, has a greater difficulty in becoming virtuous, and is a much easier prey to vice. It seems to acquire knowledge, and has none; and false knowledge is worse than none. All the wisdom we obtain, by believing as we are commanded, and committing to memory principles, doctrines, and opinions, which we have never considered or do not understand, is so much poison in the mind, which acts the more surely and fatally as we have no apprehension of danger from it. We see men overwhelmed with what they call doctrines and principles, both of religion and morality, without being of any use to the world, and without ever performing a religious or moral action. It was not so when men were educated to inquire, to think, to form to themselves a few principles which they comprehended and felt, and to act on them. This was the case in the best ages of Greece. Education had a few simple and im-

portant objects; and they always related to private and public virtue. It underwent some modifications, according to the circumstances of the different pupils. It would astonish a modern tutor to know the time and pains which were taken on these few things, and to see what wonderful men were formed in this manner. Education was, then, the art of developing the mind to principles and employments which were suited to it, and giving it habits which would lead to any degree of real knowledge. Education, at present, is a different thing: it is the art of loading the memory with the imperfect and useless knowledge of all languages and all sciences; and our youth are often sent into the world without one principle of real wisdom, and almost incapable of any act of public or private virtue.—*Williams.*

EDUCATION.—The most important and most useful rule of education is, not to gain time, but to lose it. If children took a leap from their mother's breast, and at once arrived at the age of reason, the methods of education now usually taken with them would be very proper: but according to the progress of nature, they require those which are very different. We should not tamper with the mind till it has acquired all its faculties: for it is impossible it should perceive the light we hold out to it while it is blind; or that it should pursue, over an immense plain of ideas, that route which reason hath so slightly traced, as to be perceptible only to the sharpest sight.

The first part of education, therefore, ought to be purely negative. It consists neither in teaching virtue nor truth; but in guarding the heart from vice, and the mind from error. Take the road directly opposite to that which is in use, and you will almost always do right. Never argue with a child, particularly in striving to reconcile him to what he dislikes: for to use him to reason only upon disagreeable subjects, is the way to disgust him, and bring argument early into discredit, with a mind incapable of understanding it. Exercise his corporeal organs, senses, and faculties as much as you please; but keep his intellectual ones inactive as long as possible. Be cautious of all the sentiments he acquires previous to the judgment, which should enable him to scrutinize them: prevent or restrain all foreign impressions; and in order to hinder the rise of evil, be not in too great hurry to instil good; for it is only such when the mind is enlightened by reason. Look upon every delay as an advantage; it is gaining a great deal, to advance without losing any thing: let the infancy of children, therefore, have time to ripen. In short, whatever instruction is necessary for them, take care not to give it them to-day, if it may be deferred without danger till to-morrow.—Another consideration which confirms the utility of this method, is the particular genius of the child, which ought to be known, before it can be judged what moral regimen is adapted to it. Every mind has its peculiar turn,

according to which it ought to be educated; and it is of very material consequence to our endeavours, that it be educated according to that turn, and not to any other. The prudent governor will watch a long time the workings of nature, and will lay the natural character under no unnecessary restraints. If we set about any thing before we know in what manner to act, we proceed at random; liable to mistake, we are frequently obliged to undo what is done, and find ourselves further from the end designed, than if we had been less precipitate to begin the work.—*Rousseau.*

EDUCATION OF CHILDREN.—In the education of children, excessive severity, as well as excessive indulgence, should be equally avoided. If you leave children to suffer, you expose their health, endanger their lives, and make them actually miserable. On the other hand, if you are too anxious to prevent their being sensible of any kind of pain and inconvenience, you only pave their way to feel much greater: you enervate their constitutions, make them tender and effeminate; in a word, you remove them out of their situation as men, into which they must hereafter return, in spite of all your solicitude. In order not to expose them to the few evils nature would inflict on them, you provide for them many which they would otherwise never have suffered.

Can you conceive any being can be truly happy in circumstances inconsistent with its constitution? And is it not inconsistent with the constitution of

man, to endeavour to exempt him from all the evils incident to his species? Man is capacitated to experience great pleasure only by being inured to slight pain: Such is the nature of man. If his physical constitution be too vigorous, his moral constitution tends to depravity. The man who should be ignorant of pain, would be a stranger also to the sensations of humanity, and the tender feelings of compassion for his species: his heart would be unsusceptible of sympathy; he would be unsocial; he would be a monster among his fellow-creatures.

Would you know the most infallible way to make your child miserable? It is to accustom him to obtain every thing he desires: for those desires still increasing from the facility of gratification, your incapacity to satisfy them must sooner or later reduce you to the necessity of a refusal; and that refusal, so new and uncommon, will give him more trouble than even the want of that which he desires. From wanting your cane he will proceed to your watch; he will next want the bird that flies in the air, the star that glitters in the firmament; in short, every thing he sees: nothing less than omnipotence would enable you to satisfy it.

Nature has constituted children to claim our love and assistance; but has she made them to be obeyed and feared? A child should obtain nothing merely because he asks for it, but because he stands in need of it: A child should be made to do nothing out of obedience,

but only out of necessity. Thus the words *command* and *obey* should have no place in his dictionary, much less those of *duty* and *obligation*: but those of power, necessity, impotence, and restraint, ought to stand forth in capitals. It ought to be observed, that as pain is often a necessity, so pleasure is sometimes a natural want. Children have therefore but one desire only which should not be gratified; and this is the desire of exacting obedience. Hence it follows, that in every thing they demand, it is the motive which excites them to make such demand which ought to engage our attention. Indulge them as much as possible in every thing which may give them real pleasure; but constantly refuse them what they require from motives of caprice, or merely to exercise their authority.—*Rousseau*.

EDUCATION, A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF ANCIENT AND MODERN.—Different plans and different institutions for education seem to have taken place in different ages and nations. In the republics of ancient Greece, every free citizen was instructed, under the direction of the public magistrate in gymnastic exercises and in music. By gymnastic exercises it was intended to harden his body, to sharpen his courage, and to prepare him for the fatigues and dangers of war; and as the Greek militia was, by all accounts, one of the best that ever was in the world, this part of their public education must have answered completely the purpose for which it was intended. By the other part, music, it was

proposed, at least by the philosophers and historians who have given us an account of those institutions, to humanize the mind, to soften the temper, and to dispose it for performing all the social and moral duties, both of public and private life.

In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose as those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece, and they seem to have answered it equally well. But among the Romans there was nothing which corresponded to the musical education of the Greeks. The morals of the Romans, however, both in private and public life, seem to have been not only equal, but upon the whole a good deal superior, to those of the Greeks. That they were superior in private life, we have the express testimony of Polybius and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, two authors well acquainted with both nations; and the whole tenor of the Greek and Roman history bears witness to the superiority of the public morals of the Romans. The good temper and moderation of contending factions seems to be the most essential circumstance in the public morals of a free people. But the factions of the Greeks were almost always violent and sanguinary: whereas, till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been shed in any Roman faction; and from the time of the Gracchi the Roman republic may be considered as in reality dissolved. Notwithstanding, therefore, the very respectable authority of Plato Aristotle, and Polybius,

and notwithstanding the very ingenious reasons by which Mr. Montesquieu endeavours to support that authority, it seems probable, that the musical education of the Greeks had no great effect in mending their morals; since, without any such education, those of the Romans were, upon the whole, superior. The respect of those ancient sages for the institutions of their ancestors, had probably disposed them to find much political wisdom in what was, perhaps, merely an ancient custom, continued without interruption from the earliest period of those societies, to the times in which they had arrived, at a considerable degree of refinement. Music and dancing are the great amusements of almost all barbarous nations, and the great accomplishments which are supposed to fit any man for entertaining his society. It is so at this day among the negroes on the coast of Africa. It was so among the ancient Celtes, among the ancient Scandinavians, and, as we learn from Homer, among the ancient Greeks, in the times preceding the Trojan war. When the Greek tribes had formed themselves into little republics, it was natural that the study of those accomplishments should, for a long time, make a part of the public and common education of the people.

The masters, who instructed the young people either in music or in military exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the state, either in Rome, or even in Athens; the Greek republic, of whose laws and customs we are the best

informed. The state required that every free citizen should fit himself for defending it in war, and should, upon that account, learn his military exercises. But it left him to learn them of such masters as he could find; and it seems to have advanced nothing for this purpose, but a public field or place of exercise, in which he should practise and perform them.

In the early ages both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts of education seem to have consisted in learning to read, write, and account, according to the arithmetic of the times.

—Those accomplishments the richer citizens seem frequently to have acquired at home by the assistance of some domestic pedagogue, who was generally either a slave or a freed-man; and the poorer citizens, in the schools of such masters as made a trade of teaching for hire.—

Such parts of education, however, were abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each individual. It does not appear that the state ever assumed any inspection or direction of them. By a law of Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted from maintaining those parents in their old age who had neglected to instruct them in some profitable trade or business.

At Rome, the study of the civil law made a part of the education, not of the greater part of the citizens, but of some particular families. The young people, however, who wished to acquire knowledge in the law, had no public school to go to, and had no other method of studying it,

than by frequenting the company of such of their relations and friends as were supposed to understand it. It is, perhaps, worth while to remark, that though the laws of the twelve tables were, many of them, copied from those of some ancient Greek republics, yet law never seems to have grown up to be a science in any republic of ancient Greece. In Rome it became a science very early, and gave a considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who had the reputation of understanding it. In the republics of ancient Greece, particularly in Athens, the ordinary courts of justice consisted of numerous, and, therefore, disorderly, bodies of people, who frequently decided almost at random, or as clamour, faction, and party-spirit happened to determine. The ignominy of an unjust decision, when it was to be divided among five hundred, a thousand, or fifteen hundred people (for some of their courts were so very numerous), could not fall very heavy upon any individual. At Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of justice consisted either of a single judge, or of a small number of judges, whose characters, especially as they deliberated always in public, could not fail to be very much affected by any rash or unjust decision. In doubtful cases, such courts, from their anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally endeavour to shelter themselves under the example, or precedent, of the judges who had sat before them, either in the same or in some other court. This attention

to practice and precedent necessarily formed the Roman law into that regular and orderly system in which it has been delivered down to us; and the like attention has had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where such attention has taken place. The superiority of character in the Romans over that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of their courts of justice, than to any of the circumstances to which those authors ascribe it. The Romans are said to have been particularly distinguished for their superior respect to an oath. But the people who were accustomed to make oath before some diligent and well-informed court of justice, would naturally be much more attentive to what they swore, than they who were accustomed to do the same thing before mobbish and disorderly assemblies.

The abilities, both civil and military, of the Greeks and Romans, will readily be allowed to have been at least equal to those of any modern nation. Our prejudice is, perhaps, rather to overrate them. But except in what related to military exercises, the state seems to have been at no pains to form those great abilities: for I cannot be induced to believe that the musical education of the Greeks could be of much consequence in forming them. Masters, however, had been found, it seems, for instructing the better sort of people among those nations in every art and science in which the cir-

cumstances of their society rendered it necessary or convenient for them to be instructed. The demand for such instruction produced, what it always produces, the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a very high degree of perfection. In the attention which the ancient philosophers excited in the empire, which they acquired over the opinions and principles of their auditors, in the faculty which they possessed of giving a certain tone and character to the conduct and conversation of those auditors; they appear to have been much superior to any modern teachers. In modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or less corrupted by the circumstances, which render them more or less independent of their success and reputation in their particular professions. Their salaries, too, put the private teacher, who would pretend to come into competition with them, in the same state with a merchant who attempts to trade without a bounty, in competition with those who trade with a considerable one. If he sells his goods at nearly the same price, he cannot have the same profit; and poverty and beggary at least, if not bankruptcy and ruin, will infallibly be his lot. If he attempts to sell them much dearer, he is likely to have so few customers that his circumstances will not be much mended. The privileges of graduation, besides, are, in many countries, necessary; or at least extremely convenient, to

most men of learned professions ; that is, to the far greater part of those who have occasion for a learned education. But those privileges can be obtained only by attending the lectures of the public teachers. The most careful attendance upon the ablest instructions of any private teacher cannot always give any title to demand them. It is from these different causes that the private teacher of any of the sciences which are commonly taught in universities, is in modern times generally considered as in the very lowest order of men of letters. A man of real abilities can scarce find out a more humiliating or a more unprofitable employment to turn them to. The endowments of schools and colleges have, in this manner, not only corrupted the diligence of public teachers, but have rendered it almost impossible to have any good private ones.

Were there no public institutions for education, no system, no science would be taught for which there was not a demand ; or which the circumstances of the times did not render it, either necessary, or convenient, or at least fashionable to learn. A private teacher could never find his account in teaching, either an exploded and antiquated system of a science, acknowledged to be useful, or a science universally believed to be a mere useless and pedantic heap of sophistry and nonsense. Such systems, such sciences, can subsist no where, but in those incorporated societies for education, whose prosperity and revenue are in a great measure independent of their

reputation, and altogether independent of their industry. Were there no public institutions for education, a gentleman, after going through, with application and abilities, the most complete course of education which the circumstances of the times were supposed to afford, could not come into the world, completely ignorant of every thing which is the common subject of conversation, among gentlemen and men of the world.

There are no public institutions for the education of women ; and there is, accordingly, nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical in the common course of their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it necessary or useful for them to learn ; and they are taught nothing else. Every part of their education tends evidently to some useful purpose ; either to improve the natural attractions of their person, or to form their mind to reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to economy : to render them both likely to become the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they have become such. In every part of her life, a woman feels some conveniency or advantage from every part of her education. It seldom happens that a man, in any part of his life, derives any conveniency or advantage from some of the most laborious and troublesome parts of his education.—*A. Smith.*

EDUCATION OF THE COMMON PEOPLE, ATTENTION TO WHICH IS INCUMBENT UPON THE PUBLIC.—Ought the public to give no attention, it may be asked, to the

education of the people? Or, if it ought to give any, what are the different parts of education which it ought to attend to in the different orders of the people? and in what manner ought it to attend to them?

In some cases, the state of the society necessarily places the greater part of individuals in such situations as naturally form in them, without any attention of government, almost all the abilities and virtues which that state requires, or perhaps can admit of. In other cases, the state of the society does not place the greater part of individuals in such situations; and some attention of government is necessary, in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people.

In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour; that is, of the great body of the people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man, whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of

his mind renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment; and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive interests of his country, he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his stationary life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a soldier. It corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his strength with vigour and perseverance, in any other employment than that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual, social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized society this is the state in which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to prevent it.

It is otherwise in the barbarous societies, as they are commonly called, of hunters, of shepherds, and even of husbandmen in that rude state of husbandry which precedes the improvement of manufactures, and the extension of foreign commerce. In such societies, the

varied occupations of every man oblige every man to exert his capacity, and to invent expedients for removing difficulties which are continually occurring. Invention is kept alive, and the mind is not suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity, which, in a civilized society, seems to benumb the understanding of almost all the inferior ranks of people. In those barbarous societies, as they are called, every man, it has already been observed, is a warrior. Every man, too, is in the same measure a statesman, and can form a tolerable judgment concerning the interest of the society, and the conduct of those who govern it. How far their chiefs are good judges in peace, or good leaders in war, is obvious to the observation of almost every single man among them. In such a society, indeed, no man can well acquire that improved and refined understanding, which a few men sometimes possess in a more civilized state. Though in a rude society, there is a good deal of variety in the occupations of every individual, there is not a great deal in those of the whole society. Every man does, or is capable of doing, almost every thing which any other man does, or is capable of doing. Every man has a considerable degree of knowledge, ingenuity, and invention; but scarce any man has a great degree. The degree, however, which is commonly possessed, is generally sufficient for conducting the whole simple business of the society. In a civilized state, on the contrary, though there is little va-

riety in the occupations of the greater part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety of objects to the contemplation of those few, who, being attached to no particular occupation themselves, have leisure and inclination to examine the occupations of other people. The contemplation of so great a variety of objects necessarily exercises their minds in endless comparisons and combinations, and renders their understandings, in an extraordinary degree, both acute and comprehensive. Unless those few, however, happen to be placed in some very particular situations, their great abilities, though honourable to themselves, may contribute very little to the good government or happiness of their society. Notwithstanding the great abilities of those few, all the nobler parts of the human character may be, in a great measure, obliterated and extinguished in the great body of the people.

The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and commercial society, the attention of the public more than that of people of some rank and fortune. People of some rank and fortune are generally eighteen or nineteen years of age before they enter upon that particular business, profession, or trade, by which they propose to distinguish themselves in the world. They have, before that, full time to acquire, or, at least, to fit themselves for afterwards acquiring, every accomplishment which can recommend them to the public esteem, or render them worthy of

it. Their parents or guardians are generally sufficiently anxious that they should be so accomplished; and are, in most cases, willing enough to lay out the expense which is necessary for that purpose. If they are not always properly educated, it is seldom from the want of expense laid out upon their education; but from the improper application of that expense. It is seldom from the want of masters; but from the negligence and incapacity of the masters who are to be had, and from the difficulty, or rather from the impossibility which there is, in the present state of things, of finding any better. The employments, too, in which people of some rank or fortune spend the greater part of their lives, are not, like those of the common people, simple and uniform. They are almost all of them extremely complicated; and such as exercise the head more than the hands.—The understandings of those who are engaged in such employments can seldom grow torpid for want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank and fortune, besides, are seldom such as harass them from morning to night. They generally have a good deal of leisure; during which, they may perfect themselves in every branch, either of useful or ornamental knowledge, of which they may have laid the foundation, or for which they may have acquired some taste in the earlier part of life.

It is otherwise with the common people. They have little time to spare for education.—

Their parents can scarce afford to maintain them even in infancy. As soon as they are able to work, they must apply to some trade by which they can earn their subsistence. That trade, too, is generally so simple and uniform, as to give little exercise to the understanding; while, at the same time, their labour is both so constant and so severe, that it leaves them little leisure, and less inclination, to apply to, or even to think of any thing else.

But though the common people cannot, in any civilized society, be so well instructed as people of some rank and fortune, the most essential parts of education, however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at so early a period of life, that the greater part even of those who are to be bred to the lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be employed in those occupations. For a very small expense, the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education.

The public can facilitate this acquisition by establishing in every parish or district, a little school, where children may be taught for a reward so moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it; the master being partly, but not wholly, paid by the public; because if he was wholly, or even principally paid by it, he would soon learn to neglect his business. In Scotland, the establishment of such parish-

schools has taught almost the whole common people to read, and a very great proportion of them to write and account. In England, the establishment of charity schools has had an effect of the same kind; though not so universally, because the establishment is not so universal. If in those little schools the books, by which the children are taught to read, were a little more instructive than they commonly are; and if, instead of a little smattering of Latin, which the children of the common people are sometimes taught there, and which can scarce ever be of any use to them, they were instructed in the elementary parts of geometry and mechanics, the literary education of this rank of people would perhaps be as complete as it can be. There is scarce a common trade which does not afford some opportunities of applying to it the principles of geometry and mechanics, and which would not, therefore, gradually exercise and improve the common people in those principles, the necessary introduction to the most sublime as well as to the most useful sciences.

The public can encourage the acquisition of those most essential parts of education, by giving small premiums and little badges of distinction to the children of the common people who excel in them.

The public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education, by obliging every man to undergo an examination or probation in them, before he can

obtain the freedom in any corporation, or be allowed to set up any trade either in a village or town corporate.

It was in this manner, by facilitating the acquisition of their military and gymnastic exercises, by encouraging it, and even by imposing upon the whole body of the people the necessity of learning those exercises, that the Greek and Roman republics maintained the martial spirit of their respective citizens. They facilitated the acquisition of those exercises, by appointing a certain place for learning and practising them, and by granting to certain masters the privilege of teaching in that place. Those masters do not appear to have had either salaries or exclusive privileges of any kind. Their reward consisted altogether in what they got from their scholars; and a citizen who had learnt his exercises in the public Gymnasia, had no sort of legal advantage over one who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had learnt them equally well. Those republics encouraged the acquisition of those exercises, by bestowing little premiums and badges of distinction upon those who excelled in them. To have gained a prize in the Olympic, Isthmian, or Némæan games, gave illustration, not only to the person who gained it, but to his whole family and kindred. The obligation which every citizen was under to serve a certain number of years, if called upon, in the armies of the republic, sufficiently imposed the necessity of learning those exercises, without

which he could not be fit for that service.

That in the progress of improvement, the practice of military exercises, unless government takes proper pains to support it, goes gradually to decay, and, together with it, the martial spirit of the great body of the people, the example of modern Europe sufficiently demonstrates. But the security of every society must always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the great body of the people. In the present times, indeed, that martial spirit alone, and unsupported by a well-disciplined standing army, would not, perhaps, be sufficient for the defence and security of any society. But where every citizen had the spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army would surely be requisite. That spirit, besides, would necessarily diminish very much the dangers to liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are commonly apprehended from a standing army. As it would very much facilitate the operations of that army against a foreign invader, so it would obstruct them as much, if unfortunately they should ever be directed against the constitution of the state.

The ancient institutions of Greece and Rome seem to have been much more effectual, for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the people, than the establishment of what are called the militias of modern times. They were much more simple. When they were once established, they executed themselves, and it required little or

no attention from government to maintain them in the most perfect vigour. Whereas, to maintain, even in tolerable execution, the complex regulations of any modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government,—without which, they are constantly falling into total neglect and disuse. The influence, besides, of the ancient institutions, was much more universal. By means of them, the whole body of the people was completely instructed in the use of arms: whereas, it is but a very small part of them who can ever be so instructed by the regulations of any modern militia; except, perhaps, that of Switzerland. But a coward, a man incapable either of defending or of revenging himself, evidently wants one of the most essential parts of the character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of its most essential members, or has lost the use of them. He is evidently the more wretched and miserable of the two; because happiness and misery, which reside altogether in the mind, must necessarily depend more upon the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use, towards the defence of the society, yet, to prevent that sort of mental mutilation, deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it, from spreading themselves through the great body of the

people, would still deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy or any other loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from spreading itself among them; though, perhaps, no other public good might result from such attention besides the prevention of so great a public evil.

The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stupidity which, in a civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of all the inferior ranks of people. A man, without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man, is, if possible, more contemptible than even a coward; and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature. Though the state was to derive no advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction. The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and superstition; which, among ignorant nations, frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people, besides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid one. They feel themselves, each, individually, more respectable, and more likely to obtain the respect of their law-

ful superiors; and they are therefore more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to examine, and more capable of seeing, through the interested complaints of faction and sedition; and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government. In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon the favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it must surely be of the highest importance, that they should not be disposed to judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.—*A. Smith.*

EMPIRE, THE CAUSES OF THE DECADENCY OF AN.—The introduction and improvement of the arts and sciences in an empire do not occasion its decadency; but the same causes that accelerate the progress of the sciences, sometimes produce the most fatal effects.—There are nations where, by a peculiar series of circumstances, the seeds of the arts and sciences do not spring up till the moment the manners begin to corrupt.—A certain number of men assemble to form a society. These men found a city: Their neighbours see it rise up with a jealous eye. The inhabitants of that city, forced to be at once labourers and soldiers, make use by turns of the spade and the sword. What in such a country is the necessary science and virtue? The military arts and valour, they alone are there respected. Every other science and virtue are there unknown. Such was the state of

rising Rome, when, weak and surrounded by warlike nations, it with difficulty sustained their attacks: Its glory and power extended over the whole earth: it acquired, however, the one and the other very slowly: ages of triumphs were necessary to subject their neighbours. Now, when the surrounding nations were subdued, there arose from the form of their government civil wars, which were succeeded by those with foreigners; so that it cannot be imagined, while the citizens were engaged in the different employments of magistrates and soldiers, and incessantly agitated with strong hopes and fears, they could enjoy the leisure and tranquillity necessary to the study of the sciences.—In every country where these events succeed each other in a regular series, the only period favourable to letters is, unfortunately, that when the civil wars, the troubles and factions being extinguished, liberty is expiring, as in the time of Augustus, under the strokes of despotism. Now this period precedes but a short time the decadency of an empire. The arts and sciences, however, then flourish; and that for two reasons.

The first is, the force of men's passions. In the first moments of slavery, their minds, still agitated by the remembrance of their lost liberty, are like the sea after a tempest. The citizen still burns with a desire to render himself illustrious, but his situation is altered. He cannot have his bust placed by that of Timoleon, Pelopidas, or Brutus: He cannot deliver his name down to

posterity as the destroyer of tyrants, and the avenger of liberty. His statue may, however, be placed by those of Homer, Epicurus, or Archimedes. This he knows; and therefore, if there be but one sort of glory to which he can aspire, if it be with the laurels of the muses alone that he can be crowned, it is in the career of the arts and sciences he prepares to seek them; and it is then that illustrious men of every literary profession arise. The second of these causes is, the interest sovereigns then have to encourage the progress of the sciences. At the moment that despotism is established, what does the monarch desire? To inspire his subjects with the love of the arts and sciences. What does he fear? That they should reflect on their fetters, blush on their servitude, and again turn their looks towards liberty. He would, therefore, by employing their minds, make them forget their base condition. He consequently presents them with new objects of glory. As an hypocritical fautor of the arts and sciences, he shows the more regard to the man of genius, the more he feels the want of his eulogies. The manners of a nation do not change the moment despotism is established. The spirit of a people is free some time after their hands are tied. During these first moments illustrious men still preserve some consideration. The tyrant, therefore, loads them with favours, that they may load him with praises; and men of great talents are too often seduced to become the panegyrists of usurpation and tyranny. What mo-

tives can induce them to it? Sometimes meanness, and frequently gratitude. It must be confessed, that every revolution in an empire supposes great talents in him by whom it is produced, or at least some brilliant vice that astonishment and gratitude metamorphose into virtue. Such is, at the time of the establishment of despotism, the productive cause of great accomplishments in the arts and sciences. The first moments past, if the same country become barren in men of talent, it is because the tyrant, being then well established on his throne, is no longer in want of their assistance. So that the reign of the arts and sciences in a state seldom extends above a century or two. If in each empire the sciences just shoot up and then wither, it is because the motives proper to produce men of genius do not commonly exert themselves there more than once. It is at the highest period of grandeur that a nation commonly produces the fruits of the arts and sciences. While three or four generations of illustrious men pass away, the people change their manners, and sink into servitude; their minds have lost their energy; there is no strong passion remaining to put them in action; the tyrant no longer excites the people to the pursuit of any kind of glory; it is not talents but baseness he now honours; and genius, if it still remain, lives and dies unknown to its own country: It is like the orange tree, that flourishes, perfumes the air, and dies in a desert.

Despotism, while it is gaining ground, suffers men to say what they will, while they suffer it to do what it will: but once established, it forbids all talking, writing, and thinking. The minds of men then sink into an apathy: all the inhabitants become slaves, curse the breasts that gave them milk, and under such a government every new birth is an increase of misery. The pomp of an eastern empire can, without doubt, impose on the vulgar, who may estimate the force of a nation by the magnificence of its palaces. The wise man judges differently; it is by that very magnificence he estimates its weakness. He sees nothing more in that imposing pomp, in the midst of which the tyrant sits enthroned, than a sumptuous and mournful decoration of the dead; than the apparatus of a sumptuous funeral, in the centre of which is a cold and lifeless body,—a lump of unanimated earth: in short, a phantom of power ready to disappear before the enemy by whom it is despised. A great nation, where despotic power is at last established, resembles an oak that has been crowned by ages; its majestic trunk, and the largeness of its branches, still declare its pristine force and grandeur; it seems still to be the monarch of the woods: but its true state is that of decay; its branches despoiled of their leaves, and destitute of the spirit of life, are half withered, and some of them continually broken off by the wind. Such is the state of a nation subdued by arbitrary power.—*Helvetius.*

ENGLISH CONSTITUTION.—The constitution of the English government, ever since the invasion of this island by the Saxons, may boast of this pre-eminence, that in no age the will of the monarch was ever entirely absolute and uncontrolled; but in other respects, the balance of power has extremely shifted among the several orders of the state; and this fabric has experienced the same mutability which has attended all human institutions. The ancient Saxons, like the other German nations, where each individual was inured to arms, and where the independence of men was secured by a great equality of possessions, seem to have admitted a considerable mixture of democracy into their form of government, and to have been one of the freest nations of which there remains any account in the records of history. After this tribe was settled in England, especially after the dissolution of the Heptarchy, the great extent of the kingdom produced a great inequality of property; and the balance seems to have inclined to the side of the aristocracy. The Norman conquest threw more authority into the hands of the sovereign, which, however, admitted of great control; though derived less from the general forms of the constitution, which were inaccurate and irregular, than from the independent power enjoyed by each baron in his particular district or province. The establishment of the great charter exalted still higher the aristocracy, imposed regular limits on

royal power, and gradually introduced some mixture of democracy into the constitution. But even during this period, from the accession of Edward I. to the death of Richard III., the condition of the Commons was nowise desirable; a kind of Polish aristocracy prevailed; and though the kings were limited, the people were as yet far from being free. It required the authority almost absolute of the sovereigns, which took place in the subsequent period, to pull down these disorderly and licentious tyrants, who were equally enemies to peace and to freedom, and to establish that regular execution of the laws, which, in a following age, enabled the people to erect a regular and equitable plan of liberty. In each of these successive alterations, the only rule of government, which is intelligible, or carries any authority with it, is the established practice of the age, and the maxims of administration, which are at that time prevalent, and universally assented to. Those who, from a pretended respect to antiquity, appeal at every turn to an original plan of the constitution, only cover their turbulent spirit, and their private ambition, under the appearance of venerable forms; and whatever period they pitch on for their model, they may still be carried back to a more ancient period, where they will find the measures of power entirely different, and where every circumstance, by reason of the greater barbarity of the times, will appear less worthy of ini-

tation. Above all, a civilized nation, like the English, who have happily established the most perfect, and most accurate system of liberty that ever was found compatible with government, ought to be cautious of appealing to the practice of their ancestors, or regarding the maxims of uncultivated ages as certain rules for their present conduct. An acquaintance with the history of the ancient periods of their government is chiefly useful, by instructing them to cherish their present constitution from a comparison or contrast with the condition of those distant times. And it is also curious, by showing them the remote, and commonly faint and disfigured originals of the most finished and most noble institutions, and by instructing them in the great mixture of accident, which commonly concurs with a small ingredient of wisdom and foresight, in erecting the complicated fabric of the most perfect government.—*Hume.*

ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, ABUSES IN THE.—The English history will inform us, that the people of England have always borne extreme oppression for a long time, before there has appeared any danger of a general insurrection against the government. What a series of encroachments upon their rights did even the feudal barons, whose number was not very considerable, and whose power was great, bear from William the Conqueror, and his successors, before they broke out into actual rebellion on that account, as in the reigns of King John, and Henry III.

And how much were the lowest orders of the poor Commons trampled upon with impunity by both till a much later period; when, all the while, they were so far from attempting any resistance, or even complaining of the gross infringement of their rights, that they had not so much as an idea of their having any right to be trampled upon! After the people had begun to acquire property, independence, and an idea of their natural rights, how long did they bear a load of old and new oppressions under the Tudors, but more especially under the Stuarts, before they broke out into what the friends of arbitrary power affect to call the grand rebellion? And how great did that obstinate civil war show the power of the King to be, notwithstanding the most intolerable abuse of it? At the close of the year 1642, it was more probable that the King would have prevailed than the Parliament; and his success would have been certain, if his conduct had not been as weak as it was wicked. So great was the power of the crown, that, after the Restoration, Charles II. was tempted to act the same part as his father, and actually did it in a great measure with impunity; till at last he was even able to reign without parliaments; and if he had lived much longer, he would, in all probability, have been as arbitrary as the King of France. His brother, James II., had almost subverted both the civil and religious liberties of his country in the short space of four years; and might have done

it completely, if he could have been content to have proceeded with more caution: nay, he might have succeeded notwithstanding his precipitancy, if the Divine Being had not, at that critical time, raised William III. of glorious memory, for our deliverance.— * *

ENNUI, OR THE WEARISOMENESS OF INACTION.—The ennui, or the wearisomeness of inaction is a more general and powerful spring of action than is imagined. Of all pains this is the least; but nevertheless it is one. The desire of happiness makes us always consider the absence of pleasure as an evil. We would have the necessary intervals that separate the lively pleasures always connected with the gratification of our natural wants, filled up with some of those sensations that are always agreeable when they are not painful; we, therefore, constantly desire new impressions, in order to put us in mind every instant of our existence; because every one of these informations affords us pleasure. Thus the savage, as soon as he has satisfied his wants, runs to the banks of a river, where the rapid succession of the waves that drive each other forward, make every moment new impressions upon him; for this reason, we prefer objects in motion to those at rest; and we proverbially say, that fire makes company; that is, it helps to deliver us from the wearisomeness of inaction. Men search with the greatest eagerness for every thing capable of putting them in motion; it is this desire that makes the common people run to an execution, and

the people of fashion to a play; and it is the same motive in a gloomy devotion, and even in the austere exercises of penance, that frequently affords old women a remedy against the tiresomeness of inaction: for God, who, by all possible means, endeavours to bring sinners to himself, commonly uses, with respect to them, that of the wearisomeness of inaction.

A man of literature had for his neighbour one of those indolent people, who are the pest of society; who being tired of himself, went one day to pay a visit to the man of letters; who received him in a very agreeable manner, and with great politeness continued tired of him, till being weary of staying any longer in the same place, the idler took his leave, in order to plague somebody else. He was no sooner gone, than the man of learning returned to his studies, and forgot his vexation. Some days after he was accused of not having returned the visit he had received, and taxed with want of politeness; upon which he, in his turn, went to see the idler: "Sir," said he, "I am informed that you complain of me: however, you know that it was being weary of yourself that brought you to me. I, who tired nobody, received you as well as I could; it is, then, you who are obliged, and I who am taxed with unpoliteness. Be yourself the judge of my proceedings, and see whether you ought not to put an end to complaints that prove nothing, but that I have not, like you, occasion for visits; and have neither the inhumanity

to plague my neighbour, nor the injustice to defame him, after I have tired out his patience."—*Helvetius.*

ENTHUSIASM.—Immediate revelation being a much easier way for men to establish their opinions and regulate their conduct, than the tedious and not always successful labour of strict reasoning; it is no wonder that some have been very apt to pretend to revelation, and to persuade themselves, that they are under the peculiar guidance of heaven in their actions and opinions, especially in those of them which they cannot account for by the ordinary methods of knowledge and principles of reason. Hence we see, that in all ages, men in whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or whose conceit of themselves had raised them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with God, and a nearer admittance to his favour, than is afforded to others, have often flattered themselves with a persuasion of an immediate intercourse with the Deity, and frequent communications from the Divine Spirit. God, I own, cannot be denied to be able to enlighten the understanding by a ray darted into the mind immediately from the fountain of light. This they understand he has promised to do; and who, then, has so good a title to expect it as those who are his peculiar people, chosen by him, and depending on him?

Their minds being thus prepared, whatever groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies, is an illumination from the Spirit of God,

and presently of Divine authority; and whatsoever odd action they find in themselves a strong inclination to do, that impulse is concluded to be a call or direction from heaven, and must be obeyed; it is a commission from above, and they cannot err in executing it.

This I take to be properly enthusiasm; which, though founded neither on reason nor divine revelation, but rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain, works yet, where it once gets footing, more powerfully on the persuasions and actions of men, than either of those two, or both together; men being most forwardly obedient to the impulses they receive from themselves; and the whole man is sure to act more vigorously, where the whole man is carried by a natural motion. For strong conceit, like a new principle, carries all easily with it, when got above common sense; and freed from all restraint of reason and check of reflection, it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper and inclination.—*Locke.*

EQUALITY.—It is one of the most important objects of government to prevent an extreme inequality of fortunes; not by taking away the wealth of the possessors, but in depriving them of means to accumulate them; not by building hospitals for the poor, but by preventing the citizens from becoming poor. The unequal distribution of the inhabitants of a country; some being thinly scattered over a large tract of land, while others are assembled together in crowds in cities;

the encouragement of the agreeable instead of the useful arts; the sacrifice of agriculture to commerce; the mal-administration of the finances; and, in short, that excess of venality which sets public esteem at a pecuniary value, and rates even virtue at a market-price: These are all the most obvious causes of opulence and of poverty: of the public interest; the mutual hatred of the citizens; their indifference for the common cause; the corruption of the people; and the weakening of all the springs of government.—

Rousseau.

EQUALITY, WHAT IT MEANS.—

The term Equality does not mean, that individuals should all absolutely possess the same degree of wealth and power, but only, that with respect to the latter, it should never be exercised contrary to good order and the laws; and, with respect to the former, that no one citizen should be rich enough to buy another, and that none should be so poor as to be obliged to sell himself. This supposes a moderation of possessions and credit on the side of the great, and a moderation of desires and covetousness on the part of the little. Would you give a state consistency and strength, prevent the two extremes as much as possible; let there be no rich persons, nor beggars. These two conditions, naturally inseparable, are equally destructive to the commonwealth. The one furnishes tyrants, and the other the supporters of tyranny. It is by these the traffic of public liberty is carried on;

the one buying, the other selling it. This equality, they tell us, is a mere speculative chimera, which cannot exist in practice. But though abuses are inevitable, does it thence follow they are not to be corrected? It is for the very reason that things always tend to destroy this equality, that the laws should be calculated to preserve it.—*Rousseau.*

EQUALITY, THE BENEFITS OF.—

A too great disproportion of wealth among citizens weakens any state. Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in a full possession of all the necessities, and many of the conveniences, of life. No one can doubt but such an equality is most suitable to human nature, and diminishes much less from the happiness of the rich than it adds to that of the poor. It also augments the power of the state, and makes any extraordinary taxes or impositions be paid with more cheerfulness. Where the riches are engrossed by a few, these must contribute very largely to supplying the public necessities. But, when the riches are dispersed among multitudes, the burden feels light on every shoulder; and the taxes make not a sensible difference on any one's way of living. Add to this, that where the riches are in a few hands, these must enjoy all the power; and will readily conspire to lay all the burthen on the poor, and oppress them still farther, to the discouragement of all industry.—

Hume.

EQUALITY, ITS BEARING BETWEEN

MEN.—All animals are equal; but man is a slave to man almost every where throughout the earth. If man had met every where with an easy, certain, and safe subsistence, and a climate suitable to his nature, it is manifestly impossible that one man could have enslaved another.—When this earth shall every where produce salubrious fruits; when the air, which should contribute to our life, shall not bring us sicknesses and death; when man shall stand in need of no other lodging and bed than that of the deer and roebuck; then the Tamerlanes of the earth will have no other domestics than their children, in this so natural state, which all quadrupeds, birds, and reptiles enjoy. Man would be as happy as they: Dominion would then be a chimera, an absurdity which no one could think of: for who would make a bustle to get servants without any want of their service? Should any individual, of a tyrannical disposition, and extraordinary strength, take it into his head to make a slave of his weaker neighbour, the thing would be impracticable; the party oppressed would be an hundred leagues out of the oppressor's reach before he had taken his measures. Thus, a freedom from wants would necessarily make all men equal.—It is the distress annexed to our species which subjects one man to another. Not that inequality is a real misfortune; the grievance lies in dependence. A numerous family has successfully cultivated a good soil, whilst

two small neighbouring families cannot bring the stubborn grounds to produce any thing: the two poor families must either become servants to the opulent family, or extirpate it. This is self-evident: one of the two indigent families, for a subsistence, goes and offers its labour to the rich; the other goes to dispossess it by force of arms, and is beaten. The former is the origin of domestics and labourers; and from the latter slavery is derived. In our calamitous globe, it is impossible that men, living together in society, should not be divided into two classes; one the rich, who command; the other the poor, who serve or obey. This division originates from nature. The unequal abilities, industry, ambition, and avarice, which are every where found in mankind, produce it. All the oppressed are not absolutely unhappy. Most of them being born in a servile state, continual labour, and a habit of dependence, preserve them from too sensible a feeling of their situation: but, whenever they feel it, wars are the consequence; as at Rome between the Plebeian and Patrician parties; and those of the peasants in Germany. All these wars terminate, soon or late, in the subjection of the people; because the great have riches, and riches do every thing within a state: I say, within a state, for between nation and nation it is otherwise. A nation which handles iron best, will ever be too strong for that which, with its abundance of gold, is deficient in skill and courage: the Mexi-

cans and Peruvians are striking instances of this truth. Every man is born with no small propensity to power, riches, and pleasure, and has naturally a delight in indolence; consequently, every man is for having the riches, wives, or daughters of others; would subject all to his humours, and do no work; or, at least, what only pleased himself.

Mankind, in the present state, cannot subsist, unless an infinity of useful men have the misfortune of being without any possession whatever; for no man, in easy circumstances, will plough the ground. Thus equality is, at the same time, both the most natural and the most chimerical thing in the world.

Every man has a right to believe himself naturally equal to other men; the animal functions are alike in both. But it does not from hence follow, that a man is excused in neglecting the duty of his station; were it so, there would be an end of human society.—*Voltaire.*

ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION OF THE PEOPLE.—The institutions for the instruction of the people of all ages are chiefly those for religious instruction. This is a species of instruction of which the object is not so much to render the people good citizens in this world, as to prepare them for another and a better world in a life to come. The teachers of the doctrine which contains this instruction, in the same manner as other teachers, may either depend altogether for their subsistence upon the voluntary con-

tributions of their hearers; or they may derive it from some other fund, to which the law of their country may intitle them; such as a landed estate, a tythe or land-tax, an established salary or stipend. Their exertion, their zeal and industry, are likely to be much greater in the former situation than in the latter. In this respect the teachers of new religions have always had a considerable advantage in attacking those ancient and established systems of which the clergy, reposing themselves upon their benefices, had neglected to keep up the fervour of faith and devotion in the great body of the people; and having given themselves up to indolence, were become altogether incapable of making any vigorous exertion in defence even of their own establishment. The clergy of an established and well-endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance, who possess all the virtues of gentlemen, or which can recommend them to the esteem of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to lose the qualities, both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the inferior ranks of people, and which had, perhaps, been the original causes of the success and establishment of their religion. Such a clergy, when attacked by a set of popular and bold, though perhaps stupid and ignorant enthusiasts, feel themselves as perfectly defenceless as the indolent, effeminate, and full-fed nations of the southern parts of Asia, when they were invaded by the active, hardy

and hungry Tartars of the north. Such a clergy, upon such an emergency, have commonly no other resource than to call upon the civil magistrate to persecute, destroy, or drive out their adversaries, as disturbers of the public peace. It was thus that the Roman Catholic clergy called upon the civil magistrate to persecute the Protestants; and the church of England, to persecute the Dissenters; and that, in general, every religious sect, when it has once enjoyed for a century or two the security of a long establishment, has found itself incapable of making any vigorous defence against any new sect which chose to attack its doctrine or discipline. Upon such occasions, the advantage in point of learning and good writing may sometimes be on the side of the established church: But the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining proselytes, are constantly on the side of its adversaries. In England, those arts have been long neglected by the well-endowed clergy of the established church, and are at present chiefly cultivated by the Dissenters and by the Methodists. The independent provisions, however, which in many places have been made for dissenting teachers, by means of voluntary subscriptions, of trust-rights, and other evasions of the law, seem very much to have abated the zeal and activity of those teachers. They have many of them become very learned, ingenious, and respectable men; but they have in general ceased to be very popular preachers. The Methodists, without half the learning of

the Dissenters, are much more in vogue.

In the church of Rome, the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy is kept more alive by the powerful motive of self-interest, than perhaps in any established Protestant church. The parochial clergy derive, many of them, a very considerable part of their subsistence from the voluntary oblations of the people; a source of revenue which confession gives them many opportunities of improving. The mendicant orders derive their whole subsistence from such oblations. It is with them, as with the husbands and light infantry of some armies; no plunder, no pay. The parochial clergy are like those teachers whose reward depends partly upon their salary, and partly upon the fees or honoraries which they get from their pupils; and these must always depend more or less upon their industry and reputation. The mendicant orders are like those teachers whose subsistence depends altogether upon their industry. They are obliged, therefore, to use every art which can animate the devotion of the common people. The establishment of the two great mendicant orders of St. Dominick and St. Francis, it is observed by Machiavel, revived, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the languishing faith and devotion of the Catholic church. In Roman Catholic countries, the spirit of devotion is supported altogether by the monks and by the poorer parochial clergy. The great dignitaries of the church, with all the accomplishments of

gentlemen and men of the world, and sometimes with those of men of learning, are careful enough to maintain the necessary discipline over their inferiors, but seldom give themselves any trouble about the instruction of the people.

"Most of the arts and professions in a state," says by far the most illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age (David Hume), "are of such a nature, that while they promote the interest of the society, they are also useful or agreeable to some individuals; and, in that case, the constant rule of the magistrate, except perhaps on the first introduction of any art, is to leave the profession to itself, and trust its encouragement to the individuals who reap the benefit of it. The artisans, finding their profits to rise by the favour of their customers, increase as much as possible their skill and industry; and as matters are not disturbed by any injudicious tampering, the commodity is always sure at all times to be exactly proportioned to the demand.—But there are also some callings which, though useful and even necessary in a state, bring no advantage or pleasure to any individual; and the supreme power is obliged to alter its conduct, with regard to the retainers of those professions.—It must give them public encouragement in order to their subsistence; and it must provide against that negligence to which they will naturally be subject, either by annexing particular honours to the profession, by establishing a long subordination

of ranks, and a strict dependence, or by some other expedient.—The persons employed in the finances, armies, fleets, and magistracy, are instances of this order of men.—It may naturally be thought, at first view, that the ecclesiastics belong to the first class; and that their encouragement, as well as that of lawyers and physicians, may safely be trusted to the liberality of individuals who are attached to their doctrines, and who find benefit or consolation from their spiritual ministry and assistance.—Their industry and vigilance will no doubt be whetted by such an additional motive; and their skill in the profession, as well as their address in governing the minds of the people, must receive daily increase from their increasing practice, study, and attention.—But, if we consider the matter more closely, we shall find that this interested diligence of the clergy is what every wise legislature will study to prevent: because, in every religion except the true, it is highly pernicious, and has even a natural tendency to pervert the true, by infusing into it a strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion.—Each ghostly practitioner, in order to render himself more precious and sacred in the eyes of his retainers, must inspire them with the most violent abhorrence against all other sects, and continually endeavour by some novelty, to excite the languid devotion of his audience. No regard will be paid to truth, morals, or decency, in the doctrines inculcated.—Every tenet will be adopted that best suits

the disorderly affections of the human frame.—Customers will be drawn to each conventicle by new industry and address, in practising on the passions and credulity of the populace.—And in the end, the civil magistrate will find, that he has paid dear for his pretended frugality, in saving a settled foundation for the priests; and that in reality the most decent and advantageous composition which he can make with the spiritual guides, is to bribe their indolence, by affixing stated salaries to their profession, and rendering it superfluous for them to be further active than merely to preserve their flock from straying in quest of new pastures.—And in this manner ecclesiastical establishments, though commonly they arose at first from religious views, prove in the end advantageous to the political interests of society.”

But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent provision of the clergy, it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon them from any view to those effects. Times of violent religious controversy have generally been times of equally violent political faction. Upon such occasions, each political party has either found it, or imagined it, for its interest, to league itself with some one or other of the contending religious sects. But this could be done only by adopting, or at least by favouring, the tenets of that particular sect. The sect which had the good fortune to be leagued with the conquering party, necessarily

shared in the victory of its ally, by whose favour and protection it was soon enabled in some degree to silence and subdue all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally leagued themselves with the enemies of the conquering party, and were therefore the enemies of that party. The clergy of this particular sect having thus become complete masters of the field, and their influence and authority with the great body of the people being in its highest vigour, they were powerful enough to over-awe the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and to oblige the civil magistrate to respect their opinions and inclinations. Their first demand was generally, that he should silence and subdue all their adversaries; and their second, that he should bestow an independent provision on themselves. As they had generally contributed a good deal to the victory, it seemed not unreasonable that they should have some share in the spoil. They were weary, besides, of humouring the people, and of depending upon their caprice for a subsistence. In making this demand, therefore, they consulted their own ease and comfort, without troubling themselves about the effect which it might have in future times upon the influence and authority of their order. The civil magistrate, who could comply with this demand, only by giving them something which he would have chosen much rather to take, or to keep to himself, was seldom very forward to grant it. Necessity,

however, always forced him to submit at last, though frequently not till after many delays, evasions, and affected excuses.

But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another, when it had gained the victory, it would probably have dealt equally and impartially with all the different sects, and have allowed every man to choose his own priest and his own religion as he thought proper. There would in this case, no doubt, have been a great multitude of religious sects. Almost every different congregation might probably have made a little sect by itself, or have entertained some peculiar tenets of its own. Each teacher would no doubt have felt himself under the necessity of making the utmost exertion, and of using every art both to preserve and to increase the number of his disciples. But as every other teacher would have felt himself under the same necessity, the success of no one teacher, or sect of teachers, could have been very great. The interested and active zeal of religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where there is either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a large society is divided into two or three great sects; the teachers of each acting by concert, and under a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal must be altogether innocent where the society is divided into two or three hundred, or perhaps into

as many thousand, small sects, of which no one could be considerable enough to disturb the public tranquillity. The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and moderation which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great sects, whose tenets being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who therefore see nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, finding themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every other sect; and the concessions which they would mutually find it both convenient and agreeable to make to one another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to see established; but such as positive law has perhaps never yet established, and probably never will establish, in any country: because, with regard to religion, positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less influenced by popular superstition and enthusiasm. This plan of ecclesiastical government, or more properly of no ecclesiastical government, was what the sect called Independents, a sect no doubt of very wild en-

thusiasts, proposed to establish in England towards the end of the civil war. If it had been established, though of a very unphilosophical origin, it would probably by this time have been productive of the most philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every sort of religious principle. It has been established in Pennsylvania, where, though the Quakers happen to be the most numerous, the law in reality favours no one sect more than another; and it is there said to have been productive of this philosophical good temper and moderation.

But though this equality of treatment should not be productive of this good temper and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the religious sects of a particular country; yet, provided those sects were sufficiently numerous, and each of them consequently too small to disturb the public tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each for its particular tenets could not well be productive of any very hurtful effects, but, on the contrary, of several good ones: and if the government was perfectly decided both to let them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one another, there is little danger that they would not of their own accord subdivide themselves fast enough, so as soon to become sufficiently numerous.—

A. Smith.

EVIDENCE.—Every one asks, what is truth or evidence? The root of the word indicates the idea we ought to annex to it. Evidence is derived from *videre*.—What is an evident proposition?

It is a fact of which all may convince themselves by the testimony of their senses, and whose existence they may moreover verify every instant. Such are these two facts, *two and two make four; the whole is greater than a part.*—If I pretend, for example, that there is in the north sea a polypus named Kraken, and that this polypus is as large as a small island; this fact, though evident to me, if I have seen and examined it, with all the attention to convince me of its reality, is not even probable to him who has not seen it; it is more rational in him to doubt my veracity, than to believe the existence of so extraordinary an animal.—But if, after travellers, I describe the true form of the buildings at Pekin, this description, evident to those who inhabit them, is only more or less probable to others; so that the true is not always evident, and the probable is often true. But in what does evidence differ from probability? Evidence is a fact that is subject to our senses, and whose existence all men may verify every instant. As to probability, it is founded on conjectures, on the testimony of men, and on a hundred proofs of the same kind. Evidence is a single point; there are no degrees of evidence. On the contrary, there are various degrees of probability, according to the difference, first, of the people who assert; secondly, of the fact asserted.—Five men tell me they have seen a bear in the forests of Poland: this fact, not being contradicted by any thing, is to me very probable. But if not five only, but

five hundred men, should assure me they met in the same forests, ghosts, fairies, demons, their united evidence would not be to me at all probable; for in cases of this nature, it is more common to meet with five hundred romancers, than to see such prodigies.—*Helvetius*.

EVIDENCE, HISTORICAL.—Were most historical events traced up to their causes, we should find historical evidence very deficient. Mankind is made up of inconsistencies; and no man acts invariably up to his predominant character. Our best conjectures, as to the true spring of actions, are very uncertain; the actions themselves are all we must pretend to know from history. That Cæsar was murdered by 24 conspirators, I doubt not; but I very much doubt, whether their love of liberty was the sole cause.—*Chesterfield*.

EVIL, THE ORIGIN OF.—Man is an active and free being; he acts of himself: none of his spontaneous actions, therefore, enter into the general system of Providence, nor can be imputed to it. Providence doth not contrive the evil, which is the consequence of man's abusing the liberty his Creator gave him: it only doth not prevent it; either because the evil, which so impotent a being is capable of doing, is beneath its notice; or because it cannot prevent it without laying a restraint upon his liberty, and causing a great evil by debasing his nature. Providence hath left man at liberty, not that he should do evil, but good by choice, in making a proper use of the faculties bestowed on

him: his powers, however, are at the same time, so limited and confined, that the abuse he makes of his liberty, is not of importance enough to disturb the general order of the universe. The evil done by man falls on his own head, without making any change in the system of the world, without hindering the human species from being preserved in spite of themselves. To complain, therefore, that God doth not prevent man from doing evil, is, in fact, to complain that he hath given a superior excellence to human nature: that he hath ennobled our actions, by annexing to them the merit of virtue.—*Rousseau*.

EVIL, OBSERVATIONS ON NATURAL AND MORAL.—It must be allowed, that if a very limited intelligence, whom we shall suppose utterly unacquainted with the universe, were assured that it were the production of a very good, wise, and powerful being, however finite, he would from his conjectures form *beforehand* a different notion of it from what we find it to be by experience; nor would he ever imagine merely from these attributes of the cause, of which he is informed, that the effect could be so full of vice and misery and disorder as it appears in this life. Suppose now that this person were brought into the world, still assured that it was the workmanship of such a sublime and benevolent Being, he might perhaps be surprised at the disappointment; but would never retract his former belief, if founded on a very solid argument; since such a limited intelligence must be sensible of his own blindness and ignorance,

and must allow that there may be many solutions of those phenomena which will for ever escape his comprehension. But supposing, which is the real case with regard to man, that this creature is not antecedently convinced of a supreme Intelligence, benevolent and powerful, but is left to gather such a belief from the appearances of things; this entirely alters the case, nor will he ever find any reason for such a conclusion. He may be fully convinced of the narrow limits of his understanding; but this will not help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that inference from what he is ignorant of. The more you exaggerate his weakness and ignorance, the more diffident you render him, and give him the greater suspicion that such subjects are beyond the reach of his faculties. You are therefore obliged to reason with him merely from the known phenomena, and to drop every arbitrary supposition or conjecture.

Did I show you a house or palace, where there is not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs, and the whole economy of the building, were the source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness, and the extremes of heat and cold; you would certainly blame the contrivance, without any further examination. The architect would in vain display his subtilty, and prove to you, that if this door or that window were altered, greater ills would ensue. What he says may be strictly true:

the alteration of one particular, while the other parts of the building remain, may only augment the inconveniences. But still you would assert in general, that if the architect had skill and good intentions, he might have formed such a plan of the whole, and might have adjusted the parts in such a manner as would have remedied all or most of these inconveniences. His ignorance, or even your own ignorance, of such a plan, will never convince you of the impossibility of it. If you find many inconveniences and deformities in the building, you will always, without entering into any detail, condemn the architect.

Is the world, considered in general, and as it appears to us in this life, different from what a man, or such a limited being, would *beforehand* expect from a very powerful, wise, and benevolent Deity? It must be strange prejudice to assert the contrary. And from thence I conclude, that however consistent the world may be, allowing certain suppositions and conjectures, with the idea of such a Deity, it can never afford us an inference concerning his existence. The consistence is not absolutely denied, but only the inference. Conjectures, especially where infinity is excluded from the divine attributes, may perhaps be sufficient to prove a consistence; but can never be foundations for any inference.

There seem to be *four* circumstances on which depend all the greatest part of the ills that molest sensible creatures; and it is not impossible but all these cir-

cumstances may be necessary and unavoidable. We know so little beyond common life, or even of common life, that with regard to the economy of an universe, there is no conjecture, however wild, which may not be just; nor any one, however plausible, which may not be erroneous. All that belongs to human understanding in this deep ignorance and obscurity, is to be sceptical, or at least cautious; and not to admit of any hypothesis whatever, much less of any which is supported by no appearance of probability. Now this I assert to be the case with regard to all the circumstances on which it depends. None of them appear to human reason in the least degree necessary or unavoidable; nor can we suppose them such without the utmost license of imagination.

The *first* circumstance which introduces evil is that contrivance or œconomy of the animal creation, by which pains as well as pleasures are employed, to excite all creatures to action, and make them vigilant in the great work of self-preservation. Now pleasure alone, in its various degrees, seems, to human understanding, sufficient for this purpose. All animals might be constantly in a state of enjoyment: but when urged by any of the necessities of nature, such as thirst, hunger, weariness; instead of pain, they might feel a diminution of pleasure, by which they might be prompted to seek that object which is necessary to their subsistence. Men pursue pleasure as eagerly as they avoid pain, at least might have been so constitu-

ted. It seems, therefore, plainly possible to carry on the business of life without any pain. Why then is any animal ever rendered susceptible of such a sensation? If any animals can be free from it an hour, they might enjoy a perpetual exemption from it; and it required as particular a contrivance of their organs to produce that feeling, as to endow them with sight, hearing, or any of the senses. Shall we conjecture that such a contrivance was necessary, without any appearance of reason? and shall we build on that conjecture as on the most certain truth?

But a capacity of pain would not alone produce pain, were it not for the *second* circumstance, viz. the conducting the world by general laws; and this seems no way necessary to a very perfect being. It is true, if every thing were conducted by particular volitions, the course of nature would be perpetually broken, and no man would employ his reason in the conduct of life. But might not other particular volitions remedy this inconvenience? In short, might not the Deity extirminate all ill, wherever it were to be found; and produce all good, without any preparation or long progress of causes and effects?

Besides, we must consider, that, according to the present œconomy of the world, the course of nature, though supposed exactly regular, yet to us appears not so; and many events are uncertain, and many disappoint our expectations. Health and sickness, calm and tempest, with an infinite number of other

accidents, whose causes are unknown and variable, have a great influence both on the fortunes of particular persons, and on the prosperity of public societies; and, indeed, all human life in a manner depends on such accidents. A being, therefore, who knows the secret springs of the universe, might easily, by particular volitions, turn all these accidents to the good of mankind, and render the whole world happy, without discovering himself in any operation. Some small touches given to Caligula's brain in his infancy might have converted him into a Trojan; one wave a little higher than the rest, by burying Cæsar and his fortune in the ocean, might have restored liberty to a considerable part of mankind. A few such events as these, regularly and wisely conducted, would change the face of the world; and yet would no more seem to disturb the course of nature, or confound human conduct, than the present œconomy of things, where the causes are secret, and variable, and compounded.

If every thing in the universe be conducted by general laws, and if animals be susceptible of pain; yet ill would be very rare, were it not for the *third* circumstance which I proposed to mention, viz. the great frugality with which all powers and faculties are distributed to every particular being. So well adjusted are the organs and capacities of all animals, and so well fitted to their preservation, that, as far as history or tradition reaches, there appears

not to be any single species which has yet been extinguished in the universe.

Every animal has the requisite endowments; but the endowments are bestowed with so scrupulous an œconomy, that any considerable diminution must entirely destroy the creature. Wherever one power is increased, there is a proportional abatement in the others. Nature seems to have formed an exact calculation of the necessities of her creatures, and, like a *rigid master*, has afforded them little more powers or endowments than what are strictly sufficient to supply those necessities. An *indulgent parent* would have bestowed a large stock, in order to guard against accidents, and to secure the happiness and welfare of the creature in the most unfortunate concurrence of circumstances. The Author of nature is inconceivably powerful: his force is supposed great, if not altogether inexhaustible; nor is there any reason, as far as we can judge, to make Him observe this strict frugality in His dealings with His creatures.

In order to cure most of the ills of life, I require not that man should have the wings of the eagle, the swiftness of the stag, &c. I am contented to take an increase in one single power or faculty of the soul. Let him be endowed with greater propensity to industry and labour; a more vigorous spring and activity of mind; a more constant bent to business and application. Let the whole species possess, naturally, an equal

diligence with that which many individuals are able to attain by habit and reflection; and the most beneficial consequences, without any alloy of ill, is the immediate and necessary result of this endowment. Almost all the moral, as well as natural evils of human life, arise from idleness; and were our species, by the original constitution of their frame, exempt from this vice or infirmity, the perfect cultivation of land, the improvement of arts and manufactures, the exact execution of every office and duty, immediately follow; and men at once may fully reach that state of society, which is so imperfectly attained in the best government. But, as industry is a power, and the most valuable of any, nature seems determined, suitably to her usual maxims, to bestow it on men with a sparing hand; and rather to punish him severely for his deficiency in it, than to reward him for his attainments. She has so contrived his frame, that nothing but the most violent necessity can oblige him to labour; and she employs all his other wants to overcome, at least in part, the want of diligence, and to endow him with some share of a faculty, of which she has thought fit naturally to bereave him.

The *fourth* circumstance, whence arises the misery and ill of the universe, is the inaccurate workmanship of all the springs and principles of the great machine of nature. It must be acknowledged, that there are few parts of the universe which seem not to serve some purpose,

and whose removal would not produce a visible defect and disorder in the whole. The parts hang all together; nor can one be touched without affecting the rest, in a greater or less degree. But, at the same time, it must be observed, that none of these parts or principles, however useful, are so accurately adjusted, as to keep precisely within those bounds in which their utility consists; but they are all of them apt, on every occasion, to run into the one extreme or the other. There is nothing so advantageous in the universe but what frequently becomes pernicious by its excess or defect; nor has nature guarded, with the requisite accuracy, against all disorder and confusion. The irregularity is never, perhaps, so great, as to destroy any species; but is often sufficient to involve the individuals in ruin and misery.

On the concurrence, then, of these four circumstances, does all, or the greatest part of natural evil depend. Were all living creatures incapable of pain, or were the world administered by particular volitions, evil could never have found access into the universe: and were animals endowed with a large stock of powers and faculties beyond what strict necessity requires; or were the several springs and principles of the universe so accurately framed as to preserve always the just temperament and medium, there must have been very little ill in comparison of what we feel at present.

Here the Manichean system

occurs as a proper hypothesis to solve the difficulty: and, no doubt, in some respects, it is very specious, and has more probability than the common hypothesis, by giving a plausible account of the strange mixture of good or ill which appears in life. But if we consider, on the other hand, the perfect uniformity and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks of the combat of a malevolent with a benevolent being. There is, indeed, an opposition of pains and pleasures in the feelings of sensible creatures; but are not all the operations of nature carried on by an opposition of principles; of hot and cold, moist and dry, light and heavy? *The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles; and has no more regard to good above ill, than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture; or, to light above heavy.*

There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: *That they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have perfect malice; that they are opposite, and have both goodness and malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice.* Mixt phenomena can never prove the two former unmixt principles. And the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable.

Allowing, what never will

be believed, at least what never possibly can be proved, that animal, or at least human happiness, in this life exceeds its misery, is to do nothing: for this is not by any means what we expect from Infinite Power, Infinite Wisdom, and Infinite Goodness. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause, then. Is it from the intention of the Deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is Almighty. Nothing can possibly shake this reasoning; so short, so clear, so decisive; except we assert, that these subjects exceed all human capacity and that our common measures of truth and falsehood are not applicable to them.

What is here said of natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence resembles the human.—Nay, it will be thought, that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we feel them; since moral evil, in the opinion of many, is much more predominant above moral good, than natural evil above natural good. But even though this should not be allowed, and though the virtue which is in mankind should be acknowledged much superior to the vice, yet so long as there is any vice at all in the universe, it will be very difficult to account for it. We must assign a cause for it, without having recourse

to the first cause. But every effect must have a cause, and that cause another: you must either carry on the progression in *in-finitum*, or rest on that original principle who is the ultimate cause of all things.—*Hume*.

EXPERIENCE, CAUSES AND EFFECTS DISCOVERABLE, NOT BY REASON, BUT BY.—The knowledge of causes and effects is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings *à priori*, but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water, that it would suffocate him, or, from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inferences concerning real existence and matter of fact. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy: he will never discover, that they will adhere together in such a manner as to require great force to separate them in a direct line, while they make so small a resistance to a lateral pressure. No man imagines, that the explosion of gunpowder, or the attraction of the loadstone, could ever be discovered by arguments *à priori*. Who will assert that he can give the ultimate reasons why milk

or bread is proper nourishment for a man, not for a lion or a tyger?—Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect which will result from it, without consulting past observation, after what manner must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause by the most accurate scrutiny and examination: For the effect is totally different from the cause; and consequently can never be discovered in it. A stone raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls; but to consider the matter *à priori*, is there any thing we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than upward, or any other motion in the stone?—In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause; and the first invention or conception of it *à priori* must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other effects which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience. The utmost effect of human reason is, to reduce the

principles productive of natural phenomena to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes; by means of reasoning from analogy, experience, and observation. But the causes of these general causes, the ultimate springs and principles of nature, are totally shut up from human curiosity and inquiry.—*Hume.*

EXPERIENCE, THE FOUNDATION OF ALL CONCLUSIONS FROM.—

Nature has kept us a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of these objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither sense nor reason ever can inform us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body. Sight, or feeling, conveys an idea of the actual motion of bodies: but as to that wonderful force or power, which would carry on a moving body for ever in a continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating it to others; of this we cannot form the most distant conception. But, notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we always presume, where we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and expect that effects, similar to those which we have experienced, will follow from them. If a body of like colour and

consistence with that of bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment; and foresee, with certainty, like nourishment and support. But it is allowed on all hands, that there is no known connection between the sensible qualities and the secret powers; and consequently, that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by any thing which it knows of their nature. As to past *experience*, it can be allowed to give *direct* and *certain* information only of those precise objects, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was at that time endued with such secret powers: But does it follow, that other bread must also nourish me at another time; and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems no wise necessary. These two propositions are far from being the same, *I have found such an object has always been attended with such an effect; and I foresee, that other objects, which are in appearance similar, will be attended with similar effects.* The one proposition is, in fact, always inferred from the other: — But this inference is not made by a chain of reasoning. If this conclusion were formed by reason, it would be as perfect at first; and upon one instance, as after ever so long a

course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing is so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this apparent similarity, expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security, with regard to a particular event. This inference is not intuitive; neither is it demonstrative. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case, seems evident; since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those we have experienced, may be attended with different and contrary effects. Is it not clearly and distinctly to be conceived, that a body falling from the clouds, and which, in all other respects, resembles snow, has yet the taste of salt, or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition, than to affirm, that all the trees will flourish in *December* and *January*, and decay in *May* and *June*? Now, whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction, and can never be proved false by any demonstrative arguments, or abstract reasoning *à priori*.

If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment, these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of fact and real existence: but all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; and our knowledge of that relation is de-

rived entirely from experience; and all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence is begging the question.

All arguments or inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past; and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on a supposition of this resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not, that for the future it will continue so. In vain do we pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from our past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects: why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? There is no logic, or process of argument, which can secure us against this supposition.

In all reasoning, therefore, from experience, there is a step

taken by the mind, which is not established by any argument or process of the understanding. But if the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step, it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority; and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same. Suppose a person, though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection, to be brought on a sudden into this world: he would, indeed, immediately observe a continual succession of objects, and one event following another; but he would not be able to discover any thing further. He would not be able by any reasoning to reach the idea of cause and effect; since the particular powers, by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses; nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event, in one instance precedes another, that, therefore, the one is the cause, the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of the one from the appearance of the other. And, in a word, such a person, without more experience, could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact, or be assured of any thing beyond what was immediately present to his memory or senses.

Suppose, again, that he has acquired more experience, and has lived so long in the world as to have observed similar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together; what is the consequence of this experience?

He immediately infers the existence of the one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not, by all his experience, acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other; nor is it by any process of reasoning he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to it: and though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. To this he is determined by *custom* or *habit*. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of custom. Custom, then, is the great guide of human life. It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us; and makes us expect for the future a similar train of events with those which have appeared in past. Having found, in many instances, that any two kinds of objects, flame and heat, snow and cold, have always been conjoined together; if flame or snow be presented anew to our senses, the mind is carried by custom to expect heat or cold; and to believe that such a quality does exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary consequence of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated as unavoidably to feel the

passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding, is able either to produce or to prevent!—*Hume*.

EXTERNAL OBJECTS ONLY PROBABLE, THE EXISTENCE OF.—Whoever will be satisfied with evidence only, can hardly be sure of any thing except his own existence. How could he, for example, be convinced of that of other bodies? For cannot God, by his omnipotence, make the same impressions on our senses as the presence of the objects would excite? And if we grant, that the Deity can do this, how can it be affirmed, that he does not employ his power in this manner; and that the whole universe is nothing more than a mere phenomenon? Besides, as we are affected in our dreams by the same sensation we should feel were the object present, how can it be proved, that our life is not one continued dream? I would not be understood, from hence, to deny the existence of bodies, but only to show, that we have less assurance of it than of our own existence. And, as truth is an indivisible point, we cannot say of a certain fact, that it is more or less true. It is therefore evident, that if we are more certain of our own existence than that of other bodies, the existence of the latter is no more than a probability. It is, indeed, a very great probability; and with regard to the conduct of life, equivalent to evidence; notwithstanding which, it is only a pro-

bability.—*Helvetius*.

FABULOUS STORIES, THE DIFFICULTY OF DETECTING.—The difficulty of detecting falsehood in any private, or even public history, at the time and place where it is said to happen, is very great; but much more so where the scene is removed to ever so small a distance. Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between truth and falsehood, in the most recent actions. But the matter never comes to any issue, if trusted to the common method of altercation, and debate, and flying rumours; especially when men's passions have taken party on either side.

In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention and regard. And when, afterwards, they would willingly detect the cheat, in order to undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and witnesses, which might clear up the matter, have perished beyond recovery. No means of detection remain but those which must be drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters: and these, though always sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under the comprehension of the vulgar. **

FACT, MATTERS OF, NOT DEMONSTRATIVELY CERTAIN.—ALL the objects of human reason and inquiry may be naturally divided into two kinds, viz.

Relations of ideas, and matters of fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra, and arithmetic; and, in short, every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in the universe. Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible, because it can never imply a contradiction; and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow*, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction, than the affirmation *that it will rise*. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction; and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.—*Hume*.

FACT, THE NATURE OF OUR REASONINGS CONCERNING MATTERS OF.—All reasonings concerning matters of fact, seem to be founded in the relation of cause and effect. By means of that relation alone, we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man, why he believes any matter of fact which is absent; for instance, that his friend is in the country, or in France? he would give you a reason; and this rea-

son would be some other fact; as a letter received from him, or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch, or any other machine, in a desert island, would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And here it is constantly supposed, that there is a relation between the present fact, and that inferred from it.—Were there nothing to bind them together, the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice, and rational discourse, in the dark, assures us of the presence of some person. Why? Because these are the effects of the human shape and fabric, and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other reasonings of this nature, we shall find, that they are founded on cause and effect; and that this relation is either near or remote, direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire; and the one effect may justly be inferred from the other.—*Hume*.

FAITH.—There being many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all; and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence, by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all; these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state; and that the dead shall rise, and live again: these, and

the like, being beyond the discovery of our reason, are purely matters of faith; with which, reason has directly nothing to do.

But since God, in giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters, wherein our natural faculties are able to give a probable determination; revelation, where God has been pleased to give it, must carry it against the probable conjectures of reason: Because the mind, not being certain of the truth of what it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony; which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered. Indeed, if any thing shall be thought revelation which is contrary to the plain principles of reason, and the evident knowledge the mind has of its own clear and distinct ideas; there reason must be hearkened to, as to a matter within its province: since a man can never have so certain a knowledge, that a proposition which contradicts the clear principles and evidence of his own knowledge, was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words rightly wherein it is delivered, as he has that the contrary is true: and so is bound to consider and judge of it as a matter of reason, and not swal-

low it, without examination, as a matter of faith.

First, whatever proposition is revealed, of whose truth, our mind, by its natural faculties and notions, cannot judge; that is purely matter of faith, and above reason.

Secondly, all propositions, whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge from naturally acquired ideas, are matter of reason; with this difference still, that in those concerning which it has but an uncertain evidence, and so is persuaded of their truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturning the principles of all reason; in such probable propositions, I say, *an evident revelation* ought to determine our assent even against probability.—For where the principles of reason have not evidenced a proposition to be certainly true or false, there clear revelation, as another principle of truth, and ground of assent, may determine; and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because reason, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than probability, faith gave the determination where reason came short; and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay.

Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to reason; which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved,

by new discoveries of truth coming from the eternal fountain of all knowledge. Whatever God hath revealed, is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it.—This is the proper object of faith, *but whether it be a divine revelation or no, reason must judge*; which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident, nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty. There can be no evidence, that any traditional revelation is of divine original, in the words we receive it, and in the sense we understand it, so clear, and so certain, as that of the principles of reason: and, therefore, nothing that is contrary to, and inconsistent with the clear and self-evident dictates of reason, has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith, wherein reason has nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine revelation, ought to overrule all our opinions, prejudices, and interest, and hath a right to be received with full assent.—Such a submission as this, of our reason to faith, takes not away the land-marks of knowledge; this shakes not the foundation of reason, but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us.—*Locke.*

FAITH.—Belief, or disbelief, can neither be a virtue, nor a crime, in any one who used the best means in his power of being informed. If a proposition is evident, we cannot avoid believing it; and where is the merit or piety of a necessary assent? If it is not evident, we cannot help rejecting it, or doubting of

it: and where is the crime of not performing impossibilities, or not believing what does not appear to us to be true?—*Whitby.*

FAITH AND REASON.—If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries, there will, in matters of religion, be no room for reason at all; and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world, will not deserve to be blamed. For to this crying up of faith, in opposition to reason, we may, I think, in good measure, ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind. For men having been principled with an opinion, that they must not consult reason in the things of religion, however apparently contradictory to common sense, and the very principles of all their knowledge, have let loose their fancies and natural superstition; and have been by them led into so strange opinions and extravagant practices in religion, that a considerate man cannot but stand amazed at their follies, and judge them, so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man. So that, in effect, religion, which should most distinguish us from beasts, and ought most peculiarly to elevate us, as rational creatures, above brutes, is that wherein men often appear most irrational and more senseless than beasts themselves. *Credo, quia impossibile est*, “I believe, because it is impossible,” might, in a good

man, pass for a sally of zeal; but would prove a very bad rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by.—* *

FAME.—A man, whose talents and genius give him the consciousness of deserving reputation, may let the public voice alone. He need not trouble himself in dictating what it shall determine; but wait, if I may say so, for future fame to come and take his orders. He will soon put to silence every inferior voice, as the force of the fundamental sound in a concord destroys every dissonance which tends to alter the harmony. We must act in fame as cautiously as in sickness; impatience is fatal in either of them. How many men are there distinguished for their rare endowments, to whom we may apply the rebuke formerly made to a Carthaginian general: "The gods do not give all talents to one: you have that of obtaining a victory, but not that of using it." Renown is a kind of game at commerce, where chance sometimes gets a fortune; but where merit acquires, in general, more certain gains; provided, that while it uses the tricks of gamblers, it does not expose itself to be betrayed by them. But it is too frequently considered as a mere lottery, where persons imagine they make their fortunes by inventing false tickets.—*D'Alembert.*

FAME, ORIGIN OF THE LOVE OF.—Our opinions, of all kinds, are strongly affected by society and sympathy; and it is almost impossible for us to support any principle or sentiment, against the universal consent of every one with whom we have any

friendship or correspondence.—

But of all our opinions, those which we form in our own favour, however lofty or presuming, are at bottom the frailest, and the most easily shaken by the contradiction and opposition of others. Our great concern, in this case, makes us soon alarmed, and keeps our passions upon the watch; our consciousness of partiality still makes us dread a mistake.—

And the very difficulty of judging concerning an object, which is never set a due distance from us, nor is seen in a proper point of view, makes us hearken anxiously to the opinions of others, who are better qualified to form just opinions concerning us.—Hence that strong *love of fame* with which all mankind are possessed. It is in order to fix and confirm their favourable opinion of themselves, not from any original passion, that they seek the applauses of others. And when a man desires to be praised, it is for the same reason that a beauty is pleased with surveying herself in a favourable looking-glass, and seeing the reflection of her own charms.—*Hume.*

FANATICISM.—Fanaticism is to superstition what a delirium is to a fever, and fury to anger: He who has ecstasies and visions, who takes dreams for realities, and his imagination for prophecies, is an enthusiast; and he who sticks not at supporting his folly by murder, is a fanatic.

The only remedy for this infectious disease is a philosophical temper, which spreading through society, at length softens manners, and obviates the excesses

of the distemper; for whenever it gets ground, the best way is to fly from it, and stay till the air is purified. The laws and religion are no preservative against this mental pestilence. Religion, so far from being a salutary aliment in these cases, in infected brains becomes poison.

The laws likewise have proved very ineffectual against this spiritual rage; it is, indeed, like reading an order of council to a lunatic. The creatures are firmly persuaded that the spirit by which they are actuated is above all laws, and that their enthusiasm is the only law they are to regard.

What can be answered to a person who tells you, that he had rather obey God than men; and who, in consequence of that choice, is certain of gaining heaven by cutting your throat?

The leaders of fanatics, and who put the dagger into their hands, are usually designing knaves; they are like the old man of the mountain, who, according to history, gave weak persons a foretaste of the joys of paradise, promising them an eternity of such enjoyments, provided they would go and murder all those whom he should name to them.

In the whole world, there has been but one religion clear of fanaticism, which is that of the Chinese literati. As to the sects of philosophers, instead of being infected with this pestilence, they were a ready and sure preservative against it: for the effect of philosophy is to compose the soul, and fanaticism is incom-

patible with tranquillity.—*Voltaire*.
FANATICISM, THE PUNISHMENT OF.—Painful and corporal punishments should never be applied to fanaticism; for, being founded on pride, it glories in persecution. Infamy and ridicule only should be employed against fanatics: if the first, their pride will be overbalanced by the pride of the people; and we may judge of the power of the second, if we consider, that even truth is obliged to summon all her force when attacked by error, armed by ridicule. Thus, by opposing one passion to another, and opinion to opinion, a wise legislator puts an end to the admiration of the populace, occasioned by a false principle, the original absurdity of which is veiled by some well-deduced consequences.

This is the method to avoid confounding the immutable relations of things, or opposing nature; whose actions, not being limited by time, but operating incessantly, overturn and destroy all those vain regulations which contradict her laws. It is not only in the fine arts that the imitation of nature is the fundamental principle; it is the same in sound policy, which is no other than the art of uniting and directing to the same end the natural and immutable sentiments of mankind.—*Beccaria*.

FILIAL AFFECTION.—The bond that ties children to their parents is less strong than commonly imagined. Nothing is more common in Europe than to see children desert their parents, when they become old, infirm, incapable of labour, and forced to

subsist by beggary. We see, in the country, one father nourish seven or eight children; but seven or eight children are not sufficient to nourish one father. If all children be not so unnatural, if some of them have affection and humanity, it is to education and example they owe that humanity. Nature, no doubt, designed, that gratitude and habit should form in man a sort of gravitation, by which they should be impelled to a love of their parents; but it has also designed that man should have, in the natural desire of independence, a repulsive power, which should diminish the too great force of that gravitation. From hence, perhaps, comes the proverb, founded on common and constant observation, *That the love of parents descends, and does not remount.*—*Helvetius.*

FINAL CAUSES.—A man must be (it seems) stark mad to deny, that the stomach is made for digestion, the eye to see, and the ear to hear.—On the other hand, he must be strangely attached to final causes to affirm, that stone was made to build houses, and that China breeds silk worms to furnish Europe with satin.—But it is said, if God has manifestly made one thing with design, he had a design in every thing. To allow a Providence in one case, and deny it in another, is ridiculous. Whatever is made, was foreseen and arranged; now every arrangement has its object, every effect its cause: therefore, every thing is equally the result or the product of a final cause: therefore, it is equally true to say, that noses were

made to wear spectacles, and fingers to be decorated with diamonds, as it is true to say, that the ears have been made to hear sounds, and the eyes to receive light.

This difficulty, I apprehend, may be easily cleared up, when the effects are invariably the same in all times and places; when such uniform effects are independent of the beings they appertain to, there then is evidently a final cause.—All animals have eyes, and they see; all have ears, and they hear; all have a mouth, with which they eat; a stomach, or something similar, by which they digest; all an orifice, which voids the excrements; all an instrument of generation; and these natural gifts operate in them without the intervention of any art. Here are clear demonstrations of final causes; and to contradict so universal a truth, would be to pervert our faculty of thinking.—But it is not in all places, nor at all times, that stones form edifices; all noses do not wear spectacles; all fingers have not a ring; nor are all legs covered with silk stockings: therefore, a silk worm is not made to cover my legs, as your mouth is made to eat, &c. Thus there are effects produced by final causes; but withal, many which cannot come within that appellation. But both one and the other are equally agreeable to the plan of a general providence; for certainly nothing comes to pass in opposition to it, or so much as without it. Every particular within the compass of nature is uniform, immutable, and the im-

mediate work of their Author. Men were not essentially created to butcher one another; but the composition we are made of, is frequently productive of massacres, as it produces calumnies, vanities, persecutions, and imperinences: not that the formation of man is precisely the final cause of our follies and brutalities; a final cause being universal and invariable, in all places, and at all times. The crimes and absurdities of the human mind are, nevertheless, in the eternal order of things. In thrashing corn, the flail is the final cause of the grain's separation; but if the flail, thrashing the corn, destroys a thousand insects, this is not from any determinate will of mine, neither is it mere chance: these insects were at that time under my flail; and it was determined they were to be there, that is, it was consequential to the nature of things.

The instruments given to us by nature cannot be final causes, ever in motion, and infallible in their effect. The eyes, given us for sight, are not always open; every sense has its intervals of rest, and its exertion is frequently prevented by extraneous causes; nevertheless, the final cause subsists, and as soon as it is free, will act.—*Voltaire*.

FLATTERY.—Every body hates praise when he believes it to be false; people, then, love flatterers only in the quality of sincere admirers. Under this, it is impossible not to love them, because every one believes that his actions are laudable and worthy of praise. Whoever disdains elogiums, suffers, at least, people to

praise him on this account. When they detest a flatterer, it is because they know him to be such. In flattery, it is not the praise, but the falsehood, which shocks us. If the man of sense appears little sensible of elogiums, it is because he more frequently perceives the falsehood: but let an artful flatterer praise, persist in praising him, and sometimes seem to censure with the elogiums he bestows; and even the man of the greatest sense and penetration will, sooner or later, be his dupe. This taste derives its source from a vanity common to all men. Every man, therefore, would be praised and flattered; but all would not have it done in the same manner; and it is only in this particular that the difference between them consists. Of all praises, the most flattering and delicate is, without dispute, that which most evidently proves our own excellence. What gratitude do we owe to those who discover to us defects that, without being prejudicial to us, assure us of our superiority? Of all flattery, this is the most artful.—*Helvetius*.

FRIENDSHIP.—Friendship is a tacit contract between two sensible and virtuous souls: I say sensible; for a monk, a hermit, may not be wicked, yet live a stranger to friendship. I add virtuous; for the wicked have only accomplices, the voluptuous have companions, the designing have associates, the men of business have partners, the politicians form a factious band, the bulk of idle men have connections, princes have courtiers; but virtuous men alone have friends. *Cethegus*

was Catiline's accomplice, and Mæcenas was Octavius's courtier; but Cicero was Atticus's friend.—What is implied in this contract between two tender and ingenuous souls? Its obligations are stronger and weaker, according to their degree of sensibility, and the number of good offices performed.—*Voltaire*.

FRIENDSHIP, REAL.—Love implies want, and there is no friendship without; for this would be an effect without a cause. All men have not the same wants; and, therefore, the friendship that subsists between them is founded on different motives: some want pleasure or money, others credit; those conversation, and these a confidant to whom they may disburthen their hearts. There are, consequently, friends of money, of intrigue, of the mind, and of misfortune. In friendship, as in love, people form the most romantic ideas; they always search for the hero, and every instant think they have found him. We are never so violently affected with the virtues of a man as when we first see him; for as custom renders us insensible to personal beauties, a good understanding, and even the qualities of the soul, we are never so strongly agitated as by the pleasure of surprise. We generally love a man while we know little of him, and are desirous of knowing him better; but no sooner is this curiosity satisfied, than we are disgusted. In considering friendship as a reciprocal want, it cannot but be acknowledged, that it is very difficult for the same wants, and, consequently, for the same friendship, to sub-

sist between two men for a long course of time, and, therefore, nothing is more uncommon than friendship of a long standing. The circumstances in which two friends ought to be found being once given, and their characters known; if they are ever to quarrel, there is no doubt but that a man of penetration, by foreseeing the time when these two men would cease to be reciprocally of use to each other, might calculate the moment when their rupture would happen, as an astronomer calculates the time of an eclipse. We ought not, however, to confound with friendship the chains of habit, the respectful esteem felt for an acknowledged friend, or that happy point of honour, so useful to society, that makes us keep an acquaintance with those whom we call our friends. We perform the same services for them as we did when they filled us with the warmest sensations, though in reality we do not want their company.—Friendship supposes a want; and the more this want is felt, the more lively will be the friendship; the want is, then, the measure of the sensation. A man and woman escaping shipwreck, save themselves on a desert island, where, having no hope of ever seeing their native country, they are forced to bend their mutual assistance, to defend themselves from the wild beasts, to enjoy life, and to escape despair: no friendship can be more warm than that between this man and woman, who perhaps would have hated each other had they remained at Paris. If one of them happens to perish,

the other has really lost the half of himself: no grief can equal his; a person must dwell alone on a desert island, who can be sensible of all its violence. The unfortunate are in general the most tender friends; united by their reciprocal distresses, they enjoy, while condoling the misfortune of a friend, the pleasure of being affected with their own. What is true of circumstances, is also true of characters; there are some who cannot live without a friend. The first are, those of a weak and timid disposition, who, in their whole conduct, never conclude on any thing without the advice and assistance of others. The second are, the persons of a gloomy, severe, and tyrannical disposition, who are warm friends of those over whom they vent their spleen: these are like one of the wives of Socrates, who, at the news of the death of that great man, became more inconsolable than the second, who being of a mild and amiable temper, lost in Socrates only an husband, while the other lost in him the martyr of her capricious temper, and the only man who could bear with it. If we loved a friend only for himself, we should never consider any thing but his happiness; we should not reproach him for being so long without seeing or writing to us; we should say, that he had probably spent his time more agreeably, and should rejoice in his happiness.

Men have taken great pains to repeat after each other, that those ought not to be reckoned in the list of friends whose interested views make them love

us only for our ability to serve them. This kind of friendship is certainly not the most flattering; but it is, nevertheless, a real friendship. Men, for instance, love in a minister of state the power he has of obliging them; and in most of them the love of the person is incorporated with the love of the preferment. Why is the name of friendship refused to this sensation? Men do not love us for ourselves, but always on some other account; and the above-mentioned is as good as any other. A man is in love with a woman; can it be said he does not love her, because he only admires the beauties of her eyes or complexion? But, it is said, the rich man, reduced to poverty, is no longer beloved. This is not denied: but when the small-pox robs a woman of her beauty, all addresses to her commonly cease; though this is no proof she was not beloved while she was beautiful. Suppose a friend, in whom we had the greatest confidence, and for whose mind, disposition, and character, we had the greatest esteem, were suddenly become blind, deaf, and dumb, we should regret in him the loss of a friend; we should still respect his memory; but, in fact, we should no longer love him, because he would have no resemblance to the man who was the object of our friendship. If a minister of state fall into disgrace, we no longer love him; for this reason, because he is the friend who is suddenly become blind, deaf, and dumb. It is, nevertheless, true, that the man, anxious for preferment, has great tenderness for him who can pro-

cure it for him. Whoever has this want of promotion is born the friend of the minister of state. It is, then, our vanity that makes us refuse giving the name to so selfish and necessary a passion. It may, however, be observed, that the most solid and durable friendships are commonly those of virtuous men, however villains themselves are susceptible of it. If, as we are forced to confess, friendship is only the sensation by which two men are united, we cannot deny but that friendships subsist between the wicked, without contradicting the most authentic facts. Can we, for instance, doubt, that two conspirators may be united by the warmest friendship? That Jaffier did not love James Piero? That Octavius, who was certainly not a virtuous man, did not love Mecaenas, who was, at best, but a weak man? The power of friendship is not in proportion to the virtue of two friends, but to the force of the interest by which they are united.—*Helvetius*.

FUTURE PUNISHMENTS.—If Supreme Justice avenges itself on the wicked, it avenges itself here below. It is you and your errors ye nations! that are its ministers of vengeance. It employs the evils you bring on each other, to punish the crimes for which you deserve them. It is in the insatiable hearts of mankind, corroding with envy, avarice, and ambition, that their avenging passions punish them for their vices, amidst all the false appearances of prosperity. Where is the necessity of seeking a hell in another life, when it is to be

found even in this, in the hearts of the wicked?

Where our momentary necessities or senseless desires have an end, there ought our passions and our vices to end also. Of what perversity can pure spirits be susceptible? As they stand in need of nothing, to what end should they be vicious? If destitute of our grosser senses, all their happiness consists in the contemplation of things, they cannot be desirous of any thing but good; and whoever ceases to be wicked, is it possible he should be eternally miserable?—*Rousseau*.

FUTURE REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.—Man is considered as a moral, because he is regarded as an accountable being: But an accountable being, as the word expresses, is a being that must give an account of its actions to some other; and that, consequently, must regulate them according to the good liking of this other. Man is accountable to God and his fellow-creatures. But though he is, no doubt, principally accountable to God, in the order of time he must necessarily conceive himself as accountable to his fellow-creatures, before he can form any idea of the Deity, or of the rules by which that Divine Being will judge of his conduct. A child surely conceives itself as accountable to its parents, and is elevated or cast down by the thought of their merited approbation or disapprobation, long before it forms any idea of its accountableness to the Deity, or of the rules by which that Divine Being will judge of its conduct. The great Judge

of the world has, for the wisest reasons, thought proper to interpose between the weak eye of human reason and the throne of his eternal justice, a degree of obscurity and darkness, which, though it does not entirely cover that great tribunal from the view of mankind, yet renders the impression of it faint and feeble, in comparison of what might be expected from the grandeur and importance of so mighty an object. If those infinite rewards and punishments, which the Almighty has prepared for those who obey or resist his will, were perceived as distinctly as we foresee the frivolous and temporary retaliations which we may expect from one another, the weakness of human nature, astonished at the immensity of objects so little fitted to its comprehension, could no longer attend to the little affairs of this world: and it is absolutely impossible, that the business of society could have been carried on, if, in this respect, there had been a fuller revelation of the intentions of Providence than that which has already been made.—*A. Smith.*

FUTURE STATE.—Cicero, in his speech for Cluentius, says to a full senate, What hurt does death to him? All the idle tales about hell none of us give the least credit to; then what has death deprived him of? Nothing but the feeling of pain.—Does not Cæsar, Catiline's friend, in order to save that wretch from an indictment brought against him by the same Cicero, object, that to put a criminal to death is not punishing him; that death is nothing; that it is only the end

of our sufferings; and that it is rather a happy than a fatal moment? And did not Cicero and the whole senate yield to these arguments?—*Voltaire.*

GALLANTRY.—Nature has implanted in all living creatures an affection between the sexes, which even in the fiercest and most rapacious animals is not merely confined to the satisfaction of the bodily appetite, but begets a friendship and mutual sympathy, which runs through the whole tenor of their lives; nay, even in those species where nature limits the indulgence of this appetite to one season, and to one object, and forms a kind of marriage or association between a single male and female, there is yet a visible complacency and benevolence, which extends farther, and mutually softens the affections of the sexes towards each other. How much more must this have place in man, where the confinement of the appetite is not natural; but either is derived accidentally from some strong charm of love, or arises from reflections on duty and convenience? Nothing, therefore, can proceed less from affectation than the passion of gallantry. It is natural in the highest degree. Art and education, in the most elegant courts, make no more alteration on it, than all the other laudable passions. They only turn the mind more towards it; they refine it; they polish it; and give it a proper grace and expression.—But gallantry is as generous as it is natural. Nature has given man the superiority above woman, by endowing him with greater strength both of

mind and body : it is his part to alleviate that superiority as much as possible by the generosity of his behaviour, and by a studied deference and complaisance for all her inclinations and opinions. Barbarous nations display this superiority, by reducing their females to the most abject slavery; by confining them, by beating them, by selling them, by killing them : But the male sex among a polite people, discover their superiority in a more generous, though not less evident manner; by civility, by respect, by complaisance, and in a word by gallantry.—Gallantry is not less consistent with wisdom and prudence, than with nature and generosity ; and, when under proper regulations, contributes more than any other invention to the entertainment and improvement of the youth of both sexes. Among every species of animals, Nature has founded on the love between the sexes their sweetest and best enjoyment. But the satisfaction of the bodily appetite is not alone sufficient to gratify the mind; and, even, among brute creatures, we find that their play and dalliance, and other expressions of fondness, form the greatest part of the entertainment. In rational beings, we must certainly admit the mind for a considerable share. Were we to rob the feast of all its garniture of reason, discourse, sympathy, friendship, and gaiety, what remains would scarcely be worth acceptance in the judgment of the truly elegant and luxurious.—What better school for manners than the company of virtuous women ; where the

mutual endeavour to please must insensibly polish the mind ; where the example of female softness and modesty must communicate itself to their admirers ; and where the delicacy of that sex puts every one on his guard, lest he give offence by any breach of decency?—*Hume*.

GENIUS.—Genius is properly the faculty of invention, by means of which a man is qualified for making new discoveries in science, or for producing original works of art. We may ascribe taste, judgment or knowledge, to a man who is incapable of invention ; but we cannot reckon him a man of genius. In order to determine how far he merits that character, we must inquire, whether he has discovered any new principle in science, or invented any new art, or carried those arts, which are already practised, to a higher degree of perfection than former masters ? Or, whether, at least, in matters of science, he has improved on the discoveries of his predecessors, and reduced principles formerly known to a greater degree of simplicity and consistence, or traced them through a train of consequences hitherto unknown ? or, in the arts, designed some new work, different from those of his predecessors, though perhaps not excelling them ? Whatever falls short of this is servile imitation, or a dull effort of plodding industry, which, as not implying invention, can be deemed no proof of genius, whatever capacity, skill, or diligence it may evidence. But if a man shows invention, no intellectual defects which his performance

may betray can forfeit his claim to genius. His invention may be irregular, wild, undisciplined; but still it is regarded as an infallible mark of real natural genius: and the degree of this faculty that we ascribe to him, is always in proportion to our estimate of the novelty, the difficulty, or the dignity of his invention.

—Gerard.

GOD.—Newton was fully persuaded of the existence of a God; and by that term understood, not only an infinite, almighty, eternal, creative Being, but a master, who had established a relation between himself and his creatures; as, without this relation, the knowledge of a God is only a barren idea, which would seem to invite every reasoner of a perverse nature to the practice of vice, by the hopes of impunity.

Accordingly, that great Philosopher, at the end of his *Principia*, makes a singular remark, namely, That we do not say, My eternal, my infinite, because these attributes do not at all relate to our nature; but we say, My God, and are thereby to understand the master and preserver of our life, the object of our thoughts. Newton's philosophy leads to the knowledge of a Supreme Being, who freely created and arranged all things. For if the world be finite, if there be a vacuum, the existence of matter is not necessary, and, therefore, has received existence from a free cause. If matter gravitates, it does not appear to gravitate from its nature, as it is extended by its nature; it has, therefore, received its gravitation from God. If the planets, in a space void of

resistance, revolve one way rather than another, the hand of their Creator must have directed their course that way, with an absolute freedom.

It may, perhaps, appear strange to many, that among all the proofs of the existence of a God, the strongest, in Newton's opinion, is that of final causes. The design, or rather the designs, various *ad infinitum*, displayed in the most enormous and most minute parts of the universe, form a demonstration, which, from its being so manifestly sensible, is little regarded by some philosophers; but Newton thought that these infinite relations could only be the work of an artist infinitely wise. He made little account of the proof from the succession of beings. It is commonly said, that if men, animals, vegetables, and whatever compose this world, were eternal, a series of generations without cause must, of consequence, be admitted. The existence of these beings, it is said, would have no origin; no eternal can be supposed to rise again from generation to generation without a beginning; no eternal, because no one can exist of itself. Thus every thing would be effect, and nothing cause.—This argument appeared to him founded only on the ambiguity of *generations*, and of beings *formed one by the other*. For Atheists, who admit a plenum, answer, that there are, properly speaking, no generations: there are not several substances: the universe is a whole, necessarily existing, incessantly displaying itself. It is one and the same being, whose nature is immuta-

ble in its substance, and eternally varied in its modifications. Thus the argument drawn from the succession of beings would, perhaps, prove very little against an Atheist who should deny the plurality of beings. He would have recourse to those ancient axioms, that nothing is produced by nothing; that one substance cannot produce another; that every thing is eternal and necessary.

Matter, says the Atheist, is necessary, because it exists; motion is necessary, because nothing is at rest; and motion is so necessary, that in nature never any motive forces are lost.

What is to-day was yesterday; therefore, it was before yesterday, and thus recurring without end. No person will dare to say, that things shall return to nothing; how, then, dare to say, that they came from nothing? In a word, I know not if there be a metaphysical proof more striking, and which speaks more strongly to man than the admirable order in the world; and whether there has ever been a finer argument than the following: *The heavens declare the glory of God.* Accordingly, you see that Newton, at the end of his *Optics and Principia*, uses no other. No reasoning appeared to him more grand and convincing in favour of a Deity than that of Plato, who makes one of his interlocutors say, You think I have an intelligent soul, because you perceive order in my words and actions; surely, then, from the order you see in this world, there must be in it a spirit supremely intelligent.

But if the existence of an eternally almighty Being be proved, is it not equally proved that this Being is infinitely good in the general sense of the word?

This is the grand refuge of the Atheist. If I admit a God, says he, this God must be goodness itself. He who has given me a being, should also give me happiness: but I see only disorder and calamity among mankind. The necessity of an eternal matter offends me less than a Creator dealing so harshly with his creatures. My doubts are not to be removed by being told, that a first man, composed of a body and soul, offended his Creator, and that mankind suffers for his offence. For if our bodies are derived from the first man, our souls are not; and even if they are, it seems the most horrid injustice for the punishment to descend from the father to the children.

It is evident, that the Americans, and the people of the old world, the Negroes and the Laplanders, are not at all descended from that first man. The interior constitution of the organs of the Negroes is a palpable demonstration of this.—I had, therefore, rather admit the necessity of matter, generations, and eternal vicissitudes than a God, the free author of miserable creatures.

To this, it is answered, The words, *good, comfort, and happiness*, are equivocal: what is evil with regard to you, is good in the general plan. Will you deny a God, because you have been afflicted with a fever? You say he owed you happiness: but what reason have you to think

so? Why did he owe you this happiness? Was you in any treaty with him? Therefore, to be only happy in this life, you need only acknowledge a God. You who cannot pretend to be perfect in any one thing, how can you expect to be perfectly happy? But suppose, that in a continual happiness for one hundred years, you may have a fit of the head-ach, shall this short interval induce you to deny a Creator? Surely no. If, therefore, you do not startle at a quarter of an hour's suffering, why at two hours?—Why at a day? Why should a year of torment prevail on you to reject the belief of a supreme universal Artisan?

It is proved, that there is in this world more good than evil; for, after all, few men are to be found who really wish for death.

Men are fond of murmuring; there is a pleasure in complaining, but more in living. We delight in viewing only evil, and exaggerating it. Read history, it is replied; what is it more than a continual series of crimes and misfortunes? Agreed; but histories are only the repositories of great events: tempests only are recorded; calms are overlooked.

After examining the relations between the springs and organs of an animal, and the designs which display themselves in every part, the manner by which this animal receives life, by which he sustains it, and by which he gives it, you readily acknowledge the supreme Artist. Will you, then, change your opinion, because wolves eat the sheep, and spiders catch flies? Do not you, on the contrary, perceive, that

these continual generations, ever devoured, and ever re-produced, are a part of the plan of the universe? Wisdom and power, you say, are perceivable in them, but goodness is still wanting.

In fine, if you may be happy to all eternity, can any pains and afflictions in this life be worth mentioning?

You cannot think the Creator *good*, because there is some evil in this world. But if necessity supply the place of a Supreme Being, will affairs be mended? In the system which admits a God, some difficulties only are to be removed; in all the other systems, we must encounter absurdities.

Philosophy, indeed, plainly shows us that there is a God, but it cannot teach us what he is, what he is doing, how and wherefore he does it; whether he exists in time or in space; whether he has commanded once, or whether he is always acting; whether he be in matter, or whether he be not there, &c. To himself only, these things are known.—*Voltaire*.

GOD, KNOWLEDGE OF.—Though God has given us no innate *ideas* of himself; though he has stamped no original characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being; yet having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witness, since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since he has so plentifully pro-

vided us with the means to discover and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty, yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration. To show, therefore, that we are capable of knowing, *i. e.* being certain that there is a God; and how we may come by this certainty, I think we need go no further than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence.

Man knows, by an intuitive certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real being, than it can be equal to two right angles. If a man knows not that nonentity, or the absence of all being, cannot be equal to two right angles, it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If, therefore, we know there is some real being, and that nonentity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration, that from eternity there has been something; since what was not from eternity had a beginning, and what had a beginning must be produced by something else.

Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs

to its being, from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to, and received from the same source. This eternal source, then, of all being, must also be the source and original of all power; and so this eternal Being must be also the most powerful.

Again, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge: we have then got one step further; and we are certain now, that there is not only some being, but some knowing intelligent being in the world.

There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also a knowing being from eternity. If it be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding: I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge; it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones.

Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitution, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth—that there is an

eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being; which, whether any one will please to call God, it matters not. The thing is evident; and from this idea, duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If, nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance, and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind hazard; I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully, l. ii. *De Leg.*, to be considered at his leisure: "What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside, there is no such thing? Or that those things, which, with the utmost stretch of his reason, he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?" *Quid est enim verius, quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem, ut in se mentem et rationem putet inesse, in cælo mundoque non putet?*

From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God, than of any thing our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a God, than that there is any thing else without us. When I say we know, I mean there is such a knowledge within our

reach which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our minds to that as we do to several other inquiries.—*Locke.*

GOOD, ITS PREVALENCE OVER EVIL.—That the good overbalances the evil in the physical and moral world, is clear, from their subsisting with regularity and order. If evil preponderated in the former, nature would soon destroy herself; if in the latter, rational beings would put an end to their own existence. The preference of life to death in one, and the prevalence of order over disorder in the other, lead us to the same desirable conclusion.—From the opposition of the different elements in the physical world arises all physical evil; such as storms and earthquakes: but, from this same opposition, arises all the physical good; such as the regularity of the whole, the vicissitude of season, generation, vegetation, and an endless variety of other beneficial effects. From the contrariety of interests in the moral world, arise wars, devastations, and murders; but, from the same contrariety, proceed peace, order, harmony, commerce, art, and science, with every advantage of cultivated science. To complain that there is pain in the moral world, is as unreasonable, and as absurd, as to complain that there is darkness in the physical; as all cannot be light in the one, so neither can all be pleasure in the other. It is enough if pleasure preponderate; and that point has been already established.—**

GOVERNMENT, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A FREE AND A DESPOTIC ONE.—The difference be-

tween a free and a despotic state, consists in the manner in which that whole mass of power, which, taken together, is supreme, is, in a free state, distributed among the several ranks of persons that are sharers in it: in the source from whence their titles to it are successively derived:—in the frequent and easy changes of condition between the governors and governed; whereby the interests of one class are more or less indistinguishably blended with those of the other:—in the responsibility of the governors; or the right which a subject has of having the reasons publicly assigned and canvassed of every act of power that is exerted over him: in the liberty of the press; or the security with which every man, be he of the one class or the other, may make known his complaints and remonstrances to the whole community; in the liberty of public associations; or the security with which malcontents may communicate their sentiments, concert their plans, and practise every mode of opposition short of actual revolt, before the executive power can be justified in disturbing them.—*Jer. Bentham.*

GOVERNMENT, RESISTANCE TO.—

It is then, and not till then, allowable to, if not incumbent on every man, as well on the score of duty as of interest, to enter into measures of resistance, when, according to the best calculation he can make, the probable mischiefs of resistance (speaking with respect to the community in general), appear less to him than the probable mischiefs of

submission. This, then, is to him, that is, to each man in particular, the juncture of resistance. A natural question here is:—By what sign shall this juncture be known? By what common signal alike conspicuous to all? A common sign there is none. Every man must be determined by his own internal persuasion of a balance of utility on the side of resistance; for utility is the test and measure of loyalty. It may be said, that the letter of the *law* is the measure of government in free states; and not that other loose and general rule, To govern in subservience to the happiness of the people. True it is, that the governing in opposition to the law is one way of governing in opposition to the happiness of the people: the natural effect of such a contempt of the law being, if not actually to destroy, at least, to threaten with destruction, all those rights and privileges that are founded on it; rights and privileges, on the enjoyment of which that happiness depends. But still this is not sufficient; and that for several reasons. *First*, Because the most mischievous, and under some constitutions the most feasible, method of governing in opposition to the happiness of the people, is, by setting the law itself in opposition to their happiness. *Secondly*, Because it is a case very conceivable, that a king may, to a great degree, impair the happiness of his people, without violating the letter of any single law. *Thirdly*, Because extraordinary occasions may now and then occur, in which the happiness of the people may be

better promoted by acting, for the moment, in opposition to the law, than in subservience to it. *Fourthly*, Because it is not any single violation of the law, as such, that can release the people from allegiance: for it is scarce ever any single violation of the law that, by being submitted to, can produce so much mischief as shall surpass the probable mischief of resisting it. If every single instance whatever of such violation were to be deemed an entire release from allegiance, a man, who reflects at all, would scarce find any where under the sun, that government which he could allow to subsist for twenty years together. Utility, then, is the test and measure of all government: and the obligation of governors of every denomination to minister to general happiness, is an obligation superior to, and inclusive of every other. This is the reason why kings, on the one hand, should, in general, keep within established laws; and, to speak universally, abstain from all such measures as tend to the unhappiness of their subjects: and, on the other hand, why subjects should obey kings as long as they so conduct themselves, and no longer; why they should obey, in short, so long as the probable mischiefs of obedience are less than the probable mischiefs of resistance: why, in a word, taking the whole body together, it is their duty to obey just so long as it is their interest, and no longer—where a state is limited by express convention, as the German Empire, Dutch Provinces, Swiss Cantons, and the

ancient Achæan league. There we may be furnished with a common signal of resistance. A certain act is in the instrument of convention specified, with respect to which, the government is therein precluded from issuing a law to a certain effect. A law is issued to that effect notwithstanding. The issuing, then, of such a law (the sense of it, and likewise the sense of that part of the convention which provides against it, being supposed clear) is a fact notorious and visible to all: in the issuing, then, of such a law, we have a fact which is capable of being taken for that common signal of resistance.—These bounds the supreme body has marked out to its authority: of such a demarcation, then, what is the effect? Either none at all, or this, that the disposition to obedience confines itself within these bounds. Beyond them, the disposition is stopped from extending: beyond them the subject is no more prepared to obey the governing body of his own state, than that of any other.—No convention, however, should prevent what the parties affected shall deem a reformation; no disease in a state should be without its remedy. Such might, by some, be thought the case, where that supreme body, which, in such a convention, was one of the contracting parties, having incorporated itself with that which was the other, no longer subsists to give any new modification to the engagement. Although that body itself, which contracted the engagement, be no more, a larger body, from whence the first is understood to

have derived its title, may still subsist. Let this larger body be consulted. Various are the ways that might be conceived of doing this; and that without any disparagement to the dignity of the subsisting legislature; of doing it to such effect, as that, should the sense of such larger body be favourable to the alteration, it may be made by a law; which, in this case, neither ought to be, nor probably would be, regarded by the people as a breach of the convention.—*Jer. Bentham.*

GOVERNMENT.—Rank, privileges, and prerogatives in a state, are constituted for the good of the state; and those who enjoy them, whether they be called kings, senators, or nobles, or by whatever names or titles they be distinguished, are, to all intents and purposes, the servants of the public, and accountable to the people for the discharge of their respective offices. If such magistrates abuse their trust, in the people lies the right of *deposing*, and consequently of punishing them. And the only reason why abuses which have crept into offices have been connived at, is, that the correcting them, by having recourse to first principles, is far from being easy, except in small states; so that the remedy would often be worse than the disease. But, in the largest states, if the abuses of government should at any time be great and manifest; if the servants of the people, forgetting their masters, and their masters' interest, should pursue a separate one of their own; if, instead of considering that

they are made for the people, they should consider the people as made for them; if the oppressions and violations of right should be great, flagrant, and universally resented; if, in consequence of these circumstances, it should become manifest, that the risk which would be run in attempting a revolution would be trifling, and the evils which might be apprehended from it, were far less than those which were actually suffered, and which were daily increasing; what principles are those which ought to restrain an injured and insulted people from asserting their natural rights, and from changing, or even punishing their governors; that is, their servants, who had abused their trust; or from altering the whole form of their government, if it appeared to be of a structure so liable to abuse? It will be said, that it is opening a door to rebellion, to assert that magistrates abusing their power may be set aside by the people, who are of course their own judges when their power is abused. May not the people, it is said, abuse their power as well as their governors? I answer, It is very possible they may abuse their power: it is possible they may imagine themselves oppressed when they are not: it is possible their animosity may be artfully and unreasonably inflamed by ambitious and enterprising men, whose views are often best answered by popular tumults and insurrections; and the people may suffer in consequence of their folly and precipitancy: But what man is there, or what

body of men (whose right to direct their own conduct was never called in question) but are liable to be imposed upon, and to suffer in consequence of their mistaken apprehensions and precipitate conduct?

With respect to large societies, it is very improbable that the people should be too soon alarmed, so as to be driven to these extremities. In such cases, the power of the government, that is, of the governors, must be very extensive and arbitrary; and the power of the people scattered and difficult to be united; so that if a man have common sense, he will see it to be madness to propose, or to lay any measures against the government, except in case of very general and great oppression. Even patriots, in such circumstances, will consider that present evils always appear greater in consequence of their being present; but that future evils of a revolt, and a temporary anarchy, may be much greater than are apprehended at a distance. They will also consider, that unless their measures be perfectly well laid, and their success decisive, ending in a change, not of men, but of things; not of governors, but of the rules and administration of government, they will only rivet their chains the faster, and bring upon themselves and their country tenfold ruin.

So obvious are these difficulties that lie in the way of procuring redress of grievances by force of arms, that I think we may say, without exception, that in all cases of hostile opposition

to government, the people must have been in the right; and that nothing but very great oppression could drive them to such desperate measures. The bulk of a people seldom so much complain without reason, because they never think of complaining till they feel; so that in all cases of dissatisfaction with government, it is most probable that the people are injured. The case, I own, may be otherwise in states of small extent, where the power of the governors is comparatively small, and the power of the people great and soon united. If it be asked, how far a people may lawfully go in punishing their chief magistrates? I answer, that if the enormity of the offence (which is of the same extent as the injury done to the public) be considered, any punishment is justifiable that a man can incur in human society. It may be said, there are no laws to punish those governors, and we must not condemn persons by laws made *ex post facto*; for this conduct will vindicate the most obnoxious measures of the most tyrannical administration. But I answer, that this is a case, in its own nature, prior to the establishment of any laws whatever; as it affects the very being of society, and defeats the principal ends for which recourse was originally had to it. There may be no fixed law against an open invader who should attempt to seize upon a country, with a view to enslave all its inhabitants; but must not the invader be apprehended, and even put to death, though he had broken no express law then in

being, or none of which he was properly apprised? And why should a man, who takes the advantage of being king, or governor, to subvert the laws and liberties of his country, be considered in any other light than that of a foreign invader? Nay, his crime is much more atrocious; as he was appointed the guardian of the laws and liberties which he subverts, and which he was therefore under the strongest obligation to maintain. In a case, therefore, of this highly criminal nature, *Salus populi suprema est lex*; "That must be done which the good of the whole requires;" and generally kings deposed, banished, or imprisoned, are highly dangerous to a nation; because, let them have governed ever so ill, it will be the interest of some to be their partisans, and to attach themselves to their cause. So plain are these first principles of all government, that they must overcome the meanest prejudices, and carry conviction to every one. Whatever be the form of any government, whoever be the supreme magistrates, or whatever be their number; that is, to whomsoever the power of the society is delegated, their authority is in its own nature reversible. No man can be supposed to resign his natural liberty, but on conditions. These conditions, whether they be expressed or not, must be violated, whenever the plain and obvious ends of government are not answered; and a delegated power, perverted from the intention for which it was bestowed, expires of course. Ma-

gistrates, therefore, who consult not the good of the public, and who employ their power to oppress the people, are a public nuisance; and their power is abrogated *ipso facto*. This, however, can only be the case in extreme oppression, when the blessings of society and civil government, great and important as they are, are bought too dear; when it is better not to be governed at all, than to be governed in such a manner; or, at least, when the hazard of a change of government would be apparently the less evil of the two; and, therefore, these occasions rarely occur in the course of human affairs: but where they do occur, resistance is a duty; and a regard to the good of society will certainly justify this conduct of the people.—*Priestley*.

GOVERNMENT, CIVIL.—Whether government be the appointment of a pretended religion; whether originating with the Patriarchs; or owing to a social compact;—are not matters worthy of inquiry. If it produce happiness at home, and be just and beneficent to all the world, it is good, it is valuable, and should be supported. If it be otherwise; if it render people corrupt, depraved, and miserable; if it be unjust and oppressive to its dependants and neighbours, its origin is not worth investigating: for, be its descent what it may, it is an injury, and an evil, and a curse, and mankind may and ought to treat it as such.—*Williams*.

GOVERNMENT.—Had every man sufficient sagacity to perceive, at all times, the strong interest which binds him to the observ-

ance of justice and equity, and strength of mind sufficient to persevere in a steady adherence to a general and a distinct interest, in opposition to the allurements of present pleasure and advantage; there had never, in that case, been any such thing as government or political society; but each man, following his natural liberty, had lived in entire peace with all others. What need of positive laws, where natural justice is of itself a sufficient restraint? Why create magistrates, where there never arises any disorder or iniquity? Why abridge our native freedom, when, in every instance, the utmost exertion of it is found innocent and beneficial? It is evident, that if government were totally useless, it never could have place; and that the sole foundation of the duty of allegiance is the advantage which it procures to society, by preserving peace and order among mankind. As the obligation to justice is founded entirely on the interests of society, which require mutual abstinence from property, in order to preserve peace among mankind, it is evident, that when the execution of justice would be attended with very pernicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place to public utility, in such extraordinary and pressing emergencies. The maxim, *Fiat justitia et ruat cælum*, 'Let justice be performed though the universe be destroyed,' is apparently false, and by sacrificing the end to the means, shows a preposterous idea of the subordination of duties. What go-

vernor of a town makes any scruple of burning the suburbs, when they facilitate the advances of the enemy? Or, what general abstains from plundering a neutral country, when the necessities of war require it, and he cannot otherwise maintain his army? The case is the same with the duty of allegiance; and common sense teaches us, that as government binds us to obedience only on account of its tendency to public utility, that duty must always, in extraordinary cases, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. *Salus populi suprema lex*; 'The safety of the people is the supreme law.' This maxim is agreeable to the sentiments of mankind in all ages. Accordingly, we may observe, that no nation, that could find any remedy, ever yet suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blamed for their resistance.—Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or Philip II. have the favour of every reader in the perusal of their history; and nothing but the most violent perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them. Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society; and where the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the obligation to obedience. Resistance, therefore, being admitted in extraordinary cases, the question can only be with regard to the degree of necessity which can justify resistance, and render it lawful and commendable, which can only be in desperate cases

when the public is in the highest danger from violence and tyranny. For besides the mischiefs of a civil war, which commonly attend insurrections, it is certain that, where a disposition to rebellion appears among any people, it is one chief cause of tyranny in the rulers. Thus the tyrannicide, or assassination approved of by ancient maxims, instead of keeping tyrants and usurpers in awe, made them ten times more fierce and unrelenting, and is now justly, on that account, abolished by the laws of nations.—*Hume.*

GOVERNMENT, JUST.—The general good is the end of all just government; and all the rules of conduct agreed upon, all the statutes, laws, and precepts enacted and promulgated, are made with a view to promote and secure the public good, and, therefore, the very nature and design of government requires new laws to be made, whenever it is found that the old ones are not sufficient, and old ones to be repealed, whenever they are found to be mischievous in their operation. If the essential parts of any system of civil government are found to be inconsistent with the general good, the end of government requires that such bad system should be demolished, and a new one formed, by which the public weal shall be more effectually secured. And, further, if, under any constitution of government, the administration should vary from the fundamental design of promoting and securing the common good, in such case the subjects are in duty bound to join all their strength

to reduce matters to their original good order.—*Laythrop's Sermon at Boston.*

GOVERNMENT, PRINCIPLES OF.—

To begin with first principles, we must, for the sake of gaining clear ideas on the subject, do what almost all political writers have done before us; that is, we must suppose a number of people existing, who experience the inconvenience of living independent and unconnected; who are exposed, without redress, to insults and wrongs of various kinds, and are too weak to procure themselves many of the advantages which they are sensible might easily be compassed by united strength. These people, if they would engage the protection of the whole body, and join their force in enterprises and undertakings, calculated for the common good, must voluntarily resign some part of their natural liberty, and submit their conduct to the direction of the community: for without these conceptions, such an alliance, attended with such advantages, could not be formed. Were these people few in number, and living within small distances of one another, it might be easy for them to assemble upon every occasion, in which the whole body was concerned, and every thing might be determined by the votes of the majority, provided they had previously agreed the votes of the majority to be decisive. But were the society numerous, their habitations remote, and the occasions on which the whole body must interpose frequent, it would be absolutely impossible that all the members of the state should

assemble, or give their attention to public business. In this case, though, with Rousseau, it be giving up their liberty, there must be deputies or public officers appointed to act in name of the whole body; and, in a state of very great extent, where all the people could never be assembled, the whole power of the community must necessarily, and almost irreversibly, be lodged in the hands of these deputies. It may be said, no society on earth was ever formed in the manner represented above. I answer, it is true; because all governments whatever have been, in some measure, compulsory, tyrannical, and oppressive, in their origin; but the method I have described must be allowed to be the only equitable and fair method of forming a society. And since every man retains, and can never be deprived of his natural right, (founded on a regard to the general good) of relieving himself from all oppression, that is, from every thing that has been imposed upon him without his own consent; this must be the only true and proper foundation of all the governments subsisting in the world, and that to which the people who compose them have an unalienable right to bring them back. It must necessarily be understood, then, whether it be expressed or not, that all people live in society for their mutual advantage, so that the good and happiness of the members, that is, the majority of the members, of any state, is the great standard by which every thing relating to that state must finally be determined. And

though it may be supposed, that a body of people may be bound by a voluntary resignation of all their interests to a single person, or to a few, it can never be supposed that the resignation is obligatory on their posterity, because it is manifestly *contrary to the good of the whole that it should be so*. In treating of particular regulations in states, this principle must necessarily obtrude itself; all arguments in favour of any law being always drawn from a consideration of its tendency to promote the public good. Virtue and right conduct consist in these affections and actions which terminate in general utility; justice and veracity, for instance, have nothing intrinsically excellent in them, separate from their relation to the happiness of mankind; and the whole system of right to power, property, and every thing else in society, must be regulated by the same consideration: the decisive question, when any of these subjects are examined, being, What is it that the good of the community requires?—*Priestly.*

HABIT.—We are what we are made by the objects that surround us; To expect that a man who sees other objects, and who leads a life different from mine, should have the same ideas that I have, would be to require contradictions. Why does a Frenchman resemble another Frenchman, more than a German, and a German much more than a Chinese? Because these two nations, by their education, and the resemblance of the objects presented to them, have an infinitely greater

connection with each other than with the Chinese.—*Helvetius*.

HABIT, INFLUENCE OF.—The influence of habit arises from the natural indolence of man; and this indolence increases in proportion as he indulges himself in it: it is easier to do as we have done before, than to strike out any thing new. The influence of habit is great over old men and indolent persons; it seldom affects youth. Habit is convenient only to weak minds, which it enfeebles daily more and more. Habit in every thing destroys the powers of the imagination; these are excited only by the novelty of the object. The imagination is never employed on those objects which are familiar to us; these affect only the memory; and hence we see the season of the axiom, *Ab assuetis non sit passio*; for the passions are lighted only at the fire of the imagination.—*Rousseau*.

HABIT, WHAT IT IS.—General states of mind, turns of thought, and fixed habits which are the consequences of them, arise from education and the circumstances men are placed in. It is a necessary effect of the principles of association, that the mind grows callous to new impressions continually; it being already occupied with ideas and sensations which render it indisposed to receive others, especially of an heterogeneous nature. In consequence, we seldom see any considerable change in a person's temper and habits, after he is grown to man's estate; nothing short of an entire revolution in his circumstances and mode of life can effect it.—*Priestley*;

HABITS, MORAL AND MECHANICAL, AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN POLITICAL SOCIETY.—The end of every individual is his own good. The rules he observes in the pursuit of this good are a system of propositions, almost every one founded in authority: that is, derive their weight from the credit given to one or more persons, and not from demonstration.—And this in the most important, as well as the other affairs of life, is the case even of the wisest and philosophical part of the human species; and that it should be so is the less strange, when we consider that it is perhaps impossible to prove that being, or life itself, has any other value than what is set on it by authority.—A confirmation of this may be derived from the observation, that in every country in the universe happiness is sought upon a different plan; and, even in the same country, we see it placed, by different ages, professions, and ranks of men, in the attainment of enjoyments utterly unlike.—These propositions, as well as others framed upon them, become habitual by degrees; and, as they govern the determinations of the will, I call them moral habits. There are another set of habits that have the direction of the body, that I call therefore mechanical habits. These compose what we commonly call the arts; which are more or less liberal or mechanical, as they more or less partake of assistance from the operations of the mind.—The cumulus of the moral habits of each individual is the manners of that individual; the cumulus of the

manners of individuals makes up the manners of a nation.—The happiness of individuals is evidently the ultimate end of political society; and political welfare, or the strength, splendour, and opulence of the state, have been always admitted, both by political writers, and the valuable part of mankind in general, to conduce to this end; and are therefore desirable.—The causes that advance or obstruct any one of these three objects are external or internal. The latter may be divided into physical, civil, and personal; under which last head I comprehend the moral and mechanical habits of mankind. The physical causes are principally climate, soil, and number of subjects; the civil are government and laws; and political welfare is always in a ratio composed of the force of these particular causes; a multitude of external causes, and all these internal ones; and not only control and qualify, but are constantly acting on, and thereby insensibly, as well as sensibly, altering one another both for the better and the worse; and this not excepting the climate itself.—

Franklin.

HAPPINESS.—A considerable part of our happiness consists in the desire itself. It is with happiness as with the golden bird sent by the fairies to a young princess: The bird settles at thirty paces from her; she goes to catch it, advances softly, is ready to seize it; the bird flies thirty paces further; she passes several months in the pursuit, and is happy. If the bird had suffered itself to be taken at first, the princess would

have put it in a cage, and in one week would have been tired of it. This is the bird of happiness which we incessantly pursue; we catch it not, and are happy in the pursuit, because we are secure from disgust. If our desires were to be every instant gratified, the mind would languish in inaction, and sink under disquietude. Man must have desires. Few men, however, acknowledge they have this want; it is nevertheless to a succession of their desires they owe their happiness—*Helvetius*.

HAPPINESS OF DIFFERENT STATIONS FROM THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENT OF TIME.—Men hunger and thirst; they require to lie with their wives, to sleep, &c. Of the twenty-four hours of the day they employ ten or twelve in providing for these several wants. As soon as they are gratified, from the dealer in rabbit-skins to the monarch, all are equally happy. It is in vain to say that the table of wealth is more delicate than that of mediocrity. When the labourer is well fed, he is content. The different cookery of different people proves only that good cheer is that to which we have been accustomed.—If labour be generally regarded as an evil, it is because, in most governments the necessaries of life are not to be had without excessive labour; from whence the very idea of labour constantly excites that of pain. Labour, however, is not pain in itself: habit renders it easy; and when it is pursued without remarkable fatigue, is in itself an advantage. How many artisans are there who, when rich,

still continue their occupations, and quit them not without regret when age obliges them to it? There is nothing that habit does not render agreeable.—The busy man is the happy man. To prove this, I distinguish two sorts of pleasures. The first are *the pleasures of the senses*. These are founded on corporeal wants, are enjoyed by all conditions of men; and at the time of enjoyment all are equally happy. But these pleasures are of short duration. The others are *the pleasures of expectation*. Among these I reckon all the means of procuring corporeal pleasures; these means are by expectation always converted into real pleasures. When a joiner takes up his plane, what does he experience? All the pleasures of expectation annexed to the payment for his work. Now these pleasures are not experienced by the opulent man. He is therefore always uneasy, always in motion, continually rolling about in his carriage, like the squirrel in his cage, to get rid of his disgust. The wealthy idler experiences a thousand instances of anxiety, while the labouring man enjoys the continual pleasure of fresh expectations.—In general, every useful occupation fills up in the most agreeable manner the interval that separates a gratified from a rising want; that is, the ten or twelve hours of the day, when we most envy the indolence of the rich, and think they enjoy superior happiness. Employment gives pleasure to every moment; but is unknown to the great and idle opulent. The measure of our wealth,

whatever prejudice may think, is not, therefore, the measure of our happiness. Great treasures are the appearance of happiness, not the reality; so that the workman in his shop, or the tradesman behind his counter, is often more happy than his sovereign. The condition of the workman who can by a moderate labour provide for his wants and those of his family, when the habit of labour has been early contracted, is nearly as happy as it can be, nay, is perhaps of all conditions the most happy. The want that compels his mind to application, and his body to exercise, is a preservative against discontent and disease: now these are evils; joy and health, advantages. Therefore, without being equal in wealth and dignity, individuals may be equal in felicity.—It was not on the tomb of Croesus, but on that of Baucis, this epitaph was engraved, *His death was the evening of a beautiful day.*—*Helvetius*.

HELL.—When men come to live in society, they could not but perceive that many evil-doers escaped the severity of the laws; these could affect only open crimes; so that a curb was wanting against clandestine guilt, and religion alone could be such a curb. The Persians, the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Greeks, introduced a belief of punishments after this life; and, of all ancient nations we are acquainted with, the Jews alone admitted only temporal punishments. At length the Pharisees and Essenes, among the Jews, admitted the belief of a hell in their way. This dogma

the Greeks had already disseminated among the Romans, and the Christians made it a capital article of faith. Several fathers of the Church did not hold the eternity of hell-torments; they thought it very hard that a poor man should be burning for ever and ever only for stealing a goat. Not long since, an honest well-meaning Huguenot minister advanced in his sermons, and even in print, that there would be a day of grace to the damned; that there must be a proportion between the trespass and the penalty; and that a momentary fault could not deserve an everlasting punishment.—*Voltaire.*

HEREDITARY SUCCESSION IN GOVERNORS.—The highest offices of all in a state ought to be hereditary in some measure, especially the office equivalent to that of King. Experience teaches us this maxim, elective monarchies having generally been the theatres of cabal, confusion, and misery. It must be acknowledged, however, to be exceedingly hazardous to the liberties of a people to have any office of importance filled by the same persons, or their descendants, frequently. The boundaries of very great power can never be so exactly defined, but that, when it becomes the interest of men to extend them, and when so flattering an object is kept so long time in view, opportunities will be found for the purpose. What nation would not have been enslaved by the uncontroverted succession only of three such princes as Henry IV. of France, and Henry VII. of England, or the present

king of Prussia? The more accomplished and glorious they were as warriors or statesmen, the more dangerous would they be as princes in free states. It is nothing but the continual fear of a revolt in favour of some rival, that could keep such princes within any bounds; i. e. that could make it their interest to court the favour of the people. Hereditary nobles stand in the same predicament as hereditary princes. The long continuance of the same parliaments have all the same tendency. But though it be evident that no office of great power or trust should be suffered to continue a long time in the same hands, the succession might be so rapid, that the remedy would be worse than the disease. But though the exact medium of political liberty, with respect to the continuance of men in power, be not easily fixed, it is not of much consequence to do it; since a considerable degree of perfection in government will admit of great varieties in this respect.—*Priestly.*

HEREDITARY SUCCESSION IN GOVERNMENT.—Of all the various forms of government which have prevailed in the world, an hereditary monarchy seems to present the fairest scope for ridicule. Is it possible to relate, without an indignant smile, that, on the father's decease, the property of a nation, like that of a drove of oxen, descends to the infant son, as yet unknown to mankind and to himself; and the fairest warriors and the wisest statesmen, relinquishing their natural right to empire,

approach the royal cradle with bended knees, and protestations of inviolable fidelity? Satire and declamation may paint these obvious topics in the most dazzling colours; but our most serious thoughts will respect an useful prejudice that establishes a rule of succession independant of the passions of mankind; and we shall cheerfully acquiesce in any expedient which deprives the multitude of the dangerous, and indeed the ideal power of giving themselves a master. In the cool shade of retirement, we may easily devise imaginary forms of government, in which the sceptre shall be constantly bestowed on the most worthy, by the free and incorrupt suffrage of the whole community. Experience overturns these airy fabrics; and teaches us, that, in a large society, the election of a monarch can never devolve to the wisest or to the most numerous part of the people. The army is the only order of men sufficiently united to concur in the same sentiments, and powerful enough to impose them on their fellow-citizens; but the temper of soldiers, habituated at once to violence and slavery, renders them very unfit guardians of a legal, and even civil constitution. Justice, humanity, or political wisdom, are qualities they are too little acquainted with in themselves to appreciate them in others. Valour will acquire their esteem, and liberality will purchase their suffrage; but the first of these merits is often lodged in the most savage breasts: the latter can only exert itself at the ex-

pence of the public; and both may be turned against the possessor of the throne by the ambition of a daring rival:—The superior prerogatives of birth, when it has obtained the sanction of time and popular opinion, is the plainest and least invidious of all distinctions among mankind. The acknowledged right extinguishes the hopes of faction, and the conscious security disarms the cruelty of the monarch. To the firm establishment of this idea we owe the peaceful succession and mild administration of European monarchies; to the defect of it we must attribute the frequent civil wars, through which an Asiatic despot is obliged to cut his way to the throne of his fathers.—*Gibbon.*

HISTORY, THE MIRACULOUS AND MARVELLOUS IN.—It is the business of history to distinguish between the miraculous and marvellous; to reject the first in all narrations merely profane and human; to scruple the second; and when obliged by undoubted testimony, to admit of something extraordinary, to receive as little of it as is consistent with the known facts and circumstances.—*Hume.*

HOSPITALS, FOUNDLING.—Hospitals for foundlings seem favourable to the increase of numbers, and perhaps may be so, when kept under proper restrictions. But when they open the door to every one, without distinction, they have, probably, a contrary effect, and are prejudicial to the state. It is computed, that every ninth child born at Paris is sent to the hospital, though it seems

certain, according to the common course of human affairs, that it is not a hundredth child whose parents are altogether incapacitated to rear and educate him. The great difference for health, industry, and morals, between the education in an hospital and that in a private family, should induce us not to make the entrance into an hospital too easy and engaging. To kill one's own child is shocking to nature, and must, therefore, be somewhat unusual; but to turn over the care of him upon others is very agreeable to the natural indolence of mankind.—*Hume*.

HUMANITY.—Born without ideas, without vice, and without virtue, every thing in man, even his humanity, is an acquisition: it is to his education he owes his sentiment. Among all the various ways of inspiring him with it, the most efficacious is to accustom him from childhood, in a manner from the cradle, to ask himself, when he beholds a miserable object, by what chance he is not exposed in like manner to the inclemency of the seasons, to hunger, cold, poverty, &c. When the child has been used to put himself in the place of the wretched, that habit gained, he becomes the more touched with their misery, as, in deploring their misfortunes, it is for human nature in general, and for himself in particular, that he is concerned. An infinity of different sentiments, then, mix with the first sentiment; and their assemblage composes the total of the sentiment of pleasure felt by a noble soul in succouring the distressed, a sentiment that he is

not always in a situation to analyse.—We relieve the unfortunate to avoid the pain of seeing them suffer. To enjoy an example of gratitude, which produces in us, at least, a confused hope of distant utility; to exhibit an act of power, whose exercise is always agreeable to us, because it always recalls to the mind the images of pleasure attached to that power; and, lastly, because the idea of happiness is constantly connected, in a good education, with the idea of beneficence, and this beneficence in us, conciliating the esteem and affection of men, may, like riches, be regarded as a power or means of avoiding pains and procuring pleasures:—In this manner, as from an affinity of different sentiments, is made up the total sentiment of the pleasure we feel in the exercise of beneficence.—*Helvetius*.

HUMANITY, PRACTICE OF.—In order to love mankind, little must be expected from them. In order to view their faults without asperity, we must accustom ourselves to forgiveness, to a sense that indulgence is a justice which frail humanity has a right to require from wisdom. Now, nothing has a greater tendency to dispose us to indulgence, to close our hearts against hatred, and to open them to the principles of an humane and mild morality, than a profound knowledge of the human heart. Accordingly, the wisest men have always been the most indulgent. What beautiful maxims of morality are scattered through their works! It was the saying of Plato, 'Live with your inferiors and domes'

tics as with unfortunate friends.' 'Must I always,' said an Indian philosopher, 'hear the rich crying out, Lord, destroy all who take from us the least parcel of our possessions; while the poor man, with a plaintive voice, and eyes lifted up to heaven, cries, Lord, give me a part of the goods thou dealest out in such profusion to the rich; and if others less happy deprive me of a part, instead of imprecating thy vengeance, I shall consider these thefts in the same manner as in seed-time we see the doves ranging over the fields in quest of their food.'—*Helvetius*.

HUMANITY.—The folly and wickedness of human nature does not fill a man of sense and humanity with indignation: he, like Democritus, sees in them none but fools; or children, against whom it would be ridiculous to be offended, and who are more worthy of pity than of anger. There are some men who are not humane because they have been imposed upon, and whose humanity decreases in proportion as they obtain more knowledge; but the man of genuine sense and humanity is constantly the friend of mankind, because he alone is acquainted with the nature of man. He considers men with the eye of a mechanic; and, without insulting humanity, complains that nature has united the preservation of one being to the destruction of another; that, to afford nourishment, he orders the hawk to seize in his talons the dove; made it necessary for the insect to be devoured, and rendered every being an assassin.—*Helvetius*.

HYPOCRISY.—To act the part of a hypocrite is a task at once so painful and so difficult, that nothing but the most violent effort of patience and artifice can support a long and successful performance of it. Let us always be fearful of giving too much to the mind, by taking too much away from the heart. If we enjoy some talents wherewith we deceive others, how many more talents do we not possess which seduce us to impose upon ourselves? The willingness with which we are apt to credit the supposed exertions of hypocrisy, may, perhaps, arise from the not having sufficiently reflected on the nature of the human heart. All who have observed the empire which our interest maintains over our opinions, must have met with ample reason to be convinced that its own successes soon prove the means of its destruction. We lead off, by dishonestly affecting certain practices and sentiments; and when this imposture hath brought us within the reach of applying some great part, of commanding mankind, and of receiving from them riches and consequence, we begin to repose in it more trust; and it at length happens, that by little and little our interest attains to the power of consolidating in our mind the basis of our authority. It is an old remark, that gamesters begin by being dupes, and end by being knaves: in matters of opinion the case is reversed, and we begin by being knaves, and end by being dupes.—*Chatelleur*.

IDEA OF BODY EQUALLY OBSCURE AS THAT OF SPIRIT.—If any one

say, he knows not what it is that thinks in him, he means he knows not what the substance is of that thinking thing. If he says he knows not how he thinks, I answer, neither knows he how he is extended, how the solid parts of body are united, or cohere together to make extension.—For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter, that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than the corpuscles of air; yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain, nor can be a cause of, the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the pressure of the ether, or any subtiler matter than the air, may unite and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materia subtilis*. So that that hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies, reaches not the parts of the ether itself: and by how much the more evidently it proves that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the ether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and unity; by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the ether itself, which we can neither conceive without parts, they being bodies, and divisible; nor yet how their parts cohere, they

wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies.

But, in truth, the pressure of any ambient fluid, how great soever, can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter. For though such a pressure may hinder the avulsion of two polished superficies one from another in a line perpendicular to them, as in the experiment of two polished marbles; yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a motion in a line parallel to those surfaces; because the ambient fluid, having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space deserted by a lateral motion, resists such a motion of bodies so joined, no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid, and touched no other body: And therefore, if there were no other cause of cohesion, all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion. For if the pressure of the ether be the adequate cause of cohesion, wherever that cause operates not, there can be no cohesion. And since it cannot operate against such a lateral separation, therefore in every imaginary plane, intersecting any mass of matter, there could be no more cohesion than of two polished surfaces, which will always, notwithstanding any imaginary pressure of a fluid, easily slide one from another. So that, perhaps, how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body, which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider

it in his mind, may have reason to conclude, that it is as easy for him *to have a clear idea how the soul thinks, as how the body is extended.* For since body is no further nor otherwise extended than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts, we shall very ill comprehend the *extension* of body, without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts; which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking, and how it is performed.

I allow it is usual for most people to wonder how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe. Do we not see, will they be ready to say, the parts of bodies stick firmly together? Is there any thing more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like I say concerning *thinking* and *voluntary motion*: Do we not experiment it in ourselves? and, therefore, can it be doubted?—The matter of fact is clear, I confess: but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done, there, I think, we are at a loss both in the one and the other; and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere, as how we ourselves perceive or move. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, how the parts of gold or brass (that but now, in fusion, were as loose from one another as the particles of water, or the sands of an hour-glass,) come in a few moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of men's arms cannot se-

parate them. Any considering man will, I suppose, be here at a loss to satisfy his own or another man's understanding.

The little bodies that compose that fluid we call *water*, are so extremely small, that I have never heard of any one who, by a microscope, pretended to perceive their distinct bulk, figure, or motion; and the particles of water are also so perfectly loose one from another, that the least force sensibly separates them: nay, if we consider their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another: and yet let but a sharp cold come, and they unite, they consolidate; these little atoms cohere, and are not, without great force, separable. He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly; he that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast to one another, would discover a great and yet unknown secret; and yet, when that was done, would be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could show wherein consisted the union or consolidation of the parts of those bonds, or of that cement, or of the least particle of matter that exists. Whereby it appears, that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as any thing belonging to our minds; and a solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as a thinking immaterial one, whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

In the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got to the other, which is the ordinarist case, we can have no other conception but the passing of motion out of one body into another; which, I think, is as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do.—The increase of motion by impulse, which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood.—We have, by daily experience, clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought: but the manner how, hardly comes within our comprehension; we are equally at a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion and its communication either from body or spirit, *the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body*. And if we consider the active power of moving, it is much clearer in spirit than body; since two bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the ideas of power in the one to move the other, but by a borrowed motion: whereas the mind affords ideas of an active power every day of moving bodies; and therefore it is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirits, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive: those

beings that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. But be that as it will, I think we have as many and as clear ideas belonging to spirit as we have belonging to body, the substance of each being equally unknown to us; and the idea of thinking in spirit as clear as extension in body; and the communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse, which we ascribe to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of these, though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither.

Sensation convinces us, that there are solid extended substances; and reflection, that there are thinking ones. Experience assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath a power to move the body by impulse, the other by thought: this we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say, every moment furnishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other; but beyond these ideas, as received from their proper sources, our faculties will not reach.—If we would inquire further into their nature, causes, and manner, we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do that of thinking. If we would explain them any further, one is as easy as the other; and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should by thought set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the idea belonging to body consists than those belonging to sp

rit.—*Locke.*

IDEAS, DERIVED FROM QUALITIES IN BODIES.—Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call *idea*; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is. Thus a snow-ball having a power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snow-ball, I call *qualities*; and as they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them *ideas*.

Qualities thus considered in bodies, are, *first*, Such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in whatsoever state it be; such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the force that can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter, which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself be perceived by our senses; *v. g.* Take a grain of wheat; divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, extension, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains still the same qualities; and so divide it on till the parts become insensible, they must retain still each of them all these qualities. For division (which is all that a mill or pestle, or any other body, does upon another in reducing it to insensible parts) and never take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only

makes two or more distinct or separate masses of matter of that which was before but one; all which distinct masses, reckoned as so many distinct bodies, after division, make a certain number. These I call original or *primary* qualities of body; which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us, *viz.* solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number.

Secondly, Such qualities, which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, *i. e.* by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts; as colours, sounds, tastes, &c. These I call *secondary* qualities.

The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by *impulse*; the only way which we conceive bodies operate in.

If, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas in it, and yet we perceive *these original qualities* in such of them as singly fall under our senses; it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brain, or to the seat of sensation, there to produce on our minds the particular *ideas* we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and

thereby convey to the brain some *motion*, which produces those ideas which we have of them in us.

After the same manner that the ideas of these original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive that the *ideas of secondary qualities* are also produced, viz. by the operation of *insensible particles on our senses*, for it being manifest that there are bodies, each whereof are so small that we cannot by any of our senses, discover either their bulk, figure, or motion, as is evident in the particles of air and water, and others extremely smaller than these, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air or water are smaller than pease or hailstones; the different motions and figures, bulk and number of such particles affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smell of bodies, v.g. that a violet, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, causes the ideas of the blue colour and sweet scent of that flower, to be produced in our minds.

From whence I think it is easy to draw this observation, That the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are *resemblances* of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves; but the ideas produced in us by these secondary qualities have no *resemblances* of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies themselves. They are

in the bodies we denominate from them, only a power to produce those sensations in us; and what is sweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the insensible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

Flame is denominated *hot* and *light*; snow, *white* and *cold*; and manna, *white* and *sweet*, from the ideas they produce in us which qualities are commonly thought to be the same in those bodies that those ideas are in us; the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror. But whoever considers that the same *fire*, that in one distance produces in us the sensation of *warmth*, does, at a nearer approach, produce in us the far different sensation of *pain*, will have no reason to say, that his *idea* of *warmth*, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire and his *idea* of *pain*, which the same fire produced in him the same way, is not in the fire.

The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or snow, are really in them whether one's senses perceive them or not; and therefore may be called *real qualities*; because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, whiteness, or coldness are no more really in them, than sickness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them let not the eyes see light or colours, nor the ears hear sounds let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes, odours, and sounds, as they are such particular *ideas*, vanish and cease, and are reduced to their

causes, *i. e.* bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

Pound an almond, and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one, and the sweet taste into an oily one. What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body, but an alteration of the *texture* of it?

Ideas being thus distinguished and understood, we may be able to give an account how the same water, at the same time, may produce the idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other; whereas it is impossible that the same water, if those ideas were really in it, should at the same time be both hot and cold. For if we imagine *warmth* as it is in our hands to be *nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits*, we may understand how it is possible that the same water may at the time produce the same sensation of heat in one hand, and cold in the other; which yet figure never does, that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another. But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies, caused by the corpuscles of any other body; it is easy to be understood, that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other; if a body be applied to the two hands, which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands, and a less than in those of the other, it will increase the motion of the one hand, and lessen it in the other; and so cause the dif-

ferent sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon.—*Locke*

IDEAS OF SENSATION CHANGED BY THE JUDGMENT.—The ideas we receive by sensation are often altered by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set before our eyes a round globe, of any uniform colour, *v. g.* gold, alabaster, or jet, it is certain, that the idea thereby imprinted in our mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees of light and brightness coming to our eyes, but we, having by use been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make on us, what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the sensible figure of bodies, the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters the appearances into the causes, so that, from that which is truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of a convex figure, and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variously coloured, as is evident in painting. Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught, by his touch, to distinguish a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one, and when the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose, then, the cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: Query, Whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which

is the globe, which the cube? It may be answered, No: for though he has obtained the experience how a globe, how a cube, affects his touch, yet he has not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch so or so, must affect the sight in the same manner; or that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.

But this I think is not usually in any of our ideas but those received by sight; because sight, the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure, or motion, the several varieties whereof change the appearance of its proper object, viz. light and colours, we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cases, by a settled habit in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick, that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by the judgment, so that one, viz. that of sensation, serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself; as a man who reads or hears with attention or understanding, takes little notice of the characters or sounds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice, if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed, for as itself is thought to

take up no space, to have no extension, so its actions seem to require no time, but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body. Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were, in an instant, do our minds, with one glance, see all the parts of a demonstration, which may very well be called a long one, if we consider the time it will require to put it into words, and, step by step, show it another? We shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice, if we consider how the facility which we get of doing things by a custom of doing, makes them often pass in us without our notice. *Habits*, especially such as are begun very early, come at last to *produce actions in us, which often escape our observation*. How frequently do we in a day cover our eyes with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men, that by custom, have got the use of a by-word, do, almost in every sentence, pronounce sounds,—which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor observe, and, therefore, it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.—*Locke*.

IDEAS, ASSOCIATION OF.—It is evident, that there is a principle of connection between the different thoughts and ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to

the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of regularity and method. In our more serious thinking and discourse, this is so observable, that any particular thought which breaks in upon this regular track or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, nay, in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connection upheld among the different ideas which succeeded each other.—Were the loosest and freest conversation to be transcribed, there would immediately be observed something which connected it in all its transitions; or, where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of the discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thought, which had gradually led him away from the subject of conversation. Among the languages of different nations, even where we cannot suspect the least connection and communication, it is found, that the words expressive of ideas the most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other, a certain proof, that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle,—which had an equal influence on all mankind. The principles of connection among ideas appear to be only three in number, viz. *resemblance*, *contiguity* in time and place, and *cause* and *effect*: Contrast or contrariety is a con-

nection among ideas, which may perhaps, be considered as a mixture of causation and resemblance. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other, i. e. is the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object implies the idea of its former existence. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original: this depends on the principle of *resemblance*. The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an inquiry or discourse concerning the others: this originates from the *contiguity* of the apartments. If we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it: this arises from the connection between cause and effect. This subject is copious; and many operations of the human mind depend on the connection, or association of ideas, which is here described, particularly the sympathy between the passions and imagination will, perhaps, appear remarkable, while we observe that the affections, excited by one object, pass easily to another connected with it, but transfuse themselves with difficulty, or not at all, along different objects, which have no manner of connection together. By introducing into any composition personages and actions foreign to each other, an injudicious author loses that communication of emotions, by which alone he can interest the heart, and raise the passions to their proper height and period. That this enumeration of the principles of the association of ideas is complete, and that there are no other

except these, may be difficult to prove to the reader's satisfaction, and even to a man's own satisfaction.—*Hume.*

IDEAS, THE ORIGIN OF.—ALL the perceptions of the mind may be divided into two species, distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are denominated *ideas*; the other species we shall call *impressions*. By the term *impression*, may be understood all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. There is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination. These faculties may copy the perceptions of the senses; but the utmost we say of them, even when they operate with the greatest vigour, is, that they represent the object in so lively a manner, that we could almost say we feel or see it: but except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of vivacity, as to render these perceptions altogether undistinguishable. A man in a fit of anger is actuated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me of a person in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of that passion.

All our ideas are copies of our impressions. When we analyse our thoughts or ideas, we always find, that they resolve themselves, however compounded, into such simple ideas, as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment. If it happen from a defect of the organ that a man is not sensible of any species of sensation, we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas. A blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. The case is the same, if the object, proper for exciting any sensation, has never been applied to the organ. A Laplander or Negro has no notion of the relish of wine. A man of mild manners can form no idea of inveterate revenge. There is a phenomenon, which may prove it not to be impossible for ideas to arise independent of impressions. The several ideas of colours and of sounds are really different from each other, though resembling. If this be true of different colours, it must be so of the different shades of the same colour; each shade produces a distinct idea. Suppose a person to have enjoyed his sight thirty years, and to have become acquainted perfectly with colours of all kinds, except one particular shade of blue. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank where that shade is wanting; and it seems possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and

raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses. Simple ideas, therefore, are not always, in every instance, derived from correspondent impressions.—*Hume.*

IDOLATRY, HEATHEN.—THE Heathen idolatry is a common topic of declamation and abuse on occasions of this nature. It stands, with modern absurdity and folly, in the same circumstances with a woman who has been beautiful, but whose charms are faded, and who is ever the object of the most malignant satire to another who is distinguished with a native and original ugliness. The superstitions of the ancients, like their beautiful edifices, are defaced only by time and violence. The communities of antiquity, in their decline, seem to have been like some great minds in the decline of life, who are said to retain their former conclusions, while they have totally forgotten the premises and calculations which had led them to them. The Heathen mythology is natural philosophy allegorised and abused by poets and priests: Jupiter and Juno, and Minerva and Neptune, were personifications of real principles in nature; whereas the phantoms of modern superstition are representations of no true objects in heaven or earth. The former were in the state of all similes, metaphors, and poetical ornaments, liable to be misunderstood and abused; but they were also useful, and furnished the most elegant entertainment and pleasure, the latter being the produce only of perverted and gloomy imaginations,

are never useful, never pleasing, but merely the instruments of imposture, to intimidate and injure mankind. Idolatry, therefore, was to be restrained, as all excesses of natural passions are to be restrained. For, by fixing the attention wholly on poetical persons, men were led away from nature, the only source of truth; they easily wandered into follies and vices; and their whole system fell a sacrifice to more extravagant and mysterious institutions. The emperor Julian seems to have had these ideas, and he lived at the very period of this remarkable revolution. He probably thought, that men were not at so great distance from the real principles of nature and truth, and would not require so much trouble to lead them back to those principles, while they adhered to the Heathen idolatry, as when the ambitious Christian priests had plunged them into the fathomless abyss of mysteries: awed them with heavenly and infernal phantoms: bound them down to unintelligible and useless dogmas, and reduced them to the worst species of slavery. Succeeding events proved that he judged rightly. Men, by resigning their faculties to pretended heavenly commissioners, and becoming the tools of their ambition, exhibited a scene of ignorance, barbarism, cruelty, and villany, beyond any thing which had ever dishonoured the annals of the world. This wretched state remained until some fragments of ancient learning were recovered, and some persons were tempted, by manly thoughts and fine writing, into

reason, into heresies, and rebellions.—*Williams.*

ILL-HUMOUR.—Nothing concerns me more than to see people in ill-humour; to see men torment one another; particularly when, in the flower of their age, in the very season of pleasure, they waste their few short days of sunshine in quarrels and disputes, and only feel their error when it is too late to repair it.

We are apt to complain, that we have but few happy days; and it appears to me that we have very little right to complain. If our hearts were always in a proper disposition to receive the good things which Heaven sends us, we should acquire strength to support the evil when they come upon us. But you will, perhaps, say, we cannot always command our tempers, so much depends on the constitution; when the body is ill at ease, the mind is so likewise. Well, let us look upon this disposition as a disease, and see if there is no remedy for it. I think, indeed, a great deal might be done in this respect. Ill-humour may be compared to sloth. It is natural to man to be indolent; but if once we get the better of our indolence, we then go on with alacrity, and find a real pleasure in being active. If you object, that we are not masters of ourselves, and still less of our feelings, I must answer, that we do not know how far our strength will go till we have tried it; that the sick consult physicians, and submit to the most scrupulous regimen and the most nauseous medicines to recover their health.

Is it not enough that we are

without the power to make one another happy, but must we deprive each other of that satisfaction, which, left to ourselves, we might often be capable of enjoying? Show me the man who has ill-humour, and who hides it; who bears the whole burden of it himself, without interrupting the pleasures of those about him. No; ill-humour arises from a consciousness of our own want of merit; from a discontent which always accompanies that envy which foolish vanity engenders. We dislike to see people happy, unless their happiness is the work of our own hands. Woe unto those who make use of their power over a human heart to deprive it of the simple pleasure it would naturally enjoy! All the favours, all the attention in the world, cannot, for a moment, make amends for the loss of that happiness which a cruel tyranny destroys.

We should say to ourselves every day, What good can I do to my friends? I can only endeavour not to interrupt them in their pleasures, and try to augment the happiness which I myself partake of. When their souls are tormented by a violent passion, when their hearts are rent with grief, I cannot give them relief for a moment.

And when at length a fatal malady seizes the unhappy being, whose untimely grave was prepared by thy hand—when, stretched out and exhausted, he raises his dim eyes to heaven, and the damps of death are on his brow—then thou standest before him like a condemned criminal; thou seest thy fault,

but it is too late; thou feelest thy want of power; thou feelest, with bitterness, that all thou canst give, all thou canst do, will not restore the strength of thy unfortunate victim, nor procure for him a moment of consolation.—*Goethe.*

IMAGINATION, WORKS OF, GENERALLY PLEASING.—Works of imagination are more generally admired, because there are few who have not experienced some passion. Most persons are better pleased with the beauty of a description, than with the depth of an idea; because they have felt more than they have seen, and seen more than they have reflected. From hence we may conclude, that the paintings of the passions must be more generally agreeable than those of natural objects; and a poetical description of the same objects must find more admirers than philosophical works.—*Helvetius.*

INDIANS, JUSTLY INCREDULOUS WITH REGARD TO ICE.—The Indian prince, who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost, reasoned justly; and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts that arose from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted, and bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience. Though they were not contrary to his experience, they were not conformable to it. No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to

him; and it is impossible for him, *a priori*, to tell what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain.—One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy; and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but when it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event may be denominated *extraordinary*, and requires a pretty strong testimony to render it credible to people in a warm climate; but still it is not *miraculous*, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature, in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy; but they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence.—*Hume.*

INFANTS, THE EXPOSITION OF.—The practice of exposing children in their early infancy was very common among the ancients; and is not mentioned by any author of those times with the horror it deserves, or scarcely even with disapprobation. Plutarch, the humane, good natured

Plutarch, recommends it as a virtue in Attalus, king of Pergamus, that he murdered, or, if you will, exposed all his own children, in order to leave his crown to the son of his brother Eumenes; signalizing, in this manner, his gratitude and affection to Eumenes, who had left him his heir preferably to that son. It was Solon, the most celebrated of the sages of Greece, that gave parents permission, by law, to kill their children. And, perhaps, by an odd connexion of causes, this barbarous practice of the ancients increased the population of those times. By removing the terrors of too numerous a family, it would engage people in marriage; and such is the force of natural affection, that very few, in comparison, would have resolution enough, when it came to the push, to carry into execution their former intentions, though Plutarch, it must be owned, speaks of it as a general practice of the poor. China, the only country where this practice of exposing children prevails at present, is the most populous country we know; and every man is married before he is twenty. Such early marriages could scarcely be general, had not men the prospect of getting rid of their children.—*Hume.*

INFANTS, THE EXPOSITION OF.—

The exposition, that is, the murder of new-born infants, was a practice allowed of in almost all the states of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the circumstances of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or

to wild beasts, was regarded without blame or censure. This practice had probably begun in the times of the most savage barbarity. The imaginations of men had been first made familiar with it in that earliest period of society, and the uniform continuance of the custom had hindered them afterwards from perceiving its enormity. We find at this day, that this practice prevails among all savage nations; and in that rudest and lowest state of society it is undoubtedly more pardonable than in any other. The extreme indigence of a savage is often such, that he himself is frequently exposed to the greatest extremity of hunger; he often dies of pure want; and it is frequently impossible for him to support both himself and his child. We cannot wonder, therefore, that, in this case, he should abandon it. One who, in flying from an enemy whom it was impossible to resist, should throw down his infant because it retarded his flight, would surely be excuseable: since by attempting to save it, he could only hope for the consolation of dying with it. That in this state of society, therefore, a parent should be allowed to judge whether he can bring up his child, ought not to surprise us so greatly.—In the latter ages of Greece, however, the same thing was permitted from views of remote interest or convenience, which could by no means excuse it. Uninterrupted custom had by this time so thoroughly authorised the practice, that not only the loose maxims of the world tolerated this barbarous custom,

but even the doctrine of philosophers, which ought to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the established practice; and upon this, as upon many other occasions, instead of censuring, supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations of public utility.—Aristotle talks of it as of what the magistrate ought upon many occasions to encourage. The humane Plato is of the same opinion; and, with all that love of mankind which seems to animate all his writings, no where marks this practice with disapprobation. When custom can give sanction to so dreadful a violation of humanity, we may well imagine that there is scarce any particular practice so gross which it cannot authorise. Such a thing, we hear men every day saying, is commonly done; and they seem to think this a sufficient apology for what in itself is the most unjust and unreasonable conduct.—*A. Smith.*

INGRATITUDE.—Ingratitude would be more rare, if benefits upon usury were less common. Nothing can be more natural than to love those who do us service. The heart of man is self-interested, but never ungrateful; and the obliged are less to be charged with ingratitude, than their benefactors with self-interest. If you sell me your favours, let us settle the price; but if you pretend to give, and afterwards expect to make terms with me, you are guilty of fraud; it is their being given gratis which renders them inestimable. The heart will receive laws only from itself: by endeavouring to

enslave it, you give it liberty; and by leaving it at liberty, it becomes your slave. When the fisherman throws his bait into the water, the fish assemble and continue round him without suspicion; but when, caught by the concealed hook, they perceive him draw the line, they then endeavour to escape. Is the fisherman their benefactor, or are the fish ungrateful? Do we ever see a man, who is forgotten by his benefactor, forget that benefactor? On the contrary, he speaks of him with pleasure, and never thinks of him without emotion: and if by chance he has it in his power to make any return for the favours he has received, with what joy he snatches the opportunity; with what rapture he exclaims, "Now it is my turn to oblige!" Such is the true voice of nature. A real benefit can never produce ingratitude.—*Rousseau.*

INJURY, DO NONE TO ANY ONE.—

The most important lesson of morality is, *Never do an injury to any one.* Even the positive precept of doing good, if not made subordinate to this, is dangerous, false, and contradictory. Who is there that doth not do good? All the world, even the vicious man, does good to one party or the other: he will often make one person happy at the expence of making an hundred miserable. Hence arise all our calamities. The most sublime virtues are negative; they are also the most difficult to put in practice, because they are attended with no ostentation, and are even above that pleasure so flattering to the heart of man,

that of sending away other satisfied with our benevolence.—O! how much good must that man necessarily do his fellow creatures, if such a man there be; who never did any of them harm! What intrepidity of soul, what constancy of mind, are necessary here! It is not, however, by reasoning on this maxim, but by endeavouring to put it in practice, that all its difficulty is to be discovered. The injunction of doing no harm to any one, infers that of doing the least possible harm to the community in general; for in a state of society the good of one man necessarily becomes the evil of another. The relation is essential to the thing itself, and cannot be changed. We may inquire on this principle, Which is best; man in a state of society, or in state of solitude? A certain noble author hath said, *None but a wicked man might exist alone*: for my part, I say, *None but a good man might exist alone*. If the latter proposition be less sententious, it is more true, and more reasonable, than the former. If a vicious man were alone, what harm could he put in practice? It is in society only that he finds the implements of mischief.—*Roussiau*.

INTENTIONS NOT THE OBJECTS OF HUMAN JUDGMENT.—We cannot judge of intentions. How is it possible? It is seldom or never that an action is the effect of a sentiment; we ourselves are often ignorant of the motives by which we are determined. A rich man bestows a comfortable subsistence on a worthy man reduced to poverty. Doubtless he does a good action; but is this

action simply the desire of rendering a man happy? Pity, the hopes of gratitude, vanity itself, all these different motives, separately, or aggregately, may they not, unknown to himself, have determined him to that commendable action? Now, if a man be, in general, ignorant himself of the motives of his own generous actions, how can the public be acquainted with them? Thus it is only from the actions of men that we can judge of their virtue. A man, for instance, has twenty degrees of passion for virtue; but he has thirty degrees of love for a woman; and this woman would instigate him to be guilty of murder. Upon this supposition, it is certain, that this person is nearer guilt than he who, with only ten degrees of passion for virtue, has only five degrees of love for so wicked a woman.—Hence we may conclude, that of two men, the more honest in his actions has sometimes the lesser passion for virtue. The virtue of men greatly depends on the circumstances in which they are placed. Virtuous men have too often sunk under a strange series of unhappy events. He who warrants his virtue in every possible situation, is either an impostor or a fool; characters equally to be distrusted.—*Helvetius*.

JUSTICE.—Justice has two different foundations, viz. that of *interest*, when men observe that it is impossible to live in society without restraining themselves by certain rules; and that of *morality*, when this interest is once observed, and men receive a pleasure from the view of such

actions as tend to the peace of society, and an uneasiness from such as are contrary to it. It is the voluntary convention and artifice of men which makes the first interest take place, and, therefore, those laws of justice are so far to be considered as artificial. After that interest is once established and acknowledged, the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows *naturally*, and of itself, though it is certain, that it is also augmented by a new *artifice*, and that the public instructions of politicians, and the private education of parents, contribute to the giving a sense of honour and duty in the strict regulation of our actions with regard to the properties of others. Though justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural. It is the combination of men, in a system of conduct, which renders any act of justice beneficial to society. But when once it has that tendency, we *naturally* approve of it; and if we did not so, it is impossible any combination or convention could ever produce that sentiment.

Most of the inventions of men are subject to change. They depend upon humour and caprice. They have a vogue for a time, and then sink into oblivion. It may, perhaps, be apprehended, that if justice were allowed to be a human invention, it must be placed on the same footing. But the cases are widely different. The interest on which justice is founded is the greatest imaginable; and justice extends to all times and places. It cannot possibly be served by any

other invention. It is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first formation of society. All these causes render the rules of justice steadfast and immutable; at least, as immutable as human nature; and if they were founded on original instinct, could they have any greater stability? —

Hume.

JUSTICE, VIRTUE OF.—There is one virtue, of which the general rules determine, with the greatest exactness, every external action which it requires. This virtue is *Justice*. The rules of justice are accurate in the highest degree, and admit of no exceptions or modifications but such as may be ascertained as accurately as the rules themselves, and which generally, indeed, flow from the very same principles with them. The man, therefore, who, in this virtue, refines the least, and adheres with the most obstinate steadfastness to the general rules themselves, is the most commendable, and the most to be depended upon. Though the end of the rules of justice be to hinder us from hurting our neighbour, it may frequently be a crime to violate them, though we could pretend, with some pretext of reason, that this particular violation could do no hurt. A man often becomes a villain the moment he begins, even in his own heart, to chicaner in this manner. The moment he thinks of departing from the most staunch and positive adherence to what those inviolable precepts prescribe to him, he is no longer to be trusted, and no man can say what degree of guilt he may arrive at. The thief imagines

he does no evil when he steals from the rich what he supposes they may easily want, and what possibly they may never even know has been stolen from them. The adulterer imagines he does no evil when he corrupts the wife of his friend, provided he covers his intrigue from the suspicion of the husband, and does not disturb the peace of the family. When once we begin to give way to such refinements, there is no enormity so gross of which we may not be capable.—*A. Smith.*

JUSTICE, THE ORIGIN AND PROPERTY OF.---It has been asserted, that justice arises from *human conventions*, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, and combination of mankind. If by *convention* be here meant a promise (which is the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be more absurd than this position. The observance of promises is itself one of the most considerable parts of justice, and we are not surely bound to keep our word, because we have given our word to keep it. But if by convention be meant a sense of common interest, which sense each man feels in his own breast, which he remarks in his fellows, and which carries him, in concurrence with others, into a general plan or system of actions, which tends to public utility; it must be owned, that, in this sense, justice arises from human conventions. For if it be allowed (what is indeed evident), that the particular consequences of a particular act of justice may be hurtful to the public as well as individuals; it follows, that every

man, in embracing that virtue, must have an eye to the whole plan or system, and must expect the concurrence of his fellows in the same conduct and behaviour. Did all his views terminate in the consequences of each act of his own, his benevolence and humanity, as well as his self-love, might often prescribe to him measures of conduct very different from those which are agreeable to the strict rules of right and justice.

Thus two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention, for common interest, without any promise or contract. Thus gold and silver are made the measures of exchange: thus speech, and words, and language, are fixed by human convention and agreement. Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part, but what loses all advantage if only one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct.

This theory concerning the origin of property, and, consequently of justice, is, in the main, the same with that hinted and adopted by Grotius. (*De jure belli et pacis*, Lib. ii. cap. 2, § 2, art. 4-5.)

The word *natural* is commonly taken in so many senses, and is of such a loose signification, that it seems to little purpose to dispute if justice be natural or not. If self-love, if benevolence, be natural to man; if reason and fore-thought be also natural; then may the same epithet be applied to justice, order,

fidelity, property, society. Mens' inclinations, their necessities, lead them to combine; their understandings and experience tell them, that this combination is impossible where each governs himself by no rule, and pays no regard to the possessions of others. And from these passions and reflections conjoined, as soon as we observe like passions and reflections in others, the sentiment of justice, through all ages, has infallibly and certainly had place, to some degree or other, in every individual in the human species. In so sagacious an animal, what necessarily arises from the exertion of the intellectual faculties may justly be esteemed natural.

Natural may be opposed, either to what is *unusual*, *miraculous*, or *artificial*. In the two former senses, justice and property are undoubtedly natural. But as they suppose reason, fore-thought, design, and a social union and confederacy among men, perhaps that epithet cannot be strictly, in the last sense, applied to them. Had men lived without society, property had never been known, and neither justice nor injustice had ever existed. But society among human creatures had been impossible without reason and fore-thought. Inferior animals that unite, are guided by instinct, which supplies the place of reason. But all these disputes are merely verbal.

The rules of equity and justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition of men in society, and owe their origin and existence to that utility

which results to the public from their strict and regular observance. Reverse in any considerable circumstance the condition of men; produce extreme abundance, or extreme necessity; implant in the human breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice: by rendering justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation on mankind.

The common situation of society is a medium among all these extremes. We are naturally partial to ourselves and to our friends, but are capable of learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct. Few enjoyments are given us from the open and liberal hand of nature; but by art, labour, and industry, we can extract them in great abundance. Hence the ideas of property become necessary in all civil society; hence justice derives its usefulness to the public; and hence alone arise its merit and moral obligation. Examine the writers on the laws of nature, and you will always find, that whatever principles they set out with, they are sure to terminate here at last, and to assign, as the ultimate reason for every rule which they establish, the convenience and necessities of mankind. A confession thus extorted, in opposition to systems, has more authority than if it had been made in prosecution of them. Does any one scruple, in extraordinary cases, to violate all regard to the private property of individuals, and sacrifice to public interest a distinction which had

been established for the sake of that interest? The safety of the people is the supreme law. All other particular laws are subordinate to it, and dependent on it; and if, in the *common* course of things, they be followed and regarded, it is only because the public safety and interest *commonly* demand so equal and impartial an administration.

All questions of property are subordinate to the authority of civil laws, which extend, restrain, modify, and alter the rules of natural justice, according to the particular convenience of each community. The laws have, or ought to have, a constant reference to the constitution of government, the manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the situation of each society. *What is a man's property?* Any thing which it is lawful for him, and for him alone, to use. *But what rule have we by which we can distinguish these objects?* Here we must have recourse to statutes, customs, analogies, precedents, and a hundred other circumstances, some variable and arbitrary:—But the ultimate point in which they all professedly terminate is, the interest and happiness of human society.—*Hume.*

KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORICAL FACTS AND OF SPECULATIVE OPINIONS, NOT PROPAGATED IN THE SAME MANNER.—An historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contemporaries, is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, resemblance of the original truth on which it was founded

The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their supine carelessness; these principles, if not corrected by books and writing, soon pervert the accounts of historical events; where argument or reason has little or no place, nor can ever recall the truth which has once escaped those narrations. It is thus the fables of Hercules, Theseus, Bacchus, are supposed to have been originally founded in true history, corrupted by tradition. But, with regard to speculative opinions, the case is far otherwise. If these opinions be founded in arguments so clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the same arguments which at first diffused the opinions will still preserve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more remote from vulgar apprehension, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons; and as soon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the opinions will be immediately lost and buried in oblivion.—*Hume.*

KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULAR EXISTENCE.—There can be nothing more certain, than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds; this is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be any thing more than barely that idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any thing without us which corresponds to that idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their

minds when no such thing exists, no such object affects their senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting,—for I ask any one, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception, when he looks on the sun by day, and thinks on it by night; when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks on that savour or odour? We as plainly find the difference there is between an idea revived in our minds by our own memory, and actually coming into our minds by our senses, as we do between any two distinct ideas. If any one say, a dream may do the same thing, and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects, he may please to dream that I make him this answer: 1. That it is no great matter whether I remove this scruple or no; where all is but a dream, reasoning and arguments are of no use, truth and knowledge nothing. 2. That I believe he will allow a manifest difference between dreaming of being in the fire, and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to appear so sceptical as to maintain, that what I call being actually in the fire is nothing but a dream, and we cannot thereby certainly know that any such thing as fire exists without us; I answer, that we, certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we perceive, or dream that we perceive, by our senses; this certainly is as great as our happiness or misery, be-

yond which we have no concernment to know, or to be.—*Locke.*

KNOWLEDGE, PARTLY NECESSARY, PARTLY VOLUNTARY.—If our knowledge were altogether necessary, all mens' knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable: and if it were wholly voluntary, some men so little regard or value it, that they would have extremely little or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose but receive some ideas by them; and if they have memory, they cannot but retain some of them; and if they have any distinguishing faculty, cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one with another, as he that has his eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but see some objects, and perceive a difference in them. But though a man, with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see; yet there may be certain objects which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to; there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.

There is also another thing in a man's power, and that is, though he turns his eyes sometimes toward an object, yet he may choose whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet what he does see, he cannot see otherwise than he does. It depends not on his will to see that black which appears yellow; nor to

persuade himself, that what actually scalds him feels cold. The earth will not appear painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has a mind to it: in the cold winter, he cannot help seeing it white and hoary if he will look abroad. Just thus is it with our understanding; all that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or withholding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects, and a more or less accurate survey of them: but they being employed, our will hath no power to determine the knowledge of the mind one way or other; that is done only by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered.—And therefore, as far as men's senses are conversant about external objects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the existence of things without: and so far as mens' thoughts converse with their own determined ideas, they cannot but, in some measure, observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them; which is so far knowledge: and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered, they must necessarily be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them, and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths. For what a man sees, he cannot but see; and what he perceives, he cannot but know that he perceives.

Thus he that hath got the

ideas of numbers, and hath taken the pains to compare one, two, and three to six, cannot choose but know that they are equal: he that hath got the idea of a triangle, and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes, is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones; and can as little doubt of that, as of this truth, "that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be."

He also that hath the idea of an intelligent, but frail and weak being, made by and depending on another, who is eternal, omnipotent, perfectly wise and good, will as certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey God, as that the sun shines when he sees it. For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will turn his thoughts that way, and consider them, he will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent, is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he is certain to find, that three, four, and seven are less than fifteen, if he will consider and compute these numbers; nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen, if he will but open his eyes and turn them that way. But yet these truths, being ever so certain, ever so clear, he may be ignorant of either, or all of them, who will never take the pains to employ his faculties as he should, to inform himself about them.—*Locke.*

LABOUR.—It is necessary for the happiness of man, that pleasure should be the reward of labour; but of a moderate labour. If nature had of itself provided for

all his wants, it would have made him the most pernicious of all presents; he would have passed his days in languor, the idly rich would have been without resource against *ennui*. What palliative could there have been to this evil? None: if all the people were without wants, all would be equally opulent. Where then would the wealthy idler find men to procure him amusement?—The labour to which man was formerly, they say, condemned, was not a punishment of heaven, but a benediction of nature. Labour supposes desire; and the man without desire vegetates without any principle of activity: the body and the soul remain, if I may use the expression, in the same attitude. Occupation is the happiness of man. Habit renders labour easy: if we do that always without pain which we are always doing, and if every means of acquiring pleasure ought to be reckoned among the pleasures, labour always fills up, in the most agreeable manner, the time that separates a gratified want from the next that shall arise, and consequently the twelve only hours of a day in which we suppose the greatest inequality in the happiness of men. But to be occupied and use exercise, what is necessary? A motive: and of all others that of hunger is the most powerful, and most general. It is this that commands the peasant to labour in the fields, and the savage to hunt and fish in the forest.—A want of another kind animates the artist and man of

letters: the desire of reputation, of the public esteem, and of the pleasures they represent. Every want, every desire, compels men to labour; and when they have contracted an early habit, it becomes agreeable. For want of that habit, idleness renders labour hateful; and it is with aversion that men sow, reap, or even think.—One of the principal causes of the ignorance and sloth of the Africans, is the fertility of that part of the world; which supplies almost all necessities without culture. The African therefore has no motive for reflection; and in fact he reflects but little. The same may be said of the Caribbs. If they be less industrious than the savages of North America, it is because they have less occasion to labour for subsistence.—*Helvetius*.

LABOUR, NATIONAL.—The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it with all the necessities and conveniences of life which it annually consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.

According, therefore, as this produce, or what is purchased with it, bears a greater or smaller proportion to the number of those who are to consume it, the nation will be better or worse supplied with all the necessities and conveniences for which it has occasion.

But this proportion must in every nation be regulated by two different circumstances; first, by the skill, dexterity, and

judgment with which its labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. Whatever be the soil, climate, or extent of territory of any particular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must, in that particular situation, depend upon those two circumstances.

The abundance or scantiness of this supply, too, seems to depend more upon the former of those two circumstances than upon the latter. Among the savage nations of hunters and fishers, every individual who is able to work, is more or less employed in useful labour, and endeavours to provide, as well as he can, the necessaries and conveniences of life, for himself, or such of his family or tribe as are either too old, or too young, or too infirm, to go a-hunting or fishing. Such nations, however, are so miserably poor, that, from mere want, they are frequently reduced, or, at least, think themselves reduced, to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning, their infants, their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild beasts. Among civilized and thriving nations, on the contrary, though a great number of people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times, more labour than the greater part of those who

work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied; and a workman, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the greater necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire.

Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must depend, during the continuance of that state, upon the proportion between the number of those who are annually employed in useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. The number of useful and productive labourers is every where in proportion to the quantity of capital stock which is employed in setting them to work, and to the particular way in which it is so employed.

Nations tolerably well advanced as to skill, dexterity, and judgment, in the application of labour, have followed very different plans in the general conduct or direction of it; and those plans have not all been equally favourable to the greatness of its produce. The policy of some nations has given extraordinary encouragement to the industry of the country, that of others to the industry of towns. Scarce any nation has dealt equally and impartially with every sort of industry. Since the downfall of the Roman empire, the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts, manufactures, and com-

merce, the industry of towns, than to agriculture, the industry of the country.

Though those different plans were, perhaps, first introduced by the private interests and prejudices of particular orders of men, without any regard to, or foresight of, their consequences upon the general welfare of the society; yet they have given occasion to very different theories of political œconomy, of which some magnify the importance of that industry which is carried on in towns: others, of that which is carried on in the country. Those theories have had a considerable influence, not only upon the opinions of men of learning, but upon the public conduct of princes and sovereign states. * *

LAW OF NATURE.—There are some who say, that at the moment of our birth God engraves on our hearts the precepts of the natural law. Experience proves the contrary. If God is to be regarded as the author of the laws of nature, it is as being the author of corporeal sensibility, which is the mother of human reason. This sort of sensibility at the time of the union of men in society, obliged them to make among themselves conventions and laws; the assemblage of which composes what is called the laws of nature. But have those laws been the same among different nations? No: their greater or less perfection was always in proportion to the progress of the human mind; to the greater or less extent of knowledge that societies acquired of what was useful or pre-

judicial; and this knowledge has been in all nations the produce of time, experience, and reflection.—*Helvetius*.

LAW OF NATURE.—Natural right presupposes a law of nature which has established that right. But where is this law of nature to be found? Who has produced it? Law is the expression of will. The law of nature then must be the expression of will; but of whose will? —Of nature's? But what is nature? Or is it the expression of the will of God, who is sometimes called the Author of nature? But if this be the case, where is the difference between this and what is called the law of revelation?

Right is a mere legal term. Where no law is, there is no transgression, has been said; with equal truth it might be said, Where no law is, there is no right. A man acquires a right or property in a thing by the declaration of the legislator, that he may use and enjoy that thing; joined to a promise of the legislator, expressed or implied, that he will restrain every other person from depriving him of that thing, or from troubling him in the use or enjoyment of it. How is it that a man acquires a right to do or forbear any act? By the declaration of the legislator, that he may do or forbear it; joined to a promise of the legislator, expressed or implied, that he will restrain every other person from constraining him to forbear the one or to do the other.—As to things antecedently to law, a man may have the use and en-

joyment of them, but he cannot have the right to them; that is, he may have possession, but he cannot have property. As to acts, he may be in the habit of doing or forbearing, but he cannot have the right of exercising that habit. For until there is some law, tacit or expressed, he cannot be sure that others will be restrained from troubling him in the exercise of it. He may be free, but without law he cannot have the right of freedom. When men talk of a law of nature, they mean only certain imaginary regulations, which appear to them to be fit and expedient. When they say that a man has a natural right to the use and enjoyment of anything, or to do or forbear any act, I am apt to conceive they mean no more, than that it appears to them to be fit and expedient that such a right should be established.—*Lind.*

LAWs.—The general object of legislature should be variously modified in different countries, agreeable to local situation, the character of the inhabitants, and those other circumstances which require that every people should have a particular system of laws not always the best in itself, but the best adapted to that state for which it is calculated.—Besides the maxims common to all nations, every people are possessed in themselves of some cause which influences them in a particular manner, and renders their own system of laws proper only for themselves. It is thus that, in ancient times among the Hebrews, and in modern times among the Arabians, religion

was made the principal object of national concern; among the Athenians this object was literature; at Carthage and Tyre it was commerce; at Rhodes it was navigation, at Sparta war, and at Rome public virtue.—*Rousseau.*

LAWs.—Every law that is not armed with force, or which from circumstances must be ineffectual, should not be promulgated. Opinion which reigns over the minds of men, obeys the slow and indirect impressions of the legislator, but resists them when violently applied; and useful laws communicate their insignificance to the most salutary, which are regarded more as obstacles to be surmounted, than as safe-guards of the public good. But, further, our perceptions being limited, by enforcing the observance of laws which are evidently useless, we destroy the influence of the most salutary.—*Beccaria.*

LAWs, CIVIL AND ECCLESIASTICAL.—No ecclesiastical law should be in force till it has received formally the express sanction of the civil government: By this it was that Athens and Rome never had any religious quarrels. Those quarrels appertain only to barbarous nations. To permit or prohibit working on a holiday should only be in the magistrate's power; it is not the fit concern of priests to hinder men from cultivating their grounds. Every thing relating to marriages should depend solely on the magistrate; and let the priests be limited to the august function of the solemnization. Lending at inte-

LAW

rest ought to be entirely within the cognizance of the civil law, as by it commercial affairs are regulated.—All ecclesiastics whatever should, as the state's subjects, in all cases, be under the control and animadversion of the government. No priest should have it in his power to deprive a member of society of the least privilege on pretence of his sins: for a priest being himself a sinner, is to pray for sinners; he has no business to try and condemn them. Magistrates, farmers, and priests, are alike to contribute to the expence of the state, as alike belonging to the state.—One weight, one measure, one custom. The punishments of criminals should be of use: when a man is hanged, he is good for nothing; whereas a man condemned to the public works, still benefits his country, and is a living admonition.—Every law should be clear, uniform, and precise; explanations are for the most part corruptions.—The only infamy should be vice.—Taxes to be proportionate.—A law should never clash with custom; for if the custom be good, the law must be faulty.—*Voltaire.*

LAWs, INTERPRETATION OF.—There is nothing more dangerous than the common axiom, *The spirit of the laws is to be considered.* To adopt it, is to give way to the torrent of opinions. This may seem a paradox to vulgar minds, which are more strongly affected by the smallest disorder before their eyes, than by the most pernicious, though remote, consequences produced

LAW

by one false principle adopted by a nation.—Our knowledge is in proportion to our ideas. The more complex these are, the greater is the variety of positions in which they may be considered. Every man hath his own particular point of view, and at different times sees the same objects in very different lights. *The spirit of the laws* will, then, be the result of the good or bad logic of the judge, and this will depend on his good or bad digestion; on the violence of his passions; on the rank and condition of the accused, or on his connections with the judge; and on all these little circumstances which change the appearances of objects in the fluctuating mind of man. Hence we see the fate of a delinquent changed many times in passing through the different courts of judicature, and his life and liberty victims to the false ideas or ill-humour of the judge, who mistakes the vague result of his own confused reasoning for the just interpretation of the laws. We see the same crimes punished in a different manner at different times in the same tribunals, the consequence of not having consulted the constant and invariable voice of the laws, but the erring instability of arbitrary interpretation. The disorders which may arise from a rigorous observance of the letter of penal laws, are not to be compared with those produced by the interpretation of them. The first are temporary inconveniences, which will oblige the legislator to correct the letter of the law, the want of preciseness, and un-

certainty of which, has occasioned these disorders, and this will put a stop to the fatal liberty of explaining, the source of arbitrary and venal declamations. When the code of laws is once fixed, it should be observed in the literal sense, and nothing more is left to the judge than to determine, whether an action be or be not conformable to the written law. When the rule of right is a matter of controversy, not of fact, the people are slaves to the magistrates.—These are the means by which security of person and property is best obtained, which is just, as it is the purpose of uniting in society; and it is useful, as each person may calculate exactly the inconveniences attending every crime.—*Beccaria.*

LAWS, THE CONTINUANCE OF, DEPENDS ON THE SILENCE OF THE LEGISLATURE.—The principle of political life lies in the sovereign authority. The state doth not subsist by virtue of the laws, but by the legislative power. The statutes of yesterday are not in themselves, however, necessarily binding to-day; but the tacit confirmation of them is presumed from the silence of the legislature, the sovereign being supposed incessantly to confirm the laws not actually repealed.—Whatever is once declared to be the will of the sovereign, continues always so, unless it be abrogated.

Wherefore, then, is there so much respect paid to ancient laws? Even for this reason: it is rational to suppose, that nothing but the excellence of the ancient laws could preserve them so long

in being; for that, if the sovereign had not found them always salutary and useful, they would have been repealed.—Hence we see, that the laws, instead of losing their force, acquire additional authority by time in every well-formed state: the prepossession of their antiquity renders them every day more venerable; whereas, in every country where the laws grow obsolete, and lose their force as they grow older, this alone is a proof that the legislative power is decayed, and the state extinct.—*Rousseau.*

LEGAL RESTRAINTS, THE EFFECT OF ON HUMAN NATURE.—The regularity and industry we find in common life are the effects of necessity, and that necessity is occasioned by fear. Hence that dissatisfaction and gloom which ever attend them. Man is not made to be forced even into happiness: and that society is ever ineffectual and miserable in proportion to the number and severity of its legal restraints. The mechanic regularity and order, which are the consequences of submitting all actions to the direction of laws, and to the influence of penalties, never produce happiness: they even destroy the first principle of it. This, however, is the consequence of public vices in communities which have been originally ill constituted, and which, from many causes not immediately arising from their constitution, have had their existence continued for many ages. This seems to be the case with China; where the government has survived the usual periods of prosperity,

luxury, and vice, and has settled into an universal dominion of law, without moral virtue, and even at the expence of real wisdom and happiness. It would be difficult for a Chinese to perform an action which has not been referred to by some law, or some regulation. A wise and virtuous Chinese must, of consequence, be a phenomenon.—*Williams.*

LEGISLATURE, AND ITS OMNIPOTENCE.—If any one should ask, What is the civil liberty of a nation or community, I should lead him to answer himself, by putting this other question in return: What are the civil restraints by which a community can be bound? If this community is the whole of an independent nation, the idea of civil liberty seems not at all applicable to it, because it can be under no civil restraints. Being independent, it must make its own laws to be governed by: but these laws cannot bind the whole as one body; for this one body can certainly repeal the whole at pleasure: and it is an inconsistency to say, that any person, individual or collective, is bound by a law which he can at pleasure repeal. I do not say that a nation cannot bind itself by a treaty or a promise made to a distinct nation: but this is not a civil tie; this tie has its strength from the laws of nature, from that branch of them called the laws of nations. If a part of an independent nation obtains the name of a community, it is evident that such community may be subject to civil laws, those made by the legislative power of the whole nation, wherever that resides. That the legislature is not omni-

potent, as opposed to the whole people, is clear enough, for the whole people must include the members of the legislature, and it would be absurd to say, that the voice of the legislature alone should prevail over that which is the voice of the legislature, and the rest of the people taken together. But this voice of the whole people cannot be had; it is as to practice an absolute chimera; and when once it is allowed to dispense with the actual unanimous consent of all individuals, because we are under a necessity of dispensing with it, we must go on where the necessity of human affairs leads us, and that is, if I mistake not, to this point, that those to whom the ordinary powers of legislation in any state are committed, must be considered as unconfined in the power of making laws.—What! Were the British parliament to enact a law, that no one, on pain of death, should taste food for a month? Would every Englishman be bound to submit to such a law? Extreme cases like this always bring with them all the remedy they are capable of. It is to no purpose to lay down rules about them beforehand: for when they happen, all rules and laws cease: violence alone has place. In vain would a man, in any particular circumstances, say at the time, This is an extreme case; and attempt to justify himself by arguments, in acting as if it really was so. It is trifling to argue about such cases; not merely because those who are involved in them will always act from feelings which preclude the effect of arguments, but because the

cases cannot be reduced to any distinct general ideas, so as to become a proper subject for argumentation. Therefore, in all speculations, we may still consider the legislature as unbounded in its powers.—*Hey.*

LEGISLATURE, THE POWER OF.—

The supreme power is not limited in itself; nor can it be said to have any assignable, any certain bounds, unless where limited by express convention; that is to say, is there any act they cannot do;—to speak of any thing of theirs as being illegal—as being void;—to speak of their exceeding their authority (whatever be the phrase)—their power—their right—is, however common, an abuse of language. The legislature cannot do it: the legislature cannot make a law to this effect. Why cannot? What is there that should hinder them? Why not *this* as well as many other laws murmured at, perhaps as inexpedient, yet submitted to without any question of the right? With men of the same party, with men whose affections are already listed against the law in question, any thing will go down; any rubbish is good that will add fuel to the flame. But with regard to an impartial bystander, it is plain that it is not denying the right of the legislature, their authority, their power, or whatever be the word,—it is not denying that they *can* do what is in question; it is not that, I say, or any discourse verging that way, that can tend to give him the smallest satisfaction. Grant even the proposition in general, what are the nearer? Grant that there are certain bounds to the authority

of the legislature: of what use is it to say so, when these bounds are what nobody has ever attempted to mark out to any useful purpose; that is, in any such manner whereby it might be known beforehand what description a law must be of to fall within, and what to fall beyond, them? Grant that there are things which the legislature cannot do; grant that there are laws which exceed the power of the legislature to establish: what rule does this sort of discourse furnish us for determining whether any one that is in question, is not of the number? As far as I can discover, none. Either the discourse goes on in the confusion it began; either all rests in vague assertions, and no intelligible argument at all is offered; or, if any, such arguments as are drawn from the principle of utility; arguments which, in whatever variety of words expressed, come at last to neither more nor less than this: that the tendency of the law is, to a greater or less degree, pernicious. If this, then, be the result of the argument, why not come home to it at once? Why turn aside into a wilderness of sophistry, when the path of plain reason is straight before us? What practical inferences those who maintain this language mean should be deduced from it, is not altogether clear, nor, perhaps, does every one mean the same. Some, who speak of a law as being void, would persuade us to look upon the authors of it as having thereby forfeited, as the phrase is, their whole power, as well as that of giving force to the parti-

cular law in question as to any other.—These are they who, had they arrived at the same practical conclusion through the principle of utility, would have spoken of the law as being to such a degree pernicious; as that, were the bulk of the community to see it in its true light, the probable mischief of resisting it would be less than the probable mischief of submitting to it. These point, in the first instance, at hostile opposition. — Those who say nothing about forfeiture are commonly less violent in their views. These are they who, were they to ground themselves on the principle of utility, and to use our language, would have spoken of the law as being mischievous indeed, but without speaking of it as being mischievous to the degree that has been just mentioned. The mode of opposition which they point to is one which passes under the appellation of a legal one.—Admit, then, the law to be void in their sense, and mark the consequences. The idea annexed to the epithet *void* is obtained from those instances in which we see it applied to a private instrument:—The consequence of a private instrument's being void is, that all persons concerned are to act as if no such instrument had existed. The consequence, accordingly, of a law's being void, must be, that people shall act as if there was no such law about the matter; and therefore, that if any person, in virtue of the mandate of the law, should do any thing in coercion of another person, which without such law he would be punishable for doing, he would still be punishable; to wit, by appointment of the judicial power.

Let the law, for instance, be a law imposing a tax: a man who should go about to levy the tax by force would be punishable as a trespasser; should he chance to be killed in the attempt, the person killing him should *not* be punishable as for murder: should he kill, he himself would perhaps be punishable as for murder. To whose office does it appertain to do those acts in virtue of which such punishment would be inflicted? To that of the judges. Applied to practice, then, the effect of this language is, by an appeal made to the judges, to confer on those magistrates a controlling power over the acts of the legislature. By this management a particular purpose might perhaps, by chance be answered: and let this be supposed a good one. Still, what benefit would, from the *general* tendency of such a doctrine, and such a practice in conformity to it, accrue to the body of the people, is more than I can conceive. A parliament, let it be supposed, is too much under the influence of the crown, pays too little regard to the interests of the people and their sentiments. Be it so. The people, at any rate, if not so great a share as they might and ought to have, have had at least *some* share in choosing it. Give to the judges a power of annulling its acts, and you transfer a portion of the supreme power from an assembly which the people have had some share at least in choosing, to a set of men, in the choice of whom they have not the least imaginable share; to a set of men appointed solely by the crown; appointed solely and avowedly, and constantly, by that very magistrate whose partial and occasional influence is

the very grievance you seek to remedy. In the heat of debate, some perhaps would be for saying of this management, that it was transferring at once the supreme authority from the legislative power to the judicial. But this would be going too far on the other side. There is a wide difference between a positive and a negative part in legislation. There is a wide difference, again, between a negative upon reasons given, and a negative without any. The power of repealing a law, even for reasons given, is a great power; too great indeed for judges, but still very distinguishable from, and much inferior to, that of making one. Notwithstanding what has been said, it would be in vain to dissemble, but that, upon occasion, an appeal of this sort may very well answer, and has indeed in general a tendency to answer in some sort the purposes of those who espouse the interests of the people. A public and authorized debate on the propriety of the law is by this means brought on: an opportunity is gained of impressing sentiments unfavourable to it, upon a numerous and attentive audience; from such an appeal we must expect no other effects except a certainty of miscarriage. Let us now go back a little. In denying the existence of any assignable bounds to the supreme power, I added, unless where limited by express convention; for this exception I could not but subjoin, while there are such governments as the German empire, Dutch provinces, Swiss cantons, and hath been of old the Achæan league. In this mode of limitation I see not any thing to surprize us. By what is it that any degree of power (meaning politi-

cal power) is established? It is neither more nor less, as we have already had occasion to observe, than a habit of and a disposition to obedience—habit, speaking with regard to past acts—disposition, with respect to future. This disposition it is as easy, or I am much mistaken, to conceive as being absent with regard to one sort of acts, as present with regard to another; for a body then, which is in other respects supreme, to be conceived as being, with respect to a certain sort of acts, limited, all that is necessary is, that this sort of act be in its description distinguishable from every other.—*J. Bentham.*

THE OMNIPOTENCE OF EVERY LEGISLATURE.—In all states, great or small, the sentiments of that body of men in whose hands the supreme power of the society is lodged, must be understood to be the sentiments of the whole body. These deputies or representatives of the people will make a wrong judgment, and pursue wrong measures, if they consult not the good of the whole society, whose representatives they are;—just as the people themselves would make a wrong judgment, and pursue wrong measures, if they did not consult their own good, provide they could be assembled for that purpose. No maxims or rules of policy can be binding upon them, but such as they themselves shall judge to be conducive to the public good. Their own reason and conscience are their only guide; and the people, in whose name they act, their only judge.—In large states, this ultimate seat of power, this tribunal, to which lies an appeal from every other, and from which no appeal can even be ima-

gined, is too much hid, and kept out of sight by the present complex forms of government, which derive their authority from it. Hence hath arisen a want of clearness and consistency in the language of the friends of liberty. Hence the preposterous and slavish maxim—that whatever is enacted by that body of men in whom the supreme power of the state is vested, must in all cases be implicitly obeyed; and that no attempt to repeal an unjust law can be vindicated beyond a simple remonstrance addressed to the legislators. A case which is very intelligible, but which can never happen, will demonstrate the absurdity of such a maxim. Suppose the King of England and the two Houses of Parliament should make a law, in all the usual forms, to exempt the members of either House from paying taxes to the government, or to take to themselves the property of their fellow-citizens. A law like this would open the eyes of the whole nation, and show them the true principles of government and the power of governors. The nation would see that the most regular governments may become tyrannical, and their governors oppressive, by separating their interest from that of the people whom they govern. Such a law would show them to be but servants, and servants who had shamefully abused their trust. In such a case, every man for himself would lay his hand upon his sword; and the authority of the supreme power of the state would be annihilated. Where regular commissions from the abused public cannot be had, every man who has power, and who is actuated with the sentiments of the public, may assume a public character, and

bravely redress public wrongs. In such dismal and critical circumstances, the stifled voice of an oppressed country is a loud call upon every man to exert himself; and whenever that voice shall be at liberty, it will ratify and applaud the action, which it could not formally authorise.—*Priestley*.

LIBERTY.—Liberty is the absence of coercion. Coercion is distinguishable into constraint and restraint; and, again, these into physical and moral: hence the ideas of physical and moral liberty. A man is deprived of his physical liberty, when he is constrained by physical force to do or to forbear certain acts: he is deprived of his moral liberty, when, by moral motives, that is, the threat of painful events, to happen in consequence of his doing or forbearing, he is constrained to do or forbear. But these motives must arise, these events must be brought about by foreign causes, by extraneous will, over which we have no power. The absence of physical coercion is physical liberty. The absence of moral coercion is moral liberty. Liberty is nothing positive; it is only the absence of constraint as well as restraint. The well-known story of Tarquin and Lucretia will illustrate this. Had Tarquin entered the chamber of Lucretia attended by the companions of his debaucheries; had they held the hapless victim while the prince satiated his lust, this would have been a physical coercion. Instead of this, what did Tarquin? He threatened her with instant death, and future infamy, if she refused to comply with his solicitations. This was applying not physical coercion, but moral.—It is this moral coercion that the legislator

applies to make the subject obey the laws. He has not recourse to physical coercion, except when he means to compel a subject to undergo the penalty of having disobeyed the laws.—Thus, for instance, the legislator publishes a law, addressed to all his subjects, and says, “Deprive not another of his life.” To this he adds a penalty, “If thou dost, thou shalt lose thy own life.” This is moral coercion; our moral liberty alone is suspended.—But when a man has deprived another of life, then physical coercion is applied to compel that individual to stay for a certain time at a certain place; to appear at a certain time before certain persons; to go afterwards to another certain place, and there to submit to a certain punishment.—*Lind.*

LIBERTY.—Liberty is the absence of restraint. The liberty of speaking, of petitioning, of remonstrating, is not understood to mean any thing more than the not being restrained from speaking, &c. Mr. Lind has defined liberty as the absence of constraint and restraint. But it seems to me that constraint is understood to include something more than a mere deprivation of liberty. If a person by violence puts a pen into my hand, and then constrains or forces me to write certain words or sentences, I am indeed deprived of the liberty of holding my hand still, or of moving it the way that I choose. But that is not all. I am forced into one particular and determinate action; which is something more—there is a positive violence exerted upon me. The common notion of liberty seems therefore to be merely the absence of restraint. To be

permitted to do any act is the same as having liberty to do it. Permission in the person, or authority permitting, produces liberty in the person permitted. This may be thought by some the best way of coming at the conception.—*Hey.*

A GENERAL IDEA OF THE PERFECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTY.—That some civil society is necessary to peace and good order, that many of the restraints imposed by civil laws are of use, is easily understood. It may be added, that those restraints which do no good will probably do harm. Many of them, we know, are immediately hurtful, taken singly; but there is also something pernicious to be observed in the effect common to all restraints. One mischief attending them is, that they must by their nature operate in the way of general rules. Special laws cannot be made to direct the actions of each individual; much less can the attention of the legislature be called out to every action of each. And it is found by experience, that at least such general rules as human foresight is able to invent, however useful in the main, are yet in many particular cases prejudicial. In the opinion of some, perhaps, we might go further, and say, that general rules, by their very essence, do harm, though formed in absolute perfection.—The mischief of restraints may be further seen by recollecting how nice a matter it is to bring the mind of man into such a frame that it will exert its faculties with the greatest energy. When it acts by rule, how dull and ineffective! When it goes out in pursuit of its own inclinations, how lively and forcible! There is—even in a state disturbed by licen-

tiousness, there is an animation which is favourable to the human mind, and which puts it upon exerting its powers. The fear of punishment turns a man's attention upon himself and his own interests. If the restraints are very numerous, he is employed in watching himself in his intercourse with his fellow-citizens, that he may not be caught offending. This habit of caution and minute attention to his conduct damps or extinguishes those generous sentiments which might lead him out to promote the happiness of others, and prompt him to catch with eagerness every opportunity of advancing the public welfare. It is therefore by no means the part of a good and wise legislature to impose restraints where they are not necessary to the production of some good, which may counterbalance the evil of restraining.—If a law commands me to keep to my right hand in walking along the streets, it abridges my liberty. But if, by enjoining the same to every other passenger, it removes many obstructions that would retard me, I am upon the whole more at liberty in walking along than I should have been without the law. We may see also in this trifling instance the evil of laying a restraint where it is not wanting. If the number of passengers is so small as to cause no confusion, it would be a hardship upon people to be under the necessity of observing such a regulation. Nay, we may go still further with the same instance: it shows the imperfection of a general rule. When the streets are thin, the reason of the law ceases, and the advantages of it: the inconvenience remains, without any good to counterbalance it. But where restraints

are the necessary means to increase happiness, the best part that human wisdom and human benevolence can act, is to impose them; and, when imposed, they may possibly promote the liberty of the peaceable citizen: not indeed his civil liberty, understood as the absence of civil restraints; for that must certainly be diminished by every additional civil restraint: but a law may, by tying up the hands of the violent and unprincipled, contribute more to the liberty of the peaceable citizen, than it takes away from his liberty by the new restraint which it does itself impose. So that, upon the whole, he becomes freer to follow his own will, and is less controlled in his actions than he was before. Not that we must expect this always to be the effect of a law, even in theory: there are other good purposes to be answered in legislation: national strength, commerce, the health of the people, must be attended to. But it is plain that an increase of liberty, upon the whole, may be owing to an immediate diminution of it by the laws of the community.

We seem, then, to be arrived at one useful principle by which a legislature may guide itself in the formation of laws—to avoid as much as possible multiplying restraints upon the subject. This principle leads to the point of perfection in civil liberty. It is the nature of society that each member of it can only be allowed to pursue his own happiness in a manner consistent with that of the other members; or we may say, that he ought to procure his private good through the medium (as it were) of the public good. Wherever that does not require him to be curbed, our

principle would leave him as free as he himself can wish or conceive. If he is ambitious of being more free than the public good will allow, he forgets surely that he is a member of civil society.—But why should any civil restraints at all be imposed? For two reasons, the ignorance of men, and their moral depravity. Did every man perfectly understand his own interests and those of the persons with whom he lived in society, and were his passions and his faculties always under such regulation that he could exert himself with energy wherever his knowledge directed him, we should neither want chains to tie us up from being mischievous, nor a guide to keep us from missing our road.—*Hey.*

CIVIL LIBERTY AND POLITICAL SECURITY.—Liberty is the absence of coercion. Perfect liberty would be a total absence of coercion. Civil liberty means not this. It means only a partial absence of coercion; and that enjoyed by one or more of that class of persons in a state of civil or political society who are called subjects; and with respect only to others of that same class, civil or political liberty consists in this: That no individual or body of subjects have the power of constraining another subject to do, or restraining him from doing, what the laws have ordered him to do or to forbear. This, then, is created by law, and is bestowed on one subject, or number of subjects, upon whom the law does *not* operate; and not upon all other subjects upon whom the law does operate.

Suppose, for instance, there were but one religion established, or even tolerated, in a country; and

that the ministers of that religion were the only persons permitted to speak in public on the subject of religion. To this class of citizens, called ministers, the liberty of speaking in public on the subject of religion would be then reserved. But how? Not by any operation of the law on them, but by its operation on every other subject, whom it would restrain from troubling them in the free performance of this act. But the restraint upon other subjects in this case would be two-fold: they would be restrained from troubling this particular class in the free performance of this particular act: and they would be again restrained from performing that act themselves. Supposing this last restraint never to have been imposed, and all the subjects in this instance would have been free: supposing the restraint to be taken off, and they would again become free. This liberty is bestowed by the operation of the law, not on the individual who means to do the act in question, but on every other person who may attempt to restrain him from doing it.—It may be said, that this idea of civil liberty is imperfect; that civil liberty includes an absence of coercion, with respect not only to all others of the class called subjects, but likewise with respect to that person or assemblage of persons who are called governors. It does not appear practicable to establish such liberty by law. Law is the expression of will. That person or assemblage of persons, the expression of whose will constitutes law, are governors. Is it possible that they should give liberty against themselves? The very attempt to do it, directly and

openly, would be destructive of civil liberty properly so called. For the truth of this I may appeal to the history of Rome in ancient days, to that of Poland in our own. In both these states, in proportion as the power of governors has been openly and directly checked, the civil liberty of the subject has been checked with it. The governors, as such, could not indeed infringe the liberty of the subject; but then neither could they protect the accused against the abuse of power on the part of the magistrate, nor the feeble against the oppression of the more powerful individual. Add too, that when this impotence of the governors has produced, as it naturally must produce, a state of anarchy and confusion, they have been compelled to have recourse to the most violent methods to protect the state against either the attacks of foreign foes, or the cabals of factious and overpowerful citizens. Such was, at Rome, the appointment of a Dictator, or of a Consul armed with the dictatorial power, conveyed by that arbitrary and unlimited commission of—*Videat Consul ne quid Respublica detrimenti capiat*. Such is, in Poland, the more dreadful tyranny of a confederation. No bounds can be set to the supreme power; the very term of supreme power precludes the idea. In a state where the supreme power is distributed among different ranks and bodies of men, against each of these ranks, taken separately, there may be liberty; bounds may be prescribed to them; they as well as individuals may be restrained by law: against the whole there can be no liberty; united, they are omnipotent. The coronation-oath is frequently urged as a proof

that the supreme power not only may be, but actually is, circumscribed within certain bounds. The fact is, that this oath is not a convention between the supreme power and the people, but a promise only from one of the constituent parts of the supreme power;—a very different thing:—each part may have certain limits; and yet the whole, united, be illimited. Notwithstanding this omnipotency of the supreme power in every state, there is a wide difference between a free and despotic state. In a free state, besides civil or political liberty, the subject enjoys what is often confounded with it, though very different from it, civil or political security. This security arises not from any limitation of the supreme power, but from such a distribution of the several parts of it as shall best insure the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

If this distinction could so be made as to render, the interests of the governors and governed perfectly undistinguishable, this end would be completely obtained, and the subject would enjoy perfect political security: this security is more or less perfect as these interests are less or more distinguishable. But it is at first sight apparent, that political security cannot be produced in the same manner as civil liberty. This latter is produced by a positive operation of the law; that is, by a positive act of those persons in whose hands is lodged the power of making and executing laws: But political security cannot be so produced; for this plain reason, because whatever produces it, is to operate against those very persons in whose hands the power is lodged.

Political security, or the assurance the people may have that the powers of government will be applied to the production of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, must be created by the manner of distributing the several portions of power, which, when united, form the supreme power; of arranging the functions of the several classes of governors who, taken together, compose what is meant by government. The happy effects arising from a proper arrangement of the functions and power of the several classes of governors are exemplified in the English constitution.—*Lind.*

THE DIFFERENT SORTS OF LIBERTY.—Natural liberty is that which the laws of nature allow, or the absence of restraints imposed by the laws of nature. Physical, moral, religious, and civil liberty, are the absence of physical restraints, of moral, of religious, of civil restraints. There is a liberty which is the result of natural and civil liberty, as it were, mixed together. Natural restraints bind a man in one action, civil restraints bind him in another: the liberty left him upon the whole, is less than either his natural or civil liberty taken singly. Many actions are forbidden by the laws of nature, as hurtful merely to the individual who commits them, such as drunkenness and acts of imprudence. About these we generally find civil laws to be silent. On the other hand, natural laws are silent about many particulars in which the laws of civil society prescribe to us, as about the modes of transferring property. Sometimes a civil law merely enforces a prohibition of nature. Again, it very frequently happens, that a civil

law, though it has the same action for its object as some law of nature, does yet narrow our liberty, by being more minute and circumstantial in its prohibition; and it seems that the name of civil liberty is sometimes given to this compounded or resulting liberty, which we enjoy upon the whole by the joint permission of natural and civil laws.—*Hey.*

POLITICAL AND CIVIL LIBERTY IN BARBAROUS AGES.—The great body of the people, in barbarous and licentious ages, enjoy much less true liberty, than where the execution of the laws is the most severe, and where subjects are reduced to the strictest subordination and dependence on the civil magistrate.—The reason is derived from the excess itself of that liberty.—Men must guard themselves at any price against insults and injuries; and where they receive no protection from the laws and magistrate, they will seek it by submission to superiors, and by herding in some inferior confederacy, which acts under the direction of a powerful chieftain; and thus all anarchy is the immediate cause of tyranny, if not over the state, at least over many of the individuals.—A barbarous people may be pronounced incapable of any true or regular liberty, which requires such a refinement of laws and institutions, such a comprehension of views, such a sentiment of honour, such a spirit of obedience, and such a sacrifice of private interest and connections to public order, as can only be the result of great reflection and experience, and must grow to perfection during several ages of a settled and established government.—*Hume.*

LOVE ONLY A DESIRE OF ENJOYMENT.—When a person imagines that he loves only the soul of a woman, it is certainly her person that he desires; and here, to satisfy his wants, and especially his curiosity, he is rendered capable of every thing. This truth may be proved from the little sensibility most spectators shew at the theatre, for the affection of a man and his wife; when the same spectators are so warmly moved by the love of a young man for a young woman.—What can produce these different sensations, if it be not the different sensations which they themselves have experienced in these two relations? Most of them have felt, that as they will do every thing for the favours desired, they will do little for the favours obtained; that in the case of love, curiosity being once gratified, they easily comfort themselves for the loss of one who proves unfaithful, and that then the misfortune of a lover is very supportable. Love, therefore, can never be any thing but a disguised desire of enjoyment.—*Helvetius.*

THE PHYSICAL CAUSE OF LOVE.—

When we have before us such objects as excite love and complacency, the body is affected in the following manner: the head reclines something on one side; the eye-lids are more closed than usual, and the eyes roll gently with an inclination to the object; the mouth is a little opened, and the breath drawn slowly, with now and then a low sigh; the whole body is composed, and the hands fall idly to the sides. All this is accompanied with an inward sense of melting and languour. These appearances are always in proportion to the degree of beauty in the object and of sensibility in

the observer. And this gradation, from the highest pitch of beauty and sensibility even to the lowest of mediocrity and indifference, and their correspondent effects, ought to be kept in view, else this description will seem exaggerated, which it certainly is not. But from this description it is almost impossible not to conclude, that beauty acts by relaxing the solids of the whole system. There are all the appearances of such a relaxation; and a relaxation somewhat below the natural tone seems to me to be the cause of all positive pleasure. Who is a stranger to that manner of expression so common in all times and in all countries, of being softened, relaxed, enervated, dissolved, melted away by pleasure? The universal voice of mankind, faithful to their feelings, concurs in affirming this uniform and general effect; and although some odd and particular instance may, perhaps, be found, wherein there appears a considerable degree of positive pleasure, without all the characters of relaxation, we must not therefore reject the conclusion we had drawn from a concurrence of many experiments, but we must still retain it, subjoining the exceptions which may occur, according to the judicious rule laid down by Sir Isaac Newton in the third book of his *Optics*. This position is confirmed by the genuine constituents of beauty having each of them, separately taken, a natural tendency to relax the fibres, and by the appearance of the human body, when all these constituents are united together before the sensory; so that we may venture to conclude, that the passion called love is produced by this relaxation. We may also conclude, that as a

beautiful object presented to the sense, by causing a relaxation in the body, produces the passion of love in the mind; so if by any means the passion should first have its origin in the mind, a relaxation of the outward organs will as certainly ensue in a degree proportioned to the cause.—*Burke.*

LUXURY.—Every refinement of convenience, of elegance, and of splendour, which soothe the pride or gratify the sensuality of mankind, have been severely arraigned by the moralists of every age; and it might perhaps be more conducive to the virtue, as well as happiness of mankind, if all possessed the necessities, and none the superfluities of life. But in the present imperfect condition of society, luxury, though it may proceed from vice or folly, seems to be the only means that can correct the unequal distribution of property. The diligent mechanic, and the skilful artist, who have obtained no share in the division of the earth, receive a voluntary tax from the possessors of the land; and the latter are prompted, by a sense of interest, to improve those estates, with whose produce they may purchase additional pleasures. These operations impress the political machine with new degrees of activity, and are productive of the happiest effects in every society.—*Gibbon.*

LUXURY.—Luxury is a word of an uncertain signification, and may be taken in a good as well as in a bad sense. In general, it means great refinement in the gratification of the senses; and any degree of it may be innocent or blameable, according to the age, or country, or condition of the person. The bounds between the virtue and the vice

cannot here be fixed exactly, more than in other moral subjects. To imagine that the gratifying any of the senses, or indulging any delicacy in meats, drinks, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into any head that is not disordered by the phrenzies of enthusiasm. These indulgencies are only vices when they are pursued at the expense of some virtue, as liberality or charity; in like manner, they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himself to want and beggary. Where they entrench upon no virtue, but leave ample subject whence to provide for friends, family, and every proper object of generosity or compassion, they are entirely innocent, and have in every age been acknowledged as such by almost all moralists. To be entirely occupied with the luxury of the table, for instance, without any relish for the pleasure of ambition, study, or conversation, is a mark of stupidity, and is incompatible with any vigour of temper or genius.—To confine one's expence entirely to such a gratification, without regard to friends or family, is an indication of a heart devoid of humanity or benevolence. But if a man reserve time sufficient for all laudable pursuits, and money sufficient for all generous purposes, he is free from every shadow of blame or reproach.—*Hume.*

LUXURY.—It is in vain to attempt a precise definition of luxury. The word luxury, like that of greatness, is one of those comparative expressions that do not offer to the mind any determinate idea; that only express the relation two or more objects have to each other. It has no fixed sense till the moment it is put, if I may use the expression, into an

equation; and we compare the luxury of one nation, class of men, or private person, with that of others of the same rank. An English peasant, well clothed and fed, is in a state of luxury compared with a French peasant. The man dressed in a coarse cloth, is in a state of luxury, compared to a savage covered with a bear's skin. All things, even to the feathers that adorn the cap of a wild Indian, may be regarded as luxury.—*Helvetius*.

LUXURY, AND REFINEMENT OF MANNERS, FAVOURABLE TO LIBERTY.—In rude unpolished ages, when the arts are neglected, all labour is bestowed on the cultivation of the ground; and the whole society is divided into two classes, proprietors of land and their vassals or tenants. The latter are necessarily dependant, and fitted for slavery and subjection; especially where they possess no riches, and are not valued for their knowledge in agriculture; as must always be the case where the arts are neglected. The former naturally erect themselves into petty tyrants; and must either submit to an absolute master, for the sake of peace and order; or if they will preserve their independency, like the ancient barons, they must fall into feuds and contests among themselves, and throw the whole society into such confusion, as is perhaps worse than the most despotic government. But where luxury nourishes commerce and industry, the peasants, by proper cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradesmen and merchants acquire a share of the property; and draw authority and consideration to that middling rank of men, who are

the best and firmest basis of public liberty. These submit not to slavery like the peasants, from poverty and meanness of spirit; and having no hopes of tyrannizing over others, like the barons, they are not tempted, for the sake of that gratification, to countenance the tyranny of their sovereign. They covet equal laws, which may secure their property, and preserve them from monarchical as well as aristocratical tyranny.—*Hume*.

LUXURY, EFFECTS OF, DISCOVERABLE BY A COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT COTEMPORARY NATIONS.—To declaim against present times, and magnify the virtue of remote ancestors, is a propensity almost inherent in human nature: and as the sentiments and opinions of civilized ages alone are transmitted to posterity, hence it is that we meet with so many severe judgments pronounced against luxury, and even science; and hence it is that at present we give so ready an assent to them. But the fallacy is easily perceived by comparing different nations that are cotemporaries; where we both judge more impartially, and can better set in opposition those manners with which we are sufficiently acquainted. Treachery and cruelty, the most pernicious and most odious of all vices, seem peculiar to uncivilized ages; and by the refined Greeks and Romans were ascribed to all the barbarous nations which surrounded them.—They might justly, therefore, have presumed, that their own ancestors, so highly celebrated, possessed no greater virtue, and were as much inferior to their posterity, in honour and humanity, as in taste and science. An ancient

Frank or Saxon may be highly extolled; but I believe every man would think his life or fortune much less secure in the hands of a Moor or Tartar, than in those of a French or English gentleman—the rank of men the most civilized in the most civilized nations.—

Hume.

LUXURIOUS AGES MOST HAPPY.—

Human happiness, according to the most received notions, seems to consist in three ingredients—action, pleasure, and indolence; and though these ingredients ought to be mixed in different proportions, according to the dispositions of the person, yet no ingredient can be entirely wanting, without destroying, in some measure, the relish of the whole composition. Indolence or repose, indeed, seems not of itself to contribute much to our enjoyment; but, like sleep, is requisite as an indulgence to the weakness of human nature, which cannot support an uninterrupted course of business or pleasure. That quick march of the spirits, which takes a man from himself, and chiefly gives satisfaction, does in the end exhaust the mind, and requires some intervals of repose, which, though agreeable for a moment, yet, if prolonged, beget a languor and lethargy that destroys all enjoyment. Education, custom, and example, have a mighty influence in turning the mind to any of these pursuits; and it must be owned, that where they promote a relish for action and pleasure, they are so far favourable to human happiness. In times when industry and the arts flourish, men are kept in perpetual occupation, and enjoy, as their reward, the

occupation itself, as well as those pleasures which are the fruit of their labour. The mind acquires new vigour, enlarges its powers and faculties, and by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which commonly spring up when nourished by ease and idleness.—Banish those arts from society, you deprive men both of action and pleasure; and leaving nothing but indolence in their place, you even destroy the relish of indolence, which never is agreeable but when it succeeds to labour, and recruits the spirits, exhausted by too much application and fatigue. The spirit of the age affects all the arts; and the minds of men, being once roused from their lethargy, and put into a fermentation, turn themselves on all sides, and carry improvements into every art and science. Profound ignorance is totally banished, and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures to think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of the mind as well as those of the body. The more these refined arts advance, the more sociable men become; nor is it possible that, when enriched with science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they should be contented to remain in solitude, or live with their fellow-citizens in that distant manner which is peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock into cities—love to receive and communicate knowledge, to show their wit or their breeding, their taste in conversation or living, in clothes and furniture. Curiosity allures the wise, vanity the foolish, and pleasure both. Particular clubs

and societies are every where formed, both sexes meet in an easy and sociable manner, and the tempers of men, as well as their behaviour, refine apace. So that, besides the improvements which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impossible but they must feel an increase of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together and contributing to each other's pleasure and entertainment. Thus, industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an indissoluble chain; and are found, from experience, as well as reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and what are commonly denominated the more luxurious ages. Nor are these advantages attended with disadvantages that bear any proportion to them. The more men refine upon pleasure, the less will they indulge in excesses of any kind; because nothing is more destructive to true pleasure than such excesses. One may safely affirm, that the Tartars are oftener guilty of beastly gluttony, when they feast on their dead horses, than European courtiers with all their refinements of cookery. And if libertine love, or even infidelity to the marriage-bed be more frequent in polite ages, when it is often regarded only as a piece of gallantry; drunkenness, on the other hand, is much less common, a vice more odious, and more pernicious both to body and mind.—

Hume.

LUXURY AND REFINEMENT OF MANNERS FAVOURABLE TO GOVERNMENT.—The increase and consumption of all commodities which serve to the ornament and pleasure of life, are advantageous

to society; because at the same time that they multiply those innocent gratifications to individuals, they are a kind of store-house of labour, which, in the exigencies of a state, may be turned to the public service. In a nation where there is no demand for such superfluities, men sink into indolence, and lose all enjoyment of life; and are useless to the public, which cannot maintain nor support its fleets and armies from the industry of such slothful members.—The bounds of all the European kingdoms are at present nearly the same they were two hundred years ago; but what a difference is there in the power and grandeur of those kingdoms? which can be ascribed to nothing but the increase of art and industry.—This industry is much promoted by the knowledge inseparable from ages of art and refinement; as on the other hand this knowledge enables the public to make the best advantage of the industry of its subjects. Laws, order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at least of commerce and manufactures. Not to mention, that all ignorant ages are infested with superstition, which throws the government off its bias, and disturbs men in the pursuit of their interest and happiness. Knowledge in the arts of government naturally begets mildness and moderation, by instructing men in the advantages of humane maxims above rigour and severity, which drive subjects into rebellion, and render the return to submission impracticable by cutting off all hopes of pardon. When the tempers of men

are softened, as well as their knowledge improved, this humanity appears still more conspicuous, and is the chief characteristic which distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity and ignorance. Factions are then less inveterate, revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and seditions less frequent. Even foreign wars abate of their cruelty; and after the field of battle, where honour and interest steel men against compassion as well as fear, the combatants divest themselves of the brute, and resume the man.—Luxury and refinement of manners in destroying ferocity do not annihilate the martial spirit. If anger, which is said to be the whetstone of courage, loses somewhat of its asperity by politeness and refinement, a sense of honour, which is a stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, acquires fresh vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge and a good education.—Refinement on the pleasures and conveniences of life has no natural tendency to beget venality and corruption. The disorders in the Roman state, which have been ascribed to luxury and refinement, really proceeded from an ill-modelled government, and the unlimited extent of conquests. The value which all men put upon any particular pleasure depends on comparison and experience; nor is a porter less greedy of money which he spends on bacon and brandy, than a courtier who purchases champagne and ortolans. Riches are valuable at all times to all men, because they always purchase pleasures, such as men are accustomed to and desire; nor can any thing restrain or regulate the love of

money, but a sense of honour and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all times, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and refinement.—*Hume*.

MADMEN AND IDIOTS.—Those who either perceive but dully, or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have but little matter to think on. Those who cannot distinguish, compare, and abstract, would hardly be able to understand and make use of language, or judge or reason, to any tolerable degree, but only a little, and imperfectly, about things present, and very familiar to their senses. And indeed any of the forementioned faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce suitable defects in mens understandings and knowledge.

The defect of *naturals* seems to proceed from want of quickness, activity, and motion in the intellectual faculties, whereby they are deprived of reason; whereas *madmen*, on the other side, seem to suffer by the other extreme. For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths; and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles; for by the violence of their imaginations, having taken their fancies for realities, they make right deductions from them. Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king, with a right inference, require suitable attendance, respect, and obedience; others, who have thought themselves made of glass, have used the caution necessary to preserve such brittle bodies. Hence it comes to

MAD

pass, that a man who is very sober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantic as any in *Bedlam*; if either by any very sudden strong impression, or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts, incoherent ideas have been cemented together so powerfully as to remain united. But there are degrees of madness as of folly; the disorderly jumbling ideas together is in some more and some less. In short, herein seems to be the difference between idiots and madmen, that madmen put wrong ideas together, and so make wrong propositions, but argue and reason right from them; but idiots make very few or no propositions, and reason scarce at all.—*Locke*.

MADNESS.—The causes of madness are of two kinds, bodily and mental. That which arises from bodily causes is nearly related to drunkenness, and to the deliriums attending diseases. That from mental causes is of the same kind with temporary alienations of the mind during violent passions, and with the prejudices and opinionativeness which much application to one set of ideas only occasions.

We may thus distinguish the causes for the more easy conception and analysis of the subject; but in fact they are both united for the most part. The bodily cause lays hold of that passion or affection which is most disproportionate; and the mental cause, when that is primary, generally waits till some bodily distemper gives it full scope to exert itself. Agreeably to this, the prevention and cure of all kinds of madness require an attention both to the body and mind.

MAD

It is observed, that mad persons often speak rationally and consistently upon the subjects that occur, provided that single one which most affects them be kept out of view. And the reason of this may be, that whether they first become mad because a particular original mental uneasiness falls in with an accidental bodily disorder, or because an original bodily disorder falls in with an accidental mental one; it must follow, that a particular set of ideas shall be extremely magnified, and consequently an unnatural association of sameness or repugnancy between them generated; all other ideas and associations remaining nearly the same. When one false position of this kind is admitted, it begets more of course, the same bodily and mental causes also continuing; but then this process stops after a certain number of false positions are adopted from their mutual inconsistency, unless the whole nervous system is deranged. The memory is often much impaired in madness; which is both a sign of the greatness of the bodily disorder and a hindrance to mental rectification, and therefore a bad prognostic. If an opposite state of body and mind can be introduced early, before the unnatural associations are too much cemented, the madness is cured; if otherwise, it will remain though both the bodily and mental cause should be at last removed.

In dissections after madness, the brain is often found dry, and the blood-vessels much distended; which are arguments that violent vibrations took place in the internal parts of the brain, the peculiar residence of ideas and passion; and

that it was much compressed, so as to obstruct the natural course of association.

As in mad persons the vibrations in the internal parts of the brain are preternaturally increased, so they are defective in the external organs; in the glands, &c. Hence maniacs eat little, are costive, make little water, and take scarce any notice of external impressions. The violence of the ideas and passions may give them great muscular strength upon particular occasions; but maniacs are often sluggish as well as insensible, from the great prevalence of the ideal vibrations, just as persons in a state of deep attention are. Bodily labour, with a variety of mental occupations, and a considerable abstemiousness in the quantity and quality of diet, ought always to be prescribed, and are the best preservatives in hereditary and other tendencies to madness.—*Hartley.*

MADNESS.—There are different kinds of madmen; some who are so very mad, that they lose all use of their reason, and are as little able to deduce consequences as to establish principles. Others again deduce consequences, and argue very justly, but are still mad; because they reason from principles that have no reality out of their own heated and disordered imaginations. Instances of this kind of madness are to be found in every form of life; even among those who are reputed sober and wise, and who are really such, except on some particular subject. All are in this predicament, whose imaginations are run away with by the prejudices of education on religious and political subjects.—*Bolingbroke.*

MADNESS.—By madness, is meant the distemper of the organs of the brain, which necessarily hinders a man from thinking and acting like others. An important observation here is, that this man is not without ideas; he has them, whilst waking, like all other men, and often in his sleep. It may be asked, how his soul being spiritual and immortal, and residing in his brain, whither all the ideas are conveyed to it by the senses very plain and distinct, yet never forms a right judgment of them? It sees objects equally as the souls of Aristotle, Plato, Locke, and Newton; it hears the same sounds, it has the same sense of the touch: how happens it, then, that with the same perceptions as the wisest men, it makes a wild incoherent jumble without being able to help itself? If this simple and eternal substance has the same instruments for acting as the souls of the wisest brains, it should reason like them; what can hinder it? If this madman sees red, and the sensible men blue; if when this hears music, the madman hears the braying of an ass; if when they hear yes, he hears, no;—I must of necessity conclude, that his soul must think differently from the others. But this madman has the like perceptions as they; and there is no apparent reason why his soul, having through the senses received all its tools, cannot make use of them. It is said to be pure, to be of itself subject to no infirmity, to be provided with all necessary helps; and whatever happens in the body, its essence remains unalterable, yet it is carried in its case to bedlam. This reflection may give rise to an apprehension, that the faculty of

thinking with which man is endued is liable to be disordered like the other senses. A madman is a patient whose brain suffers, as a gouty man is a patient whose feet and hands suffer; he thought by means of the brain as he walked with his feet, without knowing any thing of his incomprehensible power to walk, or of his no less incomprehensible power to think.—*Voltaire.*

MAHOMETANISM.—It was an error, to suppose it was by allowing a free indulgence to the passions that Mahomet gained so many followers. His doctrine, however absurd and stupid it may seem when compared with Christianity, was severe and rigorous, in comparison to the extravagant and licentious manners that prevailed in Arabia. Frequent prayers, charities, fasting, the prohibition of that crime which defeats the views of nature, by deceiving her with respect to the object of her desires, the denying the use of wine, and the forgiveness of injuries, were all so many yokes on a people, with whom the passions, inflamed by example, had obliterated every appearance of justice. It was not, therefore, as is generally asserted, by favouring licentiousness, that Mahomet made so many proselytes to his opinions, *but by proposing a more noble and virtuous system than that which they before followed, which is the only method of persuading any people whatever.*—Men love the practice of vice, but they are also fond of contemplating virtue. If we examine different sects, we shall find that they generally affected the appearance of austerity; and if they at any time indulged licentious manners, they carefully concealed it; the reason

is, virtue has such a natural influence over our minds, that we cannot destroy it but by assuming her venerable dress.—*Mehegan.*

MANUFACTURES.—Manufactures are founded in poverty; it is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who must work for others at low wages, or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent the importation of the same kind from abroad, and to bear the expence of its own exportation. But no man who can have a piece of land of his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist his family in plenty, is poor enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a master.—Hence, while there is land in a country sufficient for the people upon easy terms, there can be no manufactures to any amount or value. It is an observation founded upon facts, than the natural livelihood of the thin inhabitants of a forest country is hunting; that of a greater number, pasturage; that of a middling population, agriculture, and that of the greatest, manufactures, which last must subsist the bulk of the people in a full country, or they must be subsisted by charity, or perish.—*Franklin.*

MARRIAGE.—That the human, like every other species of animals, should multiply by the copulation of the two sexes, and be propagated by their care to nurse and breed up their young, is undoubtedly a law of nature. Self-love, the great spring of human actions, prompts to both. But as it is more immediately determined, and more strongly stimulated by instinct and by nature, to the one than to the other, it becomes ne-

cessary to give this principle, by reason and by art, to let it lose none that it had. For this purpose it was necessary that parents should know certainly their own respective broods; and that as a woman cannot doubt whether she is the mother of the child she bears, so a man should have all the assurance law can give him that he is the father of the child he begets. Thus matrimony forms families, which could not be formed without it; and families form states, which could not be formed without them. It was the first natural union which preceded and prepared mankind for political or civil union; and the bonds of this second union were more effectually strengthened by those of paternal and filial affection, and of consanguinity, than they could have been by those alone of accidental interests liable to vary, and of covenants liable to be broken. On such principles, and for such purposes, matrimony was instituted. They are evidently derived from the law of nature. The institution, therefore, is conformable to the law of nature, as far as it is subservient to these ends. But when it is carried further than these ends require, and that which is consistent with them, or even conducive to them, is forbid, it is, in every such respect, a mere arbitrary imposition. Great attention has been had in every well-regulated government to promote the multiplication of mankind, and this attention must be always necessary; for if the human race is daily increasing, it is daily decreasing likewise; and it would be trifling to maintain that celibacy is less hurtful, or polygamy less necessary, than they were formerly. Men who were

advanced in years, and had never been married, were stigmatized at Sparta; and as well there as at Rome, and in many other places, great immunities, prerogatives, and other encouragements, were granted to those who had a large legitimate issue. The Talmudists carry the obligation so far of getting children, that they declare the neglect of it to be a sort of homicide. All the ends of matrimony are answered by polygamy; and the custom for one man to have several wives has prevailed always, and it still prevails generally, if not universally, either as a reasonable indulgence to mankind, or as a proper, and in the early ages a necessary, expedient to increase their numbers. Such it is, no doubt—such it must be in the order of nature; and when we are told that it has not this effect among the people who retain the custom to this day, either the fact asserted by men, who cannot be competent judges of it, may be untrue; or Sodomy and abortions, in conjunction with other causes as unnatural, may prevent the natural effect of polygamy. Polygamy was allowed by the Mosaic law, and was authorised by God himself. The zeal of the Jews to promote the observation of the precept, *To increase and multiply*, was so great, that besides the establishment and regulation of polygamy, their doctors descended into many particulars for the same purpose; and among the rest were careful to appoint stated periods, beyond which it was not lawful to neglect the performance of conjugal duty in any form of life.—The periods were marked even to the artificer, the countryman, and the seaman; and the wife had her

remedy if the law was not observed. Polygamy is quite conformable to the law of nature, and provides the most effectual means for the generation and education of children. Monogamy, on the other hand, or the confinement of one husband to one wife, whilst they both live, will unite the care of both parents in breeding up subjects of the commonwealth; but will not serve as effectually, nor in as great numbers, to the begetting them. The prohibition of polygamy, therefore, is not only a prohibition of what nature permits in the fullest manner, but what she requires also in the same manner, and often in a greater degree than ordinary, for the reparation of states exhausted by wars, by plagues, and other calamities. The reasons that determined the lawgivers of Greece and Rome, and of some few other states, to forbid a plurality of wives, which was permitted in almost all countries, may have been such as these: They saw that polygamy would create large families, and large families a greater expence than could be borne by men who were reduced to live in cities, and other fixed habitations, where property was distinguished, and where no one could afford to spend more than his legal possessions, his labour, and his industry gave him. Monogamy was a sort of sumptuary law, and might be thought the more reasonable, because even in those countries where polygamy was established, men were not permitted to marry more women than they were able to maintain. But of all the reasons by which we may account for the prevalence of single marriages in opposition to polygamy, divorces constituted the

principal and the most effectual. With them, monogamy may be thought a reasonable institution; without them, it is an absurd, unnatural, and cruel imposition. It crosses the intention of nature doubly, as it stands in opposition to the most effectual means of multiplying the human species, and as it forbids the sole expedient by which this evil can be lessened in any degree, and the intention of nature can be, in many cases, at all carried on. The institution of divorces was of such absolute necessity where a plurality of wives was forbid, and of so much convenience where this plurality was allowed, that it continued on the same foot among the Romans till Christianity was established fully in the empire; and that it continues still among the Jews in the east, if not practised, for prudential reasons, in the same manner, and as openly in the west.—*Bolingbroke.*

MARRIAGE.—Marriage has two objects: *the one, the preservation of the species; the other, the pleasure and happiness of the two sexes.*—To what shall we refer the uniformity of its institution? I answer—to the conformity between this mode of matrimony and the primitive state of the inhabitants of Europe, that is, the state of peasants. In that rank, the man and woman have one common object of desire, which is the improvement of the land they occupy; this improvement results from their mutual labours. *The man and wife constantly occupied in their farm, and always useful to each other, support, without disgust, and without inconvenience, their indissoluble union.* The law of indissolubility in marriage is a cruel

and barbarous law (says Fontenelle.) The few happy marriages prove the necessity of a reformation in this matter. There are countries where the lover and his mistress do not marry till after they have lived together three years. During that time, they try the sympathy of their characters. If they do not agree, they part, and the girl goes to another.

These African marriages are the most proper to secure the happiness of the parties. But how then must the children be provided for? By the same laws that secure their maintenance in countries where divorces are permitted. Let the sons remain with the father, and the daughters go with the mother; and let a certain sum be stipulated in the marriage articles for the education of such children. The inconvenience of divorces will then be insignificant, and the happiness of the married parties secured.—But it may be said, that divorces will enormously increase under a law so favourable to human inconstancy. Experience proves the contrary. To conclude—if the variable and ambulatory desires of men and women urge them sometimes to change the object of their tenderness, why should they be deprived of the pleasure of variety, if their inconstancy, by the regulation of wise laws, be not detrimental to society? In France, the women are too much mistresses; in the east, too much slaves; they are there a sacrifice to the pleasure of men. But why should they be a sacrifice? If the two parties cease to love, and begin to hate each other, why should they be obliged to live together? Marriage frequently represents nothing more than the picture of two unfortunate

people who are chained together, to be a reciprocal torment to each other.—*Helvetius*.

MARRIAGE, THE DEGREES OF.—

The natural reason why marriage in certain degrees is prohibited by the civil laws, and condemned by the moral sentiments of all nations, is derived from mens' care to preserve purity of manners; while they reflect, that if a commerce of love were authorised between the nearest relations, the frequent opportunities of intimate conversation, especially during early youth, would introduce an universal dissoluteness and corruption. But as the customs of countries vary considerably, and open an intercourse, more or less restrained, between different families, or between the several members of the same family, so we find, that the moral precept varying with its cause, is susceptible, without any inconvenience, of very different latitude in the several ages and nations of the world.

The extreme delicacy of the Greeks permitted no converse between persons of two sexes, except where they lived under the same roof; and even the apartments of a step-mother and her daughters were almost as much shut up against visits from the husband's sons, as against those from any strangers, or more remote relations. Hence, in that nation, it was lawful for a man to marry, not only his niece, but his half-sister by the father; a liberty unknown to the Romans, and other nations, where a more open intercourse was authorised between the sexes.—Hume.

MARRIAGE BETWEEN RELATIONS.

—With regard to marriages between relations, it is a thing extremely delicate to fix exactly the

point at which the laws of nature stop, and where the civil laws begin. For this purpose we must establish some principles. The marriage of the son with the mother confounds the state of things: the son ought to have an unlimited respect to his mother, the wife an unlimited respect to her husband, therefore the marriage of the mother to the son would subvert the natural state of both. Besides, Nature has forwarded in women the time in which they are able to have children, but has retarded it in men; and for the same reason, women sooner loose the ability, and men later. If the marriage between the mother and the son were permitted, it would almost always be the case, that when the husband was capable of entering into the views of nature, the wife would be incapable. The marriage between the father and the daughter is contrary to nature as well as the other; but it is less contrary because it has not those two obstacles. Thus the Tartars, who may marry their daughters, never marry their mothers, as we see in accounts of that nation. This law is very ancient among them.—Attila, (says Priscus) in his embassy, stopt in a certain place to marry Esca his daughter—a thing permitted, he adds, by the laws of the Scythians.

It has ever been the natural duty of fathers to watch over the chastity of their children. Intrusted with the care of their education, *they are obliged to preserve the body in the greatest perfection, and the mind from the least corruption; to encourage whatever has a tendency to inspire them with virtuous desires, and to nourish a becoming tenderness.*

As children dwell, or are supposed to dwell, in their father's house, marriages between fathers and children, between brothers and sisters, are prohibited, in order to preserve natural modesty in families.

On the same principle, marriages between the son-in-law with the mother-in-law, the father-in-law with the daughter-in-law, are prohibited by the law of nature. In this case, the resemblance has the same effect as the reality, because it springs from the same cause. There are nations among whom cousin-germans are considered as brothers, because they commonly dwell in the same house; there are others where this custom is not known. Among the first, the marriage of cousin-germans ought to be regarded as contrary to nature; not so among the others. But the laws of nature cannot be local; therefore, when these marriages are forbidden, or permitted, it must be done according to the circumstances, by a civil law.

It is not a necessary custom for the brother-in-law and the sister-in-law to dwell together in the same house. The marriage between them is not then prohibited to preserve chastity in the family; and the law which forbids or permits it, is not a law of nature, but a civil law, regulated by circumstances, and dependant on the custom of each country.

The prohibitions of the law of nature are invariable; the father, the mother, and the children, necessarily dwell in the same house. The prohibitions of the civil laws are accidental, because they depend on accidental circumstances; cousin-germans and others dwelling in the house by accident. This

explains why the law of Moses, those of the Egyptians, and of many other nations, permitted the marriage of the brother-in-law with the sister-in-law, whilst these very marriages were disallowed by other nations.

In India, they have a very natural reason for admitting this sort of marriages. *The uncle is there considered as the father, and is obliged to maintain and educate his nephew, as if he were his own child. This proceeds from the disposition of these people, which is good-natured and full of humanity. This law, or the custom, has produced another:—If a husband has lost his wife, he does not fail to marry her sister, which is extremely natural, for his new consort becomes the mother of her sister's children, and not a cruel step-mother.*—Montesquieu.

MARRIAGE WITH A BROTHER'S WIDOW.—Marriage, in this degree of affinity, is indeed prohibited in Leviticus; but it is natural to interpret that prohibition as a part of the Jewish ceremonial or municipal law; and though it is there said in the conclusion, that the Gentile nations, by violating these degrees of consanguinity, had incurred the Divine displeasure, the extension of this maxim to every precise case before specified, is supposing the Scriptures to be composed with a minute accuracy and precision, to which, we know with certainty, the sacred penmen did not think proper to confine themselves. The descent of mankind from one common father, obliged them, in the first generation, to marry in the nearest degrees of consanguinity: instances of a like nature occur among the patriarchs;

and the marriage of a brother's widow was, in certain cases, not only permitted, but even enjoined as a positive precept by the Mosaic law. It is in vain to say, that this precept was an exception to the rule, and an exception confined merely to the Jewish nation. The inference is still just, that it can contain no natural or moral turpitude, otherwise God, who is the author of all purity, would never in any case have enjoined it.—Hume.

MATTER.—Wise men, on being asked, What the soul is? answer, They are entirely ignorant of it: and if asked what matter is, give the like answer. This almost unknown being, is it eternal? So all antiquity believed. Has it, of itself, an active force? This is the opinion of several philosophers. Have they who deny it any superior reason for their opinion? You do not conceive that matter can, intrinsically, have any property; but how can you affirm that it has not, intrinsically, such properties as are necessary to it.—You know nothing of its nature, and yet deny it to have modes which reside in its nature; for, after all, as matter exists, it must have a form and figure; and being necessarily figured, is it impossible that there are other modes annexed to its configuration? Matter exists, this you know; but you know it no further than by your sensations.—We weigh, we measure, we analyse, we decompound matter; but on offering to go a step beyond these operations, we find ourselves bewildered, and an

abyss opens before us. How can we conceive that what is without succession has not always been? Were the existence of matter not necessary, why exists it? And if it was to exist, why should it not always have existed? Never was an axiom more universally received than this—nothing produces nothing. The contrary, indeed, is incomprehensible; all nations have held their chaos anterior to the divine disposition of the world. Matter, therefore, was looked on in the hands of God as clay under the potter's wheel, if such faint images may be used to express the divine power. Matter being eternal, should have eternal properties; as configuration, the inert power, motion, and divisibility. But this divisibility is no more than the consequence of motion; as without motion there can be no division, separation, and arrangement: therefore motion was looked on as essential to matter. The chaos had been a confused motion; and the arrangement of the universe was a regular motion impressed on all bodies by the Deity. But how should matter, of itself, have motion, as, according to all the ancients, it has extension and impenetrability? It cannot, however, be conceived without extension, and it may without motion.—To this the answer was—It is impossible but matter must be permeable; and if permeable, something must be continually passing into its pores: where is the use of passages, if nothing passes through them? The system of the eternity of matter

has, like all other systems, very great difficulties. That of matter formed out of nothing is not less incomprehensible. Happily, which ever system is espoused, morality is hurt by neither; for what signifies it whether matter be made, or only arranged? God is equally our absolute master. Whether the chaos was only put in order, or whether it was created of nothing, still it behoves us to be virtuous.—Scarce any of these metaphysical questions have a relation to the conduct of life. Disputes are like table-talk; every one forgets after dinner what he has said, and goes away where his interest or inclination leads him.
—*Voltaire.*

MATTER.—It has at all times been alternately asserted, that matter felt, or did not feel. If a precise idea had been fixed to the word matter, it would have been perceived, if I may use the expression, that men were the creators of matter—that matter was not a being—that in nature there were only individuals to which the name of body had been given; and that this word *matter* could import no more than the collection of properties common to all bodies. The meaning of this word being determined, all that remained was to know, whether extent, solidity, and impenetrability were the only properties common to all bodies; and whether the discovery of a power, such, for instance, as attraction, might not give rise to a conjecture that bodies had some properties hitherto unknown, such as that of sensation, which, though evi-

dent only in the organized members of animals; might yet be common to all individuals? The question being reduced to this, it would have appeared, that if, strictly speaking, it is impossible to demonstrate that all bodies are absolutely insensible, no man, unless instructed by a particular revelation, can decide the question otherwise than by calculating and comparing the probability of this opinion with that of the contrary.—*Helvetius*.

MATTERS OF FACT, DEMONSTRATIONS OF.—There is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments *a priori*; because nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction.—*Nothing that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction.* Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent.—There is therefore no being whose non-existence implies a contradiction; consequently there is no being whose existence is demonstrable.—*Hume*.

MATTERS OF FACT, DEMONSTRATIONS OF.—When we once assume the existence of any thing as a fact, the non-existence of the cause implies the non-existence of the effect, or of the thing assumed as a fact.—Nothing, it is said by Mr. Hume, that is distinctly conceivable implies a contradiction.—Is it distinctly conceivable, that there should be a first cause of all things? If it be not, the necessary existence of the Deity is established.—Whatever we conceive as existent, we can according to that philosopher, conceive also as non-existent.—Not so; we conceive space as existent: can we conceive it as non-existent? The utmost stretch

of the imagination cannot annihilate space; therefore its existence is necessary, and its non-existence implies a contradiction.—So it is with the first cause, or the Deity.—Allow the existence of one thing, and of but a single atom, and the non-existence of its primary cause, or the Deity, involves an absurdity.

MELANCHOLY.—Vapours, hypochondriacal and hysterical disorders, are comprehended under this class. The causes of it are self-indulgence in eating and drinking, and particularly in fermented liquors, want of due bodily exercise, injuries done to the brain by fevers, concussions, &c. too much application of the mind, especially to the same objects and ideas, violent and long continued passions, profuse evacuations, and an hereditary disposition; which last we may suppose to consist chiefly in an undue make of the brain. In women, the uneasy states of the uterus are propagated to the brain, both immediately and mediately; i. e. by first affecting the stomach, and thence the brain. In men, the original disorder oftens begins, and continues a long time, chiefly in the organs of digestion.

The *causa proxima* of melancholy, is an irritability of the medullary substance of the brain, disposing it upon slight occasions to such vibrations as enter the limits of pain; and particularly to such kinds and degrees as belong to the passions of fear, sorrow, anger, jealousy, &c. And as these vibrations, when the passions are not in great excess, do not much transgress the limits of pleasure, it will often happen that hypochondriac and hysteric

persons shall be transported with joy from trifling causes, and be at times disposed to mirth and laughter. They are also very fickle and changeable, as having their desires, hopes, and fears, increased far beyond their natural state, when they fall in with such a state of the brain as favours them.

It often happens to these persons to have very absurd desires, hopes, and fears; and yet at the same time to know them to be absurd; and in consequence thereof to resist them. While they do this, we may reckon the disease within the bounds of melancholy; but when they endeavour to gratify very absurd desires, or are permanently persuaded of the reality of very groundless hopes and fears, and especially if they lose the connecting consciousness in any great degree, we may reckon the disease to have passed into madness strictly so called.—*Hartley.*

MEN, THE DIFFERENT RACES OF.
—None but the blind can doubt that the Whites, the Negroes, the Albinoes, the Hottentots, the Laplanders, the Chinese, the Americans, are races entirely different.

No curious traveller ever passed through Leyden, without seeing part of the reticulum mucosum of a Negro dissected by the celebrated Ruych. This membrane is black; and communicates to Negroes that inherent blackness, which they do not lose but in such disorders as may destroy this texture, and allow the grease to issue from its cells and form white spots under the skin.

Their round eyes, squat noses,

and invariable thick lips, the different configurations of their ears, their woolly heads, and the measure of their intellects, make a prodigious difference between them and other species of men; and what demonstrates that they are not indebted for this difference to their climates is, that Negro men and women being transported into the coldest countries, constantly produce animals of their own species; and that Mulattoes are only a bastard race of black men and white women. The Albinoes are, indeed, a very small and scarce nation; they inhabit the centre of Africa. Their weakness does not allow them to make excursions far from the caverns which they inhabit; the Negroes, nevertheless, catch some of them at times, and these we purchase of them as curiosities. To say that they are dwarf Negroes, whose skin has been blanched by a kind of leprosy, is like saying that the Blacks themselves are Whites blackened by the leprosy. An Albino no more resembles a Guinea Negro than he does an Englishman or a Spaniard. Their whiteness is not like ours; it does not appear like flesh, it has no mixture of white and brown; it is the colour of linen, or rather of bleached wax; their hair and eye-brows are like the finest and softest silk; their eyes have no sort of similitude with those of other men, but they come very near partridges eyes. Their shape resembles that of the Laplanders, but their head that of no other nation whatever as their hair, their eyes, their ears, are all different; and they have

nothing that seems to belong to man but the stature of their bodies, with the faculty of speaking and thinking, but in a degree very different from ours.

The apron, which nature has given to the Caffres, and whose flabby and lank skin falls from their naval half way down their thighs; the black breasts of the Samoides women, the beard of the males of our continent, and the beardless chins of the Americans, are such striking distinctions, that it is scarce possible to imagine that they are not each of them of different races.

But now if it should be asked, From whence came the Americans? it should be asked, From whence came the inhabitants of the Terra Australis? And it has been already answered, That the same Providence which placed men in Norway, planted some also in America and under the antarctic circle, in the same manner as it planted trees and made grass to grow there.

Several of the learned have surmised, that some races of men, or animals approximating to men, have perished. The Albinoes are so few in number, so weak, and so ill-used by the Negroes, that there is reason to apprehend this species will not long exist.

With respect to the duration of the life of man (if you abstract that line of Adam's descendants consecrated by the Jewish books), it is probable that all the races of man have enjoyed a life nearly as short as our own; as animals, trees, and all productions of nature, have ever had the same duration.

But it should be observed, that

commerce, not having always introduced among mankind the productions and disorders of other climates, and men being more robust and laborious in the simplicity of a country life, for which they are born, they must have enjoyed a more equal health, and a life somewhat longer, than in effeminacy, or in the unhealthy works of great cities; that is to say, that if in Paris or London one man in 20,000 attains the age of a hundred years, it is probable that 20 men in 20 years arrived formerly at that age. This is seen in several parts of America, where mankind have preserved a pure state of nature. —The plague and the small-pox, which Arabian caravans communicated in a course of years to the people of Asia and Europe, were for a long time unknown. Thus mankind in Asia and the fine climates of Europe multiplied more easily than elsewhere. Accidental disorders, and some wounds, were not indeed cured as they are at present; but the advantage of never being afflicted with the plague or small-pox, compensated all the dangers attendant on our nature; so that, every thing considered, it is to be believed, that human kind formerly enjoyed, in the favourable climates a more healthy and happy life than since the foundation of great empires.—*Voltaire.*

MEN, AN ORIGINAL INFERIORITY IN THE INTELLECTUAL ABILITIES OF, BEYOND THE POLAR CIRCLES AND BETWEEN THE TROPICS.—There is some reason to think, that all the nations which live beyond the polar circles, or between the tropics, are inferior

MEN

to the rest of the species, and are incapable of all the higher attainments of the human mind. The poverty and misery of the northern inhabitants of the globe, and the indolence of the southern from their few necessities, may perhaps account for this remarkable difference, without having recourse to physical causes.— Though it may be suspected, that the Negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds), are naturally inferior to the Whites, there scarcely ever was a civilized nation of any other complexion than White, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures among them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites, such as the ancient Germans and present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction between these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly.—*Hume.*

MEN

MEN, NO ORIGINAL DISTINCTION IN THEIR INTELLECTUAL ABILITIES.—David Hume, in a note to his *Essay on National Characters*, says, "I am apt to suspect that the Negroes, and, in general, all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds,) are inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual, eminent either in action or speculation: no ingenious manufactures among them, no arts, no sciences; not to mention our colonies, there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none have ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity."

This suspicion (for it seems scarcely to have matured into an opinion) concerning an original distinction in the breeds of men, has unaccountably given occasion to some writers to quote Hume as an advocate for the slavery of the Negroes; which, if his facts were admitted, is foreign to his argument. But his assertions are doubtless too general. Were the Carthaginians, a civilized African nation, white. No instances, it is true, can be produced among the Negroes; but examples taken under the disadvantages of that oppression in which they are usually seen by Europeans, will be reasonably objected to. The bad qualities of slaves may with more justice be attributed, not to their complexion or climate, but to the abject servility of their condition, which represses emulation, and extinguishes whatever is great and noble in the mind.

Many instances, however, prove that when opportunities have occurred of relief from the severity of their bondage, the Negroes are capable of instruction both in arts and sciences. With respect to their disposition in their own country, Adanson, in his history of Senegal, says, that they are good-natured, civil, and obliging; and that he was convinced a considerable abatement ought to be made in the accounts he had heard and read of the savage character of the Africans. Bosman, a Dutch governor, who resided some years in Africa, relates, that they are friendly to strangers; that they discover in conversation a great quickness of parts and understanding; and that they have a variety of mechanical arts, and some curious manufactures, among them; particularly that of gold and silver hat-bands, in which he doubts if they can be rivalled by the most polished nations. Barbet, Brue, and Holben, who also resided in the country, unite in the favourable representation which they give of their capacity for civil government and the administration of justice.

These testimonials, extracted from writers who had resided on the spot, evidently overthrow the fallacious foundation on which Hume had hazarded his speculation.—**

MIND, THE STRENGTH OF.—All men are equally desirous of happiness; but few are successful in the pursuit. One chief cause is the want of *strength of mind*, which might enable them to resist the temptation of present ease or pleasure, and carry them

forward in the search of more distant profit and enjoyment.—Our affections, on a general prospect of their objects, form certain rules of conduct, and certain measures of preference of one above another. And these decisions, though really the result of our calm passions and propensities, (for what else can pronounce any object eligible or the contrary?) are yet said, by a natural abuse of terms, to be the determinations of pure reason and reflection. But when some of these objects approach nearer us, or acquire the advantages of favourable lights and positions, which catch the heart or imagination, our general resolutions are frequently confounded, a small enjoyment preferred, and lasting shame and sorrow entailed upon us. And however poets may employ their wit and eloquence in celebrating present pleasure, and rejecting all distant views to fame, health, or fortune, it is obvious, that this practice is the source of all dissoluteness and disorder, repentance and misery. A man of a strong determined temper adheres tenaciously to his general resolutions; and is neither seduced by the allurements of pleasure, nor terrified by the menaces of pain; but keeps still in view those distant pursuits, by which he at once ensures his happiness and his honour.—*Hume*.

MIRACLES.—A Miracle, in the energetic sense of the word, means something wonderful; and thus every thing is a miracle. The order of nature, the activity of light, the life of animals, are per-

petual miracles. According to the received notion, however, a miracle is a violation of the divine and eternal laws. A dead man walking two leagues with his head in his hands, is what we call a miracle. Several naturalists affirm, that, in this sense, there are no miracles; and their arguments are these:—a miracle is a breach of the mathematical, divine, immutable, eternal laws; now this definition alone makes a miracle a contradiction in terms. A law cannot be both immutable and broken. But it is answered, Cannot a law of God's making be suspended by its Author? They boldly answer, No; and it cannot be that the infinitely wise Being should have made laws, and afterwards break them. If, say they, he made any alteration in his machine, it would be to make it go the better. Now it is clear that God has framed this immense machine as good as it possibly could be: if he saw that any imperfection hereafter would be occasioned by the nature of the materials, he at first provided against any such future defect; so that there would be no cause for any after-change. Besides, God can do nothing without reason: now, what reason could induce him to disfigure his own work for any time? It is for man's sake, say their opponents. It is to be hoped then, answer they, that it is for the sake of all men, it being impossible to conceive that the Divine Nature should work for some particular men, and not for all mankind. But supposing that God had been pleased to distinguish a small number of men by particular

favours, must he therefore alter what he has settled for all times and all places? Must he suspend or alter the eternal play of those immense springs on which depends the motion of the universe? He certainly can favour his creatures without any such inconstancy and change: his favours are comprised in his very laws: every thing has been wisely contrived and arranged for their good; and they all irrevocably obey the force which he has originally implanted in nature.—Wherefore is God to work a miracle? to accomplish a design he has for some living beings? That is making God to say, I have not been able, by the fabric of the universe, by my divine decrees, by my eternal laws, to compass such a design: I see I must make an alteration in my eternal ideas, my immutable laws, as what I intended cannot be executed by those means. This would be an acknowledgment of weakness, not a declaration of power: it would be the most inconceivable contradiction. So that to suppose God works any miracles, is, if men can insult God, a downright insult to him: it is no less than saying to him, You are a weak and inconsistent Being.—A further reply to these philosophers is, Your crying up the immutability of the Supreme Being, the eternity of his laws, with the regularity of his infinite worlds, signifies nothing: our small heap of dirt has been covered with miracles; in history, prodigies are as frequent as natural events. Name me one nation where incredible prodigies have not been performed,

especially in times when reading and writing were little known.

—A philosopher was one day asked, What he would say if the sun stood still; that is, if the motion of the earth round that body ceased? if all the dead arose? and if all the mountains went and threw themselves into the sea? and all this to prove some important truth. What I should say! answered the philosopher; I would turn Manichean; and say, that there is a principle which undoes what the other has done.—*Voltaire.*

MIRACLES.—I have seen the birth of many miracles of my time, which, although they were still-born, yet have we not failed to foresee what they would have come to had they lived. It is but finding the end of the clue, and a man may wind off as much as he will; and there is a greater distance betwixt nothing and the minutest thing in the world, than there is betwixt that and the greatest. Now, the first that are tinged with the beginning of novelty, when they set out their history, find, by the opposition they meet with, where the difficulty of persuasion lies, and caulk that place with some false piece. Besides that, *Insita hominibus libidine alendi de industria rumores*, “men having a natural lust to propagate reports,” we naturally make a conscience of restoring what has been lent us, without some usury and addition of our own invention. Private error first creates public error; and afterwards, in turn, public error causes a particular one. Thus all this fabric rises by patch-work from hand to

hand; so that the remotest witness knows more than the nearest, and the last informed is more certain than the first. It is a natural progress; for whoever believes any thing, thinks it a work of charity to persuade another into the same opinion: which the better to do, he will make no difficulty of adding as much of his own invention as he conceives necessary to obviate the resistance or want of conception he supposes in others.

There is nothing to which men commonly are more inclined than to give way to their own opinions. Where the ordinary means fail us, we add command and force, fire and sword. It is a misfortune to be at that pass, that the best touchstone of the truth must be the multitude of believers, in a crowd where the number of fools so much exceed the wise. *Quasi vero quidquam sit tam valde, quam nihil sapere, vulgare. Sanitatis patrociniū est insanientium turba.* “As if any thing were so common as ignorance.” “The mob of fools is a protection to the wise. It is hard for a man to form his judgment against the common opinions. The first persuasion taken of the very subject itself possesses the simple, and from that it spreads to the wise, by the authority of the number and antiquity of the witnesses. For my part, what I would not believe from one, I would not believe from a hundred; and I do not judge of opinions by the years. It is not long since one of our princes, in whom the gout has spoiled an excellent natural genius and sprightly dis-

position, suffered himself to be so far persuaded with the report of the wonderful operations of a certain priest, who by words and gestures cured all sorts of diseases, as to go a long journey to seek him out; and, by the force of his apprehension, for some time so persuaded and laid his legs asleep for several hours, as to obtain that service from which they had a long time left off. Had fortune packed together five or six such accidents, it had been enough to have brought this miracle into nature. There was after this discovered so much simplicity, and so little art, in the architect of such operations, that he was thought too contemptible to be punished, as would be the case of most such things, were they examined to the bottom. *Miramur ex intervallo fallentia*, "we admire at things that deceive by their distance." So does our sight often represent to us strange things at a distance, that vanish at approaching them near. *Nunquam ad liquidum fama perducitur*, "Fame never reports things in their true light." It is to be wondered at from how many idle beginnings and frivolous causes such famous impressions commonly proceed. This it is that obstructs the information; for whilst we seek out the causes, and the great and weighty ends worthy of so great a name, we lose the true ones. They escape our sight by their littleness; and, in truth, a prudent, diligent, and subtle enquirer is necessary in such researches; one who is indifferent, and not prepossessed.

—*Montaigne.*

MIRACLES.—A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot of itself remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or a miracle, to prevent them? Nothing is a miracle if it happen in the common course of nature. Sometimes an event may not in *itself* seem to be contrary to the laws of nature; and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle, because in fact it is contrary to these laws. Thus, if a person claiming a divine authority should command a sick person to be well, the clouds to pour rain; in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command, these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature: for if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle, and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature, than

that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined: *A transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.* A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force for that purpose, is a real miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us. No event can be miraculous unless contrary to uniform experience. Uniform experience amounts to a proof; there is therefore a direct and a full proof, from the nature of the fact, against every miracle; nor can such proof be destroyed but by an opposite superior proof.—*Hume.*

MIRACLES.—In matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary; and it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China, should all of them be true. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them abound in miracles,) as its direct scope is to establish the particular system to which it is attributed; so has it the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it likewise destroys the credit of those miracles on which that system was established: so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary facts; and the evidence to these pro-

digies, whether weak or strong, as opposite to each other. When we believe any miracle of Mahomet, &c. we have for our warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians; and, on the other hand, we are to regard the testimony of all the witnesses, Grecians, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, in the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument is not different from the reasoning of a judge, who supposes, that the credit of two witnesses, maintaining a crime against any one, is destroyed by the testimony of two others, who affirm him to have been two hundred miles distant at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed.—* *

MIRACLES, THEIR PROOF AND TESTIMONY.—Suppose all authors, in all languages, agree, that from the first of January, 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people; that all travellers, who return from foreign countries, bringing us accounts of the same tradition, without the least variation or contradiction, it is evident, that our philosophers, instead of doubting that fact, ought to receive it for certain, and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and dissolution of nature, is an event rendered probable by so

many analogies, that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe, comes within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and uniform.—*Hume*.

MIRACLES, THEIR PROOF AND TESTIMONY.—A miracle is, in a particular fact, an immediate act of divine power, a sensible change in the order of nature, a real and visible exception to its laws. Such is the idea, from which we must not wander, if we would be understood in reasoning on this subject. Now this idea presents two queries, which it is necessary for us to resolve. The first is, Can the Deity work miracles? that is to say, Can he break through those laws which he hath established? To treat this question seriously would be impious, if not absurd: to punish the man who should resolve it in the negative, would be doing him too much honour; he should be confined to straw and a dark chamber. But then, who hath ever denied the power of the Deity to work miracles? A man must be a very Jew, to ask if God Almighty could spread a table in the wilderness?—The second question is, Would the Deity work miracles? This is another thing. This question, considered merely in itself, is perfectly indifferent. It by no means interests the glory of God, whose designs we cannot penetrate. I will go still further, and say, if there were any difference with regard to faith, in the manner of answering it, the highest ideas we can entertain of the wisdom and majesty of the Divine

Being would induce us to reply in the negative. It is nothing but human vanity that could object to it. Thus far can reason go, and no further. As for any thing else, this question is futile and frivolous; as, in order to resolve it, we ought to be able to read the eternal decrees of heaven; for, as we shall see presently, it is impossible to determine it by facts. These are mysteries; and so much respect is due to the Infinite Essence, as not to come to any determination about an object of which we know nothing but its immensity.—And yet when a mere mortal comes to us and boldly affirms that he has seen a miracle, he determines this great question at once. Judge, then, if he ought to be believed merely on his word.

It is gross sophistry to employ moral proofs to ascertain facts that are physically impossible; as in that case the very principle of credibility, founded on natural possibility, is in fault. Though men are willing, in such a cause, to admit of this proof in matters of mere speculation, or in regard to facts that are in nowise interesting, we may be assured they would be more difficult with respect to any thing that in the least affected their temporal interest. Let us suppose that a dead man should return to demand his estate and effects of his heirs, affirming that he is restored again to life, and requiring to be admitted to prove it. Is there a tribunal upon earth would grant him leave? But, not to enter into this controversy, we will admit the facts to have all

the certitude ascribed to them, and content ourselves with distinguishing between what is apparent to the sense, and what is deducible from reason.

As a miracle is an exception to the laws of nature, it is necessary, in order to enable us to judge of it, that we should be fully acquainted with those laws; and in order to judge of it with certainty, that we should be acquainted with them all. For if there should be but one we are ignorant of, it may, in some circumstances unknown to the spectators, alter the effect of those which may be known. Hence every one who takes upon him to say, that such or such an act is a miracle, declares himself to be perfectly acquainted with all the laws of nature, and that he knows this act to be an exception.

But where is the man who knows all the laws of nature? Newton himself never pretended to such knowledge. A sensible man, being witness to an unheard of act, may affirm that he saw such a fact, and we may believe him. But neither that sensible man nor any other sensible man upon earth, will take upon him to affirm, that such fact, how new and astonishing soever, is a miracle; for how can he know it?

The most that can be said in favour of a person who boasts his working miracles is, that he does things very extraordinary. But who will deny the possibility or reality of things very extraordinary?

New discoveries are daily made in the operations of nature, while human industry is hourly

proceeding towards perfection. The curious art of chemistry alone hath its transmutations, precipitations, detonations, explosions, its phosphorus, its earthquakes, and a thousand other wonders, to operate on the beholders.—With such instruments as cannon, the loadstone, the barometer, and optical instruments, what prodigies might not be worked among ignorant people? The Europeans have, in consequence of their arts, always passed for gods among the barbarians. And yet if, in the midst even of these arts, of sciences, colleges and academies; if, in the midst of Europe, in France, or in England, a person had started up, in the last century, armed with all those miracles of electricity which are now common to the meanest of our experimentalists, it is probable he would have been burnt for a sorcerer, or followed as a prophet.—The spectators of marvellous things are naturally led to cry them up with exaggeration. In deceiving others on this head, therefore, men may frequently, without ill intention, deceive themselves. When things are ever so little above our knowledge or comprehension, we are apt to think them above that of human reason in general; and the mind is at length induced to see a prodigy, where the heart is so strongly inclined to find one.

From what is here advanced, I conclude that mere facts, though ever so well attested and admissible in all their circumstances, serve to prove nothing; and that we may suspect an exaggeration

of their circumstances, without suspecting the sincerity of those who have related them. The discoveries which are daily making in the laws of nature, those which probably will be made hereafter, and those which may ever remain to be made; the past and present progress of human industry; the different bounds which people set to the impossible, according as they have more or less knowledge; all these things serve to prove that we are unacquainted with those bounds. And yet, in order to a miracle's being really such, it must surpass them. Whether there be truly any miracles or not, therefore, it is impossible for a wise man to be assured that any fact whatever is truly such.
—*Rousseau.*

MIRACLE, MYSTERY, AND PROPHECY, MEANS FOR IMPOSING ON MANKIND.—Miracle, mystery, and prophecy are the three means which have been employed in all ages, and perhaps in all countries, to impose upon mankind. The two first are incompatible with true religion, and the third ought always to be suspected.

With respect to mystery, every thing we behold is, in one sense, a mystery. We cannot account how it is that an acorn when put into the ground, is made to develop itself, and become an oak. We know not how it is that the seed we sow unfolds and multiplies itself, and returns to us such an abundant interest for so small a capital.

The fact, however, as distinct from the operating cause, is not a mystery, because we see it;

and we know also the means we are to use, which are no other than the putting the seed into the ground. We know therefore as much as is necessary for us to know; and that part of the operation that we do not know, and which if we did, we could not perform, the Creator takes upon himself and performs it for us.

But though every created thing is, in this sense, a mystery, the word mystery cannot be applied to moral truth, any more than obscurity can be applied to light. The God in whom we believe is a God of moral truth, and not a God of mystery or obscurity. Mystery is the enemy of truth. It is a fog of human invention that obscures and distorts truth. Truth never envelops itself in mystery; and the mystery in which it is at any time enveloped, is the work of its antagonist, and never of itself. Religion therefore, being the belief of a God, and the practice of moral truth, cannot have connexion with mystery. The belief of a God, so far from having any thing of mystery in it, is of all beliefs the most easy, because it arises to us, as before observed, out of necessity; and the practice of moral truth, or in other words, a practical imitation of the moral goodness of God, is no other than our acting towards each other benignly, as he acts towards all. We cannot serve God in the manner we serve those who cannot do without such service; and therefore, the only idea we can have of serving God is, that of contributing to the happiness of the

living creation that God has made. This cannot be done by retiring ourselves from the world, and spending a recluse life in selfish devotion.

The very nature and design of religion, if I may so express myself, prove, even to demonstration, that it must be free from mystery, and unincumbered with every thing that is mysterious. Religion considered as a duty, must be on a level to the understanding and comprehension of all. When men, whether from policy, or pious fraud, set up systems of religion, incompatible with the word or works of God in the creation, and not only above human comprehension, but repugnant to it, they were under the necessity of inventing or adopting a word that should serve as a bar to all questions, enquiries, and speculations. The word mystery answered this purpose; and thus it has happened, that religion, which in itself, is without mystery, has been corrupted into a fog of mysteries. As *mystery* answered all general purposes, *miracle* followed as an occasional auxiliary. The former served to bewilder the mind; the latter to puzzle the senses. The one was the lingo, the other the legerdemain. But before going farther into this subject, it will be proper to enquire what is to be understood by a miracle. In the same sense that every thing may be said to be a mystery, so also it may be said that every thing is a miracle, and that no one thing is a greater miracle than another. The elephant, though larger, is not a greater miracle

than the mite; nor a mountain a greater miracle than an atom. To an almighty power, it is no more difficult to make the one than the other, and no more difficult to make a million of worlds than to make one. Every thing therefore is, in one sense, a miracle; whilst in the other sense, there is no such thing as a miracle. When compared to our power and comprehension it is a miracle. When compared to the power that performs it, it is not a miracle. Of all the modes of evidence that ever were invented to obtain belief for any system or opinion, to which the name of religion has been given, that of *miracle*, however successful the imposition may have been, is the most inconsistent. For, in the first place, whenever recourse is had to *show*, for the purpose of procuring that belief, (for a miracle, under any idea of the word, is a *show*) it implies a lameness or weakness in the doctrine that is preached; *which, not being able to stand the test of reason, calls in the assistance of miracles to its support*. And in the second place, it is degrading the Almighty into a show-man, playing tricks to amuse, and make the people stare and wonder, instead of convincing them. In every point of view, in which those things called miracles, can be placed and considered, the reality of them is improbable, and their existence unnecessary. They would not answer any useful purpose, even if they were true; *for it is more difficult to obtain belief to a miracle, than to a principle evidently moral, with-*

out any miracle. Moral principle speaks universally for itself. Miracle can be but a thing of the moment, and seen but by a few. Instead therefore, of admitting the recitals of miracles as evidence of any system of religion being true, they ought to be considered as symptoms of its being fallacious. It is necessary to the character of truth, that it reject all adventitious aid, while it is the character of fable to seek the aid of which truth has no need. Thus much for mystery and miracle.

As mystery and miracle took charge of the past and the present, prophecy took charge of the future, and thus rounded the tenses of faith. It was not sufficient to know what had been done, but also what would be done. The supposed prophet was the supposed historian of times to come; and if he happened, in shooting with a long bow of a thousand years, to come within a thousand miles of the mark, the ingenuity of posterity would make it point-blank; and if he happened to be directly wrong, it was only to suppose, as in the cases of Jonas and of Ninevah, that God had *repented* himself, and changed his mind. What fools do fabulous systems of religion make of us!

If by a prophet we are to suppose a man to whom the Almighty communicated some event that would take place at a future period, either there were such men, or there were not. If there were, it is consistent to believe that the event so communicated, would be told in

terms that could be understood; and not related in such an obscure manner, as to be out of the comprehension of those that heard it, and withal, so equivocal, as to fit almost any circumstance that might happen afterwards. It is conceiving very irreverently of the Almighty, to suppose he would deal in this jesting manner with mankind: yet all the things called prophecies, come under this description. But it is with prophecy as it is with miracle. It could not answer the purpose even if it were read. Those to whom a prophecy was told, could not tell whether the man prophesied or lied—or, whether it had been revealed to him, or was a conceit of his own. A prophet, therefore, is a character useless and unnecessary; and the safe side of the case is, to guard against being imposed upon, by not giving credit to such stories.

Upon the whole, *mystery, miracle, and prophecy, are appendages that belong to fabulous, and not to true religion, which being founded on reason, has no need of their assistance.* They are the means by which religion has been made into a trade. The success of one impostor gave encouragement to another, and the quieting salvo of doing *some good* by keeping up a *pious fraud*, protected them from remorse. Besides, the trade was a profitable one; and every one knows that so long as there are gulls, there will be no want of persons to take advantage of their gullability.—P * *.

MIRACLES.—At a period, when faith could boast of numerous miraculous victories over death, it seems difficult to account for the scepticism of those philosophers who still rejected and derided the doctrine of the resurrection. A noble Grecian had rested upon this important ground, the whole controversy; and promised Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, that if he could be gratified with the sight of a single person who had been actually raised from the dead, he would immediately embrace the Christian religion. It is somewhat remarkable that the prelate of the first eastern church, however anxious for the conversion of his friend, thought proper to decline this fair and reasonable challenge.—*Gibbon.*

MORALITY AND RELIGION NOT THE SAME.—Morality and Religion are so generally confounded, that most people look upon them as synonymous terms, although, as we shall endeavour to shew, no two things can be more different. Religion consists in *faith* in certain doctrines, and in the observance of certain ceremonies. Thus we say, “the Christian religion, the Mahometan religion, the Hindoo religion;” meaning thereby, the different articles of faith, and the different rites and ceremonies of these respective *forms* of religion, of which the professors of each, think their own the only true one, and piously condemn all who differ from them to eternal damnation, for the glory of God. We do not say the Christian morality, the Mahometan morality, the Hindoo morality, for there is

only one kind of morality, and it consists in the practice of the social virtues, and may be all summed up in the precept of “Never doing to others that which we would not they should do unto us.” This is a simple, effectual, and safe rule of conduct; for no man willingly does any thing to injure himself; and as long as he follows this precept, he will never do any thing to injure others.

A man may be perfectly moral, and at the same time totally devoid of religion; while another may be excessively religious, without possessing one particle of morality! This sounds strange, but it is not the less true. For instance—Downright is a dutiful son, a good husband, and an affectionate father; he is kind to all who are dependent upon him, upright in all his dealings, punctual to his creditors, lenient to his debtors, bountiful to the needy, affable to all; in short, he is what Pope calls the noblest word of God—an honest man. But Downright never enters a church, nor is he hypocrite enough to say he believes things, which his reason tells him are not to be believed, because they are impossible.

Glosswell again, was disrespectful to his parents, and certainly hastened their deaths by his bad behaviour. He is surly to his wife, and often brutal towards his children. But Glosswell has prayers morning and evening in his family, says grace before and after meat; goes to church regularly twice every Sunday, repeats the responses aloud, and when he comes home,

can recapitulate all the heads of the sermon;—believes that the man-god Jesus was born of a *virgin*; that three make one, and one three—or, in other words, that three and one are sometimes the same;—that about four thousand years after the creation of the world, God the father sent God the son into it, in the shape of a man, to undergo all sorts of abusive treatment, and latterly, a painful and ignominious death, by which, mankind never were, some how or other, to be freed from the effects of a sin committed soon after the creation; which sin consisted in the eating of an apple, and for the eating of which apple, the all-bountiful creator had mildly condemned all mankind, though then unborn, to eternal punishment. All this, Glosswell devoutly believes, as well as all God's violations of his own laws, called *miracles*, together with all the dark and incomprehensible *mysteries* of the Christian faith.—without which, he thinks no man can be saved. With all this ample stock of *religion*, Glosswell has not one spark of *morality*: in his dealings, he never fails to take an advantage where he can do it with safety; he is a hard creditor, and sometimes pays his own creditors with a law-suit; he is fawning to his superiors, and insolent to his inferiors; in short, his only rule of action is to keep on the *windy side* of the law, and not to do any thing that will endanger his neck.

Well, Downright has a great deal of morality, and no religion; Glosswell has a great deal of

religion, and no morality. Certainly, then, religion and morality are not the same thing; and it would therefore be right, in future, to distinguish them from one another.—S.

MIRACLES, ESTABLISHED ONLY BY HUMAN TESTIMONY, NO PROOF OF THE DIVINE ORIGINAL OF ANY RELIGION.—If we extend our theology beyond the prospect of the universe, and the proper use of our faculties, we must have recourse to extraordinary means. These means cannot depend on the authority of men: for all men being of the same species, they have all the same natural means of knowledge, and one man is as likely to be deceived as another. Faith therefore must depend not on hearsay, but on proofs. The testimony, therefore, of mankind is, at the bottom, that of reason, and adds nothing to the natural means God hath given us for the discovery of truth. What can even the apostle of truth have to tell us, of which we are not still to judge? But *God himself* hath spoken: listen to the voice of revelation. But, *to whom hath he spoken?*—and how comes it that he hath appointed others to teach his word? There would have been much less risk of deception, if every individual had heard him speak, and this would have been no difficult matter to Omnipotence. It may be said, we are secure from deception by his manifesting the mission of his messengers by miracles.—Where are these miracles to be seen? Are they only related in books? Who wrote these books? Men. Who were witnesses of

these miracles? Men. Always human testimony! It is always men that tell us what other men have told them. What a number of these are constantly between us and the Deity! We are always reduced to the necessity of examining, comparing, and verifying such evidence.

This occasions a very intricate discussion, for which we stand in need of immense erudition. We must recur back to the earliest antiquity; we must examine, weigh, confront prophecies, revelations, facts, with all the monuments of faith that have made their appearance in all the countries of the world, to ascertain their time, place, authors, and occasions. There is great sagacity requisite to enable us to distinguish between pieces that are suppositious and those which are authentic; to compare objections with their replies, translations with their originals; to judge of the impartiality of witnesses, of their good sense, of their capacity; to know if nothing be suppressed or added to their testimony, if nothing be changed, transposed or falsified; to obviate the contradictions that remain; to judge what weight we ought to ascribe to the silence of our opponents, in regard to facts alleged against them; whether they did not disdain them too much to make any reply; whether books were common enough for ours to reach them; or if we were honest enough to let theirs have a free circulation among us, and to leave their strongest objections in full force.

Again, supposing all these mo-

numents acknowledged to be incontestable, we must proceed to examine the proofs of the mission of their authors. It would be necessary for us to be perfectly acquainted with the laws of chance, and the doctrine of probabilities, to judge what prediction could not be accomplished without a miracle; to know the genius of the original language, in order to distinguish what is predictive in these languages, and what is only figurative. It would be requisite for us to know what facts are agreeable to the established order of nature, and what are not so; to be able to say how far an artful man may not fascinate the eyes of the simple, and even astonish the most enlightened spectators; to know of what kind a miracle should be, and the authenticity it ought to bear, not only to claim our belief, but to make it criminal to doubt it; to compare the proofs of false and true miracles, and discover the certain means of distinguishing them; and, after all, to tell why the Deity should choose, in order to confirm the truth of his word, to make use of means which themselves require so much confirmation, as if he took delight in playing upon the credulity of mankind, and had purposely avoided the direct means to persuade them.

Suppose that the Divine Majesty hath really condescended to make man the organ of promulgating its sacred will; is it reasonable, is it just, to require all mankind to obey the voice of such a minister, without his making himself known to be such?

Where is the equity or propriety of furnishing him, for universal credentials, with only a few particular tokens displayed before a handful of obscure persons, and of which all the rest of mankind know nothing but hearsay? In every country in the world, if we should believe all the prodigies to be true which the common people, and the ignorant, affirm to have seen, every sect would be in the right; there would be more miraculous events than natural ones; and the greatest miracle of all would be to find that no miracles had happened where fanaticism had been persecuted. The Supreme Being is best displayed by the fixed and unalterable order of nature. Who is there will venture to determine how many eye-witnesses are necessary to render a miracle worthy of credit? If the miracles intended to prove the truth of a doctrine, stand themselves in need of proof, of what use are they? There might as well be none performed at all.

The most important examination, after all, remains to be made into the truth of the doctrines delivered; for as those who say that God is pleased to work these miracles, pretend that the devil sometimes imitates them, we are not a jot nearer than before, though such miracles should be ever so well attested. As the magicians of Pharaoh worked the same miracles, even in the presence of Moses; as he himself performed by the express command of God, why might not they, in his absence, from the same proofs, pretend to the same authority? Thus, after proving

the truth of the doctrine by the miracle, we are reduced to prove the truth of the miracle by that of the doctrine, lest the works of the devil should be mistaken for those of the Lord. The doctrines coming from God ought to bear the sacred characters of the Divinity; and should not only clear up those confused ideas which unenlightened reason excites in the mind, but should also furnish us with a system of religion and morals agreeable to those attributes by which only we form a conception of his essence.—*Rousseau.*

MIRACLES, THE PASSION OF SURPRISE AND WONDER FAVOURABLE TO. — The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of those events from which it is derived.—With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received; their descriptions of sea and land monsters, &c.? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality. What greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? If, by the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of himself, and entered seriously into the delusion; who ever scruples to make use of pious frauds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause? The smallest spark may here kindle

into the greatest flame. The gazing multitude receive greedily without examination, whatever soothes superstition, and promotes wonder.

His auditors may not have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence: what judgment they have, they renounce by principle; or if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. Their credulity increases his impudence; and his impudence overpowers their credulity. The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies, and supernatural events, which, in all ages, have either been detected by contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous; and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of this kind. We judge, therefore, in conformity to experience and observation, when we account for them by the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And shall we, rather than have recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous violation of all the laws of nature?—*Hume.*

MIRACLES ABOUND IN IGNORANT AND BARBAROUS AGES.—It forms a very strong presumption against all miraculous relations, that they are observed to abound chiefly among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them, that people will be found to

have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority, which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into a new world. Pestilences, famines, death, &c. are never the effects of those natural causes which we experience. Prophecies, omens, oracles, judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them. But as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind towards the marvellous; and that though this inclination may at intervals receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

The advantages are so great of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that, even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generality of them, (which, though seldom, is sometimes the case) it has a much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have large enough correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority, to contradict and beat

down the delusion. Mens' inclination to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself. And thus a story, which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started, shall pass for certain at a thousand miles distance.—*Hume.*

MIRACLES CAN NEVER BE PROVED BY HUMAN TESTIMONY, SO AS TO BE THE FOUNDATION OF A SYSTEM OF RELIGION.—If a miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion, men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of this kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat; and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without further examination. Though the being to whom the miracle is ascribed be almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation; and obliges us to compare the instances of the violations of truth in the testimony of men, with those of the violations of the laws of nature by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely or probable. As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact, this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a reso-

lution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretext it may be covered.—*Hume.*

MONKS, PRINCIPLES OF THE, NOT A PROPER STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.—Among the different principles adopted as a standard of right and wrong, is the principle of the monks; or, as it is more frequently called, the *ascetic* principle, or *asceticism*; a term from a Greek word which signifies *exercise*. The practices by which the monks sought to distinguish themselves from other men, were called their exercises. These exercises consisted in so many contrivances they had for tormenting themselves. By this they thought to ingratiate themselves with the Deity. For the Deity, said they, is a Being of infinite benevolence: now a Being of the most ordinary benevolence is pleased to see others make themselves as happy as they can; therefore to make ourselves, as unhappy as we can is the way to please the Deity. If any body asked them, What motive they could find for doing all this? Oh! said they, you are not to imagine that we are punishing ourselves for nothing: we know very well what we are about. You are to know, that for every grain of pain it costs us now, we are to have a hundred grains of pleasure by and by. The case is, that God loves to see us torment ourselves at present; indeed he has as good as told us so. But this is done only to try us, in order just to see how we should behave; which it is plain he could not know, without

making the experiment. Now, then, from the satisfaction it gives him to see us make ourselves as unhappy as we can make ourselves in this present life, we have a sure proof of the satisfaction it will give him to see us as happy as he can make us in a life to come.

By the principle of *asceticism* therefore is meant, that principle, which, like the principle of *utility*, approves or disapproves of any action, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question; but in an inverse manner—approving of actions in as far as they tend to diminish his happiness; disapproving of them in as far as they tend to augment it. It is evident that any one who reprobates any the least particle of pleasure, as such, from whatever source derived, is *pro tanto* a partizan of the principle of asceticism. It is only upon that principle, and not from the principle of utility, that the most abominable pleasure which the vilest of malefactors ever reaped from his crime would be to be reprobated, if it stood alone. The case is, that it never does stand alone; but is necessarily followed by such a quantity of pain, (or, what comes to the same thing, such a chance for a certain quantity of pain) that the pleasure, in comparison of it, is as nothing: and this is the true and sole, but perfectly sufficient reason for making it a ground for punishment.

There are two classes of men of very different complexions,

by whom the principle of asceticism appears to have been embraced: the one a set of moralists; the other a set of religionists. Different accordingly have been the motives which appear to have recommended it to the notice of these different parties. Hope; that is, the prospect of pleasure, seems to have animated the former: hope, the aliment of philosophic pride; the hope of honour and reputation at the hands of men. Fear, that is, the prospect of pain, the latter: fear, the offspring of superstitious fancy; the fear of future punishment at the hands of a splenetic and revengeful Deity. I say, in this case, fear; for of the invisible future, fear is more powerful than hope. These circumstances characterize the two different parties among the partizans of the principle of asceticism; the parties and their motives different—the principle the same.

The religious party, however, appear to have carried it further than the philosophical they have acted more consistently, and less wisely. The philosophical party have scarcely gone further than to reprobate pleasure; the religious party have frequently gone so far as to make it a matter of merit and of duty to court pain. The philosophical party have hardly gone further than the making pain a matter of indifference. It is no evil, they have said: they have not said, it is a good. They have not so much as reprobated all pleasure in the lump. They have discarded only what they have called the gross: that is, such as

are organical, or of which the origin is easily traced up to such as are organical, they have even cherished and magnified the refined. Yet this, however, not under the name of pleasure: to cleanse itself from the sordes of its impure original, it was necessary it should change its name; the honourable, the glorious, the reputable, the becoming, the *honestum*, the *decorum*, it was to be called; in short, any thing but pleasure.

From these two sources have flowed the doctrines from which the sentiments of the bulk of mankind have all along received a tincture of this principle; some from the philosophical, some from the religious, some from both. Men of education more frequently from the philosophical, as more suited to the elevation of their sentiments; the vulgar more frequently from the superstitious, as more suited to the narrowness of their intellect; undiluted by knowledge; and to the abjectness of their condition, continually open to the attacks of fear. The tinctures, however, derived from the two sources would naturally intermingle, insomuch, that a man would not always know by which of them he was most influenced; and they would often serve to corroborate and enliven one another. It was this conformity that made a kind of alliance between parties of a complexion otherwise so dissimilar; and disposed them to unite, upon various occasions, against the common enemy, the partizan of the principle of utility, whom they joined in

branding with the odious name of Epicurean.

The principle of asceticism, however, with whatever warmth it may have been embraced by its partizans as a rule of private conduct, seems not to have been carried to any considerable length when applied to the business of government. In a few instances it has been carried a little way by the philosophical party; witness the Spartan regimen. Though then, perhaps, it may be considered as having been a measure of security; and an application, though a precipitate and perverse application of the principle of utility. Scarcely in any instances, to any considerable length, by the religious: for the various monastic orders, and the societies of the Quakers, Dumplers, Moravians, and other religionists, have been free societies, whose regimen no man has been stricted to without the intervention of his own consent. Whatever merit a man may have thought there would be in making himself miserable, no such notion seems ever to have occurred to any of them, that it may be a merit, much less a duty, to make others miserable; although it should seem, that if a certain quantity of misery were a thing so desirable, it would not matter much whether it were brought by each man upon himself, or by one man upon another. It is true, that from the same source from whence, among the religionists, the attachment to the principle of asceticism took its rise, flowed other doctrines and practices, from which misery in abundance was produced in

one man by the instrumentality of another; witness the holy wars, and the persecutions for religion. But the passion for producing misery in these cases proceeded upon some special ground; the exercise of it was confined to persons of particular descriptions; they were tormented, not as men, but as heretics and infidels. To have inflicted the same miseries on their fellow-believers and fellow-sectaries, would have been as blameable in the eyes even of these religionists, as in those of a partizan of the principle of utility.—For a man to give himself a certain number of stripes was indeed meritorious; but to give the same number of stripes to another man, not consenting, would have been a sin. We read of saints who for the good of their souls, and the mortification of their bodies, have voluntarily yielded themselves a prey to vermin; but though many persons of this class have wielded the reins of empire, we read of none who have set themselves to work, and made laws on purpose, with a view of stocking the body politic with the breed of highwaymen, housebreakers, or incendiaries. If at any time they have suffered the nation to be preyed upon by swarms of idle pensioners, or useless placemen, it has rather been from negligence and imbecillity, than from any settled plan for oppressing and plundering of the people. If at any time they have sapped the sources of national wealth, by cramping commerce, and driving the inhabitants into emigration, it has been with other views, and

in pursuit of other ends. If they have declaimed against the pursuit of pleasure, and the use of wealth, they have commonly stopped at declamation; they have not, like Lycurgus, made express ordinances for the purpose of banishing the precious metals. If they have established idleness by law, it has been, not because idleness, the mother of vice and misery, is itself a virtue, but because idleness (say they) is the road to holiness. If under the notion of fasting, they have joined in the plan of confining their subjects to a diet, thought by some to be of the most nourishing and prolific nature, it has been not for the sake of making them tributaries to the nations by whom that diet was to be supplied, but for the sake of manifesting their own power, and exercising the obedience of the people. If they have established, or suffered to be established, punishments for the breach of celibacy, they have done no more than comply with the petitions of those deluded rigorists, who, dupes to the ambitious and deep-laid policy of their rulers, first laid themselves under that idle obligation by a vow.

The principle of asceticism seems originally to have been the reverie of certain hasty speculators, who having perceived, or fancied, that certain pleasures, when reaped in certain circumstances, have, at the long run, been attended with pains more than equivalent to them, took occasion to quarrel with every thing that offered itself under the name of pleasure. Having then got thus far, and having

forgot the point which they set out from, they pushed on, and went so much further as to think it meritorious to fall in love with pain. Even this, we see, is at bottom but the principle of utility misapplied.

The principle of utility is capable of being consistently pursued; and it is but tautology to say, that the more consistently it is pursued, the better it must ever be for human-kind. The principle of asceticism never was, nor ever can be, consistently pursued by any living creature. Let but one tenth part of the inhabitants of this earth pursue it consistently, and in a day's time they will have turned it into a hell. *See the article RIGHT and WRONG.—J. Bentham.*

MORALITY.—The truths of morality, like all other truths, are discovered only by trials and experiments. The principles of moral conduct would be totally insignificant if they did not lead to some ends; and if a certain manner of exercising our faculties, a certain manner of acting, had not been found, by repeated experiments, to have made us happy, and a different manner to have made us unhappy, we should never have had any principles of morals. This science, therefore, which, under its own name, but more especially under that of religion, has been considered as a matter of mere speculation, and abounding with doubts and uncertainties and difficulties, is as plain and as clear as geometry; it depends on facts, which cannot easily be mistaken, because the whole world is collecting and observing them; and it has this

advantage over other sciences, that all men have an equal interest in the success of their inquiries.—*Williams.*

MORAL RULES, THE ORIGIN OF.—

The rules of morality are ultimately founded on experience of what, in particular instances, our moral faculties, our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve or disapprove of. We do not originally approve or condemn particular actions, because, upon examination, they appear to be agreeable or inconsistent with a certain general rule. The general rule, on the contrary, is formed, by finding from experience, that all actions of a certain kind, or circumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or disapproved of.

To the man who first saw an inhuman murder, committed from avarice, envy, or unjust resentment, and upon one too who loved and trusted the murderer; who beheld the last agonies of the dying person; who heard him with his expiring breath complain more of the perfidy and ingratitude of his false friend, than of the violence which had been done to him; there could be no occasion, in order to conceive how horrible such an action was, that he should reflect that one of the most sacred rules of conduct was what prohibited the taking away the life of an innocent person; that this was a plain violation of that rule, and consequently a very blameable action. His detestation of this crime, it is evident, would arise instantaneously, and antecedent to his having formed to himself any such general rule. The gene-

ral rule, on the contrary, which he might afterwards form, would be founded upon the detestation which he felt necessarily arise in his own breast at the thought of this and every other particular action of the same kind. When we read in history, or romance, the account of actions, either of generosity or of baseness, the admiration which we conceive for the one, and the contempt which we feel for the other, neither of them arise from reflecting that there are certain general rules which declare all actions of the one kind admirable, and all actions of the other contemptible. Those general rules, on the contrary, are all formed from the experience we have had of the effects which actions of all different kinds naturally produce upon us. An amiable action, a respectable action, an horrid action, are all of them actions which naturally excite the love, the respect, or the horror of the spectator, for the person who performs them. The general rules which determine what actions are, and what are not the objects of each of those sentiments, can be formed no other way than by observing what actions actually and in fact excite them. When these general rules indeed have been formed, and when they are universally acknowledged and established by the concurring sentiments of mankind, we frequently appeal to them, as to the standards of judgment, in debating concerning the degree of praise or blame that is due to certain actions of a complicated and dubious nature. They are

upon these occasions commonly cited as the ultimate foundations of what is just or unjust in human conduct; and this circumstance seems to have misled several eminent authors to draw up their systems in such a manner, as if they had supposed that the original judgments of mankind, with regard to right or wrong, were formed, like the decisions of a court of judicatory, by considering, first, the general rule; and then, secondly, whether the particular action under consideration fell properly within its comprehension. *See the article RIGHT and WRONG.—A. Smith.*

MORALS, IN DIFFERENT CLIMATES, GENERAL STATE OF.—In point of morality in general, it is agreed, that the manners of cold climates far exceed those of warm; in the latter, the passions are naturally very strong, and likewise kept in a perpetual state of irritation from the high degree of sensibility that prevails, which causes a great multiplication of crimes, by multiplying the objects of temptation. Many desires and passions arise there, from causes that would either never occur in a cold climate, or be easily resisted; but in a warm one the passion or inclination is stronger, and the power of restraint less. In cold climates, the desires are but few in comparison, and not often of a very immoral kind; and those repressed with less difficulty, as they are seldom very violent. In temperate climates, the passions are in a middle state, and generally inconstant in their nature; sufficiently strong, however, to

furnish motives for action, though not so powerful as to admit of no restraints from considerations of prudence, justice, or religion.—*Falconer.*

MORAL OBLIGATION, THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF.—Every person feels a gleam of pleasure the moment that light is introduced into a dark room; and disagreeable sensations, tending to melancholy, and sometimes verging towards the borders of terror, upon passing suddenly from a light into a perfectly dark place. These feelings are instantaneous and constant, and to appearance *simple*, yet they are unquestionably the offspring of association, but formed by a thousand sensations and ideas, which it is impossible to analyse or separate; and they vary exceedingly in different persons, especially according to the circumstances of their early lives.

The ideas annexed to the words *moral right* and *wrong* are likewise far from being simple in reality; though the association of their parts has become so intimate and perfect in a long course of time, that, upon first naming them, they present that appearance. So the motion of the head, and of any particular limb, may seem to be a very simple thing, though a great number of muscles are employed to perform it.

The first rudiments of the ideas of *right*, *wrong*, and *obligation*, seem to be acquired by a child when he finds himself checked and controuled by a superior power. At first, he feels nothing but mere force; and consequently he has no idea of any kind of

restraint but that of mere necessity. He finds he cannot have his will, and therefore he submits. Afterwards, he attends to many circumstances, which distinguish the authority of a father or of a master from that of other persons. Ideas of reverence, love, esteem, dependence, accompany those commands; and, by degrees, he experiences the peculiar advantages of filial subjection. He sees also, that all his companions, who are noticed and admired by others, obey their parents—and that those who are of a refractory disposition are universally disliked.

These, and other circumstances now begin to alter and modify the idea of mere necessity, till by degrees he considers the commands of a parent as something that must not be resisted or disputed, even though he has a power of doing it; and all these ideas coalescing, form the ideas of moral right and moral obligation, which are easily transferred from the commands of a parent to those of a magistrate, of God, and of conscience. It is plainly apparent to every person who has attended to the ideas of children, that their ideas of moral right and moral obligation are formed very gradually and slowly, from a long train of circumstances, and that it is a considerable time before they become at all distinct and perfect.

This opinion of the gradual formation of the ideas of moral right and wrong from a great variety of elements, easily accounts for that prodigious diversity in the sentiments of mankind respecting the objects of moral

obligation; and they seem unaccountable on any other hypothesis. If the idea of moral obligation was a simple idea, arising from the view of certain actions or sentiments, why should it not be as invariable as the perception of colours and sounds? But though the shape and colour of a flower appear the same to every human eye, one man practises as a moral duty what another looks upon with abhorrence, and reflects upon with remorse. Now a thing that varies with education and instruction, as moral sentiments are known to do, certainly has the appearance of being generated by a series of different impressions, in the manner here described.

The most shocking crimes that men can commit are those of *injustice* and *murder*; and yet it is hardly possible to define any circumstances in which some part of mankind have not, without the least scruple or remorse, seized the property, or taken away the lives of others: so that the definition of these crimes must vary in almost every country. Now, an idea, or feeling, that depends upon arbitrary definition, cannot be, properly speaking, natural, but must be fictitious.

A crime the least liable to variation in its definition, is that of a lie; and yet a child will, upon the slightest temptation, tell an untruth as readily as the truth; that is, as soon as he can suspect that it will be to his advantage; and the dread that he afterwards has of telling a lie is acquired principally by his being threatened, punished, and terrified by

those who detect him in it; till at length a number of painful impressions are annexed to the telling of an untruth, and he comes even to shudder at the thought of it. But where this care has not been taken, such a facility in telling lies, and such an indifference to truth, are acquired, as is hardly credible to persons who have been differently educated.

But whether the feelings which accompany the ideas of virtue and vice be instinctive or acquired, their operation is the very same; so that the interests of virtue may be equally secured on this scheme as on any other. There is a sufficient provision in the course of our lives to generate moral principles, sentiments, and feelings, in the degree in which they are wanted in life; and with those variations, with respect to modes and other circumstances, which we see in different ages and countries, and which the different circumstances of mankind, in different ages and countries, seem to require.—*Priestley.*

MORAL RULES, AND SENSE OF DUTY.—The regard to the general rules of morality is what is properly called a sense of duty; a principle of the greatest consequence in human life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are capable of directing their actions. There is scarce any man who, by discipline, education, and example, may not be so impressed with a regard to these general rules of conduct, as to act upon almost every occasion with tolerable decency, and through the whole

of his life avoid any tolerable degree of blame. Without this sacred regard to the general rules of morality, there is no man whose conduct can be much depended upon. It is this which constitutes the most essential difference between a man of principle and honour, and a worthless fellow. The one adheres, on all occasions, steadily and resolutely to his maxims, and preserves through the whole of his life one even tenor of conduct. The other acts variously and accidentally, as humour, inclination, or interest, chance to be uppermost. Nay, such are the inequalities of humour to which all men are subject, that without this principle, the man who, in all his cool hours, had the most delicate sensibility to the propriety of conduct, might often be led to act absurdly upon the most frivolous occasions, and when it was scarcely possible to assign any serious motive for his behaving in this manner. Upon the tolerable observance of these rules depends the very existence of human society, which would crumble into nothing if mankind were not generally impressed with a reverence for those important rules of conduct. False notions of religion are almost the only causes which can occasion any very gross perversion of the general rules of morality; and that principle, which ought to give the greatest authority to the rules of duty, is alone capable of distorting our ideas of them in any considerable degree. In all other cases, common sense is sufficient to direct us, if not to the most exquisite propriety of

conduct, yet to something which is not very far from it; and provided we are in earnest desirous to do well, our behaviour will always, upon the whole, be praise-worthy. But wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of some worthless cabal—wherever the first duty which it requires is to fulfil all the obligations of morality—wherever men are not taught to regard frivolous observances as more immediate duties of religion than acts of justice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by sacrifices and ceremonies, and vain supplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, and perfidy, and violence; it establishes and confirms the general rules of morality.—*A. Smith.*

MORAL SENSE.—The moral sense is formed by time and experience, and not born with us. So are all the natural senses, not one of which is born with us; they are all created—some instantaneously—some in a little time—some in a long time—but all by experience. The moral sense differs from a natural one, as much as the effect of reflection differs from simple feeling. But the conformation given by nature and education may be so exquisitely just in some men, that they may be said to judge of actions and principles by a kind of instantaneous sensation, which may be very properly called a moral sense. The eye, as a sense, is formed by the experience of many years: but when it is formed, it judges of distances and magnitude, of beauty

and deformity, apparently by an immediate sensation; but in fact by a process which is the effect of experience.

The mind is in the same state as to morals: it has judged of causes by effects, on all material occasions: it has so associated virtue with pleasure, and vice with pain, that when the actions and principles under those denominations present themselves, they seem to act on the mere sense, not as virtues or vices, but as pleasures or pains. The present fashionable affectation of sentiment arises from the same cause. Persons whose organization is just, perfect, and delicate, are susceptible of very lively impressions, from those principles and actions which experience has taught them to be good or bad. When they present themselves again, the associated ideas of pleasure or pain immediately present themselves; and before any judgment can be made, that is, before those circumstances, which have been often and sufficiently examined, can undergo a second examination. In time, they forget that experience and reason had any share in classing the virtues and vices—and finding this moral intelligent sensibility seldom err, they refer every thing to it; so that we very commonly hear people say, "We act from our feelings—or, we judge of men and things according as they excite our sensibility.—*Williams.*

MORAL SYSTEMS.—If there is an universal system of morality, it cannot be the effect of a particular cause. It has been the same in

past ages, and it will continue the same in future times; it cannot then be grounded on religious opinions, which, ever since the beginning of the world, and from one pole to the other, have continually varied. Greece had vicious deities—the Romans had them likewise: the senseless worshipper of the Fetiche adores rather a Devil than a God.—Every people made gods for themselves, and gave them such attributes as they pleased: to some they ascribed a goodness, to others cruelty; to some immorality; to others the greatest sanctity and severity of manners. One would imagine that every nation intended to deify its own passions and opinions. Notwithstanding that diversity in religious systems and modes of worship, all nations have perceived that men ought to be just; they have all honoured as virtues, goodness, pity, friendship, fidelity, paternal tenderness, filial respect, sincerity, gratitude, patriotism; in short, all those sentiments that can be considered as so many ties adapted to unite men more closely to one another. The origin of that uniformity of judgment, so constant, so general, ought not then to be looked for in the midst of contradictory and fluctuating opinions. If the ministers of religion have appeared to think otherwise, it is because by their system they were enabled to regulate all the actions of mankind; to dispose of their fortunes, and command their wills; and to secure to themselves, in the name of heaven, the arbitrary government of the world.—The veil is now re-

moved. At the tribunal of philosophy and reason, morality is a science whose object is the preservation and common happiness of the human species. To this double end all its rules ought to tend. Their natural, constant, eternal principle is in man himself, and in a resemblance there is in the general organization of man; which includes a similarity of wants, of pleasures and pains, of force and weakness; a resemblance, from whence arises the necessity of society, or of a common opposition against such dangers as are equally incident to each individual, which proceed from nature herself, and threaten man on all sides. Such is the origin of particular duties and of domestic virtues; such is the origin of general duties and public virtues; such is the source of the notion of personal and public utility; the source of all compacts between individuals, and of all laws of government.—Several writers have endeavoured to trace the first principles of morality in the sentiments of friendship, tenderness, compassion, honour, and benevolence; because they found them engraved on the human heart: But did they not also find there hatred, jealousy, revenge, pride, and the love of dominion? For what reason, therefore, have they founded morality on the former principles, rather than on the latter; It is because they found that the former were of general advantage to society, and the others fatal to it. The very sentiments which these philosophers adopted as the ground-

work of morality, because they appear to be serviceable to the common good, if left to themselves would be very predudicial to it. How can we determine to punish the guilty, if we listen only to the pleas of compassion?—How shall we guard against partiality, if we consult only the dictates of friendship?—How shall we avoid being favourable to idleness, if we attend only to the sentiments of benevolence? All these virtues have their limits, beyond which they degenerate into vices: and those limits are settled by the invariable rules of essential justice; or, which is the same thing, by the common interests of men united together in society, and the constant object of that union.

These limits, it is true, have not yet been ascertained; nor indeed could they, since it has not been possible to fix what the common interest itself was. And this is the reason why among all people, and at all times, men have formed such different ideas of virtue and vice; why hitherto morality has appeared to be but a matter of mere convention among men. That so many ages should have passed away in an entire ignorance of the first principles of a science so important to our happiness, is a certain fact; but so extraordinary, that it should appear incredible. We cannot imagine how it has not been sooner discovered, that the uniting of men in society has not, and indeed could not have, any other design but the general happiness of individuals; and therefore, that there is not, and can-

not be, any other social tie between them than that of their common interest; and that nothing can be consistent with the order of societies, unless it be consistent with the common utility of the members that compose them: that it is this principle which necessarily determines virtue and vice; and that our actions are consequently more or less virtuous, according as they tend more or less to the common advantage of society; that they are more or less vicious, according as the prejudice, society receives from them, is greater or less.

Is it on its own account that valour is ranked among the number of virtues? No: it is on account of the service it is of to society. This is evident from hence, that it is punished as a crime in a man whom it causes to disturb the public peace.—Why then is drunkenness a vice? Because every man is bound to contribute to the common good; and to fulfil that obligation, he has occasion for the free exercise of his faculties. Why are certain vices more blameable in a magistrate than in a private man? Because greater inconveniences result from them to society.

As society ought to be beneficial to every one of its members, it is but just that each of its members should contribute to the advantage of society. To be virtuous, therefore, is to be useful; to be vicious, is to be useless or hurtful. This is morality. This, indeed, is universal morality. That morality which, being connected with the nature of man, is connected with the

nature of society; that morality which can vary only in its application, but never in its essence: that morality, in short, to which all law should refer, and to which they should be subordinate.—*Raynal.*

MORALITY, THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF, AND THEIR INFLUENCE.—In every civilized society—in every society where the distinction of ranks has once been completely established, there have been always two different schemes or systems of morality current at the same time: of which the one may be called the *strict* or *austere*; the other the *liberal*, or, if you will, the *loose* system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common people: the latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are called people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour, seems to constitute the principal distinction between those two opposite schemes or systems. In the liberal or loose system, luxury, wanton and even disorderly mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of chastity, at least in one of the two sexes, &c. provided they are not accompanied with gross indecency, and do not lead to falsehood or injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are easily either excused or pardoned altogether. In the austere system, on the contrary, those ex-

cesses are regarded with the utmost abhorrence and detestation. The vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people; and a single week's thoughtlessness and dissipation is often sufficient to undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him, through despair, upon committing the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort of the common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and detestation of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so immediately fatal to people of their condition. The disorder and extravagance of several years, on the contrary, will not always ruin a man of fashion; and people of that rank are very apt to consider the power of indulging in some degree of excess as one of the advantages of their fortune; and the liberty of doing so without censure or reproach, as one of the privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station, therefore, they regard such excesses with but a small degree of disapprobation, and censure them very slightly, or not at all.

Almost all religious sects have begun among the common people, from whom they have generally drawn their earliest, as well as their most numerous proselytes. The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been adopted by those sects almost constantly, or with very few exceptions; for there have been some. It was the system by which they could best recommend themselves to that order of people to whom they first pro-

posed their plan of reformation upon what had been established. Many of them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain credit by refining upon this austere system, and by carrying it to some degree of folly and extravagance; and this excessive rigour has frequently recommended them more than any thing else to the respect and veneration of the common people.

A man of rank and fortune is by his station a distinguished member of a great society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby oblige him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and consideration depend very much upon the respect which this society bears to him. He dare not do any thing which would disgrace or discredit him in it; and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that species of morals, whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on the contrary, is far from being a distinguished member of any great society. While he remains in a country village, his conduct may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this situation only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as he comes into a great city, he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct is observed and attended to by nobody; and he is therefore very likely to neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low

profligacy and vice. He never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct never excites so much the attention of any respectable society, as by his becoming the member of a small religious sect. He from that moment acquires a degree of consideration which he never had before. All his brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe his conduct; and if he gives occasion for any scandal, if he deviates very much from those austere morals which they almost always require of one another, they punish him by what is always a very severe punishment, even where no civil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication from the sect. In little religious sects, accordingly, the morals of the common people have been almost always remarkably regular and orderly; generally much more so than in the established church. The morals of those little sects, indeed, have frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial.

There are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint operation the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unsocial or disagreeably rigorous in the morals of all the little sects into which the country was divided.

The first of those remedies is the study of science and philosophy, which the state might render almost universal among all people of middling or more than middling rank and fortune; not by giving salaries to teachers in order to make them negligent and idle, but by instituting

some sort of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone by every person before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession, or before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office of trust or profit. If the state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trouble about providing them with proper teachers. They would soon find better teachers for themselves than any whom the state could provide for them.—Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks could not be much exposed to it.

The second of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public diversions. The state, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire liberty to all those who for their own interest would attempt, without scandal or indecency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, music, dancing, by all sorts of dramatic representations and exhibitions, would easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and gloomy humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and enthusiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread and hatred, to all the fanatical promoters of those popular frenzies. The gaiety and good-humour which those diversions inspire were altogether inconsistent with that temper of mind, which was fittest for their pur-

pose, or which they could best work upon. Dramatic representations, besides, frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and sometimes even to public execration, were upon that account, more than all other diversions; the objects of their peculiar abhorrence.

In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more than those of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should have any particular or immediate dependency upon the sovereign or executive power: or that he should have any thing to do, either in appointing, or in dismissing them from their offices. In such a situation he would have no occasion to give himself any concern about them, further than to keep the peace among them, in the same manner as among the rest of his subjects; that is, to hinder them from persecuting, abusing, or oppressing one another. But it is quite otherwise in countries where there is an established or governing religion. The sovereign can in this case never be secure, unless he has the means of influencing in a considerable degree the greater part of the teachers of that religion.

The clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation. They can act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan, and with one spirit, as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they are frequently too under such direction. Their interest as an incorporated body is never the same with that of

the sovereign, and is sometimes directly opposite to it. Their great interest is to maintain their authority with the people; and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the supposed necessity of adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith, in order to avoid eternal misery. Should the sovereign have the imprudence to appear either to deride or doubt himself of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or from humanity attempt to protect those who did either the one or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy, who have no sort of dependency upon him, is immediately provoked to proscribe him as a profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion in order to oblige the people to transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient prince. Should he oppose any of their pretensions, or usurpations, the danger is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel against the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been charged too with the additional crime of heresy, notwithstanding their solemn protestations of their faith and humble submission to every tenet which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the authority of religion is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests conquer all other fears. When the authorised teachers of religion propagate through the great body of the people doctrines subver-

sive of the authority of the sovereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that he can maintain his authority. Even a standing army cannot in this case give him any lasting security; because if the soldiers are not foreigners, which can seldom be the case, but drawn from the great body of the people, which must almost always be the case, they are likely to be soon corrupted by those very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually occasioning at Constantinople, as long as the eastern empire subsisted; the convulsions which, during the course of several centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning in every part of Europe; sufficiently demonstrate how precarious and insecure must always be the situation of the sovereign who has no proper means of influencing the clergy of the established and governing religion of his country.

Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who, though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to be so for instructing the people. With regard to such matters, therefore, his authority can seldom be sufficient to counterbalance the united authority of the clergy of the established church. The public tranquillity, however, and his own security, may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may think

proper to propagate concerning such matters. As he can seldom directly oppose their decision, therefore, with proper weight and authority, it is necessary that he should be able to influence it; and he can influence it only by the fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater part of the individuals of the order. Those fears and expectations may consist in the fear of deprivation or other punishment, and in the expectation of further preferment.—*A. Smith.*

MORAL VIRTUE, THE PRINCIPLE OF.—Men are no more to be told what they must believe, and how they must act, than an instrument is to be told what harmony it is to afford. The thoughts and actions of a man result from his construction, as harmony does from that of an instrument.—That construction is good or evil, and will lead to virtue or vice, according as he has been originally formed by nature; according as he has been tempered in his childhood; according as he has been educated in his youth; and according to the company and friends he has been connected with. This organization of the mind, or this moral constitution, is the true principle of human actions.—When this is right, truly or nobly, or delicately harmonized; virtues of a noble or of an amiable aspect, and every species of genuine happiness, will be the effects. When this is wrong, when it is defective or disarranged, the effect is vice; and no precepts, no instructions, no doctrines from heaven or hell, will make dissonance harmony.

darkness light, or vice to be virtue. If a god had descended, and told the world, in a language to be understood from pole to pole, This you are to believe, and thus you are to act:—What would have been the consequence? Exactly what we see to be the consequence in the Christian world, where every true believer is thoroughly persuaded that God Almighty came from heaven; laid down in his gospel every thing necessary to be believed and practised, in order to bear things patiently here, and to be everlastingly happy hereafter. And are men the wiser, or the better? We must be thoroughly blinded by prejudice, and extremely ignorant of history, to say they are.—*Williams.*

NATIONAL CHARACTERS.--Different reasons are assigned for national characters: some account for them from *moral*, and others from *physical* causes. By moral causes we may understand all circumstances which are fitted to work on the mind as motives or reasons, and which render a peculiar set of manners habitual to us. Of this kind are the nature of governments, the revolutions of public affairs, the plenty or penury in which the people live, the situation of the nation with regard to its neighbours, and such like circumstances. By physical causes we may understand those qualities of the air and climate which are supposed to work insensibly on the temper, by altering the tone and habit of the body, and giving a particular complexion, which, though reflection and reason

may sometimes overcome it, yet it will prevail among the generality of mankind, and have an influence on their manners.—That the character of a nation will depend much on moral causes, is evident to every observer; since a nation is nothing but a collection of individuals, and the manners of individuals are frequently determined by these causes. As poverty and hard labour debase the minds of the common people, and render them unfit for any science or ingenious profession; so where any government becomes very oppressive to all its subjects, it has a proportional effect on their temper and genius, and banishes all the liberal arts from among them.

As to *physical* causes, their operation is doubtful; in this particular, men seem to owe nothing of their temper or genius to the air, food, or climate. The contrary opinion seems, at first sight, probable; since we find those circumstances have an influence over every other animal. The human mind is of a very imitative nature; nor is it possible for any set of men to converse often together, without acquiring a similitude of manners, and communicating to each other their vices as well as virtues. Where a number of men are united into one political body, the occasions of their intercourse must be so frequent, for defence, commerce, and government, that, together with the same speech or language, they must acquire resemblance in their manners, and have a common and national cha-

racter, as well as a personal one, peculiar to each individual. Now, though nature produces all kinds of temper and understanding in great abundance, it follows not that she always produces them in like proportions, and that in every society the ingredients of industry and indolence, valour and cowardice, humanity and brutality, wisdom and folly, will be mixed after the same manner. In the infancy of society, if any of these dispositions be found in greater abundance than the rest, it will naturally prevail in the composition, and give a tincture to the national character. If, on the first establishment of a republic, a Brutus should be placed in authority, and be transported with such an enthusiasm for liberty, as to overlook all the ties of nature as well as private interest, such an example will naturally have an effect on the whole society, and kindle the same passion in every bosom. Whatever it be that forms the manners of one generation, the next must imbibe a deeper tincture of the same die; men being more susceptible of all impressions during infancy, and retaining these impressions as long as they remain in the world. All national characters, where they depend not on fixed moral causes, proceed from such accidents as these; and physical causes appear not to have any discernible operation on the human mind. It is a maxim in all philosophy, That causes which do not appear are to be considered as not existing. The Chinese have the greatest uni-

formity of character imaginable; though the air and climate, in different parts of those vast dominions, admit of very considerable variations. Athens and Thebes were but a short day's journey from each other; though the Athenians were as remarkable for ingenuity, politeness, and gaiety, as the Thebans for dulness, rusticity, and a phlegmatic temper. Strabo (*lib. ii.*) rejects, in a great measure, the influence of climate upon men. "All is custom and education," says he: "It is not from nature that the Athenians are learned, the Lacedæmonians ignorant, and the Thebans too, who are still nearer neighbours to the former. Even the difference of animals," he adds, "depends not on climate."

The same national character commonly follows the authority of government to a precise boundary; and upon crossing a river, or passing a mountain, one finds a new set of manners, with a new government. Is it conceivable, that the qualities of the air should change exactly with the limits of an empire? Any set of men, scattered over distant nations, who have a close communication together, acquire a similitude of manners, and have but little in common with the nations amongst whom they live. Thus the Jews in Europe, and the Armenians in the East, have a peculiar character.

Where a difference of language or religion keeps two nations, inhabiting the same country, from mixing with each other, their manners will be very dis-

inct, and even opposite. The Turks and modern Greeks have very different characters.

The same set of manners will follow a nation, and adhere to them, over the whole globe, as well as the same language and laws. The manners of a people change very considerably from one age to another. The ingenuity, industry, and activity of the ancient Greeks, have nothing in common with the stupidity and indolence of the present inhabitants of those regions. Candour, bravery, and love of liberty, formed the character of the ancient Romans; as subtlety, cowardice, and a slavish disposition, do that of the modern.

Where the government of a nation is altogether republican, it is apt to beget a particular set of manners. Where it is altogether monarchical, it is more apt to have the same effect; the imitation of superiors spreading the national manners faster among the people. If the governing part of a state consist altogether of merchants, as in Holland, their uniform way of life will fix their character. If it consist chiefly of nobles and landed gentry, like Germany, France, and Spain, the same effect follows. The genius of a particular sect of religion is also apt to mould the manners of a people. If the characters of men depended on the air, the degrees of heat and cold would naturally be expected to have a mighty influence, since nothing has a greater effect on all plants and animals. And indeed there is some reason to think, that all the nations that live beyond the

polar circles, or between the tropics, are inferior to the rest of the species. The poverty of the northern inhabitants, and the indolence of the southern from their few necessities, may perhaps account for this difference without physical causes. This, however, is certain, that the character of nations is very promiscuous in the temperate climates; and that almost all the general observations which have been formed of the more southern or more northern nations in these climates, are found to be uncertain and fallacious.—*Hume*.

NATIONS, THE CHARACTER OF, AND THE CAUSES OF THEIR ALTERATIONS.—Each nation has its particular manner of seeing and feeling, which forms its character: and in every nation its character either changes on a sudden, or alters by degrees, according to the sudden or insensible alterations in the form of its government, and consequently of its public education; for the form of government under which we live always makes a part of our education. That of the French, which has been for a long time gay, was not always so. The Emperor Julian says of the Parisians, “I like them, because their character, like mine, is austere and serious.”

The characters of nations, therefore, change: but at what period is the alteration most perceptible? At the moment of revolution, when a people pass on a sudden from liberty to slavery. Then from bold and haughty they become weak and pusillanimous: they dare not look on the man in office; they

are enthralled. This dejected people say, like the ass in the fable, *Whoever be my master, I cannot carry a heavier load.* As much as a free citizen is zealous for the honour of his nation, so much is a slave indifferent to the public welfare. His heart is deprived of activity and energy; is without virtue, without spirit, and without talents; he becomes indifferent to the arts, commerce, agriculture, &c. It is not for servile hands, say the English, to till and fertilize the lands. Simonides entered the empire of a despotic sovereign, and found there no traces of men. A free people are courageous, open, humane, and loyal. A nation of slaves are base, perfidious, malicious, and barbarous; they push their cruelty to the greatest excess. If the severe officer has all to fear from the resentment of the injured soldier on the day of battle, that of sedition is in like manner, for the slave oppressed, the long-expected day of vengeance; and he is the more enraged in proportion as fear has held his fury the longer restrained.

What a striking picture of a sudden change in the character of a nation does the Roman history present us with? What people, before the elevation of the Cæsars, showed more force, more virtue, more love of liberty, and horror for slavery? And what people, when the throne of the Cæsars was established, showed more weakness or depravity? Their baseness disgusted Tiberius.

Indifferent to liberty, when Trajan offered it, they refused

it: they disdained that liberty their ancestors had purchased with so much blood. All things were then changed in Rome; and that determined and grave character, which distinguished its first inhabitants, was succeeded by that light and frivolous disposition with which Juvenal reproaches them in his tenth Satire.—Let us exemplify this matter by a more recent change. Compare the English of the present day with those under Henry VIII. Edward VI. Mary and Elizabeth. This people, now so humane, indulgent, learned, free, and industrious, such lovers of the arts and philosophy, were then nothing more than a nation of slaves; inhuman and superstitious; without arts, and without industry.—When a prince usurps over his people a boundless authority, he is sure to change their character; to enervate their souls; to render them timid and base. From that moment, indifferent to glory, his subjects lose that character of boldness and constancy proper to support all labours, and brave all dangers. The weight of arbitrary power destroys the spring of their emulation. Does a prince, impatient of contradiction, give the name of factious to the man of veracity? he substitutes in his nation the character of falsity for that of frankness. If, in those critical moments, the prince, giving himself up to flatterers, finds that he is surrounded by men void of all merit, whom should he blame? Himself; for it is he that has made them such. Who could believe, when he considers the evils of servitude, that there were still

princes mean enough to wish to reign over slaves; and stupid enough to be ignorant of the fatal changes that despotism produces in the character of their subjects? What is arbitrary power? The seed of calamities, that, sown in the bosom of a state, springs up to bear the fruit of misery and devastation. Let us hear the King of Prussia: *Nothing is better*, said he, in a discourse pronounced to the Academy of Berlin, *than an arbitrary government, under princes just, humane, and virtuous; nothing worse under the common race of kings.* Now, how many kings are there of the latter sort? and how many such as Titus, Trajan, and Antoninus? These are the thoughts of a great man. What elevation of mind, what knowledge does not such a declaration suppose in a monarch?—What, in fact, does a despotic power announce? Often ruin to the despot, and always to his posterity. The founder of such power sets his kingdom on a sandy foundation. It is only a transient ill-judged notion of royalty, that is, of pride, idleness, or some similar passion, which prefers the exercise of an unjust and cruel despotism over wretched slaves, to that of a legitimate and friendly power over a free and happy people. Arbitrary power is a thoughtless child, who continually sacrifices the future to the present.—The most formidable enemy of the public welfare is not riot and sedition, but despotism; it changes the character of a nation, and always for the worse; it produces nothing but vices. Whatever

might be the power of an Indian Sultan, he could never form magnanimous subjects; he would never find among his slaves the virtues of free men. Chemistry can extract no more gold from a mixed body than it includes; and the most arbitrary power can draw nothing from a slave but the baseness he contains. Experience, then, proves, that the character and spirit of a people change with the form of government; and that a different government gives by turns, to the same nation, a character noble or base, firm or fickle, courageous or cowardly. If the Persians have no idea of liberty, and the savage no idea of servitude, it is the effect of their different instruction.—*Helvetius.*

NATIONAL FAITH.—When a number of political societies are erected, and maintain a great intercourse together, a new set of rules are immediately discovered to be useful in that particular situation; and accordingly take place under the title of the *laws of nations*. The rules of justice, such as prevail among individuals, are not entirely suspended among political societies. All princes pretend a regard to the rights of other princes; and some, no doubt, without hypocrisy. Alliances and treaties are every day made between independent states, which would be only so much waste of parchment, if they were not found by experience to have *some* influence and authority. But here is the difference between kingdoms and individuals. Human nature cannot by any means subsist without the association of individuals; and

that association never could have place, were no regard paid to the laws of equity and justice. Disorder, confusion, the war of all against all, are the necessary consequences of such a licentious conduct. But nations can subsist without intercourse. They may even subsist, in some degree, under a general war. The observance of justice, though useful among them, is not guarded by so strong a necessity as among individuals; and the moral obligation holds proportion with the usefulness. All politicians will allow, and most philosophers, that reasons of state may, in particular emergencies, dispense with the rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of it would be prejudicial in a considerable degree to either of the contracting parties. But nothing less than the extremest necessity, it is confessed, can justify individuals in a breach of promise, or an invasion of the properties of others. In a confederated commonwealth, such as the Achæan republic of old, or the Swiss Cantons, and the United Provinces in modern time; as the league has here a peculiar utility, the conditions of union have a peculiar sacredness and authority; and a violation of them would be regarded as equally criminal, or even as more criminal than any private injury or injustice.—*Hume*.

NATIONAL FAITH.—When two nations conclude a treaty between them, they have, like private persons, no other object than their reciprocal advantage and happiness; when this re-

ciprocal advantage no longer subsists, the treaty becomes void: one of the two nations may break it. Ought they to do it? No, if there result but a small damage to them from observing it; for then it would be better to suffer that damage, than be regarded as too easy violators of their engagements. Now, in the motives themselves that make those two people observe their treaty, we see the right that every people have to disannul a treaty when it is evidently destructive to their happiness.—*Helvetius*.

NATIONAL FAITH.—If treaties between nations were as sacred as promises between individuals, nations would be perpetually sacrificed to the folly and inattention of their rulers; who ought always to consult the interest of the community, and not their own reputation for integrity, when it must be injurious to the people.—*Helvetius*.

NATURE, THE PUPIL OF.—Was it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty and deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror

which he wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behaviour of those he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here he first views the propriety and impropriety of his own passions—the beauty and deformity of his own mind. To a man, who from his birth was a stranger to society, the objects of his passions, the eternal bodies which either pleased or hurt him, would occupy his whole attention. The passions themselves, the desires or aversions, the joys or sorrows, which those objects excited, though of all things the most immediately present to him, would scarce ever be the objects of his thoughts. The idea of them could never interest him so much as to call upon his attentive consideration. The consideration of his joy could in him excite no new joy, nor that of his sorrow any new sorrow; though the consideration of the causes of these passions might often excite both.—Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately become the causes of new passions. He will observe that mankind approve of some of them, and are disgusted by others. He will be elevated in the one case, and cast down in the other; his desires and aversions, his joys and sorrows, will now become the causes of new desires and new aversions, new joys and new sorrows; they will now therefore interest him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive consideration.—*A. Smith.*

NECESSITY AND LIBERTY.—Is not

the will necessarily determined by what appears to be the best reason?—It no doubt is so: nor is it possible to conceive any creature willing what he does not think best. But this is improperly called necessity; for necessity is always from without, and cannot be without two things—an agent who applies force and violence, and a patient who suffers it. Nothing, therefore, can force itself: so that when we say the intellect is necessarily determined by the strongest reason, we can mean nothing, but that necessity, which is in the nature of every thing, and is the same by which a triangle, or any other geometrical figure, has all the properties belonging to its nature.—*L. Monboddo.*

NECESSITY AND LIBERTY.—If moral motives are certain in their operation, is not man as much a machine as if he were impelled by a mechanical force? If the Deity proposes a motive which I cannot resist, am I in that case a free agent? Are not my elective powers absolutely overruled and determined to one particular choice? On the contrary, if moral motives are not certain in their effects, there will be a difficulty in reconciling divine fore-knowledge, and man's free will. In reply to this, it may be answered, That even admitting the certain operation of moral motives, man is not so much a machine as if he were impelled by mere mechanical force. The very asking, If he be not as much a machine as some others? necessarily implies a comparative gradation in machinery: so

that a man may even be admitted to be a machine, and yet possess a capacity of being actuated by moral motives, which none but rational machines are. For distinction sake, he may be called a moral machine; possessed of a principle of self-determination or volition, in which he is infinitely superior to inanimate machines. In the operation, however, of the moral motives by which he is actuated, and the actions subsequent thereto, he is as very a mechanical machine as a piece of clock-work. How should it be otherwise, when the operations of the Deity himself in the government of the world are mechanical? The universe itself is one great machine, moved by the power of its great Creator. It is pride, therefore, alone, which makes a man ashamed to be thought a microcosm, subject to similar laws of motion; he is ambitious of being thought a god, capable of willing and moving solely of himself.—*Kenrick.*

NECESSITY, THE ORIGIN OF OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF PHILOSOPHICAL.—If we examine the operations of bodies, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find, that all our faculties can never carry us further in our knowledge of this relation, than barely to observe, that particular objects are constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject,

men still entertain a strong propensity to believe, that they penetrate further into the powers of nature, and perceive something like a necessary connection between the cause and effect.—When, again, they turn their reflections towards the operation of their own minds, and feel no such connection of the motive and the action, they are apt from thence to suppose, that there is a difference between the effects resulting from material force, and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced, that we know nothing further of causation of any kind, than merely the *constant conjunction* of objects, and the consequent *inference* of the mind from one to another; and finding that these two circumstances are universally allowed to have place in voluntary actions, we may thence be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes.

The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for from another cause, viz. a false sensation or seeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference in many of our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference,

which we feel in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that though, in *reflecting* on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness and indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that in *performing* the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it: and as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative, and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel that our actions are subject to our will on most occasions; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a velleity, as it is called in schools), even on that side on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could at that time have been completed into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find upon a second trial, that at present it can. We consider not, that the fantastical desire of showing liberty is here the motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circum-

stance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.—
Hume.

NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL. --- It is universally allowed, that matter in all its operations, is actuated by a necessary force; and that every natural effect is so precisely determined by the energy of its cause, that no other effect, in such particular circumstance, could possibly have resulted from the operation of that cause. Would we, therefore, form a just and precise idea of *necessity*, we must consider whence that idea arises, when we apply it to the operation of bodies. It seems evident, that if all the scenes of nature were shifted continually in such a manner, that no two events bore any resemblance to each other, but every object was entirely new, without any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never, in that case, have attained the least idea of necessity, or of a connection among those objects, or of cause and effect. Inference and reasoning concerning the operations of nature, would, from that moment, be at an end. Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity in the operations of nature; where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is, by custom, determined to infer the one from the other. These two circumstances form the whole of that necessity we ascribe to matter.

And these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men, and in the operations of the mind. The constant conjunction of similar events in voluntary actions, appears from their uniformity in all nations and ages. The same motives produce always the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, public spirit; these passions, mixed in various degrees, and distributed through society, have been from the beginning of the world, and still are, the source of all the actions and enterprizes which have ever been observed among mankind. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. The records of wars, intrigues, and factions, are collections of experiments, by which the politician or moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science; in the same manner as the physician or natural philosopher is acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, &c. by experiments. Nor are the earth, water, or other elements, examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates, more like to those which at present lie under our observation, than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world. The veracity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected, when he describes the supernatural courage of Alexander, by which he was hurried on singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and activity

by which he was able to resist them. So readily and universally do we acknowledge an uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body. Hence likewise the benefit of that experience, acquired by long life and a variety of business and company, in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, expressions, and even gestures; and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind. We must not, however, expect that this uniformity of actions should be carried to such a length, as that all men, in the same circumstances, will always act precisely in the same manner, without making any allowance for the diversity of characters, prejudices, and opinions. Such an uniformity in every particular is found in no part of nature. An artificer who handles only dead matter, may be disappointed of his aim as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent beings. It is from the variety of conduct in different men we form a greater variety of maxims, which still support a degree of regularity. Are the manners of

men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education. Even the characters which are peculiar to each individual, have an uniformity in their influence; otherwise our acquaintance with the persons, and our observation of their conduct, could never teach us their dispositions, nor serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them. The irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. Even when an action, as sometimes happens, cannot be particularly accounted for, either by the person himself, or by others; we know, in general, that the characters of men are, to a certain degree, inconsistent and irregular. This is in a manner the constant character of human nature; though it be applicable, in a more particular manner, to some persons, who have no fixed rule for their conduct, but proceed in a continued course of caprice and inconsistency. The internal principles and motives, however, may operate uniformly, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities.—*Hume.*

NECESSITY AND LIBERTY, A DISPUTE OF WORDS.—Men begin at the wrong end of the question, concerning *liberty* and *necessity*, when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, viz.—*the operations of body, and of brute*

unintelligent matter; and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity, except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality, the whole of that necessity which we conceive in matter, and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute is merely verbal.—*Hume.*

NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL.—

Whoever desires to injure himself, say the Stoics, and without motives, should throw himself into the fire, the sea, or out of the window, would be justly thought a madman: for, in his natural state, man pursues pleasure and flies pain; and, in all his actions, is necessarily determined by a desire of happiness, real or apparent. Man, therefore, is not free. His will is as necessarily the effect of his ideas, and consequently of his sensations, as pain is the effect of a blow.—Beside, add the Stoics, is there a single instant when the liberty of man can be referred to the different operations of the same mind? If, for example, the same thing cannot, at the same instant, be and not be, it is not therefore possible, that at the moment the mind acts, it could act otherwise; that at the moment it chooses, it could choose otherwise; that at the moment it deliberates, it could deliberate otherwise; that at the moment it wills, it could will otherwise. Now if it be my will, such as it is, that makes me deliberate;

if my deliberation, such as it is, makes me choose; if my choice, such as it is, makes me act; and if, when I deliberated, it was not possible for me (considering the love I have for myself) not to deliberate; it is evident that that liberty does not consist in the actual volition, nor in the actual deliberation, nor in the actual choice, nor in the actual action; and, in short, that liberty does not relate to any of the operations of the mind. If that were the case, the same thing must be and not be at the same instant. Now, add the Stoics, this is the question we ask the philosophers, Can the mind be free, if, when it wills, when it deliberates, and when it chooses, it is not free?---*Helvetius*.

NECESSITY, THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL, IS, --- When the word liberty is applied to the will, nothing more can be understood by it than the free power of willing or not willing a thing. But this power would suppose that there could be wills without a motive, and consequently effects without a cause. And it would follow, that we could equally wish ourselves good and evil: a supposition absolutely impossible. In fact, if the desire of happiness be the true principle of all our thoughts and of all our actions; if all men really tend towards their true or apparent happiness; it will follow, that all our wills are no more than the effect of this tendency. In this sense, therefore, no adequate idea can be annexed to the word liberty. But it will be said, if we are under a necessity of pursuing happiness wherever

we discern it, we are at least at liberty in making choice of the means for procuring our happiness. Yes, it may be answered; but then liberty is only a synonymous term for knowledge. The more or less a person understands of the law, or the more or less able the counsellor is by whom he is directed in his affairs, the more or less eligible will be his measures. But whatever his conduct be, the desire of happiness will always induce him to take those measures which appear to him the best calculated to promote his interest, his disposition, his passions, and, in fine, whatever he accounts his happiness. There are some who consider the suspension of the mind as a proof of liberty. They are not aware, that in volition, suspension is no less necessary than precipitancy. When, for want of consideration, we have drawn on ourselves some misfortune, self-love renders suspension absolutely necessary. The word deliberation is equally mistaken. We conceive, for instance, that while we are choosing between two pleasures nearly equal, that we are deliberating. But what we consider as deliberation, is only the slowness with which the heavier of two weights, nearly equal, makes one of the scales of a balance subside. How can the problem of liberty be philosophically solved, if, as Mr. Locke has proved, we are disciples of friends, parents, books, and, in fine, all the objects that surround us? All our thoughts and wills must then be either the immediate effects, or necessary

consequences, of the impressions we have received.—*Helvetius*.

NECESSITY AND LIBERTY.—When any past perception is brought into view again, whether by any conatus or exertion of the percipient, or *ab extra* only, or without any design of his, such being in view is what we call memory. The perceptions of living beings may be related to each other two ways extremely different; the one, when a being exerts an internal power to make a past perception again present; the other, when the perception, or the resemblance of it, is offered by some external cause, without any exertion on the part of the percipient. Hence it appears that there are two kinds of memory specifically different, an active and a passive memory. Reason implies or supposes memory in general; for without memory, whatever is in the mind would be a train of unconnected and unrelated perceptions, which is inconsistent with a power producing a chain of depending consequences: and without active memory, whatever is in the mind, would be related by accident only with respect to us; which is inconsistent with a power, by which we bring together any two perceptions or ideas, that we may see their agreement and diversity. In a word, reasoning supposes our comparing, and comparing supposes our bringing together perceptions, that are in nature successive, and consequently distant; that is, it supposes active memory. Since reason implies and supposes active memory, it follows that it implies or sup-

poses liberty; this kind of memory being only the power of reflecting back, and applying voluntarily our attention to any past perception, and consequently to any part of our past consciousness within certain limits at least. The power of reflecting and applying, is here opposed to the necessity of doing it on the one hand, and the necessity of not doing it on the other. But we are not free in seeing the identities, diversities, agreements, or disagreements of our ideas: we are not free in seeing the natures and habitudes, and relations of those perceptions, upon which we have thus freely and voluntarily reflected back our attention. For every percipient, if it shall bring together and compare any two perceptions, must of necessity, according to its faculty of discernment, see whether they agree or disagree, or how far they are the same or different. It must by its original constitution be thus far purely passive in its perception, being active and free only in reflecting and applying its attention to it. So that it is wonderful that there should ever have been any dispute in the world, whether a rational creature could be a free creature; since the pronouncing a creature rational is the same thing as the pronouncing it free in other words. It happens to human liberty, as to motion, that it is easier to feel it, and be certain of the reality of it, than accurately to explain its nature. The friends of common sense and sound philosophy should therefore deduce their instances of

it from the first and highest kind of liberty, than over the perceptions of the mind, which is the cause; rather than from the motions of the body, which are but the consequence and effect of the other.—*Baxter*.

NECESSITY AND LIBERTY, PHILOSOPHICAL, IN MAN.—According to Newton and others, the infinitely free Being has communicated to man a limited portion of that liberty; and by liberty here, is not understood the simple power of applying our thoughts to such or such an object, and of beginning the motion: not only the faculty of willing is meant, but that of willing in the most free and efficacious manner; and even of willing without any other reason than the will itself. There is not a man on the earth who does not believe that he sometimes feels himself possessed of this liberty. Many philosophers, however, think the contrary; and that all the liberty we enjoy is that of wearing sometimes freely the fetters of fatality.—Collins is of this opinion: he calls man a necessary agent. Clarke says, if this be true, man is no longer an agent. But who does not see that this is true chicanery? Whatever produces necessary effects, Collins calls a necessary agent. Is it of any consequence whether he be called agent or patient? The point is to know whether he be necessarily determined.

If only one single case can be found where man is really free with a liberty of indifference, that alone seems sufficient to decide the question. Now what

case shall we find more proper than that where our liberty is put to a trial? For instance, it is proposed to me to turn to the right or the left, or to do some other action, to which neither pleasure attracts, nor disgust diverts. I then choose, and do not follow the dictates of my understanding which represents to me the best; for, in this case, there is neither better nor worse. How do I act? I exercise a right God has given me of willing and acting in certain cases without any other reason than my own will. I enjoy a right and power to begin the motion, and begin it on which side I please. If, in this case, my will directs me, why should any other cause be sought than my own will? It seems probable, therefore, that in indifferent things we have the liberty of indifference. For who can say that God has, or has not been able to confer on us this gift? And if he is able, and we feel this power in ourselves, how can it be affirmed that we do not enjoy it? This liberty of indifference is, however, treated as a chimera: it is said, that to determine without a reason, belongs only to madmen. But it should be remembered, that madmen are distempered persons, without any liberty. They are necessarily determined by the disorder of their organs. They are not their own masters; they choose nothing. He is free who determines for himself. Now, why shall we not in things indifferent determine ourselves merely by our own will?

We enjoy, in all other cases, the liberty called spontaneity;

that is, our will is determined by motives when there are any; and these motives are always the last result of the understanding or instinct. Thus, when my understanding represents to itself, that it is better for me to obey than break the law, I conform to the law with a spontaneous liberty; I perform voluntarily what the last dictamen of my understanding leads me to perform. This species of liberty is never better perceived, than when our will opposes our desires. I have a violent passion for something—but my understanding tells me, I must resist this passion; it represents to me a greater good in victory, than in a compliance with my appetite. This last motive preponderates, and I oppose my desires by my will. This command of my reason I necessarily and willingly obey. I do not what I desire, but what I will; and, in this case, I am free, and enjoy all the liberty of which such a circumstance can make me susceptible. In fine, I am free in no respect, when my passion is too strong; and my understanding too weak; or, when my organs are disordered; and this, unfortunately, is very often the case of men. So that spontaneous liberty is to the soul what health is to the body: some persons enjoy it entirely and constantly; many are often deprived of it; and others are sick during their whole lives: all the other faculties of man are subject to the same variation. Sight, hearing, taste, strength, cogitation, are sometimes stronger, and sometimes weaker: our liberty, like every

thing else, is limited, variable: in a word, very trifling; because man is himself inconsiderable.

The difficulty of reconciling human actions with God's eternal prescience, was no obstacle to Newton; he avoided that labyrinth. Liberty being once proved, it is not for us to determine how God foresees what we shall freely do. We know not how God sees what passes at present. We have no idea of his mode of seeing, why then should we have any of his mode of foreseeing? We should consider all his attributes as equally incomprehensible.

It must be owned, that against this idea of liberty there are objections which startle. It is immediately seen that this liberty of indifference would be but a trivial present, if it extended no further than spitting to the right or left, or choosing either odd or even. The business is, whether Cartouche and Shah Nadier have a liberty of not shedding human blood? Of what consequence is the liberty of putting the left or right foot first? This liberty of indifference is then found to be impossible; for how can we be said to determine without reason? You will, but why will you? You are asked even or odd; you choose even, without being aware of the motive; which is, that even presents itself to your mind at the instant you make the choice.

Every thing has its cause: consequently your will is not excepted. There is then no willing, but in consequence of the last idea received. No person

can know what idea he will have the next moment; therefore, no person is master of his own ideas; therefore no person is master of willing or not willing. Were he master of these, he might perform the contrary of what God has disposed in the concatenation of the things of this world. Thus every person might, and actually would, change the eternal order.

All the liberty the wise Locke knew, was the power of doing what one wills. Free-will seemed to him only a chimera. A patient during the paroxysm of the gout has not the liberty of walking; nor the prisoner that of going abroad: the one becomes free when cured; the other on opening to him the gate.

To place these difficulties in a stronger light, I will suppose that Cicero is attempting to prove to Catiline that he ought not to conspire against his country. Catiline tells him, it is out of his power; that his conferences with Cethegus have imprinted in his mind the idea of the conspiracy; that this idea pleases him beyond any other; and that we only will in consequence of our last decision. But you might, answers Cicero, adopt other ideas as well as I, by listening attentively to me, and reflecting on the duty of consulting the good of your country. It is of no consequence, returns Catiline, your ideas offend me; and the desire of assassinating you prevails. I am sorry for your madness, says Cicero; endeavour to take some of my medicines. If I am mad, replies Ca-

tiline, I cannot command my endeavours to be cured. But, urged the consul, men are endued with reason, which they may consult, and may cure the disorder of the organs which renders you thus perverse, thus hardened in so horrid a crime; especially if this disorder be not too strong.—Show me, says Catiline, the point where this disorder is curable. For my part, I own, that from the first moment I began the conspiracy, all my reflections have tended to make me persevere in the undertaking. When did you first take this fatal resolution? asks the consul. When I had lost my money at play. And could not you have abstained from play! No—for the idea of play predominated at that time in my mind above all other ideas; and had I not played, I should have discomposed the order of the universe, by which Quartilla was to win 400,000 sesterces of me; with this money she was to purchase a house and a gallant; by this gallant she was to have a son; Cethegus and Lentulus were to come to my house, and we were to conspire against the republic. Destiny has made me a wolf, and you a shepherd's dog: destiny will decide which is to cut the throat of the other. To this, Cicero could have answered only by an oration. It must indeed be allowed, that the objections against liberty can hardly be answered but by a vague eloquence: a subject on which the wiser a person is, the more he fears to consider it. But, whichever system we embrace—by whatever fatality we suppose all

our actions are governed, we shall always act as if we were free.—*Voltaire.*

NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND THE LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE.

—1. Plants are organized beings, in which every thing is done necessarily. Some plants belong to the animal kingdom, and are, in effect, animals attached to the earth.

2. Can these animal plants, with roots, leaves, and sensations, be supposed to have liberty? No, surely.

3. Have not animals a perception, an instinct, a reason begun, a measure of ideas and of memory? What, in reality, is instinct? Is it not one of those secret springs we can never know? Nothing can be known but by analysis, or a consequence of what are called the first principles. Now, what analysis, or what synthesis, can explain the nature of instinct? We only perceive that this instinct is always necessarily accompanied with ideas. A silk worm has a perception of the leaf which nourishes it; the partridge of the worm which it seeks and swallows; the fox of the partridge which it eats; the wolf of the fox which it devours. Now it is not very likely that these beings possess what we call liberty: may we not, therefore, have ideas without being free?

4. Men receive and combine ideas in their sleep; but they cannot be said to be then free. Is not this a fresh proof, that we may have ideas without being free?

5. Man has, above other animals, the gift of a more compre-

hensive memory: this memory is the sole source of all his thoughts. Can this source, common to animals and men, produce liberty? The ideas of reflection in one brain, can they be any other than ideas of reflection in another?

6. Are not all men determined by their instinct? And is not this the reason why they never change their character? Is not this instinct what we call the disposition?

7. Were we free, where is the man who would not change his disposition? But was ever a man seen on earth, who gave himself one single propensity? Was there ever a man born with an aversion to dancing, that gave himself a taste for dancing? A sluggish and sedentary man, that gave himself an inclination to seek motion? Do not age and regimen diminish the passions, which reason fancies it has subdued?

8. Is not the will the last consequence of the last ideas received? If these ideas are necessary, is not the will also necessary?

9. Is liberty any thing more than the power of acting or not acting? And was not Locke in the right to call liberty, Power?

10. A wolf has the perception of sheep feeding in a meadow; his instinct prompts him to devour them, but is prevented by the dogs. A conqueror has the perception of a province, which his instinct leads him to invade: he finds fortresses and armies to obstruct his passage. Where is the great difference between the wolf and the conqueror?

11. Does not this universe ap-

pear in all its parts subjected to immutable laws? If a man might at his pleasure direct his will, is it not plain, that he might discompose these immutable laws?

12. By what privilege should man be exempted from the same necessity, to which the stars, animals, plants, and every thing else in nature are subjected?

13. Is it justly said, that in the system of this universal fatality, punishments and rewards would be useless and absurd? Is it not rather evident, that the inutility and absurdity of punishments and rewards appears in the system of liberty? In short, if a highwayman is possessed of a free will, determining itself solely by itself, the fear of punishment may very well fail of determining him to renounce robbery: but if the physical causes act alone: if the sight of the gibbet and wheel make a necessary and violent impression: they then necessarily correct the villain, while he is gazing at the execution of another.

14. To know if the soul be free, should we not first know what this soul is? Can any one boast that his reason alone demonstrates to him the spiritual nature, the immortality of the soul? It is the general opinion of physicians, that the principle of sensation resides in the place where the nerves unite in the brain. But this place is not a mathematical point. The origin of every nerve is extended. There is in that place a bell on which the fine organs of our senses strike; but who can con-

ceive that this bell occupies no point of space? Are we not automata; born to will always, to do sometimes what we will, and sometimes the contrary? Stars at the centre of the earth, without us and within us, every essence, every substance is to us, unknown. We see only appearances. We are in a dream.

15. Whether in this dream we believe the will free or subject; the organised earth of which we are formed endued with an immortal or perishable faculty; whether we think like Epicurus or like Socrates, the wheels that move the machine of the universe will be always the same.—*Voltaire*.

NECESSITY AND LIBERTY.—Every one finds in himself a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and necessity.

All the actions that we have any idea of, reducing themselves to these two, viz. thinking and motion: so far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power: wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it: there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary. So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in

any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other: where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty; that agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear.

A tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition or preference of motion to rest, or *vice versa*; and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but both its motion and rest come under our idea of necessity, and are so called. Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent. For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a man striking himself, or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm which it is not in his power, by volition or the direc-

tion of his mind, to stop or forbear; nobody thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by necessity and constraint.

Again, suppose a man to be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room, where is a person he longs to see and speak with; and to be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in, *i.e.* prefers his stay to going away; I ask, is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it: and yet being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay; he has not freedom to be gone. So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring; but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no further. For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability on either side to act, or to forbear acting; there liberty and our notion of it presently ceases.

We have instances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop; and, therefore, in respect of these motions, where rest depends not on his choice, nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it should prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulsive motions agitate his legs, so that though he will it ever so much, he can-

not by any power of his mind stop their motion (as in that odd disease called *chorea sancti Viti*) but he is perpetually dancing; he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity of moving as a stone that falls, or a tennis-ball struck with a racket. On the other side, a palsy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all these there is want of freedom; though the sitting still even of a paralytic, whilst he prefers it to a removal is truly voluntary. Voluntary, then, is not opposed to necessary, but to involuntary. For a man may prefer what he can do to what he cannot do; the state he is in to its absence or change, though necessity has made it in itself unalterable.

As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds: where any one is such, that we have power to take it up; or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind, is not at liberty to think or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body shall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his choice; and then he is in respect of his ideas as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on: he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. But yet some ideas to the mind, like some

motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations: and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather choose. But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin or forbear, any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a free agent again.

Wherever thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear according to the direction of thought; there necessity takes place. This, in an agent capable of volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to that preference of his mind, is called Compulsion; when the hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his volition, it is called Restraint. Agents that have no thought, no volition at all, are in every thing necessary agents.

If this be so, (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and I think unreasonable, because unintelligible, question, viz. Whether man's will be free or no? For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the question itself is altogether improper: and it is as in-

significant as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square: liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue. Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these: because it is obvious, that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of figure to virtue: and when any one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.

I think the question is not proper, Whether the will be free? but, Whether a man be free? Thus I think—

That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and *vice versa*, make it to exist or not exist: so far he is free. For if I can, by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or *vice versa*; it is evident, that in respect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace. And as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not

being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest; so far can he do what he will. For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it: and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he will. So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him.

But the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this; freedom, unless it reaches further than this, will not serve the turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this further question, Whether a man be free to will? Which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine—

That willing or volition, being an action and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man, in respect of willing, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest: for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist; and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his

will; he cannot avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action: it is absolutely necessary that he will the one or the other; *i. e.* prefer the one to the other: since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it; for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act or not to act; which in regard to volition, a man, upon such a proposal, has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power which is once so proposed to his thoughts: a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them; upon which preference or volition, the action, or its forbearance, certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man, in respect of that act of willing, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once.

This then is evident, that in all proposals of present actions, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing; liberty consisting in a power to act or forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it; but if a man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he is not at li-

berty. So likewise a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk or give off walking or no: he must necessarily prefer one to the other of them; walking or not walking. And so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed; which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will, till the time they are to be done; and in all such actions, as I have shown, the mind in respect of willing, has not a power to act or not to act, wherein consists liberty. The mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determination concerning them, let the consideration be as short, the thought as quick, as it will; it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect to the other; and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

Since, then, it is plain, that, in most cases, a man is not at liberty whether he will or no, the next thing demanded is, Whether

a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, motion or rest? This question carries the absurdity of it so manifestly in itself that one might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will. For to ask, Whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest; speaking or silence, which he pleases? is to ask, Whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which, I think, needs no answer: and they who can make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that, and so on *in infinitum*.

To avoid these and the like absurdities, nothing can be of greater use than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration. If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in the understandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the questions that are raised about them, I suppose a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts, and entangle their understandings, would be much easier resolved; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing, caused the obscurity.

It is carefully to be remembered, that freedom consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of any action upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap twenty yards

downwards into the sea; not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do; but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that case: because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power. He that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at the north side of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward, because he can walk or not walk it; but is not at the same time at liberty to do the contrary, *i. e.* to walk twenty feet northward.

In this, then, consists freedom viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will.

We must remember, that volition, or willing, is an act of the mind, directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word *action*; to comprehend the forbearance too of any action proposed: sitting still, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are proposed; though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their consequences, as the contrary actions, may, on that consideration, well enough pass for actions too.

The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the

operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction: to the question, What is it that determines the will? the true and proper answer is, The mind: for that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has that particular way. If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, What determines the will? is this, What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or rest? And to this I answer, The motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satisfaction in it: the motive to change is always some uneasiness; nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action; which, for shortness sake, we will call determining of the will.

That which determines the will in regard to our actions, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine, is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view; but some (and for the most part the most pressing) uneasiness a man is at present under. This is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, *desire*; which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body, of what sort so-

ever, and disquiet of the mind, is uneasiness; and with this is always joined desire equal to the pain or uneasiness felt, and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that absent good: and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire; nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good: and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatness, as all pain causes desire equal to itself: because the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire. But so much as there is any where of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

That desire is a state of uneasiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it) "that it being deferred makes the heart sick:" and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire; which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, Give me children, give me the thing

desired, or I die? Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness.

Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon the mind: but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good; either negative, as indolence to one in pain; or positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the successive voluntary actions whereof the greatest part of our lives are made up, and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends, I shall endeavour to show, both from experience and the reason of the thing.

When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in, which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness, what industry, what action, what will is there left but to continue in it? Of this every man's observation will satisfy him. And thus we see our all-wise Maker, suitable to our constitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural desires, that return at their seasons, to move and determine their wills, for the preservation of themselves and the continuation of their species. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we are carried by these several un-

easinesses, had been sufficient to determine the will, and set us on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps, in this world, little or no pain at all. "It is better to marry than to burn," says St. Paul; where we may see what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt, pushes us more powerfully, than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure.

We being in this world beset with sundry uneasinesses, distracted with different desires, the next inquiry naturally will be, Which of them has the precedence in determining the will to the next action? And to that the answer is, That, ordinarily, which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable: that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to loose its labour, for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable: and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will when they are judged not capable of a cure; they in that case put us not upon endeavours. But, these set apart, the most important and urgent uneasiness we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will successively in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest present

uneasiness is the spur to action, that is constantly felt, and, for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else; for we producing nothing by our willing it but some action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no further.

There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will, it is natural that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action: and so it does for the most part, but not always: for the mind having in most cases, as is evident in experience a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so all, one after another, is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has: and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults, which we run into in the conduct of our lives and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as every one may experience in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that which is (as I think, improperly) called free-will: For

during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do: and when, upon due examination, we have judged we have done our duty, all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act, according to the last result of a fair examination.

This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgement, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the further we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifferency on the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of an intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection as the want of indifferency to act or not to act till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other side. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it rest quiet: he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the same indifferency whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its re-

maining in rest when it would save his head or eyes from a blow he sees coming: it is as much a perfection that desire, or the power of preferring, should be determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will: and the more certain such a determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free; the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we choose. And therefore every man is put under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do; else he would be under the determination of some other than himself; which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other? unless he can have and not have it, will and not will, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be admitted.

If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to judge that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are less happy or less free

than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do, I think we might say, that God himself cannot choose what is not good: the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best.—*Locke.*

NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL, ESSENTIAL TO BUSINESS AND SCIENCE.—The mutual dependence of men is so great in all societies, that scarce any human action is entirely complete in itself, or is performed without some reference to the actions of others, which are requisite to make it answer fully the intention of the agent. The artificer expects, when he carries his goods to market and offers them at a reasonable price, he shall find buyers, and shall be able, by the money he acquires, to engage others to supply him with those commodities which are requisite for his subsistence. In proportion as men extend their dealings, and render their intercourse with others more complicated, they always comprehend a greater variety of voluntary actions, which they expect, from their proper motives, to cooperate with their own. In all these conclusions, they take their measures from past experience, in the same manner as in their reasonings concerning external objects; and firmly believe that men, as well as all the elements, are to continue in their operations the same which they have ever found them.—What would become of history, had we not a dependence on the veracity of

the historian, according to the experience which we have had of mankind? How could politics be a science, if laws and forms of government had not an uniform influence upon society? Where could be the foundation of morals, if particular characters had no certain nor determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our *criticisms* upon any poet or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters, and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this *inference* from motives to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct.—

Hume.

NECESSITY, PHILOSOPHICAL, ESSENTIAL TO MORALITY AND RELIGION.—Necessity may be defined two ways. It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another. It has never been denied, that we can draw inferences concerning human actions; and that those inferences are founded in the experienced union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and circumstances.—All laws being founded on rewards and punishments, it is supposed as a fundamental principle, that these motives have a regular and uniform influence on the mind, and

both produce the good and prevent the evil actions. Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing: and where they proceed not from some cause in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound to his honour if good, nor infamy if evil. The actions themselves may be blameable; they may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion; but the person is not answerable for them; and as they proceeded from nothing in him that is durable and constant, and leave nothing of that nature behind them, it is impossible he can upon their account become the object of punishment or vengeance. According to the principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently, causes, a man is as pure and untainted, after having committed the most horrid crime, as at the first moment of his birth: nor is his character any way concerned in his actions, since they are not derived from it: and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other.

Men are not blamed for such actions as they perform ignorantly and casually, whatever may be the consequences. Why, but because the principles of these actions are only momentary, and terminate in them alone? Men are blamed less for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditatedly, than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what reason, but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause and principle

in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character? Again, repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners. How is this to be accounted for, but by asserting, that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by any alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal? But except upon the doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently never were criminal.—*Hume*.

NOVELTY, THE ORIGIN OF THE LOVE OF.—The continuance of the same sensations render them at length insensible to us: and from hence that inconstancy and love of novelty common to all men: for all would be affected in a strong and lively manner. Habit dulls the vivacity of an impression. I see with indifference what I always see; and even the beautiful ceases to be so to me. I have so often regarded the sun, that sea, this landscape, and fine woman, that, to excite my attention or admiration, the sun must paint the heavens with colours more lively than common; the sea must be ravaged by storms; the landscape must appear with uncommon lustre; and the woman present herself to me under a new form. The more forcibly we are affected, the more happy we are; provided, however, the sensations be not painful.—*Helvetius*.

OATHS.—Oaths are requisite in all courts of judicature; but it is a

question whether their authority arises from any popular religion. It is the solemnity and importance of the occasion, the regard to reputation, and the reflecting on the general interests of society, together with the punishments annexed to perjury in all well-regulated governments, that are the chief restraints upon mankind. Custom-house oaths, and political oaths, are but little regarded, even by some who pretend to principles of honesty and religion; and a Quaker's affirmation is with us justly put upon the same footing with the oath of any other person. Polybius ascribes, indeed, the infamy of Greek faith to the prevalence of the Epicurean philosophy: but the Punic faith, it is well known, had as bad a reputation in ancient times, as Irish evidence has in modern; though we cannot account for these vulgar observations by the same reason. Not to mention, that Greek faith was infamous before the rise of the Epicurean philosophy; and Euripides has glanced a remarkable stroke of satire against his nation with regard to this circumstance.—*Hume*.

OBSTINACY.—It is often from the want of passions that arises the obstinacy of persons of mean parts. Their slender knowledge supposes that they never had any desire of instruction, or at least, that this desire has been always very faint; very much below their fondness for sloth: now he who is not desirous of instruction, has never sufficient motives for altering his mind. To save himself the fatigue of ima-

gination, he must always turn a deaf ear to the remonstrances of reason; and obstinacy, in this case, is the necessary effect of sloth.—*Helvetius*.

OCCULT QUALITIES.—The doctrine of occult qualities is the wisest and truest which antiquity has produced. The formation of the elements, the emission of light, animals, vegetables, minerals, our birth, our death, waking, sleeping, sensation, thought—every thing is occult quality. See, feel, separate, measure, weigh, collect, and be assured that you will never do any more. Newton calculated the force of gravitation, but he has not discovered its cause. Why is that cause occult? It is a first principle. We are acquainted with the laws of motion; but the cause of motion being a first principle, will for ever remain a secret. You are alive, but how? You will never know any thing of the matter. You have sensations, ideas: but can you guess by what they are produced? Is not that the most occult thing in the world? Names have been given to a certain number of faculties which display themselves in us, according as our organs acquire some degree of strength, when they are freed from the teguments in which we were enclosed during nine months, without so much as knowing in what that strength consists. If we call any thing to mind, we say it is memory: if we range a few ideas in order, it is judgment; if we form a connected picture of some other scattered ideas, it is called imagination:—and the result or

principle of those qualities is named *soul*, a thing still a thousand times more occult.

It is a certain truth, that there does not exist in us one separate being called sensibility, another memory, a third judgment, a fourth imagination; how then can we easily conceive that we have a fifth composed of the four others which are really non-entities?—What was understood by the ancients, when they pronounced the Greek word *Psyche*? Did they mean a property of man, or a particular being concealed in man? Was it not an *occult* expression of a very occult thing? Are not all the systems of ontology and psychology mere dreams? In our mother's womb we are entirely unacquainted with ourselves; yet there our ideas ought to be the purest, because there our attention is the least distracted. We are unacquainted with ourselves at our birth, in our growth, during our life, and at the hour of death. The first reasoner who departed from the ancient doctrine of occult qualities, corrupted the understanding of mankind. He involved us in a labyrinth, from which it is now impossible to extricate ourselves.

How much wiser had the first man been, who, sensible of his ignorance, had said to that Being who is the author of the universe: "Thou hast made me without my knowing it; and thou preservest me without my being able to find out the mode of my existence. When I suckled my nurse's breast, I fulfilled one of the most abstruse laws of natural philoso-

"phy; and I fulfil one still more unknown, when I eat and digest the aliments with which thou feedest me. I know still less, how some ideas enter my head to quit it the next moment without ever re-appearing; and how others remain there during my whole life, notwithstanding my strongest efforts to drive them out. I am an effect of thy occult and supreme power, which the stars obey as well as myself. A particle of dust agitated by the wind, saith not, I command the winds. *In te vivimus, movemur, et sumus.* Thou art the sole *Being*, and the rest is only mode."—*Voltaire.*

OPINIONS, OUR, DEPEND UPON OUR INTEREST.—All men agree in the truth of geometric propositions. Is it because they are demonstrated? No: but because men have no interest in taking the false for the true. If they had such interest, the propositions most evidently demonstrated would appear to them problematic; they would prove on occasion, that the contained is greater than the container: this is a fact of which some religions afford examples. If a Catholic divine propose to prove that there are sticks that have not two ends, nothing is more easy: he will first distinguish sticks into two sorts, the one material, the other spiritual. He will then deliver an obscure dissertation on the nature of spiritual sticks; and conclude that the existence of these sticks is a mystery above, yet not contrary to, reason: and then this self-evident proposition, that there is no stick with-

out two ends, becomes problematic. It is the same with the most obvious truths of morality; the most evident is—"That, with regard to crimes, the punishment should be personal, and that I ought not to be punished for a crime committed by my neighbour."—Yet how many theologians are there who still maintain, that God punishes in the present race of mankind the sins of their first parents.—*Helvetius.*

OPINIONS, SPECULATIVE, NOT INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY.—The most absurd opinions in morality, and from whence the most detestable consequences may be drawn, can have no influence on the manners of a people, if there be no alteration in their laws. It is not a false maxim in morality that will render us wicked, but the interest we have to be so. In morality, says Machiavel, whatever absurd opinion we advance, we do not thereby injure society, provided we do not maintain that opinion by force. In every sort of science, it is by exhausting the errors that we come at last to the spring of truth. In morality, the thing really useful, is the inquiry after truth; and the non-inquiry that is really detrimental. He that extols ignorance, is a knave that would make dupes. Should we destroy error, compel it to silence? No: How then? Let it talk on. Error, obscure in itself, is rejected by every sound understanding. If time has not given it credit, and it be not favoured by government, it cannot be a the aspect of examination.—Reason will ultimately direct

wherever it be freely exercised.
Helvetius.

ORACLES.—It is evident we cannot be acquainted with futurity, because we cannot be acquainted with what does not exist; but it is also clear, that conjectures may be formed of an event.

All predictions are reduced to the calculations of probabilities: there is, therefore, no nation in which some predictions have not been made that have come to pass. The most celebrated and best attested, is that which Flavius Josephus made to Vespasian and Titus his son, the conquerors of the Jews. He saw Vespasian and Titus adored by the Roman armies in the East, and Nero detested by the whole empire. He had the audacity, in order to obtain the good graces of Vespasian, to predict to him, in the name of the God of the Jews, (Joseph, Book iii. ch. 28.) that he and his son would become emperors. They, in effect, were so; but it is evident that Josephus ran no risk. If the day of Vespasian's overthrow had come, he would not have been in a situation to punish Josephus; if he obtained the imperial throne, he must recompense his prophet; and till such time as he reigned, he was in hopes of doing it. Vespasian informed this Josephus, that if he were a prophet, he should have foretold him the loss of Jotapat, which he had ineffectually defended against the Roman army. Josephus replied, that he had in fact foretold it; which was not very surprising. What commander, who sustains a siege in a small

place against a numerous army, does not foretell that the place will be taken.

The most brilliant function of the oracles was to insure victory in war. Each army, each nation, had its own peculiar oracles, who promised triumphs. The oraculous intelligence of one of the parties was infallibly true. The vanquished, who had been deceived, attributed their defeat to some fault committed towards the gods after the oracle had been consulted; and they hoped the oracle's prediction would, another time, be accomplished. Thus is almost the whole earth fed with illusion.

It was not difficult to discover that respect and money might be drawn from the multitude by playing the prophet; and the credulity of the people must be a revenue for any who knew how to cheat them. There were in all places soothsayers; but it was not sufficient to foretell in their own name, it was necessary to speak in the name of the divinity; and from the time of the prophets of Egypt, who called themselves seers, till the time of Ulpian, who prophesied to the favourite of the empire, Adrian, who became a god, there was a prodigious number of sacred quacks, who made the gods speak to make a jest of man. It is well known how they might succeed; by an ambiguous reply, which they afterwards explained as they pleased.

These prophets were reckoned to know the past, the present, and the future. This is the eulogium which Homer makes upon Calchas.

Divinations and auguries were a kind of oracles, and, perhaps, of higher antiquity; for many ceremonies were necessary—much time was required—to draw custom to a divine oracle, that could not do without temple and priests; and nothing was easier than to tell fortunes in the cross ways. This art was subdivided into a thousand shapes; predictions were extracted from the flight of birds, sheeps' livers, the lines of the palms of the hand, circles drawn upon the ground, water, fire, small flints, wands, and, in a word, from every thing that could be devised, and frequently from enthusiasm alone, which supplied the place of all rules. But who invented this art? The first rogue that met with a fool.—*Voltaire.*

ORTHODOXY. — Orthodoxy is a Greek word, which signifies a right opinion; and hath been used by churchmen as a term to denote a soundness of doctrine or belief, with regard to all points and articles of faith. But as there have been amongst these churchmen several systems of doctrine or belief, they all assert for themselves, that they *only* are orthodox, and in the right; and that all others are heterodox, or in the wrong. So that what at one time, and in one place, hath been declared orthodoxy; or sound belief, has at another time, and in another, or even the same place, been declared to be heterodoxy, or wrong belief. Of this there are numberless instances in ecclesiastical history; and we need only just take a transient view of the present Christian

world, to perceive many more of it subsisting at this day. What is orthodoxy at Constantinople, is heterodoxy or heresy at Rome. What is orthodoxy at Rome, is heterodoxy at Geneva, London, and many other places. What was orthodoxy here in the reign of Edward VI. became heresy in the reign of his sister Mary; and in Queen Elizabeth's time, things changed their names again. Various was the fate of these poor words in the reigns of our succeeding kings: as the currents of Calvinism, Arminianism, and Popery, ebbed and flowed. So uncertain and fluctuating a thing is orthodoxy. To-day it consists in one set of principles, to-morrow in another. Were the words orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and heresy, employed as they ought, in distinguishing virtue from vice, and good from evil, they would admit of no variation, and be forever taken in the same sense. But as they are used to denote opinions concerning the most incomprehensible subjects, no wonder that their meaning should be so often mistaken, and occasion so many endless and bitter disputes.—*Robertson.*

PAIN AND PLEASURE, MANKIND GOVERNED BY.—Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every

effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire; but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The *principle of utility* recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is, to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead of light.

The happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, is the end and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view: the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be *made* to fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any thing else that is to be *done*, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be *made* to do it, but either pain or pleasure.

J. Bentham.

PAIN AND PLEASURE, SANCTIONS, OR SOURCES OF, AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN LEGISLATION.—

There are four distinguishable sources from which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: Considered separately, they may be termed the *physical*, the *political*, the *moral*, and the *religious*; and inasmuch as the pleasures and pains belonging to each of them are capable of giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they may all of them be termed *sanctions*. If it be in

the present life, and from the ordinary course of nature, not purposely modified by the interposition of the will of any human being, nor by any extraordinary interposition of any superior invisible being, that the pleasure or the pain takes place or is expected, it may be said to issue from or belong to the *physical sanction*. If at the hands of a *particular* person or set of persons in the community, who under names correspondent to that of *judge*, are chosen for the purpose of dispensing it, according to the will of the sovereign or supreme ruling power in the state, it may be said to issue from the *political sanction*. If at the hands of such *chance* persons in the community, as the party in question may happen in the course of his life to have concerns with, according to each man's spontaneous disposition, and not according to any settled or concerted rule, it may be said to issue from the *moral sanction*. If from the immediate hand of a superior invisible Being, either in the present life, or in a future, it may be said to issue from *religious sanction*. Pleasures or pains which may be expected to issue from the *physical*, *political*, or *moral* sanctions, must all of them be expected to be experienced, if ever, in the *present* life: those which may be expected to issue from the *religious* sanction, may be expected to be experienced either in the *present* life or in a *future*.

Those which can be experienced in the present life, can of course be no other than such as human nature in the course of

The present life is susceptible of; and from each of these sources may flow all the pleasures or pains of which, in the course of the present life, human nature is susceptible. With regard to these then, (with which alone we have in this place any concern) those of them which belong to any one of those sanctions, differ not ultimately in kind from those which belong to any one of the other three: the only difference there is among them lies in the circumstances that accompany their production. A suffering which befalls a man in the natural and spontaneous course of things, shall be styled, for instance, a *calamity*; in which case, if it be supposed to befall him through any imprudence of his, it may be styled a punishment issuing from the *physical* sanction. Now this same suffering, if inflicted by the law, will be what is commonly called a *punishment*; if incurred for want of any friendly assistance, which the misconduct, or supposed misconduct of the sufferer has occasioned to be withholden, a punishment issuing from the *moral* sanction; if through the immediate interposition of a particular providence, a punishment issuing from a *religious* sanction. A man's goods, or his person, are consumed by fire. If this happened to him by what is called an accident, it was a calamity; if by reason of his own imprudence, (for instance, from his neglecting to put his candle out) it may be styled a punishment of the physical sanction; if it happened to him by the sentence of the political magis-

trate, a punishment belonging to the political sanction; that is, what is commonly called a punishment: if for want of any assistance which his *neighbour* withheld from him out of some dislike to his *moral* character; a punishment of the *moral* sanction: if by an immediate act of *God's* displeasure, manifested on account of some *sin* committed by him, or through any distraction of mind, occasioned by the dread of such displeasure, a punishment of the *religious* sanction. As to such of the pleasures and pains belonging to the religious sanction as regard a future life, of what kind these may be we cannot know. These lie not open to our observation. During the present life they are matter only of expectation: and, whether that expectation be derived from natural or revealed religion, the particular kind of pleasure or pain, if it be different from all those which lie open to our observation, is what we can have no idea of. Of these four sanctions, the physical is altogether, we may observe, the groundwork of the political and the moral; so is it also of the religious, in as far as the latter bears relation to the present life. It is included in each of those other three. This may operate in any case, (that is, any of the pains or pleasures belonging to it may operate) independently of *them*: none of *them* can operate but by means of this. In a word, the powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither the magistrate, nor men at large, can operate, nor is God, in the case in question, *supposed* to operate,

but through the powers of nature.

For these four objects, which in their nature have so much in common, it seemed of use to find a common name. It seemed of use, in the first place, for the convenience of giving a name to certain pleasures and pains, for which a name equally characteristic could hardly otherwise have been found: in the second place, for the sake of holding up the efficacy of certain moral forces, the influence of which is apt not to be sufficiently attended to. Does the political sanction exert an influence over the conduct of mankind? The moral, the religious sanctions do so too. In every inch of his career are the operations of the political magistrate liable to be aided or impeded by these two foreign powers: who, one or other of them, or both, are sure to be either his rivals or his allies. Does it happen to him to leave them out in his calculations: he will be sure almost to find himself mistaken in the result. It behoves him, therefore, to have them continually before his eyes; and that under such a name as exhibits the relation they bear to his own purposes and designs.—*J. Bentham.*

PAIN AND TERROR, THE NATURE OF.—A man who suffers under *violent* bodily pain has his teeth set, his eye-brows violently contracted, his forehead wrinkled, his eyes dragged inwards, and rolled with great vehemence, his hair stands on end, the voice is forced out in short shrieks and groans, and the whole fabric totters. Fear or terror, which is an

apprehension of pain or death, exhibits exactly the same effects, approaching in violence to those just mentioned, in proportion to the nearness of the cause, and the weakness of the subject.

This is not only so in the human species, but it is observable even in dogs; they, under the apprehension of punishment, writhe their bodies, and yelp, and howl, as if they actually felt blows. From whence we may conclude, that pain and fear act upon the same parts of the body, and in the same manner, though somewhat different in degree: that pain and fear consist in an unnatural tension of the nerves; that this is sometimes accompanied with an unnatural strength, which sometimes suddenly changes into an extraordinary weakness; that the effects often come on alternately, and are sometimes mixed with each other. This is the nature of all convulsive agitations, especially in weaker subjects, which are the most liable to the severest impressions of pain and fear. The only difference between pain and terror is, that things which cause pain operate on the mind by the intervention of the body; whereas, things that cause terror, generally affect the bodily organs by the operation of the mind suggesting the danger; but both agreeing, either primarily, or secondarily, in producing a tension, contraction, or violent emotion of the nerves, they agree likewise in every thing else. For it appears clearly from this example, as well as from many others, that when the body is disposed, by any

means whatsoever, to such emotions as it would acquire by the means of a certain passion, it will of itself excite something very like that passion in the mind.

To this purpose, Mr. Spon, in his *Recherches d'Antiquite*, gives us a curious story of the celebrated Campanella, a physiognomist. This man, it seems, had not only made very accurate observations on human faces, but was very expert in mimicking such as were any way remarkable. When he had a mind to penetrate into the inclinations of those he had to deal with, he composed his face, his gesture, and his whole body, as nearly as he could, into the exact similitude of the person he intended to examine; and then carefully examined what turn of mind he seemed to acquire by this change. So that, says our author, he was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people as effectually as if he had been changed into the very men. We may observe, that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or daring men, our minds are involuntarily turned to that passion whose appearance we endeavour to imitate; nay, it seems hard to avoid it, though one strove to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures. Our minds and bodies are so closely and intimately connected, that one is incapable of pain and pleasure without the other. Campanella, of whom we have been speaking, could so abstract his attention from any sufferings of his body, that he was able to en-

dure the rack itself without much pain: and in lesser pains, every body must have observed that when we can employ our attention on any thing else, the pain has been for some time suspended: on the other hand, if by any means the body is indisposed to perform such gestures, or to be stimulated into such emotions as any passion usually produces in it, that passion itself never can arise, though its cause should be ever so strongly in action; though it should be merely mental, and immediately affecting none of the senses: As an opiate, or spirituous liquors, shall suspend the operation of grief, or fear, or anger, in spite of all our efforts to the contrary: and this, by inducing in the body a disposition contrary to that which it receives from these passions.—*Burke*.

PARABLE AGAINST PERSECUTION.
—AND it came to pass after these things, that Abraham sat in the door of his tent, about the going down of the sun. And behold a man bent with age, coming from the way of the wilderness leaning on his staff. And Abraham arose, and met him, and said unto him, Turn in, I pray thee, and wash thy feet, and tarry all night; and thou shalt arise early in the morning, and go on thy way. And the man said, Nay; for I will abide under this tree. But Abraham pressed him greatly: so he turned, and they went into the tent: and Abraham baked unleavened bread, and they did eat. And when Abraham saw that the man blessed not God, he said unto him, Wherefore dost thou not worship

the most high God, Creator of heaven and earth? And the man answered and said, I do not worship thy God, neither do I call upon his name; for I have made to myself a god, which abideth always in my house, and provideth me with all things. And Abraham's zeal was kindled against the man; and he arose, and fell upon him, and drove him forth with blows into the wilderness. And God called unto Abraham, saying, Abraham, where is the stranger? And Abraham answered and said, Lord, he would not worship thee, neither would he call upon thy name; therefore have I driven him out from before my face into the wilderness. And God said, Have I borne with him these hundred and ninety and eight years, and nourished him, and clothed him, notwithstanding his rebellion against me; and couldst not thou, who art thyself a sinner, bear with him one night?—*Franklin.*

PARDON OF CRIMINALS.—Clemency is a virtue which belongs to the legislator, and not to the executor of the laws; a virtue which ought to shine in the code, and not in the private judgment. To show mankind, that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment is not the necessary consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity, and is the cause of their considering every punishment inflicted as an act of injustice and oppression. The prince in pardoning, gives up the public security in favour of an individual, and, by his ill-judged benevolence, proclaims a public act of impunity. Let then the executors of the laws be in-

exorable; but let the legislators be tender, indulgent, and humane. He is a wise architect, who erects his edifice on the foundation of self-love, and contrives that the interest of the public shall be the interest of each individual; who is not obliged, by particular laws and irregular proceedings, to separate the public good from that of individuals, and erect the image of public felicity on the basis of fear and distrust; but, like a wise philosopher, he will permit his brethren to enjoy, in quiet, that small portion of happiness which the immense system established by the first cause, permits them to taste on this earth. A small crime is sometimes pardoned, if the person offended choose to forgive the offender. This may be an act of good-nature and humanity, but it is contrary to the good of the public. For, although a private citizen may dispense with satisfaction for the injury he has received, he cannot remove the necessity of example—*Beccaria.*

PARENTAL AFFECTION.—It is the constant hourly attention that a mother gives to her child, an attention that commences on her part before it is born, and not any thing properly instinctive, that is the cause of the idea of it becoming associated with almost every idea and affection of her soul, which is the source of maternal tenderness; a kind of tenderness that the father seldom feels any thing of till some months afterwards, when it is acquired by the same attention: hence it is that a sickly child generally gets the largest share of

its parents' love. For the same reason also, nurses that are not mothers feel more of this tenderness than the mothers who send their children out to nurse. The same familiar intercourse, that endears a child to a parent, does likewise endear the parent to the child; and to expect these affections without such intercourse and attention, is the same thing as expecting the harvest without a previous seed-time. This intercourse, and those endearments, which gradually supply the associations that constitute parental affection, are mechanical things, and cannot be acquired without the association of the proper ideas and sensations which only time and intercourse can supply.—*Priestly.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—A mother idolizes her son; I love him, says she, for his own sake. However, one might reply, you take no care of his education, though you are in no doubt that a good one would contribute infinitely to his happiness: why, therefore, do not you consult some men of sense about him, and read some of the books written on that subject? Why, because, says she, I think I know as much of that matter as those authors and their works. But how did you get this confidence in your own understanding? Is it not the effect of your indifference? An ardent desire always inspires us with a salutary distrust of ourselves. If we have a suit at law of considerable consequence, we visit counsellors and attorneys, we consult a great number, and examine their advice. Are we attacked by

any of those lingering diseases, which incessantly place around us the shades and horrors death we go to physicians, compare their opinions, read medical books, and in some degree become physicians, ourselves. Such is the conduct of a man very much interested. With respect to the education of children, if you are not influenced in the same manner, it is because you do not love your son so well as yourself. But, adds the mother, What then should be the motive of my tenderness? Among fathers and mothers, I reply, some are influenced by the desire of perpetuating their name in their children; they properly love only their names: others are fond of command, and see in their children their slaves. The animal leaves its young when their weakness no longer keeps them in dependence; and paternal love becomes extinguished in almost all hearts, when children have by their age and station attained to independence. Then, said the poet Saadi, the father sees nothing in them but greedy heirs; and this is the cause, adds some poet, of the extraordinary love of the grandfather for his grandchildren; he considers them as the enemies of his enemies. There are fathers and mothers who make their children their playthings and their pastimes. The loss of this play-thing would be insupportable to them; but would their affliction prove that they loved the child for itself? Every body knows the story of M. de Lauzun; when he was in the Bastille, without books, without employment, a prey to lassi-

tude and the horrors of a prison, he took it into his head to tame a spider. This was the only consolation he had left in his misfortune. The governor of the Bastille, from an inhumanity common to men accustomed to see the unhappy, crushed the spider. The prisoner felt the most cutting grief; and no mother could be affected by the death of an only son with a more violent sorrow. Now, whence is derived this conformity of sentiments for such different objects? It is because, in the loss of a child, or in the loss of the spider, people frequently weep for nothing but for the lassitude and want of employment into which they fall. If mothers appear, in general, more afflicted at the death of a child, than fathers employed in business, or given up to the pursuit of ambition, it is not because the mother loves her child more tenderly, but because she suffers a loss more difficult to be supplied. Errors in this respect, are very frequent; people rarely cherish a child for its own sake. That parental affection, of which so many people make a parade, and by which they believe themselves so warmly affected, is most frequently nothing more than an effect, either of a desire of perpetuating their names, of the pride of command, or the fear of the wearisomeness of inaction.—*Helvetius*.

PARLIAMENT OF BRITAIN, THE INDEPENDENCY OF THE.—Men are generally more honest in their private than in their public capacity; and will go greater lengths to serve a party, than

when their own private interest is alone concerned. Honour is a great check upon mankind: But where a considerable body of men act together, this check is in a great measure removed: since a man is sure to be approved by his own party for what promotes the common interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of adversaries. When there offers, therefore, to our censure and examination, any plan of government, real or imaginary, where the power is distributed among several courts, and several orders of men, we should always consider the private interest of each court and each order; and if we find that, by the skilful division of power, private interest must necessarily in its operation concur with public, we may pronounce that government to be wise and happy. If, on the contrary, the private interest of each order is not checked, and be not directed to public interest, we ought to look for nothing but faction, disorder, and tyranny, from such a government. The share of power allotted by the British constitution to the House of Commons is so great, that it absolutely commands all the other parts of the government. The king's legislative power is plainly no proper check to it. For though the King has a negative in framing laws; yet this, in fact, is esteemed of so little moment, that whatever is voted by the two Houses, is always sure to be passed into a law, and the Royal assent is little better than a form. The principal weight of

the Crown lies in the executive power. But besides that, the executive power in every government is altogether subordinate to the legislature; besides this, I say, the exercise of this power requires an immense expence; and the Commons have assumed to themselves the sole power of granting money. How easy, therefore, would it be for that House to wrest from the Crown all these powers, one after another, by making every grant conditional, and choosing their time so well, that their refusal of subsidies should only distress the government, without giving foreign powers any advantage over us? — By what means is this member of the British constitution confined within the proper limits, since, from the very constitution, it must necessarily have as much power as it demands, and can only be confined by itself? How is this consistent with our experience of human nature? I answer, that the interest of the body is here restrained by the interest of individuals; and that the House of Commons stretches not its power, because such an usurpation would be contrary to the interest of the majority of its members. The Crown has so many offices at its disposal, that, when assisted by the honest and disinterested part of the House, it will always command the resolution of the whole: so far, at least, as to preserve the ancient constitution from danger. We may, therefore, give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious appellations of *corruption* and

dependence; but some degree and some kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed government.

All questions concerning the proper medium between extremes are difficult to be decided; both because it is not easy to find words to fix this medium, and because the good and ill, in such cases, run so gradually into each other, as even to render our sentiments doubtful and uncertain. But there is a peculiar difficulty in the present case, which would embarrass the most knowing and impartial examiner. The power of the Crown is always lodged in a single person, either king or minister; and as this person may have either a greater or less degree of ambition, capacity, courage, popularity, or fortune, the power which is too great in one hand, may become too little in another. By that influence of the Crown, which I would justify, I mean only that arising from the offices and honors which are at the disposal of the Crown. As to private *bribery*, it may be considered in the same light as employing spies; which is scarcely justifiable in a good minister, and is infamous in a bad one: but to be a spy, or to be corrupted, is always infamous under all ministers, and is to be regarded as a shameless prostitution. Polybius justly esteems the pecuniary influence of the senate and censors, to be one of the regular and constitutional weights which preserved the balance of the Roman government.—*Hume*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—It may

be questioned whether the progress to absolute slavery and insecurity would be more rapid, if the King were *nominally* arbitrary, or only virtually so; by uniformly influencing the House of Commons. In some respects, so large a body of men would venture upon things which no single person would choose to do of his own authority; and so long as they had little intercourse but with one another, they would not be much affected with the sense of fear or shame. One may safely say, that no single member of the House would have had the assurance to decide as the majority have often done in cases of controverted elections. Whenever the House of Commons shall be so abandonedly corrupt, as to join with the Court in abolishing any of the essential forms of the constitution, or effectually defeating the great purposes of it, let every Englishman, before it is too late, re-peruse the history of his country, and do what Englishmen are renowned for having done formerly in the same circumstances.—Where civil liberty is entirely divested of its natural guard, political liberty, I should not hesitate to prefer the government of one to that of a number; because a sense of shame would have less influence upon them, and they would keep one another in countenance, in cases in which any single person would yield to the sense of the majority.

—*Priestly.*

PASSIONS, THE ORIGIN OF.—We must distinguish the passions into two kinds; those immediately given us by nature, and those we owe to the establishment of so-

ciety. And to know which of these passions has produced the other, let us transport ourselves in idea to the first ages of the world; and we shall there see that nature, by hunger, thirst, heat, and cold, informed man of his wants, and added a variety of pleasing and painful sensations; the former to the gratifications of these wants, the latter to the incapacity of gratifying them. There we shall behold man capable of receiving the impressions of pleasure and pain, and born as it were with a love for the one and hatred for the other. Such was man when he came from the hand of nature. In this state he had neither envy, pride, avarice, or ambition; sensible only of the pleasure and pain derived from nature, he was ignorant of all those artificial pains and pleasures we procure from the above passions. Such passions then are not immediately given by nature; but their existence, which supposes that of society, also supposes that we have in us the latent seeds of those passions. If, therefore, we receive at our birth only wants, in those wants, and in our first desires, we must seek the origin of these artificial passions.—*Helvetius.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—They certainly do not attach clear ideas to the word *passions*, who regard them as detrimental. Our desires are our motives; and it is the force of our desires which determines that of our virtues and vices. A man without desire and without want, is without invention and without reason. No motive can engage him to com-

bine or compare his ideas with each other. The more a man approaches to that state of apathy, the more stupid he becomes. To attempt to destroy the passions of *men*, is to attempt to destroy their action. Does the theologian rail at the passions? He is the pendulum that mocks its spring, and the effect that mistakes its cause. By annihilating the desires, you annihilate the mind; every man without passions, has within him no principle of action, nor motive to act.---*Helvetius*.

PASSIONS, DIFFERENT, RECIPROCALLY INSULT EACH OTHER.—Let a woman, young, beautiful, and full of gallantry, such as history has painted the celebrated Cleopatra, who by the multiplicity of her charms, the attractions of her wit, the variety of her caresses, makes her lover daily taste all the delights that could be found in inconstancy, and in short, whose first enjoyment was, as Echard says, only the first favour; let such a woman appear in an assembly of prudes, whose age and deformity secure their chastity; they will there despise her charms and her talents: sheltered from seduction by the Medusean shield of deformity, these prudes form no conception of the pleasure arising from the infatuation of a lover; and do not perceive the difficulty a beautiful woman finds in resisting the desire of making him the confidant of all her secret charms: they therefore fall with fury upon this lovely woman, and place her weakness among crimes of the blackest die: but let one of these prudes in her turn ap-

pear in a circle of coquets, she will there be treated with as little respect as youth and beauty shew to old age and deformity. To be revenged on her prudery, they will tell her, that the fair who yields to love, and the disagreeable who resists that passion, are both prompted by vanity; that in case of a lover, one seeks an admirer of her charms, and the other flies from him who proclaims her disgrace; and that both being animated by the same motive, there is no other difference but that of beauty between the prude and the woman of gallantry.—*Helvetius*.

PASSIONS, THE, SOURCES OF ERROR.

—The passions lead us into error, because they fix our attention to that particular part of the object they present to us, not allowing us to view it on every side. A king passionately affects the title of conqueror; and inebriated with the hopes of victory, he forgets that fortune is inconstant, and that the victor shares the load of misery almost equally with the vanquished. He does not perceive, that the welfare of his subjects is only a pretence for his martial frenzy, and that pride alone forges his arms, and displays his ensigns; his whole attention is fixed on the pomp of the triumph.—Fear, equally powerful with pride, will produce the same effect: it will raise ghosts and phantoms, and disperse them among the tombs; and in the darkness of the woods, present them to the eyes of the affrighted traveller; seize on all the faculties of the soul, without leaving any one at liberty to reflect on the absurdity of the mo-

heavenly present. The names of Seneca, of the elder and younger Pliny, of Tacitus, of Plutarch, of Galen, of the stoic Epictetus, and of the emperor Marcus Antoninus, adorn the age in which they flourished, and exalt the dignity of human nature. They filled with glory their respective stations, either in active or contemplative life; their excellent understandings were improved by study: philosophy had purified their minds from the prejudices of the popular superstition; and their days were spent in the pursuit of truth, and in the practice of virtue. Yet all these sages overlooked or rejected the perfection of the Christian system. Their language or their silence equally discover their contempt for the growing sect; which, in their time, had diffused itself over the Roman empire. Those of them who condescend to mention the Christians, consider them only as obstinate and perverse enthusiasts, who exacted an implicit submission to their mysterious doctrines, without being able to produce a single argument that could engage the attention of men of sense and learning.

It is at least doubtful whether any of these philosophers perused the apologies which the primitive Christians repeatedly published in behalf of themselves and their religion: but it is much to be lamented that such a cause was not defended by abler advocates. They expose, with superfluous wit and eloquence, the extravagance of polytheism. They interest our com-

passion by displaying the innocence and sufferings of their injured brethren: but when they would demonstrate the divine origin of Christianity, they insist much more strongly on the predictions which announced, than on the miracles which accompanied the appearance of the Messiah. Their favourite argument might serve to edify a Christian, or to convert a Jew, since both the one and the other acknowledge the authority of those prophecies, and both are obliged, with devout reverence, to search for their sense and their accomplishment. But this mode of persuasion loses much of its weight and influence, when it is addressed to those who neither understand nor respect the Mosaic dispensation, and the prophetic style. In the unskilful hands of Justin, and the succeeding apologists, the sublime meaning of the Hebrew oracles evaporates in distant types, affected conceits, and cold allegories; and even their *authenticity* was rendered suspicious to an unenlightened Gentile, by the mixture of *pious forgeries*, which, under the names of Orpheus, Hermes, and the Sibyls, were obtruded on him as of equal value with what were looked upon as the genuine inspirations of heaven.

But how shall we excuse the supine inattention of the Pagan and philosophic world to those evidences which were presented by the hand of omnipotence, not to their *reason*, but to their *senses*? During the age of Christ, of his apostles, and of their first disciples, the doc-

trine which they preached was confirmed by innumerable prodigies. The lame walked, the blind saw, the sick were healed, the dead were raised, dæmons were expelled, and the laws of nature were, or appeared to be frequently suspended, for the benefit of the church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and pursuing the ordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any alterations in the moral or physical government of the world. In the reign of Tiberius, we are told that the whole earth, or, at least, a celebrated province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event which ought to have excited the wonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science and history. It happened during the life-time of Seneca, and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate effects, or received the earliest intelligence of the prodigy. Each of these philosophers, in a laborious work, has recorded all the great phenomena of nature, earthquakes, meteors, comets, and eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye has been witness since the creation of the globe. A distinct chapter of Pliny is designed for eclipses of an extraordinary nature and unusual duration; but he contents himself with describing the singular defect of light which fol-

lowed the murder of Cæsar, when during the greatest part of the year, the orb of the sun appeared pale and without splendour. This season of obscurity, which cannot surely be compared with the preternatural darkness of the passion, had been already celebrated by most of the poets and historians of that memorable age; who, however wonderful it may seem, make no mention of Christ, or of his miracles, although they appeared in a province of the Roman empire. —*Gibbon*.

PHILOSOPHY. — The surest sign whereby to judge of any philosophy, is by its fruits or usefulness in supplying the necessities of mankind, and improving the practical arts whereon the accommodations of life principally depend. We are not, therefore, to form a judgment of any philosophy from its show and appearance, the greatness of its authors, the antiquity of its origin, the multitude of its admirers, the reputation it has gained among learned men, nor even from general consent itself; but principally from its use, or the tendency it has to improve the mind, enlarge the human powers, and give us a command over nature. The cultivation of natural philosophy is the foundation of all philosophical knowledge, or the true matter whereof science should be formed. —*Bacon*.

PHILOSOPHY, ANCIENT GREEK. — The ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three great branches; *Physics*, or natural philosophy; *Ethics*, or moral philosophy; and *Logic*. This

general division seems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things.

The great phenomena of nature, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, eclipses, comets, thunder, lightning, and other extraordinary meteors; the generation, the life, growth, and dissolution of plants and animals; are objects which, as they necessarily excite the wonder, so they naturally call forth the curiosity of mankind to inquire into their causes. Superstition first attempted to satisfy this curiosity, by referring all those wonderful appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards endeavoured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such as mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As those great phenomena are the first objects of human curiosity; so the science which pretends to explain them must naturally have been the first branch of philosophy that was cultivated. The first philosophers, accordingly, of whom history has preserved any account, appear to have been natural philosophers.

In every age and country of the world men must have attended to the characters, designs and actions of one another; and many reputable rules and maxims for the conduct of human life, must have been laid down and approved of by common consent. As soon as writing came into fashion, wise men, or those who fancied themselves such, would naturally endeavour to increase the number of those established and respected max-

ims, and to express their own sense of what was either proper or improper conduct; sometimes in the more artificial form of apologies, like what are called the fables of Æsop; and sometimes in the more simple one of apophthegms, or wise sayings, like the Proverbs of Solomon, the verses of Theognis and Phocylides, and some part of the works of Hesiod. They might continue in this manner for a long time, merely to multiply the number of those maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempting to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical order, much less to connect them together by one or more general principles, from which they were all deducible, like effects from their natural causes. The beauty of a systematical arrangement of different observations connected by a few common principles, was first seen in the rude essays of those ancient times towards a system of natural philosophy. Something of the same kind was afterwards attempted in morals. The maxims of common life were arranged in some methodical order, and connected together by a few common principles in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect the phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and explain those connecting principles, is what is properly called Moral Philosophy.

Different authors gave different systems both of natural and moral philosophy. But the arguments by which they supported those different systems

far from being always demonstrations, were frequently at best but very slender probabilities, and sometimes mere sophisms, which had no other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language. Speculative systems have in all ages of the world been adopted, for reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of common sense in a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross sophistry has scarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind, except in matters of philosophy and speculation; and in these it has frequently had the greatest. The patrons of each system of natural and moral philosophy naturally endeavour to expose the weakness of the arguments adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In examining those arguments, they were necessarily led to consider the difference between a probable and a demonstrative argument, between a fallacious and a conclusive one; and logic, or the science of the general principles of good and bad reasoning, necessarily arose out of the observations which a scrutiny of this kind gave occasion to. Though in its origin posterior both to physics and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not indeed in all, but in the greater part of the ancient schools of philosophy, previously to either of those sciences. The student, it seems to have been thought, ought to understand well the difference between good and bad reasoning, before he was led to reason upon subjects

of so great importance. — *A. Smith.*

PHILOSOPHY, MODERN. — In the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature either of the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of physics. Those beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to consist, were parts of the great system of the universe, and parts, too, productive of the most important effects. Whatever human reason could either conclude or conjecture concerning them, made, as it were, two chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great system of the universe. But in the universities of Europe, where philosophy was taught only as subservient to theology, it was natural to dwell longer upon these two chapters than upon any other of the science. They were gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many inferior chapters; till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can be known, came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy, as the doctrine of bodies, of which so much can be known. The doctrines concerning those two subjects were considered as making two distinct sciences. What are called metaphysics or pneumatics were set in opposition to physics, and were cultivated not only as the more sublime, but for the purposes of a particular profession, as the more useful science of the two. The proper subject of experiment and observation, a

subject in which a careful attention is capable of making so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely neglected. The subject in which, after a few very simple and almost obvious truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and uncertainty, and can consequently produce nothing but subtleties and sophisms, was greatly cultivated.

When those two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another, the comparison between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was called Ontology, or the science which treated of the qualities and attributes which were common to both the subjects of the other two sciences. But if subtleties and sophisms composed the greater part of the metaphysics or pneumatology of the schools, they composed the whole of this cobweb science of ontology; which was likewise sometimes called metaphysics.

Wherein consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, considered not only as an individual, but as the member of a family, of a state; and of the great society of mankind, was the object which the ancient moral philosophy proposed to investigate. In that philosophy the duties of human life were treated of as subservient to the happiness and perfection of human life. But when moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come. In the ancient

philosophy, the perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in this life. In the modern philosophy, it was frequently represented as generally, or rather as almost always, inconsistent with any degree of happiness in this life; and heaven was to be earned only by penance and mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a monk; not by the liberal, generous, and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry and an ascetic morality made up, in most cases, the greater part of the moral philosophy of the schools. By far the most important of all the different branches of philosophy, became in this manner by far the most corrupted.

Such, therefore, was the common course of philosophical education in the greater part of the universities in Europe. Logic was taught first: Ontology came in the second place: Pneumatology, comprehending the doctrine concerning the nature of the human soul and of the Deity, in the third; In the fourth followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which was considered as immediately connected with the doctrines of pneumatology, with the immortality of the human soul, and with the rewards and punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be expected in a life to come: A short and superficial system of physics usually concluded the course.

The alterations which the universities of Europe thus introduced into the ancient course of

philosophy, were all meant for the education of ecclesiastics, and to render it a more proper introduction to the study of theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry and the ascetic morality which those alterations introduced into it, certainly did not render it more proper for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or more likely either to improve the understanding, or to mend the heart.

This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the greater part of the universities of Europe; with more or less diligence, according as the constitution of each particular university happens to render diligence more or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the richest and best endowed universities, the tutors content themselves with teaching a few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted course; and even these they commonly teach very negligently and superficially.

The improvements which, in modern times, have been made in several different branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been made in universities; though some no doubt have. The greater part of universities have not even been very forward to adopt those improvements after they were made; and several of those learned societies have chosen to remain for a long time the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection, after they had been hunted out of every other

corner in the world. In general, the richest and best endowed universities have been the slowest in adopting those improvements, and the most averse to permit any considerable change in the established plan of education. Those improvements were more easily introduced into some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, depending upon their reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more attention to the current opinions of the world.

But though the public schools and universities of Europe were originally intended only for the education of a particular profession, that of churchmen, and though they were not always very diligent in instructing their pupils even in the sciences which were supposed necessary for that profession; yet they gradually drew to themselves the education of almost all other people, particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of fortune. No better method, it seems, could be fallen upon of spending, with any advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which men begin to apply in good earnest to the real business of the world, the business which is to employ them during the remainder of their days. The greater part of what is taught in schools and universities, however, does not seem to be the most proper preparation for that business.

In England, it becomes every day more and more the custom to send young people to travel in

foreign countries immediately upon their leaving school, and without sending them to any university. Our young people, it is said, generally return home much improved by their travels. A young man who goes abroad at seventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one and twenty, returns three or four years older than he was when he went abroad; and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four years. In the course of his travels, he generally acquires some knowledge of one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is seldom sufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In other respects he commonly returns home more conceited, more unprincipled, more dissipated, and more incapable of any serious application either to study or to business, than he could well have become in so short a time had he lived at home. By travelling so very young, by spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most precious years of his life, at a distance from the inspection and controul of his parents and relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of his education might have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being rivetted and confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or defaced. Nothing but the discredit into which the universities are allowing themselves to fall, could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of travelling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father

delivers himself, at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as that of a son unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes.

Such have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for education.—*A. Smith.*

PHYSIOGNOMY.—The physiognomy, or countenance, is formed by a simple display of the traces already sketched out by nature: but besides this natural display of the features, they are insensibly fashioned into physiognomy by the frequent impression of certain affections of the mind. That these affections are impressed on the visage, is beyond doubt; and that such impressions, by frequent repetition, must necessarily become durable. Hence it is that a man's character may frequently be discovered in his face, without having recourse to mysterious explanations, which suppose a knowledge we are not endowed with.—In the countenance of a child there are only two affections which are strongly impressed, *i. e.* joy and grief: he laughs or he cries: the intermediate affections are nothing. He passes incessantly from one emotion to another; and this continual change prevents any permanent impression which might form a physiognomy: but at an age when, becoming more sensible, he is more powerfully and frequently affected, the impressions are too deep to be easily effaced; and from the habitual state of the mind results a certain arrangement of features, which in time becomes unalterable. Nevertheless, the physiognomy does

sometimes change at different ages: but whenever this happens, it may be remarked, that there is a change also of the habitual passions.—*Rousseau.*

PLEASURE, THE LOVE OF, AND THE LOVE OF ACTION, PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN NATURE.—There are two natural propensities, which we may distinguish in the most virtuous and liberal dispositions, the love of pleasure and the love of action. If the former is refined by art and learning, improved by the charms of social intercourse, and corrected by a just regard to œconomy, to health, and to reputation, it is productive of the greatest part of the happiness of private life. The love of action is a principle of a much stronger and more doubtful nature. It often leads to anger, to ambition, and to revenge; but when it is guided by the sense of propriety and benevolence, it becomes the parent of every virtue; and if those virtues are accompanied with equal abilities, a family, a state, or an empire, may be indebted for their safety and prosperity to the undaunted courage of a single man. To the love of pleasure we may therefore ascribe most of the agreeable, to the love of action, we may attribute most of the useful and respectable qualifications. The character in which both the one and the other should be united and harmonized, would seem to constitute the most perfect idea of human nature. The insensible and inactive disposition, which should be supposed alike destitute of both, would be rejected by the common consent of mankind, as

utterly incapable of procuring any happiness to the individual, or any public benefit to the world.—*Gibbon.*

POLYTHEISM.—The belief of a plurality of gods is one of the great errors with which the moderns reproach the Greeks and Romans. There seems to be no reason to infer that they had more than one Supreme God. We may read in a thousand different parts of their writings, that Zeus Jupiter is the master of gods and men. *Jovis omnia plena.* And the Apostle Paul himself gives the same testimony with regard to the ancients: “*In God we live, move, and have our being, as one of your poets expresses it.*” After this testimony, shall we presume to accuse our masters of not acknowledging a Supreme God?

We are not here to examine, whether there was in former times a Jupiter, king of Crete; whether he was made a god; or whether the Egyptians had twelve great gods, or eight; or whether the Jupiter of the Latins was one of this number! The present object of inquiry is only to know, whether the Greeks or Romans acknowledged a Divine Being, supreme over the rest of heavenly beings? This they are for ever repeating, and therefore we cannot but believe them. Let us only look into the admirable epistle of the philosopher Maximus of Medavra to St. Augustin. “There is one God” (says he) “without beginning, the common parent of all things, who has never begotten any one like himself. Who is the man so brutish or stupid, as to

"entertain a doubt thereof?" Thus does this Heathen, who wrote in the fourth century, declare the sentiments of all antiquity.

If I was to draw the veil of the Egyptian mysteries, I should there find the *Knef* by whom all things were produced, and who presides over all the other deities; I should find Methra among the Persians; Brama, among the Indians; and it is more than probable, that I should be able to demonstrate, that every well governed nation acknowledged a Supreme Being, who had other inferior gods subordinate to him. The Chinese have never acknowledged any more than one sole God for upwards of 4000 years. The Greeks and Romans admitted numberless superstitions. There is no doubt of it. Every one knows they adopted the most ridiculous fables; and to this I add, that they themselves laughed at them. The basis of their mythology, however, was founded in reason.

In the first place, allowing that the Greeks gave their heroes a place in heaven as a reward for their virtues; this was a most prudent and useful act of religion. What nobler incentive could have been proposed? The number of saints to whom the Catholics have raised temples and altars, infinitely exceed those of the Greek and Roman demigods and heroes. But their deified heroes, though they were admitted into the court, or partook of the favours of Zeus, the Demiurgos, the Eternal Lord,

they did not share his throne or power.

The second subject of reproach we have against them, is for admitting such a number of Gods into the government of the world. Neptune presides over the sea; Juno over the air; Eolus over the winds; Pluto, or Vecta, over the earth; Mars over the field of battle. Let us reject these genealogies, and condemn all their adventures, which never made any part of the basis of the Greek or Roman religion. But there seems no degree of folly in adopting beings of the second order, to whom some degree of power is given over us mortals. Do not we assign particular functions to several angels? There was a destroying angel who fought for the Jews: there was the angel of travellers, who served as a guide to Tobias. Michael was the tutelary angel of the Hebrew people. We are told in Daniel, that he fought with the angel of the Persians, and disputed with the angel of the Greeks. In the prophet Zachariah, we read of an angel of an inferior order, who gives an account to Michael of the state in which he found things upon earth. Every nation has its particular angel. The Septuagint version tells us in Deuteronomy, that the Lord divided the nations according to the number of the angels.—The Apostle Paul in the Acts addresses himself to the angel of Macedonia. These celestial spirits are often called by the name of gods, *Elcim*; in scripture; and the word that answers to *Deus*,

God, of all nations, does not constantly signify the Supreme Master of heaven and earth, but frequently a heavenly being, a being superior to man, though dependent on the Sovereign Lord of nature.

We may from hence conclude, that the ridicule or error does not lie in polytheism itself, but in the abuse made of that belief in the vulgar fables, and in the multitude of ridiculous deities which every one set up after his own fancy, which served as the amusements of the old women and children of Rome, and proves that the word *Deus* had very different acceptations. It is certain, *Deus Crepitus*, did not cause the same idea, as *Deus Divan*, and *Hominum Pater* the father of gods and men. The Roman pontiffs never gave a place in their temples to those little puppets, with which the good women used to fill their chambers and closets. The religion of the Romans was in the main extremely grave and rigid. Oaths were held inviolable.—They could not begin a war till the college of the *Feciales* had declared it just. A vestal, that was convicted of having broke her vow of virginity, was condemned to die. All which bespeaks a people rather rigid than ridiculous in their morals.

It may be asked, how a senate who imposed chains and laws upon whole nations, could suffer so many extravagances, and countenance such a heap of absurd fables among their pontiffs? It may be answered, wise men in all nations have made use of

fools. They willingly left the people in possession of their favourite feasts, the Luperalia and Saturnalia, as long as they continued obedient to authority.—The holy chickens which foretold victory to their armies, were exempted from the spit and the pot. Never let us be surprised, that the wisest governments have permitted the most ridiculous customs, or improbable fables. These customs, these fables, existed before those governments were formed; and we do not pull down an extensive and irregular city, merely for the sake of building it again by rule and compass.

But how happens it, some may say, that on the one hand we perceive so much philosophy and science, and on the other so much fanaticism? It is because science and philosophy came to the world a little before Cicero, and fanaticism had already been in being for many ages. Policy then said to Folly and Fanaticism, let us all live together as comfortably as we can.

The ancients taught and were instructed to look upon utility, and not truth, as the end of the national religion. Their maxims with regard to the public worship, were, *Quæ omnia sapiens servabit tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis gratia.* —Voltaire.

POLYTHEISM, THE CAUSE OF THE LONG DURATION OF.—The Pagan religion, despised by its own ministers, inveighed against by the philosophers, and neglected, the most frequently, by the people, was equally incapable of

striking a deep root, and of forming a code of doctrines difficult to be overthrown.

The credit which it maintained during a length of time is, notwithstanding, unquestionable.—To account, therefore, for all this, we must have recourse to some more distant cause; for it is not sufficient to demonstrate with Mr. Hunre, that polytheism is the first religion which must have offered itself to an untutored set of men; it is not even sufficient to have discovered that this religion was mild, and that its modes of worship were agreeable and ingenious: on the one hand, it may be answered, that it existed during the most polished ages; and, on the other hand, that the pain and cruelty attending its practices, have been already proved. We must therefore lead our observations still further; and we shall then discover in the system of politics, the true reason of the long duration of polytheism. Would we, in general, comprehend some circumstance from antiquity, we must not lose sight of two important facts; namely, that Asia hath been the cradle, as it were, of the sciences; and Greece, the cradle of poetry. From this single consequence a thousand considerations will naturally flow. The poets, the first amongst the Greeks who enjoyed the knowledge of any thing, have arranged, as well as they possibly could, all the materials which they were able to collect, from the sentiments of the Phenicians and Egyptians, relative to the origin of the world, and the generation of

gods: but these poets forged many new fables, which they mixed with the ancient fables, and particularly laboured at attempts to circulate delusive accounts concerning the origin of the Greeks; an origin for which they blushed to have been indebted to merchants, or a people of slaves. Amidst these poets, Homer quickly obtained the first rank. He composed so many tales, and spoke of such a multitude of things, that his books, in this respect, like the Koran, were of themselves sufficient to found a religion. And yet the oracle of Delphos, another poet, Lycurgus, who made metrical laws, pretending indeed that they were dictated by Apollo, but which he had stolen from the Cretans, Hesiod, and many others, began to form, from a very small number of acquired intelligences, and from a very great number of ingenious conjectures, a monstrous and gigantic scaffolding of materials. From all these poems, and all these oracles, arose a particular language, styled *Muthos* in opposition to *Logos*, which was the language of reason, and which did not prevail until some time afterwards. But the *Muthos* maintained its ground during whole ages; and as the poets had continually treated of the most interesting subjects, such as the origin of republics, the principles of legislation, the rights of magistracy, the limits of states, &c. poetry, or fable, or, if it be a more proper expression, religion, became, as it were, the general repository of archives, and the titles of the nobility of republics.

From thence sprang the obligation which united polity with religion, and the necessity which preserved tenets and ceremonies.—*Chatellur.*

POLYTHEISM, THE PRIMARY RELIGION OF MANKIND.—It is a matter of fact incontestable, that about 1700 years ago all mankind were idolators. The doubtful and sceptical principles of a few philosophers, or the theism, and that, too, not entirely pure, of one or two nations, form no objection worth regarding. Behold, then, the clear testimony of history. The further we mount up into antiquity, the more do we find mankind plunged into idolatry. The most ancient records of the human race still present us with polytheism as the popular and established system. Shall we assert, that, in more ancient times, before the knowledge of letters, or the discovery of any art or science, men entertained the principles of pure theism? That is, while they were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth; but fell into error as soon as they acquired learning and politeness. This assertion contradicts probability and experience. The savage tribes of America, Africa, and Asia, are all idolators. Not a single exception to this rule.

It seems certain, that according to the natural progress of human thought, the ignorant multitude must first entertain some groveling and familiar notion of superior powers, before they stretch their conception to that perfect Being, who bestowed order on the whole frame of nature. We may as reasonably

imagine, that men inhabited palaces before huts and cottages, or studied geometry before agriculture, as assert, that the Deity appeared to them a pure spirit, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, before he was apprehended to be a powerful, though limited, being, with human passions and appetites, limbs and organs. The mind rises gradually from inferior to superior: By abstracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of perfection: And slowly distinguishing the nobler parts of its frame from the grosser, it learns to transfer only the former, much elevated and refined, to its divinity. Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought, but some obvious and invincible argument, which might immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of theism, and make it overleap at one bound the vast interval which is interposed between the human and the divine nature. But though the order and frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords such an argument; yet this consideration could never have any influence on mankind when they formed their first rude notions of religion. The causes of such objects as are quite familiar to us, never strike our attention or curiosity; and however extraordinary or surprising these objects in themselves, they are passed over by the raw and ignorant multitude without much examination or inquiry. Adam rising at once in paradise, and in the full perfection of his faculties, would naturally, as represented by Milton, be astonished at the

glorious appearances of nature, the heavens, the air, the earth, his own organs and members; and would be led to ask, Whence this wonderful scene arose? But a barbarous, necessitous animal (such as man is on the first origin of society) pressed by such numerous wants and passions, has no leisure to admire the regular face of nature, or make inquiries concerning the cause of objects, to which, from his infancy, he has been gradually accustomed. On the contrary, the more regular and uniform, that is, the more perfect nature appears, the more he is familiarized to it, and the less inclined to scrutinize and examine it. A monstrous birth excites his curiosity, and is deemed a prodigy. It alarms him from its novelty; and immediately sets him a trembling, and sacrificing, and praying. But an animal, complete in all its limbs and organs, is to him an ordinary spectacle, and produces no religious affection or opinion. Ask him from whence that animal arose? he will tell you, From the copulation of its parents. And these, whence? from the copulation of theirs. A few removes satisfy his curiosity, and set the objects at such a distance that he entirely loses sight of them.

If men were at first led into the belief of one Supreme Being, by reasoning from the frame of nature, they could never possibly leave that belief in order to embrace idolatry; but the same principles of reason, which at first produced and diffused over mankind so magnificent an opinion, must be able, with great

facility, to preserve it. The first invention, or proof of any doctrine, is much more difficult than the supporting and retaining it.

There is a great difference between historical facts and speculative opinions; nor is the knowledge of the one propagated in the same manner with that of the other. An historical fact, while it passes by oral tradition from eye-witnesses and contemporaries, is disguised in every successive narration, and may at last retain but very small, if any, resemblance of the original truth on which it was founded. The frail memories of men, their love of exaggeration, their supine carelessness; these principles, if not corrected by books and writing, soon pervert the account of historical events, where argument or reasoning have little or no place, nor can ever recal the truth which has once escaped those narrations. It is thus the fables of Hercules, Theseus, Bacchus, are supposed to have been originally founded in true history, corrupted by tradition. But with regard to speculative opinions, the case is far otherwise. If these opinions be founded in arguments so clear and obvious as to carry conviction with the generality of mankind, the same arguments which at first diffused the opinions will still preserve them in their original purity. If the arguments be more abstruse, and more remote from vulgar apprehension, the opinions will always be confined to a few persons; and as soon as men leave the contemplation of the arguments, the

opinions will immediately be lost, and be buried in oblivion. Which ever side of the dilemma we take, it must appear impossible, that Theism could, from reasoning, have been the primary religion of the human race, and have afterwards by its corruptions, given birth to idolatry, and to all the various superstitions of the heathen world. Reason, when obvious, prevents these corruptions. When abstruse, it keeps the principles entirely from the knowledge of the vulgar, who are alone liable to corrupt any principles or opinions.—*Hume*.

POLYTHEISM, NOT THE PRIMARY RELIGION OF MANKIND.—David Hume, in his natural history of religion, produces strong reasons to prove that the first religion was Polytheism; and that before improved reason came to see there could only be one Supreme Being, men began with believing several gods.

It may, however, on the contrary, be presumed, that they began with worshipping only one god, and that afterwards human weakness adopted several others. It is not to be doubted but villages and country towns were prior to large cities; and that men were divided into small republics before they were united into large empires. It is very natural that a town, terrified at the thunder, distressed by the rain of its harvest, insulted by a neighbouring town, daily feeling its weakness, and every where perceiving an invisible power, soon came to say, there is some being above us which does us good and hurt. It seems

impossible that they should have said, there are two powers; For wherefore several? In every thing we begin with the simple, and then proceed to the compound; and often an improvement of knowledge brings us back again to the simple: this is the process of the human mind.

Which being was first worshipped? Was it the sun? Was it the moon? It is hardly credible. Only let us take a view of children, they are pretty nearly on a footing with ignorant men. The beauty and benefit of that luminous body, which animates nature, make no impression on them; as insensible are they of the conveniences we derive from the moon, or of the regular variations of its course; they do not so much as think of these things; they are accustomed to them. What men do not fear, they never worship. Children look up to the sky with as much indifference as on the ground; but at a tempest the poor creatures tremble, and run and hide themselves. I am inclined to think it was so with the primitive men. They who first observed the course of the heavenly bodies, and brought them to be objects of admiration and worship, must necessarily have had a tincture of philosophy: the error was too exalted for rude illiterate husbandmen.

Thus the cry of a village would have been no more than this: There is a power which thunders, which sends down hail on us, which causes our children to die; let us by all

means appease it: But which way? Why, we see that little presents will soothe angry people; let us try what little presents will do with this power. He must also, to be sure, have a name or title; and that which naturally presents itself first is, chief, master, lord: Thus is this power called My Lord. Hence it probably was that the first Egyptians called their god, Knef; the Syrians, Adoni; the neighbouring nations, Baal or Bel, or Molock or Meloc; the Scythians, Pape; all words signifying Lord, Master.

In like manner almost all America was found to be divided into multitudes of little colonies, all with their patron deity. The Mexicans and Peruvians, who were large nations, had but one only god; the latter worshipping Mango Kapack, and the other the god of war, whom they called Vilipusti, as the Hebrews had styled their lord *Sabaoth*. It is not from any superiority or exercise of reason that all nations began with worshipping only one deity; for had they been philosophers, they would have worshipped the universal God of nature, and not the god of a village; they would have examined the infinite testimonies acknowledged of a creating and preserving Being; they examined nothing, they only perceived: and such is the progress of our weak understanding. Every town perceived its weakness and want of a powerful protector. This tutelary and terrible being, they fancied to reside in a neighbouring forest, or mountain, or in a cloud. They fancied only one

such power, because in war the town had but one chief. This being they imagined to be corporeal, it being impossible they could have any other idea. They could not but believe that the neighbouring town had also its god. Accordingly Jephtha says to the inhabitants of Moab, "Wilt thou not possess that which Chemosh thy god giveth thee to possess? So whomsoever the Lord our God shall drive out from before us, them will we possess."

This speech from one foreigner to another is very extraordinary.

It is very natural that from the heat of fancy and a vague increase of knowledge, men soon multiplied their gods, and assigned guardians to the elements, seas, forests, springs, and fields. The more they surveyed the heavenly bodies, the greater must their astonishment have been. Well might they who worshipped the deity of a brook pay their adorations to the sun; and the first step being taken the earth was soon covered with deities; so that at length cats and onions came to be worshipped.

However, time must necessarily improve reason: accordingly it produced some philosophers, who saw that neither onions nor cats, nor even the heavenly bodies, had any share in the disposition of nature. All those philosophers, Babylonians, Persians, Egyptians, Scythians, Greeks, and Romans, acknowledged only one supreme God, rewarding and punishing.

This they did not immediately

make known to the people: for a word against onions and cats, spoken before old women and priests, would have cost a man his life: Those good people would have stoned him.

Well, what was to be done? Orpheus and others instituted *mysteries*, which the initiated swear by execrable oaths never to reveal; and of these mysteries the principal is the worship of one only God. This great truth spreads over half the earth: the number of the initiated swells immensely: the ancient religion indeed still subsists; but not being contrary to the tenet of God's unity it is connived at. The Romans had their Deus Optimus Maximus; the Greeks their Zeus, their supreme God. All the other deities are only intermediate beings; Heroes and emperors were classed among the gods, which meant no more than the blessed; for it is not supposed that Claudius, Octavius, Tiberius, and Caligula, were accounted creators of heaven and earth.

In a word, it seems certain, that in Augustus's time, all who had any religion acknowledged one supreme eternal God, with several classes of secondary deities; the worshipping of whom has since been called *idolatry*.—*Voltaire*.

POOR, RELIEF OF THE.—The best way of doing good to the poor, is not making them easy in poverty, but by driving them out of it. The more public provisions are made for the poor, the less they provide for themselves, and become poorer: And on the contrary, the less is done for

them, the more they do for themselves, and become richer. There is no country in the world where so many provisions are established for them as in England: so many hospitals to receive them when they are sick or lame, founded and maintained by voluntary charities; besides a general law made by the rich for the support of the poor. Under all these obligations, are the poor modest, humble, thankful, industrious? On the contrary, it may be affirmed, that there is no country in the world in which the poor are more idle, dissolute, drunken, and insolent. The day the parliament passed that law, it took away from before their eyes the greatest of all inducements to industry, frugality, and sobriety, by giving them a dependence on somewhat else than a careful accumulation during youth and health, for support in age and sickness. In short, a law to provide for the poor is a premium for the encouragement of idleness; and it has its effect in the increase of poverty. More will be done for the happiness of the poor by inuring them to provide for themselves, than could be done by dividing all the estates in the kingdom among them.—*Franklin*.

POPULACE, THE.—It is the populace which compose the bulk of mankind. Those which are not in this class are so few in number that they are hardly worth notice. Man is the same creature in every state; therefore that which is the most numerous, ought to be most respected. To a man capable of reflection, all civil distinctions are nothing;

He observes the same passions, the same feelings, in the clown and the man of quality. The principal difference between them consists in the language they speak; in a little refinement of expression; but if there be any real distinction, it is certainly to the disadvantage of the least sincere. The common people appear as they really are; and they are not amiable: If those in high life were equally undisguised, their appearance would make us shudder with horror. There is, say our philosophers, an equal allotment of happiness and misery to every rank of men; a maxim as dangerous as it is absurd. If all mankind are equally happy, it would be ridiculous to give ourselves any trouble to promote their felicity. Let each remain in his situation: let the slave endure the lash, the lame his infirmity, and let the beggar perish, since they would gain nothing by a change of situation. The same philosophers enumerate the pangs of the rich, and expatiate on the vanity of their pleasures. Was there ever so palpable a sophism? The pangs of a rich man are not essential to riches, but to the abuse of them. If he were even more wretched than the poor, he would deserve no compassion; because he is the creator of his own misery, and happiness was in his power. But the sufferings of the indigent are the natural consequences of his state; he feels the weight of his hard lot; no length of time nor habit can ever render him insensible of fatigue and hunger: neither wis-

dom nor good-humour can annihilate the evils which are inseparable from his situation. What avails it an Epictetus to foresee that his master is going to break his leg? Doth that prevent the evil? On the contrary, his foreknowledge adds greatly to his misfortune. If the populace were really as wise as we suppose them stupid, how could they act otherwise than as they do?—*Rousseau.*

POPULAR OPINION.—The popular opinion, in many instances, is as contemptible as it is ill-founded. It is oftentimes below the concern of a good man, and unworthy the notice of a wise one. A sovereign scorn of it has been esteemed the peculiar result of an elevation of soul, and an unequivocal indication of the truest wisdom. This superiority to current calumnies hath formed the poet's rhapsody, hath proved the philosopher's impenetrable armour, and supported the real patriot under the storms of obloquy, the pressure of exile, and the agonies of an ignominious death. On occasions of this sort, it is necessary, it is useful, it is laudable. It leads to generous plans of conduct, and it inspires resolution to attempt their accomplishment. It fortifies us against the probable event of ill success; and consoles us under the mortification of disappointment, the envious strife of tongues, and the envenomed shafts of low, illiberal reproach. When it is directed to these ends, and effects these purposes, it is the strength and blessing of those who possess it. But, then, its excellency entirely depends on this direction, and

these effects. We are, unhappily, on many accounts, disposed to extend its influence, and to overstretch its tone. Self-deception obscures our moral discernment, and renders us unjust and incompetent judges of our own motives to action. We sometimes, perhaps, mistake them involuntarily. But oftentimes through weakness which we might have prevented, or through wickedness which we are studious to conceal from our own view, we call that a contempt of popular rumour, which is no other than the lordly pride of intoxicated reason, or the sordid vanity of blind self-love.

*Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo
Ipse domi.*

For great occasions there are, when the public verdict is respectable, and the public censure awful!

Interdum vulgus rectum videt:

When enormous abuses extort a general and just disapprobation, then the "Vox populi" is, without a perversion of terms, "Vox Dei;" then God and man alike insulted, alike condemn. In this case, no station can justify inattention. An audience is due from the highest; and sovereigns themselves refuse to listen at the peril of their salvation.

* * *

POPULATION.—People increase in proportion to the number of marriages; and that greater in proportion to the ease and convenience of supporting a family. When a family can be easily supported, more persons marry, and earlier in life. As the increase of people depends on the encour-

agement of marriages, the following things must diminish a nation, viz. 1. The being conquered. 2. Loss of territory. 3. Loss of trade. 4. Loss of food. 5. Bad government and insecure property. 6. Heavy taxes. 7. The introduction of slaves. The negroes brought into the English sugar islands, have greatly diminished the whites there; the poor are by these means deprived of employment, while a few families acquire vast estates, which they spend on foreign luxuries; and educating their children in the habit of those luxuries, the same income is needed for the support of one that might have maintained one hundred. The whites who have slaves, not labouring, are enfeebled, and therefore not so generally prolific; the slaves being worked too hard, and ill fed, their constitutions are broken, and the deaths among them are more than the births; so that a continual supply is needed from Africa. The northern colonies having few slaves, increase in whites. Slaves also pejorate the families that use them; the white children become proud, disgusted with labour; and being educated in idleness, are rendered unfit to get a living by industry. Hence the prince that acquires new territory, if he finds it vacant, or if he removes the natives to give his own people room; the legislator that makes effectual laws for promoting of trade, increasing employment, improving land by more and better tillage, providing more food by fisheries, securing property, &c. and the man

that invents new trades, arts, manufactures, or new improvements in husbandry; may be properly called the *fathers* of their nation; as they are the cause of the generation of multitudes, by the encouragement they afford to marriage. As to privileges granted to the married, (such as the *jus trium liberorum* among the Romans) they may hasten the filling of a country that has been thinned by war or pestilence, or that has otherwise vacant territory; but cannot increase a people beyond the means provided for their subsistence. Foreign luxuries and needless manufactures, imported and used in a nation, do, by the same reasoning, increase the people of the nation that furnishes them, and diminish the people of the nation that uses them. Laws, therefore, that prevent such importations, and, on the contrary, promote the exportation of manufactures to be consumed in foreign countries, may be called (with respect to the people that make them) generative laws; as by increasing subsistence they encourage marriage. Such laws likewise strengthen a country doubly, by increasing its own population, and diminishing its neighbours. Some European nations prudently refuse to consume the manufactures of East India. They should likewise forbid them to their colonies; for the gain to the merchant is not to be compared to the loss, by these means, of people to the nation. Home luxury in the great, increases the nation's manufacturers employed by it,

who are many; and only tends to diminish the families that indulge in it, who are few. The greater the fashionable expence of any rank of people, the more cautious they are of marriage. Therefore luxury should never be suffered to become common. The great increase of offspring in particular families, is not always owing to greater fecundity of nature, but sometimes to examples of industry in the heads, and industrious education; by which the children are enabled to provide better for themselves, and their marrying early is encouraged from the prospect of good subsistence. To manners of this kind are owing the populousness of Holland, Switzerland, China, Japan, and most parts of Hindostan, &c. in every one of which the force of extent of territory and fertility of soil is multiplied, or their want compensated by industry and frugality. Natural fecundity is hardly to be considered; because the *vis generandi*, as far as we know, is unlimited, and because experience shows, that the numbers of nations are altogether governed by collateral causes; and among these, none is of so much force as quantity of subsistence; whether arising from climate, soil, improvement of tillage, trade, fisheries, secure property, conquest of new countries, and other favourable circumstances.

—*Franklin.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—There is in all men, both male and female, a desire and power of generation, more active than is ever universally exerted. The restraints which they lie under,

must proceed from some difficulties in their situation, which it belongs to a wise legislature to observe and remove. Almost every man who thinks he can maintain a family will have one, and the human species, at this rate of propagation, would more than double every generation. How fast do mankind multiply in every colony, or new settlement, where it is an easy matter to provide for a family; and where men are no ways straitened or confined as in long established governments? History tells us frequently of plagues, which have swept away the third or fourth part of a people: yet in a generation or two the destruction was not perceived, and the society had again acquired their former number. The lands which were cultivated, the houses built, the commodities raised, the riches acquired, enabled the people, who escaped, immediately to marry, and to rear families, which supplied the place of those who had perished. Where there is room for more people, they will always arise, even without the assistance of naturalization bills. It is remarked, that the provinces of Spain which send most people to the Indies, are most populous; which proceeds from their superior riches. Every wise, just and mild government, by rendering the condition of its subjects easy and secure, will always abound most in people, as well as in commodities and riches. A country, indeed, whose climate and soil are fitted for vines, will naturally be more populous than one which pro-

duces only corn; and that more populous than one which is only fitted for pasturage. In general, warm climates, as the necessities of the inhabitants, are there fewer, and vegetation more powerful, are likely to be most populous: But if every thing else be equal, it seems natural to expect, that wherever there are most happiness and virtue, and the wisest institutions, there will also be most people.—*Hume*.

POPULOUSNESS, THE, OF ANCIENT EUROPE.—It has been contended by many, that Europe, when ignorant and barbarous, was more populous than at present. The answer to their numerous citations, is, that ten acres of wheat will nourish more men than a hundred acres of heath, pasturage, &c.; that Europe was formerly covered with vast forests; and that the Germans lived on the produce of their cattle. This Cæsar and Tacitus affirms; and their testimony decides the question. A nation of herdsmen cannot be numerous. Civilized Europe is, therefore necessarily more populous than it was when barbarous and savage. It is a folly to have recourse to historians concerning this matter, who are often untrue or ill informed, when we have before us evident proofs of their falsehood. A country cannot support a great number of people without agriculture, unless it be by a miracle, and miracles are much more rare than falsehoods.—*Helvetius*.

POWER, THE ORIGIN OF OPINION CONCERNING INVISIBLE INTELLIGENT.—It must be allowed, that in order to carry men's at-

attention beyond the present course of things, or lead them into any inference concerning invisible intelligent power, they must be actuated by some passion, which prompts their thought and reflection; some motive, which urges their first inquiry. But what passion shall we here have recourse to, for explaining an effect of such mighty consequence? Not speculative curiosity surely, or the pure love of truth. That motive is too refined for men in ignorant ages and barbarous nations, and would lead men into inquiries concerning the frame of nature; a subject too large and comprehensive for their gross apprehensions. No passions, therefore, can be supposed to work upon such barbarians, but the ordinary affections of human life; the anxious concern for happiness, the dread of future misery, the terror of death, the thirst of revenge, the appetite for food and other necessities. Agitated by hopes and fears of this nature, especially the latter, men scrutinize, with a trembling curiosity, the course of future causes, and examine the various and contrary events of human life. And in this disordered scene, with eyes still more disordered and astonished, they see the first obscure traces of divinity.

We are placed in this world, as in a great theatre, where the true springs and causes of every event are entirely unknown to us; nor have we either sufficient wisdom to foresee, or power to prevent, those ills with which we are continually threatened. We hang in perpetual suspense be-

tween life and death, health and sickness, plenty and want; which are distributed amongst the human species by secret and unknown causes, whose operation is often unexpected and always unaccountable. These *unknown causes*, then, become the constant object of our hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers on which we have so entire a dependence.

In proportion as any man's course of life is governed by accident, we always find that he increases in superstition: as may particularly be observed of gamblers and sailors, who though, of all mankind, the least capable of serious consideration, abound most in frivolous and superstitious apprehensions. The gods, says Coriolanus, in Dionysius, have an influence in every affair; but above all in war, where the event is so uncertain. All human life, especially before the institution of order and good government, being subject to fortuitous accidents, it is natural that superstition should prevail every where in barbarous ages, and put men on the most earnest inquiry concerning those invisible powers who dispose of their happiness and misery.—Any of the human affections may lead us into the notion of invisible, intelligent power; hope as well as fear, gratitude as well as affliction: but if we examine our own hearts, or observe what passes around us, we shall find that men are much oftener

thrown on their knees by the melancholy than by the agreeable passions. Prosperity is easily received as our due; and few questions are asked concerning its cause or author. It begets cheerfulness, and activity, and alacrity, and a lively enjoyment of every social and sensual pleasure: and during this state of mind, men have little leisure or inclination to think of the unknown invisible regions. On the other hand, every disastrous accident alarms us, and sets us on inquiries concerning the principles whence it arose: apprehensions spring up with regard to futurity: and the mind, sunk in diffidence, terror, and melancholy, has recourse to every method of appeasing those sacred intelligent powers, on whom our fortune is supposed entirely to depend.—Even at this day, and in Europe, ask any of the vulgar, Why he believes in an Omnipotent Creator of the world? he will never mention the beauty of final causes, of which he is ignorant: He will not hold out his hand, and bid you contemplate the suppleness and variety of joints in his fingers, their bending all one way, the counterpoise which they receive from the thumb, the softness and fleshy parts of the inside of his hand, with all the other circumstances which render that member fit for the use for which it was destined. To these he has been long accustomed: and he beholds them with listlessness and unconcern. He will tell you of the sudden and unexpected death of such a one: the fall and bruise of such another; the ex-

cessive drought of this season; the cold and rains of another. These he ascribes to the immediate operation of Providence: and such events, as with good reasoners are the chief difficulties in admitting a Supreme Intelligence, are with him the sole arguments for it.—Convulsions in nature, disorders, prodigies, miracles, though the most opposite to the plan of a wise superintendant, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of religion: the causes of events seeming then the most unknown and unaccountable. We may conclude, therefore, upon the whole, that since the vulgar, in nations which have embraced the doctrine of Theism, still build it upon irrational and superstitious opinions, they are never led into that opinion by any process of argument, but by a certain train of thinking more suitable to their genius and capacity.—*Hume.*

POWER, THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF.—When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in any single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the *outward* senses. The mind feels no sentiment or *inward* impression from the succession of objects; consequently there is not, in any single particular instance, of

cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.—From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by the mere dint of thought and reasoning.

The scenes in the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted course: but the power or force which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of the body. We know that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but what is the connection between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of bodies in single instances of their operation: because no bodies discover any power which can be the original of this idea.

Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, says, That finding, from experience, that there are several new productions in matter, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive by this reasoning at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new original simple idea: as this philosopher himself confesses. This, therefore, can never be the origin of

that idea. Nor can external objects, as they appear to the senses, give us any idea of power or necessary connection by their operation in particular instances. This idea is derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and is copied from internal impressions. We are every moment conscious of internal power, while we feel that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our minds, in their operation. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy: and are certain, that we ourselves, and all other intelligent beings, are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our minds, and on the command which is exercised by the will, both over the organs of the body, and the faculties of the mind.—*Hume.*

PRACTICE OF CHRISTIANITY CONTRASTED WITH ITS PRECEPTS.

—The inconsistencies into which men are led by the profession of Christianity, arise chiefly from the excessive purity of its principles, contrasted with the violence of our passions, which it is unequal wholly to subdue, from the neglect of its *spirit*, occasioned by a mistaken attachment to *external forms*; and from a desiré in many zealous Christians to consider their religion as *something superior to the control and direction of reason.*

To these three causes we must attribute the inconsistencies of those, who having no design to deceive others, are deceived themselves; and never compare their conduct with that standard by which they constantly profess to be directed. To what else is it that we see so many political fanatics who pray to God for success in war without examining the justice of their cause, and thank him for victories in which thousands of innocent men have been murdered! The conduct of the world will ever be found inconsistent with those precepts which command us to "love our enemies, to do good to them that hate us, and when stricken on one cheek to offer the other," *for they are wholly incompatible with our nature.* They may be followed by a few individuals, but they never can be generally observed. Socrates judged more wisely on this subject than Jesus Christ. (See *Plato's Georgics.*)

That Bacon, Newton, and Locke, have written in defence of Christianity, is no proof that Christianity is true; it proves only that even the strongest minds cannot always overcome the force of early impressions.—*Burdon's Elements for Thinking.*

PRAYER.—The Hebrew books, in which there are so many strange stories, "passing all human understanding," tell us, that God created man after his own image. The unknown writer does not tell us from whom he derived this singular piece of information, but it does appear a little extraordinary, that the

Almighty Creator of that glorious luminary, the sun, with all its dependent planets, including this our earth, and all its wonderful productions, should, after all, be, to appearance, no more than one of ourselves. To many, this assertion in what is called the Mosaic account of the creation, does appear to savour more of blasphemy than any thing that ever emanated from the pen of Voltaire or Paine.

It is utterly impossible that we should ever know who the ignorant compiler or compilers of the Hebrew books were; as, till comparatively a late period, the knowledge of their existence was wholly confined to the insignificant, barbarous, and bloodthirsty horde who had the audacity to call themselves the chosen people of God. Beyond the small territory occupied by the Jews, not exceeding in extent and fertility the principality from which the eldest son of our king takes his title, these books were totally unknown, till about 270 years before Christ, when a translation of them was procured for the library at Alexandria, founded by the second Ptolemy, about 277 years before Christ. Where, or in what shape they existed before that time can never be known; and those who are inclined to place implicit faith in the modern Jews, may place what faith they please in the accounts given by their savage and illiterate ancestors, of the writing of their *sacred* books, and the sources from which the authors of them drew their information.

It appears that the presump-

tion of the compiler of the books was at least equal to his ignorance; for being desirous to give an account (and such an account!) of what he could not possibly know any thing about,—the creation and the Creator—and seeing that man was the most dignified being with which he was acquainted, he impiously makes God the same in appearance as man: for if man be like God, as he tells us he is, God must be like man. Nay, he not only makes him resemble man in his appearance, but he also ascribes to him many of the passions and imperfections of mankind. He makes him a Being requiring rest; he makes him capricious, *repenting* him of what he had done; he makes him cruel, ordering the extirpation of whole nations, and harshly punishing even unintentional faults: jealous to excess of the worship paid to him: unjust, for he punishes the sins of the fathers upon the children: in short, he makes the God of the Jews a compound of every thing that is bad in human nature—in one word, *a very Jew*.

In the same way that a proud, vain-glorious tyrant insists upon having homage paid to him by his dependants, so this writer makes *his* God delight in the worship paid to him by those he has created; fond of bloody sacrifices, and pleased with the savoury odour of their burnt offerings. Nay, he makes him give the most minute directions about every thing relating to his superstitious and unmeaning worship; even to the mak-

ing of the perfumes, lighting of the lamps, blowing of trumpets, &c. ! No busy-body, preparing for a feast, could be more occupied with it, or enter more into the detail of all the minutiae of it, than this ignorant Jew makes the Almighty Creator of the world to be ! Instead of finding him engaged in contemplating the beautiful spectacle of the universe he has created, we find him exclusively occupied with a villainous horde of barbarians in a desert ! Instead of finding him engaged in regulating the motions of the millions of worlds he has made, we find him directing the building of altars and tabernacles, the cutting up of victims, the preparing of burnt offerings, &c. even down to the most minute and disgusting details of domestic cleanliness !

It is upon such books that a certain religion is founded !—a religion which is become “part and parcel” of the law of some countries, and for publishing their doubts concerning which, the inhabitants are subjected to fine and imprisonment under the most grievous restrictions. These books, written nobody knows when, nor by whom; but most of them evidently the production of some ignorant barbarian !—These books, in which almost every page teems with gross absurdities; with impossibilities under the name of miracles; and with instances of indecency, cruelty, and breach of faith, not to be paralleled in any other books in the world ! These books are to be extolled as the works of inspired writers, and to be taken

as our infallible guides. We are from them to look upon God as a Being pleased with the eternal adulation and fawning of his creatures, and to be gained by the ceremonies of adoration, humiliation, and prayer!

When we have a favour to ask of our fellow men, we *beg* it of them; we *pray* them to grant it; a vanquished enemy *kneels* to his conqueror to entreat him to spare his life. And because we use these means towards our weak fellow-mortals, are we to suppose that the Almighty Creator of the universe is to be won by the same degrading means? Is it not blasphemous to imagine that our benevolent Maker is to be moved to hear us by the same means we would use to move a Dey of Algiers, or an Emperor of Morocco?

When will man, shaking off the prejudices with which, in all ages, priests have endeavoured to enslave his understanding, make use of his reason, and judge for himself? When will he discover that the true worship of the Deity consists not in empty forms and unmeaning ceremonies, in genuflexions and prayers, but in the grateful enjoyment of all that the goodness of God has set before him; and in endeavouring humbly to imitate his example by contributing as much as he can to the happiness of others? To pray to God to grant us this or that; is it not to ask him to substitute our will for his? To be guided by our fallible judgment, instead of his own, which is infallible?

He has made this world and all it contains: he has given it

certain rules essential to its endurance: he has provided in the most admirable manner for the continuation of every thing in it, animate and inanimate: his all-seeing eye overlooks the whole; but is it to be believed, that, distrustful of his own work, he is incessantly watching all the petty and trivial occurrences that take place in this *millionth part of the creation*; and that he is to be constantly listening to all the prayers and importunities which foolish mortals are perpetually addressing to him! Away with the vain thought! Enjoy with contentment what God has set before thee. Seek him not in edifices raised by the hand of man, but look round thee, and contemplate him in all his glorious works. Waste not that time in useless prayer, which might be more beneficially employed in assisting thy fellow-creatures. If thou hast not the ability to do works of active benevolence, make it the rule of thy conduct "never to do to others that which thou wouldest not they should do to thee." Do this; and leave prayers and the *theory* of religion to priests and monks, and their deluded votaries; confiding, that if "there is another and a better world," thou wilt be rewarded not according to thy *belief*, but according to thy *deeds*.—*Bowbridge*.

PREJUDICE.—There is a high degree of difficulty in questioning opinions established by time, by habits, and by education: every religious and political innovation is opposed by the timidity of some, the obstinacy and pride of

others, and the ignorance of the bulk of mankind, who are incapable of attention to reasoning and argument: and must, if they have any opinions, have opinions of prejudice. All improvements therefore in religion and politics must be gradual. There was a time when the most part of the inhabitants of Britain would have been as much startled at questioning the truth of the doctrine of transubstantiation, as they would, in this age, at the most sceptical doubts on the being of a God.—* *

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—The Chinese theologian, who proves the nine incarnations of Whisth-nou; and the Musselman, who, after the Koran, maintains, that the earth is carried on the horns of a bull; certainly found their opinions on ridiculous principles and prejudices: yet each of them, in his own country, is esteemed a person of sense. What can be the reason of this? It is because they maintain opinions generally received. In relation to religious truths, reason loses all her force against two grand missionaries, Example and Fear. Besides, in all countries, the prejudices of the great are the laws of the little. This Chinese and Musselman pass then for wise, only because they are fools of the common folly.—Certain countrymen, it is said, erected a bridge, and upon it carved this inscription: *The present bridge is built here*: If folly and stupidity of this kind must always excite laughter, why do not different absurdities in our own country make the same impression upon us? It is

because people freely ridicule the folly from which they think themselves exempt, because nobody repeats after the countrymen, *The present bridge is built here*.—*Helvetius*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—Men are vain, full of contempt, and consequently unjust, whenever they can be so with impunity. For which reason all men imagine, that on this globe there is no part of it, in this part of the earth no nation, in the nation no province, in the province no city, in the city no society, comparable to their own. We, step by step, surprise ourselves into a secret persuasion that we are superior to all our acquaintance. If an oyster confined within its shell, is acquainted with no more of the universe than the rock on which it is fixed, and therefore cannot judge of its extent; how can a man, in the midst of a small society, always surrounded by the same objects, and acquainted with only one train of thoughts, be able to form a proper estimate of merit without his own circle. Truth is never engendered or perceived but in the fermentation of contrary opinions. The universe is only known to us in proportion as we become acquainted with it. Whoever confines himself to conversing with one set of companions, cannot avoid adopting their prejudices, especially if they flatter his pride. Who can separate himself from an error, when vanity, the companion of ignorance, has tied him to it, and rendered it dear to him?

It is the philosopher alone who contemplates the manners,

laws, customs, religions, and the different passions that actuate mankind, that can become almost insensible both to the praise and satire of his cotemporaries; can break all the chains of prejudice, examine with modesty and indifference the various opinions which divide the human species; pass, without astonishment, from a seraglio to a chartrouse, reflect with pleasure on the extent of human folly, and see, with the same eye, Alcibiades cut off the tail of his dog, and Mahomet shut himself up in his cavern; the one to ridicule the folly of the Athenians, and the other to enjoy the adoration of the world. He knows, that our ideas necessarily proceed from the company we keep, the books we read, and the objects presented to our sight; and that a superior intelligence might divine our thoughts from the objects presented before us, and from our thoughts divine the number and nature of the objects offered to the mind.—The Arab persuaded of the infallibility of his Khalif, laughs at the credulity of the Tartar, who believes the Great Lama immortal. In Africa, the negro who pays his adorations to a root, the claw of a lobster, or the horn of an animal, sees nothing on the earth but an immense mass of deities, and laughs at the scarcity of gods among us; while the ill-informed Musselman accuses us with acknowledging three.—If a sage, descended from heaven, and in his conduct consulted only the light of reason, he would universally pass for a fool. All are so scrupulously attached

to the interest of their own vanity, that the title of wise is only given to the fools of the common folly. The more foolish an opinion is, the more dangerous it is to prove its folly. Fontenelle was accustomed to say, that if he held every truth in his hand, he would take great care not to open it to shew them to men.

In destroying of prejudices, we ought to treat them with respect: like the doves from the ark, we ought to send some truths on the discovery, to see if the deluge of prejudices does not yet cover the face of the earth; if error begins to subside; and if there can be perceived here and there some isles, where virtue and truth may find rest for their feet, and communicate themselves to mankind.—*Helvetius*.

PREJUDICE, THE VIRTUES AND VICES OF.—All those virtues originate from prejudice, the exact observance of which does not in the least contribute to the public happiness; such as the austerities of those senseless Fakirs with which the Indies are peopled: virtues that, being often indifferent, and even prejudicial to the state, are the punishment of those who make vows for the performance of them. These false virtues in most nations (for many of them are to be found in every nation under heaven) are more honoured than the true virtues; and those that practise them held in greater veneration than good citizens. Happy the people among whom the virtues which originate from prejudice and folly are only ridiculous, they are frequently extremely

barbarous. In the capital of Cochin they bring up crocodiles; and whoever exposes himself to the fury of one of these animals, and is devoured, is reckoned among the elect. What is more barbarous than the institution of convents among the Papists? In Martemban, it is an act of virtue, on the day when the idol is brought out, for the people to throw themselves under the wheels of his chariot; and whoever offers himself to this death, is reputed a saint. As there are virtues of prejudice, there are also vices of prejudice. It is one for a Bramin to marry a virgin. If, during the three months in which the people of Formosa are ordered to go naked, a man fastens upon him the smallest piece of linen, he wears, say they, a clothing unworthy of a man. The neglect, in Catholic countries, of fasts, confessions, penances, and pater noster, is a crime of the first magnitude. And there is, perhaps, no country where the people have not a greater abhorrence of some of these crimes of prejudice, than for villainies the most atrocious, and the most injurious to society.

Helvetius.

PREJUDICES, RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL.—It is a very true observation, and a very common one, that our affections and passions put frequently a bias so secret, and yet so strong, on our judgments, as to make them swerve from the direction of right reason: and on this principle we must account, in a great measure, for the different systems of philosophy and religion, about which men dispute so much,

and fight and persecute so often. But it is not so commonly observed, though it be equally true, that as extensive as this principle is in itself, since it extends to almost all mankind, the action of it in one single man is sometimes sufficient to extend the effects of it to millions. Many a system, and many an institution, has appeared and thrived in the world as a production of human wisdom raised to the highest pitch, and even illuminated by inspiration, which was owing, in its origin, to the predominant passion, or to the madness of one single man. Authority comes soon to stand in the place of reason. Men come to defend what they never examined, and to explain what they never understood. Their system, or their institution, to which they were determined by chance, not by choice, is to them that rock of truth on which alone they can be saved from error: they cling to it accordingly; and doubt itself was this rock to the Academicians.—*De rebus incognitis judicant, et ad quamcunque sunt disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tanquam ad saxum adhærescunt.* (Acad. quæst. lib. 2.)

All errors, even those of ignorance and superstition, are hard to remove when they have taken long hold of the minds of men, and especially when they are woven into systems of religion. But there are some from which men are unwilling to depart, and of which they grow fond by degrees. As men advance in knowledge, their self-conceit and curiosity are apt to

increase; and these are sure to be flattered by every opinion that gives man high notions of his own importance. What contradictions and inconsistencies are not huddled together in the human mind?—Superstition is produced by a sense of our weakness; philosophical presumption by an opinion of our strength; and superstition and presumption contribute alike to continue, to confirm, to propagate error.—Errors in rules of policy and law are easy to be corrected by experience, like errors in natural philosophy. Nay, the first are so the most; because how little regard soever philosophers may have to experience, in either case, the truth will force itself upon them, or others; in one, by the course of affairs; whereas it must be sought, to be had in the other. But when it is sought, it is obtained. Errors in theology and metaphysics cannot be thus corrected. Systems of laws and politics may be various; nay, contrary to one another; and yet be such as right reason dictates, provided they do not stand in opposition to any of the laws of our nature. But in theological reasonings, and those which are called metaphysical, the various opinions may be all false; or if they are not all so, one alone can be true. This consideration should have two effects. It should render philosophers and divines more cautious in framing opinions on such subjects, and less positive in maintaining them from the beginning. The very contrary has happened, to such a degree of extravagance, as must

seem delirious to every one who is not in the same delirium. Can he be less than mad, who pretends to contemplate an intellectual world, which he assumes in the dull mirror of his own mind; of which he knows little more than this, that it is both dull and narrow! Can he be less than mad, who perseveres dogmatically in this pretension, whilst he is obliged to own, that he arrives with many helps, much pains, and by slow degrees, to a little imperfect knowledge of the visible world which he inhabits; and concerning which he is, therefore, sober, and modest enough to reason hypothetically!—In a word, can he be less than mad, who boasts a revelation super-added to reason, to supply the defects of it; and who super-adds reason to revelation, to supply the defects of this too, at the same time?—This is madness, or there is no such thing incident to our nature.—All men are apt to have a high conceit of their own understandings, and to be tenacious of the opinions they profess: and yet almost all men are guided by the understandings of others, not by their own; and may be said more truly to adopt, than to beget, their opinions. Nurses, parents, pedagogues, and after them all, and above them all, that universal pedagogue Custom, fill the mind with notions which it has no share in framing; which it receives as passively as it receives the impressions of outward objects; and which left to itself, it would never have framed, perhaps, or would have

examined afterwards. Thus prejudices are established by education, and habits by custom. We are taught to think what others think, not how to think for ourselves; and whilst the memory is loaded, the understanding remains unexercised, or exercised in such trammels as constrain its motions, and direct its pace, till that which was artificial becomes in some sort natural, and the mind can go no other. It may sound oddly, but it is true in many cases, to say, that if men had learned less, their way to knowledge would be shorter and easier. It is indeed shorter and easier to proceed from ignorance to knowledge, than from error. They who are in the last, must unlearn, before they can learn to any good purpose: and the first part of this double task is not, in many respects, the least difficult; for which reason it is seldom undertaken. The vulgar, under which denomination we must rank, on this occasion, almost all the sons of Adam, content themselves to be guided by vulgar opinions. They know little, and believe much. They examine and judge for themselves in the common affairs of life sometimes: and not always even in these. But the greatest and noblest objects of the human mind are very transcendently at best, the object of theirs. On all these they resign themselves to the authority that prevails among the men with whom they live. Some of them want the means, all of them want the will to do more: and as absurd as this may appear in speculation, it is best perhaps

upon the whole, the human nature, and the nature of government considered, that it should be as it is.---*Bolingbroke.*

PROVISIONS, THE PRICE OF, THE INEFFECTUACITY OF LAWS TO REGULATE.—It is impracticable to fix the rates and prices of provisions and commodities by civil laws; and if it were possible to reduce the price of food by any other expedient than introducing plenty, nothing could be more pernicious and destructive to the public. Where the produce of a year, for instance, falls so far short, as to afford full subsistence only for nine months, the only expedient for making it last all the twelve, is to raise the prices, to put the people by that means on short allowance, and oblige them to spare their food till a more plentiful year.—But in reality, the increase of prices is a necessary consequence of scarcity; and laws, instead of preventing it, only increase the evil, by cramping and restraining commerce.—*Hume.*

PRIESTS.—The first priests were probably botanists, chemists, physicians, natural philosophers, and astronomers. These performed cures, showed wonders, and were in the rank of those impostors who, under the name of conjurers, continue to deceive the world. The poets took up the principles and actions of these men; personified some of them; and referred those they could not understand to the operations of invisible powers, with whom the impostors pretended to converse, and whose messengers and delegates they were supposed to be. These invisible beings, once in-

troduced into the system of nature, and being supposed to cure diseases, to perform miracles, and to foretel events, men were soon prevailed upon, not only to consign their health and fortunes to their direction, but even their understandings and senses; and to receive rules from them for the conduct of life, which could only be derived from those senses and understandings: rules which gradually deviated from the effects of experience, until all attention was transferred from experience to the priest, and religion was set in opposition to morality.—*Williams.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—Though all mankind have a strong propensity to religion at certain times and in certain dispositions, yet are there few or none who have it to that degree, and with that constancy, which is requisite to support the character of this profession. It must therefore happen, that clergymen being drawn from the common mass of mankind, as people are to other employments, by the views of profit, the greatest part, though no Atheists or Free-thinkers, will find it necessary, on particular occasions, to feign more devotion than they are at that time possessed of; and to maintain the appearance of fervor and seriousness, even when jaded with the exercises of their religion, or when they have their minds engaged in the common occupations of life. They must not, like the rest of the world, give scope to their natural movements and sentiments: they must set a guard over their

looks, and words, and actions: and in order to support the veneration paid them by the ignorant vulgar, they must not only keep a remarkable reserve, but must promote the spirit of superstition, by a continued grimace and hypocrisy. This dissimulation often destroys the candour and ingenuity of their temper, and makes an irreparable breach in their character.—If by chance any of them be possessed of a temper more susceptible of devotion than usual, so that he has but little occasion for hypocrisy to support the character of his profession, it is so natural for him to overrate this advantage, and to think that it atones for every violation of morality, that frequently he is not more virtuous than the hypocrite. And though few dare openly avow those exploded opinions, *That every thing is lawful to the saints, and that they alone have property in their goods*: yet may we observe, that these principles lurk in every bosom, and represent a zeal for religious observances as so great a merit, that it may compensate for many vices and enormities. This observation is so common, that all prudent men are on their guard when they meet with any extraordinary appearance of religion; though, at the same time, they confess, that there are many exceptions to this general rule; and that probity and superstition, or even probity and fanaticism, are not altogether, and in every instance, incompatible.

Most men are ambitious; but the ambition of other men may

commonly be satisfied, by excelling in their particular profession, and thereby promoting the interests of society. The ambition of the clergy can often be satisfied only by promoting ignorance, and superstition, and implicit faith, and pious frauds. And having got what Archimedes only wanted, (viz. another world on which he could fix his engines) no wonder they move this world at their pleasure.

Most men have an overweening conceit of themselves; but these have a peculiar temptation to that vice, who are regarded with such veneration, and are even deemed sacred, by the ignorant multitude.

Most men are apt to bear a particular regard for members of their own profession: but as a lawyer, or physician, or merchant, does each of them follow out his business apart, the interests of these professions are not so closely united, as the interests of clergymen of the same religion; where the whole body gains by the veneration paid to their common tenets, and by the suppression of antagonists.

Few men bear contradiction with patience: but the clergy proceed even to a degree of fury on this article: because all their credit and livelihood depend upon the belief which their opinions meet with; and they alone pretend to a divine and supernatural authority, or have any colour for representing their antagonists as impious and profane. The *odium theologicum*, or theological hatred, is noted even to a proverb; and means that degree of rancour which is

the most furious and implacable. —Revenge is a natural passion to mankind; but seems to reign with the greatest force in priests and women. Because, being deprived of the immediate exertion of anger, inviolence and combat, they are apt to fancy themselves despised on that account; and their pride supports their vindictive disposition.

Thus many of the vices in human nature are, by fixed moral causes, inflamed in that profession; and though several individuals escape the contagion, yet all wise governments will be on their guard against the attempts of a society who will for ever combine into one faction; and while it acts as a society, will for ever be actuated by ambition, pride, revenge, and a persecuting spirit.

The temper of religion is grave and serious; and this is the character required of priests, which confines them to strict rules of decency, and commonly prevents irregularity and intemperance among them. The gaiety, much less the excesses of pleasure, is not permitted in that body; and this virtue is, perhaps, the only one they owe to their profession. In religions, indeed, founded on speculative principles, and where public discourses make a part of religious services, it may also be supposed, that the clergy will have a considerable share in the learning of the times, though it is certain that their taste in eloquence will always be better than their skill in reasoning and philosophy. But whoever possesses the other noble virtues of humanity, meekness, and mo-

deration, as very many of them, no doubt, do, is beholden for them to nature or reflection, not to the genius of his calling.

It was no bad expedient in the old Romans, for preventing the strong effect of the priestly character, to make it a law, that none should be received into the sacerdotal office till he was past fifty years of age, (Dion. Hal. lib. 1.) The living a layman till that age, it is presumed, would be able to fix the character.

It is a trite, but not altogether a false maxim, that *priests of all religions are the same*; and though the character of the profession will not in every instance prevail over the personal character, yet it is sure always to predominate with the greater number. For, as chemists observe, that spirits when raised to a certain height are all the same, from whatever materials they are extracted; so these men, being elevated above humanity, acquire a uniform character, which is entirely their own, and which, in my opinion, is, generally speaking, not the most amiable that is to be met with in human society.

—*Hume.*

PRIMOGENITURE CONTRARY TO THE REAL INTEREST OF FAMILIES.—When land, like moveables, is considered as the means only of subsistence and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence and enjoyment may be supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law of succession accordingly took place among the Romans, who made no more distinction between elder and

younger, between male and female, in the inheritance of lands, than we do in the distribution of moveables. But when land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided to one. In those disorderly times, every great landlord was a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace, and their leader in war. He made war according to his own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, therefore, the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its neighbours. The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not immediately indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of monarchies, though not always at their first institution. That the power, and consequently the security, of the monarchy may not be weakened by division, it must descend entire to one of the children. To which of them so important a preference shall be given, must be determined by some general rule, founded not upon the doubtful distinctions of personal merit, but upon some plain and evident difference which can admit of no dispute. Among the same family, there

can be no indisputable difference but that of sex, and that of age. The male sex is universally preferred to the female; and when all other things are equal, the elder every where takes place of the younger. Hence the origin of the right of primogeniture, and of what is called lineal succession.

Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable, are no more. In the present state of Europe, the proprietor of a single acre of land is as perfectly secure of his possession as the proprietor of a hundred thousand. The right of primogeniture, however, still continues to be respected; and as of all institutions it is the fittest to support the pride of family distinctions, it is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing can be more contrary to the real interests of a numerous family, than a right which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children.

Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They were introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the law of primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original estate from being carried out of the proposed line, either by gift or devise, or alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its successive owners. They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither their substitu-

tions nor fideicommisses bear any resemblance to entails, though some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the modern institution in the language and garb of those ancient ones.

When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not be unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the present state of Europe, when small as well as great estates derive their security from the laws of their country, nothing can be more completely absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, and to all that it possesses; but that the property of the present generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are still respected through the greater part of Europe; in those countries, particularly, in which noble birth is a necessary qualification for the enjoyment either of civil or military honours.—Entails are thought necessary for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices and honours of their country; and that order having usurped one unjust advantage over the rest of their fellow-citizens, lest their poverty should render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have

another. The common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities, and they are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European monarchy; though even England is not altogether without them. In Scotland, more than one-fifth, perhaps, more than one-third part of the whole lands of the country, are at present supposed to be under strict entail.

Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner not only engrossed by particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again was as much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however, that a great proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times which gave birth to those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor was sufficiently employed in defending his own territories, or in extending his jurisdiction and authority over those of his neighbours. He had no leisure to attend to the cultivation and improvement of land. When the establishment of law and order afforded him this leisure, he often wanted the inclination, and almost always the requisite abilities.

If the expense of his house and person either equalled or exceeded his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no stock to employ in this manner. If he was an oeconomist, he generally found it more profitable to employ his annual savings in new purchases, than in the improvement of his old estate. To improve land with profit, like all other commercial projects, requires an exact attention to small

savings and small gains, of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal, is very seldom capable. The situation of such a person naturally disposes him to attend rather to ornament which pleases his fancy, than to profit for which he has so little occasion. The elegance of his dress, of his equipage, of his house and household-furniture, are objects which from his infancy he has been accustomed to have some anxiety about. The turn of mind which this habit naturally forms, follows him when he comes to think of the improvement of land. He embellishes perhaps four or five hundred acres in the neighbourhood of his house, at ten times the expence which the land is worth after all his improvements; and finds, that if he was to improve his whole estate in the same manner, and he has little taste for any other, he would be a bankrupt before he had finished a tenth part of it. There still remain in both parts of the united kingdoms some great estates, which have continued without interruption in the hands of the same family since the times of feudal anarchy. Compare the present condition of those estates with the possessions of the small proprietors in their neighbourhood, and you will require no other argument to convince you how unfavourable such extensive property is to improvement.—*A. Smith.*

PROBABILITY, GROUNDS OF.—Probability being to supply the defect of our knowledge, and to guide us where that fails, is always conversant about proposi-

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tions whereof we have no certainty, but only some inducements to receive them for true.

The grounds of it are these two following:

First, the conformity of any thing with our own knowledge, observation and experience.

Secondly, the testimony of others, vouching their observation and experience. In the testimony of others is to be considered, 1. The number, 2. The integrity, 3. The skill of the witnesses. 4. The design of the author, where it is a testimony out of a book cited. 5. The consistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation. 6. Contrary testimonies.

Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding, and produces certain knowledge, the mind, if it would proceed rationally, ought to examine all the grounds of probability, and see how they make more or less, for or against, any proposition, before it assents to or dissents from it; and, upon a due balancing the whole, reject or receive it, with a more or less firm assent, proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on the one side or the other.

If I see a man walk on the ice, it is past probability, it is knowledge: but if another tells me he saw a man in England in the midst of a sharp winter, walk upon water hardened with cold; this has so great a conformity with what is usually observed to happen, that I am disposed by the nature of the thing itself to assent to it, unless some manifest suspicion attend the rela-

PRO

tion of that matter of fact. But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics, who never saw nor heard of any such thing before, there the whole probability relies on testimony; and as the relators are more in number, and of more credit, and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth, so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief. Though, to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary, and has never heard of any thing like it, the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief. As it happened to a Dutch ambassador, who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland, which he was inquisitive after, amongst other things told him, that the water in his country would sometimes, in cold weather, be so hard, that men walked upon it, and that it would bear an elephant if he were there. To which the king replied, "Hitherto I have believed the strange things you have told me, because I look upon you as a sober fair man; but now I am sure you lie."

Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition; and as the conformity of our knowledge, as the certainty of observations, as the frequency and constancy of experience, and the number and credibility of testimonies, do more or less agree or disagree with it, so is any proposition in itself more or less probable. There is another, I confess, which though by itself it be no true ground of probability, yet is often made use of for one, by

which men most commonly regulate their assent, and upon which they pin their faith more than any thing else, and that is the opinion of others; though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on, nor more likely to mislead one, since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowledge. And if the opinions and persuasions of others, whom we know and think well of, be a ground of assent, men have reason to be Heathens in Japan, Mahometans in Turkey, Papists in Spain, Protestants in England, and Lutherans in Sweden.—*Locke.*

PRODIGALITY, TENDENCY AND EFFECTS OF.—Capitals are increased by parsimony, and diminished by prodigality and misconduct.

Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of productive hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it to him for an interest, that is, for a share of the profits. As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual gains, so the capital of a society, which is the same with that of all the individuals who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner.

Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of capital. Industry indeed provides the subject which parsimony accumulates. But whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not save and store up, the capital would never be the greater.

Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance of productive hands, tends

to increase the number of those hands whose labour adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. It tends, therefore, to increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of industry, which gives an additional value to the annual produce.

What is annually saved is as regularly consumed as what is annually spent, and nearly in the same time too; but is consumed by a different set of people. That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends, is, in most cases, consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave nothing behind them in return for their consumption. That portion which he annually saves, as, for the sake of the profit, it is immediately employed as a capital, is consumed in the same manner, and nearly in the same time too, but by a different set of people; by labourers, manufacturers, and artificers, who reproduce with a profit the value of their annual consumption. His revenue, we shall suppose, is paid him in money. Had he spent the whole, the food, clothing, and lodging, which the whole could have purchased, would have been distributed among the former set of people. By saving a part of it, as that part is for the sake of the profit immediately employed as a capital either by himself or by some other person, the food, clothing, and lodging, which may be purchased with it, are necessarily reserved for the latter. The consumption is the same; but the consumers are different.

By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords mainte-

nance to an additional number of productive hands for that or the ensuing year; but, like the founder of a public workhouse, he establishes as it were a perpetual fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come. The perpetual allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always guarded by any positive law, by any trust-right, or deed of mortmain. It is always guarded, however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and evident interest of every individual to whom any share of it shall ever belong. No part of it can ever afterwards be employed to maintain any but productive hands, without an evident loss to the person who thus perverts it from its proper destination.

The prodigal perverts it in this manner. By not confining his expence within his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts the revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes, he pays the wages of idleness with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers had as it were consecrated to the maintenance of industry. By diminishing the funds destined for the employment of productive labour, he necessarily diminishes, so far as it depends upon him, the quantity of that labour which adds a value to the subject upon which it is bestowed, and consequently the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of some was not compensated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every prodigal, by feeding the idle with the bread of the industrious,

tends not only to beggar himself, but to impoverish his country.

Though the expence of the prodigal should be altogether in home-made, and no part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive funds of the society would still be the same. Every year there would be still a certain quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained productive, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Every year, therefore, there would still be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

This expence, it may be said, indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not occasioning any exportation of gold and silver, the same quantity of money would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and clothing, which were thus consumed by unproductive, had been distributed among productive hands, they would have reproduced, together with a profit, the full value of their consumption. The same quantity of money would in this case equally have remained in the country, and there would besides have been a reproduction of an equal value of consumable goods. There would have been two values instead of one.

The same quantity of money, besides, cannot long remain in any country in which the value of the annual produce diminishes. The sole use of money is to circulate consumable goods. By means of it, provisions, materials, and finished work, are bought and sold, and distributed to their proper consumers. The quantity of money, therefore,

PRO

which can be annually employed in any country, must be determined by the value of the consumable goods annually circulated within it. These must consist either in the immediate produce of the land and labour of the country itself, or in something which had been purchased with some part of that produce. Their value, therefore, must diminish, as the value of that produce diminishes, and along with it the quantity of money which can be employed in circulating them. But the money which, by this annual diminution of produce, is annually thrown out of domestic circulation, will not be allowed to lie idle. The interest of whoever possesses it requires that it should be employed; but having no employment at home, it will, in spite of all laws and prohibitions, be sent abroad, and employed in purchasing consumable goods which may be of some use at home. Its annual exportation will, in this manner, continue for some time to add something to the annual consumption of the country, beyond the value of its own annual produce. What, in the days of its prosperity, had been saved from that annual produce, and employed in purchasing gold and silver, will contribute, for some little time, to support its consumption in adversity. The exportation of gold and silver is, in this case, not the cause, but the effect of its declension; and may even, for some little time, alleviate the misery of that declension.

The quantity of money, on the contrary, must in every country naturally increase, as the value of the annual produce increases. The value of the consumable goods annually circulated within the so-

PRO

ciety being greater, will require a greater quantity of money to circulate them. A part of the increased produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchasing, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of gold and silver necessary for circulating the rest. The increase of those metals will in this case be the effect, not the cause, of the public prosperity. Gold and silver are purchased every where in the same manner. The food, clothing, and lodging, the revenue and maintenance, of all those whose labour or stock is employed in bringing them from the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in Peru as well as in England. The country which has this price to pay, will never be long without the quantity of those metals which it has occasion for; and no country will ever long retain a quantity which it has no occasion for.

Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a country to consist in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land and labour, as plain reason seems to dictate; or in the quantity of the precious metals which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices suppose; in either view of the matter, every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and every frugal man a public benefactor.

The effects of misconduct are often the same as those of prodigality. Every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, fisheries, trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to diminish the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour. In every such project, though the capital is consumed by productiv

PRO

hands only, yet as, by the injudicious manner in which they are employed, they do not reproduce the full value of their consumption, there must always be some diminution in what would otherwise have been the productive funds of the society.

It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great nation can be much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of individuals, the profusion or imprudence of some being always more than compensated for by the frugality and good conduct of others.

With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expense is the passion for present enjoyment, which, though sometimes violent and very difficult to be restrained, is in general only momentary and occasional. But the principle which prompts to save is the desire of bettering our condition: a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce perhaps a single instant in which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied with his situation as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better their condition. It is the means the most vulgar and the most obvious; and the most likely way of augmenting their fortune is to save and accumulate some part of what they acquire, either regularly and annually, or upon some extraordinary occasions. Though the principle of expense, therefore, prevails

PRO

in almost all men upon some occasions, and in some men upon almost all occasions; yet in the greater part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly.

With regard to misconduct, the number of prudent and successful undertakings is everywhere much greater than injudicious and unsuccessful ones. After all our complaints of the frequency of bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune make but a very small part of the whole number engaged in trade and all other sorts of business; not much more perhaps than one in a thousand. Bankruptcy is perhaps the greatest and most humiliating calamity that can befall an innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are sufficiently careful to avoid it. Some, indeed, do not avoid it; as some do not avoid the gallows.

Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes are by public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole, public revenue is in most countries employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Such are the people who compose a numerous and splendid court; a great ecclesiastical establishment; great fleets and armies; who in time of peace produce nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can compensate the expense of maintaining them, even while the war lasts. Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the produce of other mens' labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an unnecessary number, they may in a particular year

consume so great a share of this produce as not to leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive labourers, who should re-produce it next year. The next year's produce, therefore, will be less than that of the foregoing; and if the same disorder should continue, that of the third year will be still less than that of the second. Those unproductive hands, who should be maintained by a part only of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a share of their whole revenue, and thereby oblige so great a number to encroach upon their capitals, and upon the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour, that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not be able to compensate the waste and degradation of produce occasioned by this violent and forced encroachment.

This frugality and good conduct, however, is, upon most occasions, it appears from experience, sufficient to compensate, not only for private prodigality and misconduct of individuals, but the public extravagance of government. The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance of government and of the greatest errors of administration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescription of the doctor.---*A. Smith.*

PROFESSORS IN UNIVERSITIES, CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH DETERMINE THE MERIT OF. --- In countries where church-benefices are the greater part of them very moderate, a chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a church-benefice. The universities have, in this case, the picking and choosing of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every country, constitute by far the most numerous class of men of letters. Where church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very considerable, the church naturally draws from the universities the greater part of their eminent men of letters: who generally find some patron who does himself honour by procuring them church-preferment. In the former situation, we are likely to find the universities filled with the most eminent men of letters that are to be found in the country. In the latter we are likely to find few eminent among them; and those few among the youngest members of the society, who are likely to be drained away from it, before they can have acquired experience and knowledge enough to be of much use to it. It is observed by M. de Voltaire, that Father Porree, a Jesuit of no great eminence in the republic of letters, was the only professor they had ever had in France whose works were worth the reading. In a country which has produced so many eminent men of letters, it must appear somewhat singular, that scarce one of them should have been a professor in a university. The famous Gassendi was, in the beginning of his life, a professor of the university of Aix. Upon the first dawn-

ing of his genius, it was represented to him that by going into the church, he could easily find a much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better situation for pursuing his studies, and he immediately followed the advice. The observation of M. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France, but to all other Roman Catholic countries. We very rarely find, in any of them, an eminent man of letters who is a professor in a university, except, perhaps, in the professions of law and physic; professions from which the church is not likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of England is by far the richest and best endowed church in Christendom. In England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the universities of all their best and ablest members; and an old college tutor, who is known and distinguished in Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be found there as in any Roman Catholic country. In Geneva, on the contrary, in the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, in the Protestant countries of Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the most eminent men of letters whom those countries have produced, have, not all indeed, but the far greater part of them, been professors in universities. In those countries the universities are continually draining the church of all its most eminent men of letters.---*A. Smith.*

PROMISES, AND THEIR OBLIGATION.---

The only intelligible reason why men ought to keep their promises is this; that it is for the advantage of society they should keep them; and if they do not, that, as far as

punishment will go, they should be made to keep them. It is for the advantage of the whole number that the promises of each individual should be kept; and, rather than they should not be kept, that such individuals as fail to keep them should be punished. If it be asked how this appears? the answer is at hand:---Such is the benefit to gain, and mischief to avoid, by keeping them, as much more than compensates the mischief of so much punishment as is requisite to oblige men to it. Suppose the constant and universal effect of an observance of promises were to produce mischief, would it then be mens' duty to observe them? Would it then be right to make laws, and apply punishment to oblige to observe them?---"No (it may perhaps be replied); but for this reason: Among promises, there are some that, as every one allows, are void: a promise that is in itself void, cannot, it is true, create any obligation; but allow the promise to be valid, and it is the promise itself that creates the obligation, and nothing else." The fallacy of this argument it is easy to perceive. For what is it then the promise depends on for its validity? What is it that being present makes it valid? What is it that being wanting makes it void? To acknowledge that any one promise may be void, is to acknowledge, that if any other is binding, it is not merely because it is a promise. That circumstance, then, whatever it be, on which the validity of a promise depends, that circumstance, I say, and not the promise itself, must, it is plain, be the cause of the obligation which a promise is apt in general to carry with it, and not the intrinsic obligation of promises upon those who

make them. Now this other principle that still recurs upon us, what other can it be than the principle of utility? the principle which furnishes us with that reason, which alone depends not on any higher reason, but which is itself the sole and all-sufficient reason for every point of practice whatsoever.---*J. Bentham.*

PROPERTY.---Laws and conventions are necessary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine justice to its proper objects. In a state of nature, where every thing is common, I owe nothing to those I have promised nothing; I acknowledge nothing to be the property of another, but what is useless to myself. In a state of society, the case is different, where the rights of each are fixed by law. Each member of the community, in becoming such, devotes himself to the public from that moment, in such a state as he then is, with all his powers and abilities; of which abilities his possessions make a part. Not that in consequence of this act the possession changes its nature by changing hands, and becomes actual property in those of the sovereignty; but as the power of the community is incomparably greater than that of an individual, the public possession is in fact more fixed and irrevocable, without being more lawful, at least with regard to foreigners. For every state is, with regard to its members, master of all their possessions by virtue of the social compact; which in a state, serves as the basis of all other rights; but with regard to other powers or states, it is master of them only by the right of prior occupancy, which it derives from individuals.---The right of prior occupancy, although

more real than that of the strongest, becomes not an equitable right till after the establishment of property. Every man had naturally a right to every thing which is necessary for his subsistence; but the positive act by which he is made the proprietor of a certain possession excludes him from the property of any other. His portion being assigned him, he ought to confine himself to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of possession. Hence it is, that the right of prior occupancy, thought but of little force in a state of nature, is so respectable in that of society. The point to which we are chiefly directed in the consideration of this right rather what belongs to another, than what does not belong to us.

---It is easy to conceive, how the united and contiguous estates of individuals become the territory of the public, and in what manner the right of sovereignty, extending itself from the subjects to the lands they occupy, becomes at once both real and personal; a circumstance which lays the possessors under a state of the greatest dependence, and makes even their own abilities a security for their fidelity. This is an advantage which does not appear to have been duly attended to by sovereigns among the ancients; who, by styling themselves only Kings of the Persians, the Scythians, the Macedonians, seemed to look on themselves only as chief of men, rather than as masters of a country. Modern princes more artfully style themselves the Kings of England, France, Spain, &c., and thus, by claiming the territory itself, are secure of the inhabitants.---What is very singular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the posses-

sions of individuals, is so far from despoiling them thereof, that, on the contrary, it only confirms them in such possession, by converting an usurpation into an actual right, and a bare possession into a real property. The possessors also being considered as the depositories of the public wealth, while their rights are respected by all the members of the state, and maintained by all its force against a foreign power, they acquire, if I may so say, by a cession advantageous to the public, and still more so to themselves, every thing they ceded by it: a paradox which is easily explained by a distinction between the rights which the sovereign and the proprietor have in the same fund.---It may also happen, that men may form themselves into a society before they have any possessions; and that, acquiring a sufficient territory for all, they may possess it in common, or divide it among them either equally, or in such different proportions as may be determined by the sovereign. Now, in whatsoever manner such acquisition may be made, the right which each individual has to his own estate must be always subordinate to the right which the community hath over the possessions of all; for, without this, there would be nothing binding in the social tie, nor any real force in the exercise of the supreme power.—*Rousseau.*

PROPERTY, THE ORIGIN OF.—According to Mr. Locke, “A law is a rule prescribed to the people, with the sanction of some punishment or reward, proper to determine their wills. All laws (according to him) suppose rewards or punishments attached to the observation or infraction of them.”

The definition laid down, The

man who violates, among a polished people, a convention not attended with this sanction, is not punishable: he is however unjust. But could he be unjust before the establishment of all convention, and the formation of a language proper to express injustice? No: for in that state man can have no idea of property, nor consequently of justice. Injustice, therefore, cannot precede the establishment of a convention, a law, and a common interest. Now what does the establishment of laws suppose? The union of men in society, greater or less, and the formation of a language proper to communicate a certain number of ideas. Now, if there be savages whose language does not contain above five or six sounds or cries, the formation of a language must be the work of several centuries. Until that work be completed, men without convention and laws must live in a state of war. That condition is a state, it may be said, of misery; and misery being the creator of laws, must force men to accept them. Before the public interest has declared the law of first possession to be held sacred, what can be the plea of a savage inhabitant of a woody district, from which a stronger savage had driven him out? What right have you, he would say, to drive me from my possession? What right have you, says the other, to that possession? Chance, replies the first, led my steps thither: it belongs to me because I inhabit it, and land belongs to the first occupier.---What is that right of the first occupier? replies the other; if chance first led you to this spot, the same chance has given me the force necessary to drive you from it. Which of these

two rights deserves the preference? Would you know all the superiority of mine? Look up to heaven, and see the eagle that darts upon the dove: turn thine eyes to the earth, and see the lion that preys upon the stag: look toward the sea, and behold the goldfish devoured by the shark. All things in nature show that the weak is a prey to the powerful. Force is the gift of the gods; by that I have a right to possess all that I can seize. Heaven, by giving me these nervous arms, has declared its will. Begone from hence; yield to superior force, or dare the combat. What answer can be given to the discourse of this savage, or with what injustice can he be accused, if the law of first occupation be not yet established?—Justice then supposes the establishment of laws. The observance of justice supposes an equilibrium in the power of the inhabitants. It is by a mutual and salutary fear that men are made to be just to each other. Justice is unknown to the solitary savage. It is at a period that men, by increasing, are forced to manure the earth, that they perceive the necessity of securing to the labourer his harvest, and the property of the land he cultivates. Before cultivation, it is no wonder that the strongest should think he has as much right over a piece of barren ground as the first occupier.

—*Helvetius.*

PROPHECIES.—The truth of prophecies can never be proved without the concurrence of three things, which cannot possibly happen. These are, that I should in the first place be a witness to the delivery of the prophecy; next, that I should also be a witness to the event; lastly, that it should be clearly demonstrated to

me that such event could not have followed by accident: for though a prophecy were as precise, clear, and determinate as an axiom of geometry, yet as the perspicuity of the prediction, made at random, does not render the accomplishment of it impossible, that accomplishment, when it happens, proves nothing in fact concerning the foreknowledge of him who predicted it.—*Rousseau.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—All prophecies are real miracles; and as such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature to foretel future events, it would be absurd to employ any prophecy as an argument for a Divine mission or authority from heaven.—*Hume.*

PROTESTANTISM, THE PRINCIPLES OF.—When the Reformers separated themselves from the church of Rome, they accused it of error; and in order to correct this error at the fountain-head, they interpreted the Scriptures in a different sense from what the church had been accustomed to. When they were asked, on what authority they venture thus to depart from received doctrines? they answered, on their own authority; on that of their reason. They said, the meaning of the Scriptures was plain and intelligible to all mankind, as far as they related to salvation: that every man was a competent judge of doctrines, and might interpret the Bible, which is the rule of faith, according to his own mind: that by this means all would agree as to essential points; and as to those on which they would not agree, they must be unessential.

Here then was private judgment established as the only interpreter of the Scriptures: thus was the au-

thority of the church at once rejected, and the religious tenets of individuals left to their own particular jurisdiction. Such are the two fundamental points of the Reformation; to acknowledge the Bible as the rule of belief, and to admit of no other interpreter of its meaning than one's self. These two points combined, form the principle on which the Protestants separated from the church of Rome: nor could they do less, without being inconsistent with themselves; for what authority of interpretation could they pretend to, after having rejected that of the church?—But it may be asked, how on such principles the Reformed could ever be united among themselves? How, every one having his own particular way of thinking, they could form themselves into a body, and make head against the Catholic Church? This it was necessary for them to do; and therefore they united with regard to this one point, they acknowledged every one to be a competent judge as far as related to himself. They tolerated, as in such circumstances they ought, every interpretation but one, viz., that which prohibited other interpretations. Now this interpretation, the only one they rejected, was that of the Catholics. It was necessary for them unanimously to proscribe the Romish church, which in its turn equally proscribed them all. Even the diversity of their manner of thinking from all others was the common bond of union. They were so many little stages in league against a great power, each losing nothing of its own independence by their general confederacy.

Thus was the Reformation established, and thus it ought to be main-

tained. It is true, that the opinion of the majority may be proposed to the whole, as the most probable manner, or as the most authentic. The sovereign may even reduce it into form, and recommend it to those who are appointed to teach it; because some rule and order ought to be observed in public instructions: and in fact, no person's liberty is infringed by it, as none are compelled to be taught against their will. But it does not hence follow, that individuals are obliged directly to adopt the interpretations thus proposed to them, or that doctrine which is thus publicly taught. Every one remains, after all, a judge for himself, and in that acknowledges no other authority than his own.

Good instructions ought less to fix the choice we ought to make, than to qualify us for making such choice. Such is the true spirit of the Reformation; such its real foundation; according to which private judgment is left to determine in matters of faith, which are to be deduced from the common standard, *i. e.*, the gospel. Freedom is so essential also to reason, that it cannot, if it would, subject itself to authority. If we infringe ever so little on this principle of private judgment, Protestantism instantly falls to the ground.

Now the liberty of interpreting the Scripture, not only includes the right of explaining its several passages, but that of remaining in doubt with regard to such as appear dubious, and also that of not pretending to comprehend those which are incomprehensible. The Protestant religion is tolerant from principle; it is essentially so, as much as it is possible for a religion to be; since the only tenet it does

not tolerate is that of persecution.---*Rousseau.*

PROVIDENCE, AND A FUTURE STATE.---

When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other; and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect. If the cause, assigned for any effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject the cause, or add to it such qualities as will give it a just proportion to the effect. But if we ascribe to it other qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other effects, we indulge the licence of conjecture, and suppose qualities and energies without reason.---

The same rule holds, whether the cause assigned be brute unconscious matter, or a rational intelligent being. If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought to assign to it any qualities beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect: nor can we, by any rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one, merely from the sight of one of Zeuxis's pictures, could know that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less skilful in stone and marble than in colours. Allowing, therefore, the gods, to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe; it follows, that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing further can ever be proved. So far as any attribute at present appears, so far may we conclude these attributes to exist. The supposition of further attributes is mere hypothesis;

much more the supposition, that in distant periods of time and place, there has been, or will be, a more magnificent display of these attributes, and a scheme of administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues.---The Divinity may possibly possess attributes which we have never seen exerted; may be governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be satisfied. All this may be allowed. But still this is mere possibility and hypothesis. If there be any marks of distributive justice in the world, we may conclude from thence, that since justice here exerts itself, it is satisfied. If there be no marks of a distributive justice in the world, we have no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If it be said, that the justice of the gods at present exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer, that we have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as we see it at present exert itself.

In works of human art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and, returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations which it has probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this manner of reasoning? Plainly this: that man is a being, whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations have a certain connection and coherence according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature. When, therefore, we find, that any work had proceeded from the skill and industry of man; as we are

otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him; and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the single work or production which we examine, it were impossible for us to argue in this manner; because our knowledge of all the qualities which we ascribe to him, being in that case derived from the production, it is impossible they could point to any thing further, or be the foundation of any new inferences.

If we saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, we should conclude from our other experience, that there was probably another foot, which also left its impression, though effaced by time or other accident. Here we mount from the effect to the cause; and descending again from the cause, infer alterations in the effect: but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal; without which this method of argument would be fallacious and sophistical.---The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, nor comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shows wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shows a particular degree of these perfections we infer a parti-

cular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine.---The great source of our mistake in all our reasonings on the works of nature is, that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being; and conclude, that he will, on every occasion, observe the same conduct which we ourselves, in his situation, would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us, that almost every thing is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours; besides this, it must evidently appear contrary to all rule of analogy to reason from the intentions and projects of men, to those of a Being so different and so much superior, who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper; and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines, beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection.

It may, indeed, be matter of doubt whether it be possible for a cause to be known only by its effect (as we have all along supposed), or to be of so singular or particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation. It is only when two species of objects are found to be constantly conjoined that we can infer the one from the other; and were an effect presented which was entirely singular, and could not be comprehended under any known species, we could form no conjecture or inference at all concerning its cause. The universe is such an effect: it is quite singular and unparalleled, and supposed to be the

proof of a Deity; a cause no less singular and unparalleled. If experience, and observation and analogy be, indeed, the only guides in inferences of this nature, both the effect and cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know, and which we have found, in many instances, to be conjoined with each other.--*Hume.*

PUBLIC SPIRIT AND PRIVATE VIRTUES, NO NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN.---Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity and justice into the tempers of men. The most illustrious period of the Roman history, considered in a political view, is that between the beginning of the first and end of the last Punic war; the due balance between the nobility and people being then fixed by the contest of the tribunes, and not being yet lost by the extent of conquests. Yet, at this very time, the horrid practice of poisoning was so common, that, during part of a season, a prætor punished capitally for this crime above three thousand persons in a part of Italy; and found informations of this kind still multiplying upon him. There is a similar, rather a worse instance, in the more early times of the common-wealth; so depraved in private life were that people, whom in their histories we so much admire. It seems they were really more virtuous during the time of the two *triumvirates*, when they were tearing their common country to pieces, and spreading slaughter and desolation over the face of the earth merely for the choice of tyrants.--*Hume.*

PUBLIC WORKS, AND PUBLIC INSTITU-

TIONS, HOW TO BE MAINTAINED.---

One of the duties of the sovereign or common wealth is that of erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works, which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual, or small number of individuals; and which it therefore cannot be expected that any individual, or small number of individuals, should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires, too, very different degrees of expence in the different periods of society.

After the public institutions and public works necessary for the defence of the society, and for the administration of justice, the other works and institutions of this kind are chiefly those for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting the instruction of the people. The institutions for instruction are of two kinds; those for the education of the youth, and those for the instruction of people of all ages.--*A. Smith.*

PUNISHMENTS, THE POWER OF.---Experience shows, that in countries remarkable for the lenity of their laws, the spirit of the inhabitants is as much affected by slight penalties as in other countries by severer punishments.

If an inconveniency or abuse arises in the state, a violent Government endeavours suddenly to redress it; and, instead of putting the old laws in execution, it establishes some cruel punishment, which instantly puts a stop to the evil. But the spring of Government hereby loses its elasticity: the imagination grows accustomed to the

severe as well as to the milder punishment: and as the fear of the latter diminishes, they are soon obliged in every case to have recourse to the former. Robberies on the highway were grown common in some countries; in order to remedy this evil, they invented the punishment of breaking upon the wheel, the terror of which put a stop for a while to this mischievous practice; but soon after robberies on the highways became as common as ever.

Mankind must not be governed with too much severity; we ought to make a prudent use of the means which nature has given us to conduct them. If we inquire into the cause of all human corruption, we shall find that they proceed from the impunity of criminals, and not from the moderation of punishments.

Let us follow nature, who has given shame to man for his scourge; and let the heaviest part of the punishment be the infamy attending it.

But if there be some countries where shame is not a consequence of punishment, this must be owing to tyranny, which has inflicted the same penalties on honest men and villains.---And if there are others where men are deterred only by cruel punishments, we may be sure that this must, in a great measure, arise from the violence of the Government which has used such penalties for slight transgressions.---It often happens that a legislator, desirous of remedying an abuse, thinks of nothing else; his eyes are open only to this object, and shut to its inconveniences. When the abuse is redressed, you see only the severity of the legislator; yet

there remains an evil in the state that has sprung from this severity; the minds of the people are corrupted, and become habituated to despotism.

There are two sorts of corruption--one when the people do not observe the laws; the other when they are corrupted by the laws: an incurable evil, because it is in the very remedy itself.---*Montesquieu.*

PUNISHMENTS.---Among a people hardly yet emerged from barbarity, punishments should be most severe as strong impressions are required; but in proportion as the minds of men become softened by their intercourse in society, the severity of punishments should be diminished, if it be intended that the necessary relation between the object and the sensation should be maintained.---That a punishment may not be an act of violence of one, or of many, against a private member of society, it should be public, immediate, and necessary; the least possible in the case given; proportioned to the crime, and determined by the laws.---*Beccaria.*

PUNISHMENTS, CAPITAL.---The frequency of executions is always a sign of the weakness or indolence of Government. There is no malefactor who might not be made good for something; nor ought any person to be put to death, even by way of example, unless such as could not be preserved without endangering the community. In a well-governed state there are but few executions; not because there are many pardoned, but because there are few criminals: whereas, when a state is on the decline, the multiplicity of crimes occasions their impunity. Under the Roman republic, neither the Senate nor the

Consuls ever attempted to grant pardons: even the people never did this, although they sometimes recalled their own sentence. The frequency of pardons indicates, that in a short time crimes will not stand in need of them; and every one may see the consequence of such conduct.—*Rousseau.*

PUNISHMENTS, THE INTENT OF.---The intent of punishments is not to torment a sensible being, nor to undo a crime already committed. Is it possible that torments and useless cruelty, the instrument of furious fanaticism, or of the impotency of tyrants, can be authorised by a political body; which, so far from being influenced by passion, should be the cool moderator of the passions of individuals? Can the groans of a tortured wretch recal the time past, or reverse the crime he has committed?---The end of punishment, therefore, is no other than to prevent the criminal from doing further injury to society, and to prevent others from committing the like offence. Such punishments, therefore, and such a mode of inflicting them, ought to be chosen, as will make the strongest and most lasting impressions on the minds of others, with the least torment to the body of the criminal.---*Beccaria.*

PUNISHMENTS, IMMEDIATE.---The more immediately after the commission of a crime a punishment is inflicted, the more just and useful it will be. It will be more just, because it spares the criminal the cruel and superfluous torment of uncertainty, which increases in proportion to the strength of his imagination and the sense of his weakness; and because the privation of liberty, being a punishment, ought to be inflicted

before condemnation but for as short a time as possible. The time should be determined by the necessary preparation for the trial, and the right of priority in the oldest prisoners. The imprisonment should be attended with as little severity as possible. The confinement ought not to be closer than is requisite to prevent his flight, or his concealing the proofs of his crime, and the trial should be conducted with all possible expedition. Can there be a more cruel contrast than that between the indolence of a judge and the painful anxiety of the accused; the comforts and pleasures of an insensible magistrate, and the filth and misery of the prisoner? The degree of the punishment and the consequences of a crime, ought to be so contrived, as to have the greatest possible effect on others, with the least possible pain to the delinquent.—An immediate punishment is more useful; because the smaller the interval of time between the punishment and the crime, the stronger and more lasting will be the association of the two ideas, crime and punishment; so that they may be considered, one as the cause, and the other as the unavoidable and necessary effect.---It is then of the greatest importance, that the punishment should succeed the crime as immediately as possible, if we intend that, in the rude minds of the multitude, the seducing picture of the advantage arising from the crime should instantly awake the attendant idea of punishment. Delaying the punishment serves only to separate these two ideas; and thus affects the minds of the spectators rather as being a terrible sight, than the necessary consequence of a crime,

the horror which should contribute to heighten the idea of punishment.

---There is another excellent method of strengthening this important connexion between the ideas of crime and punishment; that is, to make the punishment as analogous as possible to the nature of the crime; in order that the punishment may lead the mind to consider the crime in a different point of view from that in which it was placed by the flattering idea of promised advantages.--*Beccaria*.

PUNISHMENTS, INFAMOUS.--The punishment of infamy is a mark of the public disapprobation. This is not always in the power of the laws. It is necessary that the infamy inflicted by the laws should be the same as that which results from the relations of things, from universal morality, or from that particular system adopted by the nation and the laws which governs the opinion of the vulgar. If, on the contrary, one be different from the other, either the laws will no longer be respected, or the received notions of morality and probity will vanish; which are always too weak to resist the force of example. If we declare those actions infamous which are in themselves indifferent, we lessen the infamy of those which are really infamous. The punishment of infamy is properly adapted to those injuries which affect the honour of the citizens in any government: but it should not be too frequently inflicted, for the power of opinion grows weaker by repetition; nor should it be inflicted on a number of persons at the same time, for the infamy of many resolves itself into the infamy of none.--*Beccaria*.

PUNISHMENTS, MILD.--Crimes are more effectually prevented by the cer-

tainty than the severity of punishment. The certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression than the fear of one more severe, if attended with the hopes of escaping; for it is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest inevitable evil, whilst hope, the best gift of heaven, hath the power of dispelling the apprehension of a greater; especially if supported by examples of impunity, which weakness or avarice too frequently afford.

---If punishments be very severe, men are naturally led to the perpetration of other crimes, to avoid the punishment due to the first.

In proportion as punishments become more cruel, the minds of men, as a fluid rises to the same height with that which surrounds it, grow hardened and insensible; and the force of the passions still continuing, in the space of an hundred years the wheel terrifies no more than formerly the prison. That a punishment may produce the effect required, it is sufficient that the evil it occasions should exceed the good expected from the crime; including in the calculation the certainty of the punishment and the privation of the expected advantage. All severity beyond this is superfluous, and therefore tyrannical.---Men regulate their conduct by the repeated impression of evils they know, not by those with which they are unacquainted. Let us, for example, suppose two nations, in one of which the greatest punishment is perpetual slavery, and in the other the wheel. Both will inspire the same degree of terror; and there can be no reasons for increasing the punishments of the first, which are not equally valid for augmenting those

of the second to more lasting and ingenious modes of tormenting.—The most artful contrivance of punishments can never establish an exact proportion between the crime and the punishment; the human frame can only suffer to a certain degree, beyond which it is impossible to proceed, be the enormity of the crime ever so great. Severe punishments also occasion impunity. Human nature is limited no less in evil than in good. Excessive barbarity can never be more than temporary; it being impossible that it should be supported by a permanent system of legislation; for if the laws be too cruel, they must be altered, or anarchy and impunity will succeed.—*Beccaria*.

REASON.—Of all the words in our language, the meaning of the word *reason* is the most ambiguous. Sometimes it is taken for that fitness in subjects to one another which is natural and independent on will and pleasure; as when we say, that such or such a thing is agreeable or contrary to the reason of things. Sometimes it is taken for human capacity and comprehension; as in that trite observation, That many things are *above* our reason which are *not contrary* to our reason: for the meaning of that sentence must be, if it has any meaning at all, that there are many things which we have no capacity to comprehend. And this, indeed, every man who reflects ever so little upon human nature, must be fully convinced of; for we can no more argue upon such subjects, than we can describe objects which are confessedly out of sight. Sometimes the word *reason* is taken for the cause or inducement which prevailed upon us to act in this or that manner rather than any other; as when we say,

this was my reason for acting thus or thus. Sometimes it signifies the argument by which we prove any truth or detect any falsehood; as we say a thing must be true or false for this or that reason. Sometimes it signifies the human intellect or understanding; which is that faculty of the mind by which it perceives objects suitable to it, and which may be communicated to it by various means. Sometimes by reason we mean the moral sense, moral virtue in general, or more particularly the virtue of justice; as when we say, it is contrary to reason to make one law for ourselves, and another for other people: and thus we call a man good, who is governed more by reason than appetite and passion. And sometimes it is taken for the power of judging or drawing a conclusion from premises; which is the greatest mean by which we arrive at knowledge. The difference between the knowledge of God and his intelligent creatures is, that he knows and sees all things, with all their possible combinations and circumstances, by intuition at one view: whereas we come to our knowledge by slow degrees, and after many deductions of one thing from another. But as all good things come from God, we could not possibly have any knowledge at all, unless he had been pleased to communicate to us some portion of his own divine knowledge, and made us to see and perceive by intuition, and at the first view, some certain truths that we call Axioms, Data, or Self-evident Principles; which, by the use of our reason or faculty of comparing and judging, should lead us on to other truths, and raise us step by step to larger views, and more extensive knowledge. This is the

most proper use of the word Reason; and this includes the intellectual, the moral and the discussive powers of the mind: the two former as certain principles; the latter as the power of comparing objects, which are thus presented to us, with each other, and thereby finding out wherein they agree or disagree. This is what we commonly call reasoning or exercising our reason. This is the characteristic of human nature; this distinguishes man from all the other animals of the earth, and makes him wiser than the beasts that perish.—*Robertson*.

REASON AND FAITH.—I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly; and where it fails them, they cry out, it is matter of faith, and above reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one; or even convince a gainsayer who makes use of the same plea, without setting down strict boundaries between faith and reason; which ought to be the first point established on all questions where faith has any thing to do.

Reason, therefore, here, as contradistinguished to faith, I take to be the certainty or probability of such propositions or truths which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. by sensation and reflection.

Faith, on the other side, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made out by the deductions of reason, but on the credit of the proposer, as coming from God in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths to men we call Revelation.

First, then, I say, no man in-

spired by God can by any revelation communicate to others any new simple ideas which they had not before from sensation and reflection. For whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, this revelation, if it be of new simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another, either by words, or any other signs. Because words, by their immediate operations on us, cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds: and it is by the custom of using them for signs that they excite and revive in our minds latent ideas; but yet only such ideas as were there before. For words seen or heard, recall to our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs, which cannot signify to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all.

Thus, whatever things were discovered by the Apostle Paul, when he was snatched up into the third heaven, whatever new ideas his mind there received, all the description he can make to others of that place is only this, that there are such things "as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive." And supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, a species of creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter or Saturn, (for that it is possible there may be such, nobody can deny) which has six senses, and imprint on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense he could no more, by words, produce in the minds of other men those ideas imprinted by that sixth sense, than one of us could convey

the idea of any colour by the sounds of words into a man, who, having the other four senses perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of seeing. For our simple ideas, then, which are the foundation and sole matter of all our notions and knowledge, we must depend wholly on our reason, I mean our natural faculties; and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from traditional revelation; I say traditional revelation, in distinction to original revelation. By the one, I mean that first impression which is made immediately by God on the mind of any man, to which we cannot set any bounds; and by the other, those impressions delivered over to others in words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I say, that the same truths may be discovered, and conveyed down from revelation, which are discoverable to us by reason, and by those ideas we naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid, as well as men, by the natural use of their faculties, come to make the discovery themselves. In all things of this kind, there is little need or use of revelation; God having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be more certain to us, than those which are conveyed to us by traditional revelation. For the knowledge we have, that this revelation came at first from God, can never be so sure, as the knowledge we have from the clear and distinct perception of the

agreement or disagreement of our own ideas; v. g. if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right ones, I might assent to the truth of that proposition, upon the credit of the tradition, that it was revealed; but that would never amount to so great a certainty, as the knowledge of it, upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact, knowable by our senses; v. g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings, which had their original from revelation; and yet nobody, I think, will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it; or as he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses, that it is written in the book supposed written by Moses inspired; but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that book, as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses.---

Locke.

REASON AND FAITH NOT OPPOSITE.---

There is a use of the word reason, wherein it is opposed to faith; which, though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking, yet common use has so authorised it, that it would be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it. Only I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however faith may be opposed to reason, faith is nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good reason; and so cannot

be opposite to it. He that believes without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies; but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This, at least, is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that, though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it: for he governs his assent right, and places it as it should, who, in any case and matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him. He that doth otherwise transgress against his own light; and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability.—*Locke.*

REASON, AND NATURE SUFFICIENT TO TEACH US MORALITY AND THE TRUE WORSHIP OF THE DEITY.—

What purity of morals, what system of faith useful to man, or honourable to the Creator, can we deduce from any positive doctrines, that we cannot deduce as well without them from a good use of our natural faculties? Let any one show me what can be added, either

for the glory of God, the good of society, or my own advantage, to the obligations we are laid under by nature; let him show me what virtue can be produced from any new worship which is not the consequence of natural religion. The most sublime ideas of the Deity are inculcated by reason alone. Take a view of the works of nature, listen to the voice within, and then tell me what God hath omitted to say to our sight, our conscience, our understandings? Where are the men who can tell us more of him than he thus tells us of himself? Their revelations only debase the Deity, in ascribing to him human passions. So far from giving us enlightened notions of the Deity, their particular tenets, in my opinion, give us the most obscure and confused ideas. To the inconceivable mysteries by which the Supreme Being is hid from our view, they add the most absurd contradictions. They serve to make mankind proud, persecuting, and cruel: instead of establishing peace on earth, they bring fire and sword. I ask myself, to what good purpose tends all this? without being able to resolve the question. Artificial religion presents to my view only the wickedness and miseries of mankind. It is said, indeed, that revelation is necessary to teach mankind the manner in which God would be served: as a proof of this, they bring the diversity of whimsical modes of worship which prevail in the world; and that without remarking, that this very diversity arises from the whim of adopting revelations. Ever since men have taken it into their heads to make the Deity speak, every people make him speak in their

own way, and say what they like best. Had they listened only to what the Deity hath said in their hearts, there would have been but one religion on earth. It may be said, that it is necessary that the worship of God should be uniform; it may be proper: but is this a point so very important, that the whole apparatus of divine power was necessary to establish it? Let us not confound the ceremonials of religion with religion itself. The worship of God demands that of the heart; and this, when it is sincere, is ever uniform. Men must entertain very ridiculous notions of the Deity indeed, if they imagine he can interest himself in the dress of a priest, in the order of the words he pronounces, or in the ceremonies of the altar. God requires to be worshipped in spirit and in truth: this is a duty incumbent on men of all religions and countries. With regard to exterior forms, it is merely an affair of government; the administration of which, surely, requires not the aid of revelation.---*Rousseau.*

REFORMATION, THE.---It will easily be conceived, that though the balance of evil prevailed in the Romish church, this was not the chief reason which produced the Reformation. A concurrence of incidents must have contributed to forward that great work. Pope Leo X. by his generous and enterprising temper, had very much exhausted his treasury, and was obliged to make use of every invention which might yield money, in order to support his projects, pleasures, and liberalities. The scheme of selling indulgences was suggested to him, as an expedient which had often served in former times to draw money from

the Christian world, and to make devout people willing contributors to the grandeur and riches of the Court of Rome. The church, it was supposed, was possessed of a great stock of merit, as being entitled to all the good works of the saints beyond what was employed in their own justification; and even to the merits of Christ himself, which were infinite and unbounded; and from this unexhausted treasury the Pope might retail particular portions, and by that traffic acquire money, to be employed in pious purposes, the resisting the Turk or subduing schismatics. When the money came into his treasury, the greatest part of it was usually diverted to other purposes. It is commonly believed that Leo, from the penetration of his genius, and his familiarity with literature, was fully acquainted with the ridicule and fallacy of the doctrines which, as supreme Pontiff, he was obliged by his interest to promote; and it is the less wonder, therefore, that he employed for his profit these pious frauds which his predecessors, the most ignorant and credulous, had always, under plausible pretences, made use of for their selfish purposes. He published the sale of a general indulgence; and as his expences had not only exhausted his usual revenue, but even anticipated the income of this extraordinary expedient, the several branches of it were openly given away to particular persons, who were intitled to levy the imposition. The produce, particularly of Saxony and the countries bordering on the Baltic, was assigned to his sister Magdalene, married to Cibo, natural son to Innocent the VIIIth; and she, in order to enhance her profit,

had farmed out the revenue to one Arcemboldi, a Genoese, then a bishop, formerly a merchant, who still retained all the lucrative arts of his former profession. The Austin friars had usually been employed in Saxony to preach the indulgences, and from this trust had derived both profit and consideration; but Arcemboldi, fearing lest practice might have taught them means to secrete the money, and expecting no extraordinary success from the ordinary methods of collection, gave this occupation to the Dominicans. These monks, in order to prove themselves worthy of the distinction conferred on them, exaggerated the benefit of indulgences by the most unbounded panegyrics; and advanced doctrines on that head, which, though not more ridiculous than those already received, were such as the ears of the people were not fully accustomed to. To add to the scandal, the collectors of this revenue are said to have lived very licentious lives, and to have spent in taverns, gaming-houses, and places still more infamous, the money which devout persons had saved from their usual expences, in order to purchase a remission of sins. All these circumstances might have given offence, but would have been attended with no event of any importance, had there not arisen a man qualified to take advantage of the incident. Martin Luther, an Austin friar, professor in the university of Wirtemberg, resenting the affront put upon his order, began to preach against these abuses in the sale of indulgences; and being naturally of a fiery temper, and being provoked by opposition, he proceeded even to decry indulgences themselves; and was thence

carried, by the heat of dispute, to question the authority of the Pope, from which his adversaries derived their chief arguments against him. Still as he enlarged his reading in order to support these tenets, he discovered some new abuse or error in the church of Rome; and, finding his opinions greedily hearkened to, he promulgated them by writing, discourses, sermons, conferences, and daily increased the number of his disciples. All Saxony, all Germany, all Europe, were in a very little time filled with the voice of this daring innovator; and men, roused from that lethargy in which they had so long slept, began to call in question the most ancient and most received opinions. The Elector of Saxony, favourable to Luther's doctrine, protected him from the violence of the papal jurisdiction: the Republic of Zurich even reformed their church, according to the new model: many Sovereigns of the Empire, and the Imperial Diet itself, showed a favourable disposition towards it: and Luther, a man naturally inflexible, vehement, opinionative, was become incapable, either from promises of advancement or terrors of severity, to relinquish a sect of which he was himself the founder, and which brought him a glory superior to all others, the glory of dictating the religious faith and principles to multitudes.* The quick and sur-

* I was told (says M. d'Alembert, in his account of the destruction of the Jesuits in France) by a person extremely worthy of credit, that he was particularly acquainted with a Jesuit, who had been employed twenty years in the missions of Canada, and who, while he did not believe a God, as he owned privately to this friend, had faced death twenty times for the sake of the religion which he had preached with

prising progress of this bold sect may justly in part be ascribed to the late invention of printing, and revival of learning: not that reason bore any considerable part in opening mens' eyes with regard to the impostures of the Romish church; for of all branches of literature, philosophy had as yet, and till long afterwards, made the most inconsiderable progress; neither is there any instance where argument has been able to free the people from that enormous load of absurdity with which superstition has every where overwhelmed them: not to mention that the rapid advance of the Lutheran doctrine, and the violence with which it was embraced, prove sufficiently that it owed not its success to reason and reflection. The art of printing and the revival of learning forwarded its progress in another manner. By means of that art, the books of Luther and his sectaries, full of vehemence, declamation, and a rude eloquence, were propagated more quickly, and in greater numbers. The minds of men, somewhat awakened from a profound sleep of so many centuries, being prepared for every novelty, scrupled less to tread in any unusual path which was opened to them; and, as copies of the Scripture and other ancient monuments of the Christian faith became more common, men perceived the innovations which were introduced after the first centuries; and though argument and reasoning could not

success to the savages.—This friend represented to the Jesuit the inconsistency of his zeal. "Ah!" replied the missionary, "you have no idea of the pleasure which is felt in commanding the attention of twenty thousand people, and in persuading them to what we believe not ourselves."

give conviction, an historical fact, well supported, was able to make impression on their understandings. Many of the powers, indeed, assumed by the church of Rome were very ancient, and were prior to almost every political government established in Europe. But as the ecclesiastics would not agree to possess their privileges as matters of civil right, which time could render valid, but appealed still to a divine origin, men were tempted to look into their primitive charter; and they could, without much difficulty, perceive its defect in truth and authenticity.—In order to bestow on this topic the greater influence, Luther and his followers, not satisfied with opposing the pretended divinity of the Romish church, and displaying the temporal inconveniences of that establishment, carried matters much further, and treated the religion of their ancestors as abominable, detestable, damnable, foretold by sacred writ itself as the source of all wickedness and pollution. They denominated the Pope Antichrist, called his communion the scarlet whore, and gave to Rome the appellation of Babylon; expressions which, however applied, were to be found in Scripture, and which were better calculated to operate on the multitude than the most solid arguments. Excited by contest and persecution on the one hand, by success and applause on the other, many of the reformers carried to the greatest extremity their opposition against the church of Rome; and, in contradiction to the multiplied superstitions with which that communion was loaded, they adopted an enthusiastic strain of devotion, which admitted of no

observances, rites, or ceremonies; but placed all merit in a mysterious species of faith, in inward vision, rapture and ecstasy. The new sectaries seized with this spirit, were indefatigable in the propagation of their doctrine, and set at defiance all the anathemas and punishments with which the Roman pontiff endeavoured to overwhelm them. That the civil power, however, might afford them protection against the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the Lutherians advanced doctrines favourable in some respects to the temporal authority of sovereigns. They inveighed against the abuses of the court of Rome, with which men were at that time generally discontented; and exhorted princes to reinstate themselves in those powers, of which the encroaching spirit of the ecclesiastics, and especially the sovereign pontiff, had so long bereaved them. They condemned celibacy and monastic vows; and they thereby opened the doors of the convents to those who were either tired of the obedience and chastity, or disgusted with the licence in which they had hitherto lived. They blamed the excessive richness, the idleness, the libertinism of the clergy; and pointed out their treasures and revenues as lawful spoil to the first invader. And as the ecclesiastics had hitherto conducted a willing and stupid audience, and were totally unacquainted with controversy, much more with every species of true literature, they were unable to defend themselves against men armed with authorities, citations, and popular topics, and qualified to triumph in every altercation or debate.—Such were the advantages with which

the reformers began their attack on the Roman hierarchy; and such were the causes of their rapid and astonishing success.—*Hume*.

REFORMATION, AND ITS EFFECTS.—

The authority of the church of Rome was in a state of declension, when the disputes which gave birth to the Reformation began in Germany, and soon spread themselves through every part of Europe. The new doctrines were every where received with a high degree of popular favour. They were propagated with all that enthusiastic zeal which commonly animates the spirit of party when it attacks established authority. The teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps in other respects not more learned than many of the divines who defended the established church, seem in general to have been better acquainted with ecclesiastical history, and with the origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the authority of the church was established; and they had thereby some advantage in almost every dispute. The austerity of their manners gave them authority with the common people, who contrasted the strict regularity of their conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy. They possessed too, in a much higher degree than their adversaries, all the arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes; arts which the lofty and dignified sons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great measure useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to some, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the established clergy to a still greater number; but the zealous, passionate,

and fanatical (though frequently coarse and rustic) eloquence with which they were almost every where inculcated, recommended them to by far the greatest number.

The success of the new doctrines was almost every where so great, that the princes who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of Rome, were by means of them easily enabled, in their own dominions, to overturn the church; which, having lost the respect and veneration of the inferior ranks of people, could make scarcely any resistance. The court of Rome had disoblged some of the smaller princes in the northern parts of Germany, whom it had probably considered as too insignificant to be worth the managing. They universally, therefore, established the Reformation in their own dominions. The tyranny of Christiern II. and of Troll, archbishop of Upsal, enabled Gustavus Vasa to expel them both from Sweden. The Pope favoured the tyrant and the archbishop, and Gustavus Vasa found no difficulty in establishing the Reformation in Sweden. Christiern II. was afterwards deposed from the throne of Denmark, where his conduct had rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The Pope, however, was still disposed to favour him; and Frederick of Holstein, who had mounted the throne in his stead, revenged himself by following the example of Gustavus Vasa. The magistrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel with the Pope, established with great ease the Reformation in their respective cantons, where, just before, some of the clergy had, by an imposture somewhat grosser than ordinary, rendered the whole

order both odious and contemptible.

In this critical situation of its affairs, the Papal court was at sufficient pains to cultivate the friendship of the powerful sovereigns of France and Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their assistance it was enabled, though not without great difficulty and much bloodshed, either to suppress altogether, or to obstruct very much, the progress of the Reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined too to be complaisant to the king of England. But, from the circumstances of the times, it could not be so without giving offence to a still greater sovereign, Charles V. king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII. accordingly, though he did not himself embrace the greater part of the doctrines of the Reformation, was yet enabled, by their general prevalence, to suppress all the monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the church of Rome in his dominions. That he should go so far, though he went no further, gave some satisfaction to the patrons of the Reformation; who having got possession of the government in the reign of his son and successor, completed, without any difficulty the work which Henry VIII. had begun.

In some countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak, unpopular, and not very firmly established, the Reformation was strong enough to overturn not only the church, but the state likewise for attempting to support the church.

Among the followers of the Reformation, dispersed in all the dif-

ferent countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal, which, like that of the court of Rome, or an oecumenical council, could settle all disputes among them, and with irresistible authority prescribe to all of them the precise limits of orthodoxy. When the followers of the Reformation in one country, therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no common judge to appeal to, the dispute could never be decided; and many such disputes arose among them. Those concerning the government of the church, and the right of conferring ecclesiastical benefices, were perhaps the most interesting to the peace and welfare of civil society. They gave birth accordingly to the two principal parties or sects among the followers of the Reformation, the Lutheran and Calvinistic sects; the only sects among them, of which the doctrine and discipline have ever yet been established by law in any part of Europe.

The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of England, preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established subordination among the clergy, gave the sovereign the disposal of all the bishopricks and other consistorial benefices within his dominions, and thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the bishop of the right of collating to the smaller benefices within his diocese, they, even to those benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of presentation both in the sovereign and in all other laypatrons. This system of church-government was from the beginning favourable to peace and good

order, and to submission to the civil sovereign. It has never, accordingly, been the occasion of any tumult or civil commotion in any country in which it has once been established. The church of England in particular has always valued herself, with great reason, upon the unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under such a government the clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themselves to the sovereign, to the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by whose influence they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to those patrons, sometimes, no doubt, by the vilest flattery and assentation, but frequently too by cultivating all those arts which best deserve, and which are therefore most likely to gain them the esteem of people of rank and fortune; by their knowledge in all the different branches of useful and ornamental learning; by the decent liberality of their manners; by the social good-humour of their conversation; and by their avowed contempt of those absurd and hypocritical austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practise, in order to draw upon themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practise them, the abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect altogether the means of maintaining their influence and authority with the lower. They are listened to, esteemed and respected by their superiors; but before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, effectually

and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate doctrines, against the most ignorant enthusiast who chooses to attack them.

The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly those of Calvin, on the contrary, bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church became vacant, the right of electing their own pastor; and established at the same time the most perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of this institution, as long as it remained in vigour, seems to have been productive of nothing but disorder and confusion, and to have tended equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The latter part seems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable.

As long as the people of each parish preserved the right of electing their own pastors, they acted almost always under the influence of the clergy, and generally of the most factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order to preserve their influence in those popular elections, became, or affected to become, many of them, fanatics themselves, encouraged fanaticism among the people, and gave the preference almost always to the most fanatical candidate. So small a matter as the appointment of a parish-priest occasioned almost always a violent contest, not only in one parish, but in all the neighbouring parishes, who seldom failed to take part in the quarrel. When the parish happened to be situated in a great city, it divided all the inhabitants into two parties; and when that city happened either to constitute itself a little republic, or

to be the head and capital of a little republic, as is the case with many of the considerable cities in Switzerland and Holland, every paltry dispute of this kind, over and above exasperating the animosity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind it both a new schism in the church, and a new faction in the state. In those small republics, therefore, the magistrate very soon found it necessary, for the sake of preserving the public peace, to assume to himself the right of presenting to all vacant benefices. In Scotland, the most extensive country in which this Presbyterian form of church-government has ever been established, the rights of patronage were in effect abolished by the act which established Presbytery in the beginning of the reign of William III. That act at least put it in the power of certain classes of people in each parish, to purchase, for a very small price, the right of electing their own pastor. The constitution which this act established was allowed to subsist for about two and twenty years; but was abolished by the 10th of Queen Anne, ch. 12. on account of the confusions and disorders which this more popular mode of election had almost every where occasioned. In so extensive a country as Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote parish was not so likely to give disturbance to government as in a smaller state. The 10th of Queen Anne restored the rights of patronage. But though in Scotland the law gives the benefice without any exception to the person presented by the patron, yet the church requires sometimes (for she has not in this respect been very uniform

in her decisions) a certain concurrence of the people, before she will confer upon the presentee what is called the cure of souls, or the ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the parish. She sometimes, at least, from an affected concern for the peace of the parish, delays the settlement till this concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of some of the neighbouring clergy sometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate, in order to enable them upon such occasions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps the causes which principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical spirit, either in the clergy or in the people of Scotland.

The equality which the Presbyterian form of church-government establishes among the clergy, consists, first, in the equality of authority or ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and, secondly, in the equality of benefice. In all Presbyterian churches the equality of authority is perfect; that of benefice is not so. The difference, however, between one benefice and another is seldom so considerable as commonly to tempt the possessor even of the small one to pay court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and assentation, in order to get a better. In all the Presbyterian churches, where the rights of patronage are thoroughly established, it is by nobler and better arts that the established clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour of their superiors; by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their lives, and by the faithful and diligent discharge of their duty. Their patrons even frequently com-

plain of the independency of their spirit, which they are apt to construe into ingratitude for past favours, but which at worst, perhaps, is seldom any more than that indifference which naturally arises from the consciousness that no further favours of the kind are ever to be expected. There is scarcely perhaps to be found any where in Europe a more learned, decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the greater part of the Presbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and Scotland.

Where the church-benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be very great; and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may no doubt be carried too far, has, however, some very agreeable effects. Nothing but the most exemplary morals can give dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of levity and vanity necessarily render him ridiculous; and are, besides, almost as ruinous to him as they are to the common people. In his own conduct, therefore, he is obliged to follow that system of morals which the common people respect the most. He gains their esteem and affection by that plan of life which his own interest and situation would lead him to follow. The common people look upon him with that kindness with which we naturally regard one who approaches somewhat to our own condition, but who, we think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindness naturally provokes his kindness. He becomes careful to instruct them, and attentive to assist and relieve them. He does not even despise the prejudices of people who are disposed to be so favour-

able to him, and never treats them with those contemptuous and arrogant airs which we so often meet with in the proud dignitaries of opulent and well-endowed churches. The Presbyterian clergy, accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people than perhaps the clergy of any other established church. It is accordingly in Presbyterian countries only that we ever find the common people converted, without persecution, completely, and almost to a man, to the established church.---
A. Smith.

REFORMATIONS, NATIONAL.---There is no abuse so great in civil society as not to be attended with a great variety of beneficial consequences; and, in the beginnings of reformati-
ons, the loss of these advantages is always felt very sensibly, while the benefit resulting from the change is the slow effect of time, and is seldom perceived by the bulk of a nation.---*Hume.*

RELIGION.---There is naturally every where a religion affirmative or negative, (some religions indeed partake of both) and which enter deeply in forming the habits and manners of the people. Where religion is affirmative, *i. e.* consists of forms and ceremonies, it gives a loose and enthusiasm to the fancy, which spirit into the air and manners. A negative religion being formed in direct opposition to the first, its measures are regulated accordingly; much pains are taken to root out, and to remove, every thing that can give wing to the imagination, and to regulate the external conduct by a torpid, inanimate composure, gravity, and indifference. Some religions appear to be the grave of arts and sciences, of genius, of sen-

sibility, and of all the finer and spiritual parts of the human faculties. Other religions have been the nurse and mother of them; they have embraced all the arts, poetry, painting, music, architecture; every effort of ingenuity has been employed in giving a force and furtherance to their views. If the Greeks had been of the same leaven with our Quakers, Puritans, and Mahometans, they would not only have been without an Apelles, or a Phidias, but, (the connection of things considered) perhaps without poets, and without any thing that could be a proof that there was either genius or imagination amongst them.---* *

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---Religion, in general, at its origin, is believed literally as it is professed; and it is afterwards rather refined by the learned, than debated by the ignorant. The institution of a religion has been, in every country, the first step towards an emersion from savage barbarism and the establishment of civil society. The human mind, at that period when reason is just beginning to dawn, and science is yet below the horizon, has by no means acquired that facility of invention, and those profound habits of thinking, which are necessary to strike out and arrange a connected, consistent chain of abstruse allegory. The vulgar and illiterate have always understood the mythology of their country in its most simple and literal sense; and there was a time to every nation, when the highest rank in it was equally vulgar and illiterate with the lowest: we have, therefore, no right to expect in them a greater capability of refinement than in the modern vulgar. The

progress of science is slow and gradual; men start not at once into divines and philosophers; yet it may be fairly presumed, that when the manners of a people become polished, and their ideas enlightened, attempts will be made to revise and refit their religious creed into a conformity with the rest of their improvements; and that those doctrines which the ignorant ancestor received with reverence and conviction, as the literal exposition of undoubted fact, the philosophic divine will strive to gloss over by *a posteriori* constructions of his own, and in the fury of symbol and allegory, obscure and distort the text, which the simplicity of its author never suspected as liable to the possibility of such mutilation.--

These innovations, however, have always been screened with most scrupulous attention from the general view of mankind: and if a hardy sage hath, at any time, ventured to remove the veil, his opinions have usually been received with detestation, and his person hath frequently paid the forfeit of his temerity.

The Eleusinian mysteries were not coeval with the Pagan mythology, to whose disapproval they owed their establishment: probably the institution was formed at a more advanced period of science, when the minds of the learned were eager to pierce through the obscurity of superstition; and when the vanity of superior penetration made them ashamed, literally, to believe those tenets which popular prejudices would not suffer them absolutely to renounce. --- *Preface to Gentoo Laws.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT. --- The religions instituted by human, under

the mask of divine authority, though they might be intended to restrain and reform mankind, to give stronger sanctions to the law of nature, and to be subservient to government, have served in all ages to very different purposes. They have promoted false conceptions of the Deity, they have substituted superstition in the place of those real duties which we owe to God and man; they have added new occasions to those that subsisted before of enmity and strife; and insociability has increased as they have flourished. May, the first principles have been laid in it, in direct opposition to the religion of nature and reason; the first principle of which is a sociability that flows from universal benevolence.

We are obliged to except out of the religions instituted by human authority the Jewish and the Christian; but we cannot except even these, as one of them was taught originally, as the other of them has been taught in the course of it, and as both of them have been practised, out of the religions that have served to the ill purposes here mentioned, to that principally of insociability. On the contrary, no religions have rendered the professors of them so insociable to other men, as those which have claimed, truly or falsely, to be immediate revelations of the Supreme Being, and have exacted an implicit faith as well as an implicit obedience. Insociability was at the first, and continues still, the great characteristic of Judaism. So it was, and so it is, of Mahometanism: so it was not of Gospel Christianity, but so it is become of theological Christianity; if it be allowed to make a

distinction, which will justify itself in every instance of comparison.---
Bolingbroke.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---A Christian, who takes his religion from the gospel, and not from systems of theology, far from being under any obligation of believing, is under the strongest of rejecting, every law, whether perpetual or occasional; whether given to the Jews alone, or to them and to others, that is evidently repugnant to the law of nature and of right reason and to the precepts of the gospel. If this was the Spirit of God in the days of Christ, it was the Spirit of God in the days of Moses; and whatever differences there might be in the several dispensations and the objects of them, God could have effected his purposes without contradicting his Spirit. We may believe any thing sooner than this, that immutability admits of change; and yet we must admit both the contradiction and the change, if we give entire credit to all that we find related, and as it stands related in the books of the Old Testament. Father Simon, a divine of the faculty of Paris, held that the authenticity of these books, and the divine inspiration of their authors, should be understood to extend no further than to matters purely of doctrine, or to such as have a necessary connection with these. Upon the same, or even a stronger principle of reason, we may assert, that as the sacred writers have no claim to inspiration when they write on other subjects; so neither have they when they write any thing on these which are evidently inconsistent with right reason, in matters that are proper objects of reason, and with the

first principles of natural law, and which are at the same time the first principles of Christianity. The all-perfect Being cannot contradict himself; but he would contradict himself, if the laws contained in the 13th chapter of Deuteronomy, to mention no others here, were his laws, since they contradict those of nature. From these indisputable premises we must conclude, that all those expressions in the text, which ascribe these laws to God, are uninspired, perhaps interpolated, but undoubtedly false; or we must impute to the Author of nature what we are forced to own unjust and cruel according to the laws of nature.---*Bolingbroke.*

RELIGION, THE INCONVENIENCE OF TRANSPLANTING IT FROM ONE COUNTRY TO ANOTHER.---There are many local laws in various religions; and when Montezuma with so much obstinacy insisted, that the religion of the Spaniards was good for their country, and his for Mexico, he did not assert an absurdity; because, in fact, legislators could never help having a regard to what nature had established before them. The opinion of the Metempsychosis is adapted to the climate of India. An excessive heat burns all the country; they can breed but very few cattle; they are always in danger of wanting them for tillage; their black cattle multiply but indifferently, and they are subject to many distempers; a law of religion that preserves them is therefore more suitable to the policy of the country.

When the meadows are scorched up, rice and pulse, by the assistance of water, are brought to perfection: a law of religion which permits only this kind of nourish-

ment, must therefore be extremely useful to men in those climates.

The flesh of cattle in that country is insipid, but the milk and butter which they receive from them serves for a part of their subsistence: therefore the law which prohibits the eating and killing of cows is in India not unreasonable.

Athens contained a prodigious multitude of people, but its territory was barren. It was therefore a religious maxim with this people, that those who offered some small presents to the gods, honoured them more than those who sacrificed an ox.

It follows from hence, that there are frequently many inconveniences attending the transplanting a religion from one country to another. "The hog (says M. de Boulainvilliers) must be very scarce in Arabia, where there are almost no woods, and hardly any thing fit for the nourishment of those animals: besides, the saltness of the water and food renders the people most susceptible of cutaneous disorders." This local law could not be good in other countries as in China, where the hog is almost an universal, and in some sort a necessary nourishment.

Sanctorius has observed, that pork transpires but little, and that this kind of meat greatly hinders the transpiration of other food; he has found that this diminution amounts to a third. Besides, it is known that the want of transpiration forms or increases the disorders of the skin. The feeding on pork ought therefore to be prohibited, in climates where the people are subject to these disorders; as in Palestine, Arabia, Egypt, and Libya.

Sir John Chardin says, that there

is not a navigable river in Persia except the Kur, which is at the extremity of the empire. The ancient law of the Gaurs, which prohibited sailing on rivers, was not, therefore, attended with any inconveniences in this country, though it would have ruined the trade of another.

Frequent bathings are extremely useful in hot countries. On this account they are ordained in the Mahometan law, and in the Indian religion. In India, it is a meritorious act to pray to God in the running stream: but how could these things be performed in other climates?

When a religion adapted to the climate of one country clashes too much with the climate of another, it cannot be there established; and whenever it has been introduced, it has been afterwards discarded. It seems to all human appearance, as if the climate had prescribed the bounds of the Christian and Mahometan religions.

It follows from hence, that it is almost always proper for a religion to have particular doctrines and a general worship. In laws concerning religious worship, there ought to be but few particulars: for instance, they should command mortification in general, and not a certain kind of mortification. Christianity is full of good sense: abstinence is of divine institution; but a particular kind of abstinence is ordained by human authority, and may therefore be changed.---*Montesquieu*.

RELIGIONS, OF THE MOTIVES OF ATTACHMENT TO DIFFERENT.---The different religions of the world do not give to those who profess them equal motives of attachment: this depends greatly on the manner in

which they agree with the turn of thought and perceptions of mankind. We are extremely addicted to idolatry, and yet have no great inclination for the religion of idolaters: we are not very fond of spiritual ideas, and yet are most attached to those religions which teach us to adore a spiritual being. This proceeds from the satisfaction we find in ourselves at having been so intelligent as to choose a religion which raises the Deity from that baseness in which he had been placed by others. We look upon idolatry as the religion of an ignorant people: and the religion which has a Spiritual Being for its object, as that of the most enlightened nations.

When, with a doctrine that gives the idea of a spiritual Supreme Being, we can still join those of a sensible nature, and admit them into our worship, we contract a greater attachment to religion; because those motives which we have just mentioned are added to our national inclination for the objects of sense. Thus the Catholics, who have more of this kind of worship than the Protestants, are more attached to their religion than the Protestants are to theirs, and more zealous for its propagation.

When the people of Ephesus were informed, that the fathers of the council had declared they might call the Virgin Mary the *Mother* of God, they were transported with joy; they kissed the hands of the bishops, they embraced their knees, and the whole city resounded with acclamations.

When an intellectual religion superadds a choice made by the Deity, and a preference of those who profess it to those who do not,

this greatly attaches us to religion. The Mahometans would not be so good Musselmans if, on the one hand, there were not idolatrous nations who make them imagine themselves champions of the unity of God; and, on the other, Christians to make them believe that they are the objects of his presence.

A religion burthened with many ceremonies, attaches us to it more strongly than that which has a fewer number.. We have an extreme propensity to things in which we are continually employed; witness the obstinate prejudices of the Mahometans and the Jews, and the readiness with which barbarous and savage nations change their religion; who, as they are employed entirely in hunting or war, have but few religious ceremonies.

Men are extremely inclined to the passions of hope and fear; a religion, therefore, that had neither a heaven nor a hell would hardly please them. This is proved by the ease with which foreign religions have been established in Japan, and the zeal and fondness with which they were received.

In order to raise an attachment to religion, it is necessary that it should inculcate pure morals. Men who are knaves by retail, are extremely honest in the gross: they love morality. This appears remarkably evident in our theatres; we are sure of pleasing the people by moral sentiments; we are sure of shocking them by those it disapproves.

When external worship is attended with great magnificence, it flatters our minds, and strongly attaches us to religion. The riches of temples and those of the clergy greatly affect us. Thus even the misery of

the people is a motive that renders them fond of a religion, which has served as a pretext to those who were the cause of their misery.--

Montesquieu.

RELIGION, THE TRUTH OR FALSITY OF A DOCTRINE IN, ARE NOT OF SO MUCH CONSEQUENCE TO GOVERNMENT AS THE USE OR ABUSE OF IT.--The most true and holy doctrines may be attended with the very worst consequences, when they are not connected with the principles of society; and, on the contrary, doctrines the most false may be attended with excellent consequences, when contrived so as to be connected with these principles. The religion of Confucius disowns the immortality of the soul; and the sect of Zeno did not believe it. These two sects have drawn from their bad principles consequences, not just, indeed, but most admirable as to their influence on society. Those of the religion of Tao, and of Fo, believe the immortality of the soul; but from this sacred doctrine they draw the most frightful consequences. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul falsely understood, has almost in every part of the globe, and in every age, engaged women, slaves, subjects, friends, to murder themselves, that they might go and serve in the other world the object of their respect or love in this. Thus it was in the West Indies; thus it was among the Danes; thus it is at present in Japan, in Macassar, and many other places.

These customs do not so directly proceed from the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, as from that of the resurrection of the body; from whence they have drawn this consequence, that, after death, the

same individual will have the same wants, the same sentiments, the same passions. In this point of view, the doctrine of the immortality of the soul has a prodigious effect on mankind; because the idea of only a simple change of habitation, is more within the reach of the human understanding, and more adapted to flatter the heart, than the idea of a new modification. It is not enough for religion to establish a doctrine, it must also direct its influence. This the Christian religion performs in the most admirable manner; particularly with regard to the doctrines of which we have been speaking. It makes us hope for a state which is the object of our belief; not for a state which we have already experienced or known: thus every article, even the resurrection of the body, leads us to spiritual ideas.

The sacred books of the ancient Persians say, *If you would be holy, instruct your children; because all the good actions which they perform will be imputed to you.* They advise them to marry betimes; because children at the day of judgment will be as a bridge, over which those who have none cannot pass. These doctrines were false, but extremely useful.--*Montesquieu.*

RELIGION, THE ONE TRUE, NOT TO BE DISCOVERED WITHOUT AN EXAMINATION OF ALL RELIGIONS. -- Among the many different religions, each of which proscribes and excludes the other, one only can be true: if, indeed, there be such a one among them all. Now, to discover which this is, it is not enough to examine that one: it is necessary to examine them all; as we should not, on any occasion whatever, condemn without a hearing. It is necessary to

compare objections with proofs, and to know what each objects to in the rest, as well as what the others have to offer in their defence. The more clearly any sentiment or opinion appears demonstrated, the more narrowly it behoves us to inquire what are the reasons which prevent its opponents from subscribing to it. To form a proper judgment of any religion, we are not to deduce its tenets from the books of its professors; we must go and learn it among the people. Each sect have their peculiar traditions, their customs, prejudices, and modes of acceptance, which constitute the peculiar mode of their faith; all which should be taken into consideration, when we form a judgment of their religion.

We have three principal religions in Europe; one admits only of one revelation, another of two, and the third of three. Each holds the other in detestation; anathematizes its professors, accuses them of ignorance, obstinacy, and falsehood. What impartial person will presume to decide between them, without having first examined their proofs, and heard their reasons? That which admits of only one revelation is the most ancient, and seems the least disputable: that which admits of three is the most modern, and seems to be the most consistent: that which admits of two, and rejects the third, may possibly be the best, but it hath certainly every prepossession against it; its inconsistency stares one full in the face.

In all these three revelations, the sacred books are written in languages unknown to the people who believe in them. The Jews no longer understand Hebrew; the Christians neither Greek nor He-

brew; the Turks and Persians understand no Arabic; and even the modern Arabs themselves speak not the language of Mahomet. Is not this a very simple manner of instructing mankind, by talking to them always in a language which they do not comprehend? But these books, it will be said, are translated; but who can assure us they are faithfully translated, or that it is even possible they should be so? Who can give us a sufficient reason why God, when he hath a mind to speak to mankind, should stand in need of an interpreter?

Among the doctors of the Sorbonne, it is as clear as day-light, that the predictions concerning the Messiah relate to Jesus Christ.—Among the Rabbins of Amsterdam, it is just as evident they have no relation at all to him. At Constantinople, the Turks make known their reasons, and we durst not publish ours; there it is our turn to submit. Two thirds of mankind are neither Jews, Mahometans, nor Christians; how many millions of men, therefore, must there be who never heard of Moses, Jesus Christ, or of Mahomet!

If there be in the world but one true religion, and every man be obliged to adopt it, it is necessary to spend our lives in the study of all religions, to visit the countries where they have been established, and examine and compare them with each other. No man is exempted from the principal duty of his species; and no one hath a right to confide in the judgment of another. The artisan who lives only by his industry, the husbandman who cannot read, the timid and delicate virgin, the feeble vale-

tudinarian; all without exception must study, meditate, dispute, and travel the world over in search of truth: there would be no longer any settled inhabitants in a country; the face of the earth being covered with pilgrims, going from place to place at great trouble and expence, to verify, examine, and compare the several different systems and modes of worship to be met with in various countries. We must in such a case bid adieu to arts and sciences, to trade, and all the civil occupations of life. Every other study must give place to that of religion; while the man who should enjoy the greatest share of health and strength, and make the best use of time and his reason, for the greatest term of years allotted to human life, would, in the extreme of old age, be still perplexed where to fix; and it would be a great thing after all, if he should learn before his death, what religion he ought to have believed and practised during life.---*Rousseau.*

RELIGION, THE CHRISTIAN, FOUNDED ON FAITH.---If we examine the miracles in the Pentateuch according to reason, and not as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human writer and historian, we shall find that book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still more barbarous, and in all probability long after the facts which it relates; corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we shall find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of a state of the world and of human nature entirely diffe-

rent from the present: of our fall from that state: of the age of man extended to near 1000 years: of the destruction of the world by a deluge: of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favourites of heaven; and that people the countrymen of the author: of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable. Would not the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates? Upon the whole, we may conclude, that the *Christian religion* not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one.---Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity; and whoever is moved by faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.---*Hume.*

RELIGION, NATURAL.---As a knowledge of the essential differences of things may lead men, who know not God, to a knowledge of the morality of actions; so do these essential differences serve as so many clues, by which the Theist may guide himself through all the intricacies of error and disputation, to a knowledge of the will of God. Since infinite wisdom, that must always proportion means to ends, has made happiness the end or instinctive object of all his human creatures; and has so constituted them, and the system in which he has placed them, that they can neither attain to this happiness,

nor be secure in the possession of it, by any other means than the practice of morality or the social virtues; it is demonstrated, that God wills we should pursue these means to arrive at this end. We know more certainly the will of God in this way, than we can know it in any other. We may take the word of men for the word of God; and, in fact, this has been, and is the case of many. But we can never mistake the works of God for the works of men; and may be therefore assured that a revelation, evidently manifested in them, is a divine revelation. But though natural religion is an object of knowledge, and all other religions, even that of the Gospel, can rest on nothing more than probability; yet may that probability be such as will and ought to force our assent. There are sanctions implied in the religion of nature, because it assumes, and to be sure very justly, that the general happiness or misery depends on the observation of its precepts; and that the degrees of one and the other bear always a proportion to the exercise, and to the neglect, of public and private virtue in every community. But these motives are such as particular men will be apt to think do not immediately, nor directly, concern them; because they are apt to consider themselves as individuals, rather than as members of society, and to catch at pleasure without any regard to happiness. To give an additional strength, therefore, to these motives, that are determining in their own nature, but not so according to the imperfection of ours; decisive to our reason, but not so to our appetites and passions; the ancient Theists and Polytheists,

philosophers or legislators, invented another; that, I mean, of future rewards and punishments, represented under various forms, but always directed to the same purpose.

This motive, every man who believes it, may, and must apply to himself, and hope the reward and fear the punishment, for his secret as well as public actions. What effect this motive had in remote antiquity we cannot say; but it had lost its force long before the institution of Christianity. The fear of hell, particularly, was ridiculed by some of the greatest moralists; and to show how little it was kept up in the minds of the vulgar, we may observe, that Tully treated it in some of his public pleadings as he would have avoided scrupulously to do, whatever he thought of it himself, if this fear had been at that time prevalent even among the vulgar. Human reason, says Mr. Locke, unassisted by revelation, in its great and proper business of morality, never made out an entire body of the law of nature from unquestionable principles, or by clear deductions.-- Scattered sayings, -- incoherent apophthegms of philosophers and wise men---could never make a morality---could never rise to the force of a law. These assertions now are in part, and in part only, true.

But when he comes to contrast this supposed imperfect knowledge of the religion of nature, which the heathen had, with that supposed perfect knowledge which is communicated by the Gospel, what he advances stands in direct contradiction to truth. It is not true, that Christ revealed an entire body

of ethics, proved to be the law of nature from principles of reason, and reaching all the duties of life. If mankind wanted such a code, to which recourse might be had on every occasion as to an unerring rule in every part of the moral duties, such a code is still wanting; for the Gospel is not such a code. Moral obligations are occasionally recommended and commanded in it, but no where proved from principles of reason, and by clear deductions, useless allusions, parables, and comparisons, and promises, and threats, are to pass for such.--- Were all the precepts of this kind, that are scattered about in the whole New Testament, collected, like the short sentences of ancient sages in the memorials we have of them, and put together in the very words of the sacred writers, they would compose a very short, as well as unconnected system of ethics. A system thus collected from the writings of ancient heathen moralists; of Tully, of Seneca, of Epictetus, and others; would be more full, more entire, more coherent, and more clearly deduced from unquestionable principles of knowledge. If there was any thing like a complete system of morality in the Gospel, we should find it in the Sermon on the Mount, preached by Christ himself, not on any particular doctrine, but on the whole duty of man. What now do we find in this sermon? Many excellent precepts of morality, no doubt, intermingled with, and enforced by several considerations drawn from his own revelations; and yet such as the religion of nature enjoins, or implies, and as have been practised by philosophers, and other good men among the heathen. Some of

these, and some others which are interspersed in the Gospel, require great purity and perfection. Thus, for instance, wherever marriage has been instituted, adultery has been forbid. It was so by the Mosaic law, and it is so by the religion of nature; for though marriage is not directly instituted by the religion of nature, yet every wrong, every invasion of another man's property, and every injustice, is forbid by it. Now the Gospel carries this duty much further; and declares, that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. The law that forbids a crime, does certainly imply that we should not desire to commit it: for to want the desire, or to be able to extinguish it, is the best security of our obedience; though he who is unable to extinguish it, and yet abstains from the sin, has, in the eye of reason, a greater degree of merit. Reason commands what a man may by the force of reason perform.--- Revelation commands what it is impossible to obey, without an assistance unknown to reason. Thus, again, murder is forbid by the law of nature; but even anger is forbid by this; and universal benevolence, that great principle of the first, is strained by the last to the love of our enemies and persecutors: a precept so sublime, that I doubt whether it was ever exactly observed any more under the law of grace than under the religion of nature; though some appearances of it may be found, perhaps, under both; and as least as many under one as under the other.--- These sublime precepts have not been observed by the professors of Christianity, either ancient or mo-

dern. The Quaker, who says, Yea, yea, and Nay, nay, and doth not swear at all, does not willingly part with his coat as well as his cloak, nor give away one because the other has been taken from him; neither does the good man neglect to lay up some treasures on earth, where moth and rust corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal.

There are besides these, general duties, and others of the same kind commanded or recommended by the Gospel, some of them directed to the Jews only, and some that seem directed more immediately to the disciples of Christ. Of the first sort, is that injunction that restrains divorces to the case of adultery; whereas, by the law of Moses, as well as by those of other legislators, a man who did not like his wife, nor care to cohabit with her, might give her a letter of divorce, and turn her out of doors, for which express leave is given in the xxivth chapter of Deuteronomy. Of the same sort are those directions which tend to render the worship of God more intellectual, and the practice of good works less ostentatious. Of the second sort, are certain duties which seem fit enough for an order of men like the Essenians, but are by no means practicable in the general society of mankind. To resist no injury, to take no care for to-morrow, to neglect providing for the common necessities of life, and to sell all to follow Christ, might be properly exacted from those who were his companions, and his disciples in a stricter sense, like the scholars of Pythagoras, admitted within the curtain; but reason and experience both show, that, considered as general duties, they are impracticable, inconsistent with na-

tural instinct, and quite destructive of society. The religion of nature is therefore the plainest of all laws; and if the heavens do not declare the will as well as the glory of God, the earth and the inhabitants of it declare both. The will of God has been revealed in his works to all those who have applied themselves to the contemplation of them; even to those who did not discover him in them, from the time that men have used their reason: and where reason improved, and knowledge increased, morality was carried as high in speculation, and in practice too, by some of the heathen worthies, as by any of the Christian saints.—*Bolingbroke*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---By natural religion, I mean the principles of morality common to mankind. Newton believed that God having given the same senses to all men, the same wants, the same sentiments; consequently the same rude notions, every where the foundation of society, prevail among all mankind. It is certain, that God has given to bees and ants something to induce them to live in common, which he has not given to wolves nor falcons. It is certain, from all mens living in society, there is in their essence a secret tie, by which God intended to connect them together. Now, if at a certain age, the ideas flowing from the senses to men, all organized in the same manner, did not gradually give the same principles necessary to society, it is certain that such society could not subsist. This is the reason why truth, gratitude, friendship, &c. are esteemed from Siam to Mexico.

It has always seemed strange to me, that so wise a man as Locke should have advanced, that there is

no notion of good and evil common to all men. This is a mistake.—It is founded on the narratives of travellers; who say, that in some countries it is customary for parents to eat their children, and to eat women when past childbearing; that in others, certain enthusiasts, who make use of she-asses instead of women, are honoured with the name of saints. But there is nothing more common than for them to see through a false medium, give a false account of what they have seen; to mistake the intention, especially in a nation to whose language they are strangers; and, in fine, to judge of the manners of a whole people by a particular fact, whose circumstances are to them unknown.

Were a Persian at Lisbon, at Madrid, at Goa, on the day of an Auto-da-Fe, he would think, and not without an appearance of reason that the Christians sacrificed men to God. Let him look into the almanacks, sold all over Europe among the lower class, and he will conclude, that we all believe in the effects of the moon; though this is so far from being true, that we laugh at them. Thus, should a traveller tell me, for instance, that the savages eat their parents from filial affection; I should answer, that, first, the fact is dubious; secondly, if it be true, it will be so far from destroying the idea of respect due to parents, that it is probably a barbarous manner of showing tenderness; a horrible mistake of the law of nature. For possibly they kill their parents from mere duty, to free them from the troubles of old age, or the fury of an enemy: and if they thus give their parents a tomb within their own bodies, in-

stead of being devoured by savage conquerors, this custom, however shocking it may appear to human nature, necessarily flows from a goodness of heart. Natural religion is nothing more than this law known through the world, *Do as you would be done by*. Now the savage who kills his father to save him from the enemy, and who buries him in his breast, that he may not find a grave in the bowels of his enemy, wishes that his son might treat him in the same manner as if reduced to the same exigency. This law of treating our neighbour as ourselves, flows naturally from the rudest notions, and sooner or later is heard in the hearts of all men; for having all the same reason, the fruits of that tree must have a resemblance: and they do, in reality, resemble each other; for, in every society, the name of virtue is given to whatever is thought useful to the society.

Name me a country upon earth, or a society of ten persons, where what tends to promote the common good is not esteemed; and when you have done this, I will allow there is no natural law. The law is doubtless infinitely varied; but, can we infer from hence any thing more than that it exists? Matter every where receives different forms; yet every where it retains its nature. It is in vain to say, that theft was enjoined at Lacedemon; but, in a city where every thing was common, a permission to take dexterously what private persons appropriated to themselves contrary to law, was a method of punishing the spirit of appropriation prohibited among that people. *Meum* and *tuum* was a crime, for which what we call theft was the punishment; and among them,

as among us, there was some order made by God for us all, as he made for the ants to live in society. The disposition we all have for living in society, is the foundation of the law of nature.—*Voltaire.*

RELIGION OF THE FIRST MAN.—After the formation of societies, it is credible that there was some religion, a kind of rustic worship. Man entirely occupied with his wants, could not soar to the Author of life. He could not be acquainted with those causes and effects, which to the wise proclaim an eternal Architect.

The knowledge of a God, creator, requiter, and avenger, is the fruit of cultivated reason, or of revelation.

All people were for ages what the inhabitants of the several coasts of Africa, and of several islands, and half the Americans, are at present. Those people have no idea of a sole God, creator of all things, omnipresent, and existing of himself from all eternity. They should not, however, be called Atheists in the usual sense; for they do not deny a Supreme Being; they are not acquainted with him; they have no idea of him. The Caffres take an insect for their protector, the Negroes a serpent. Among the Americans, some adore the moon, others a tree. Several have no worship whatever.

The Peruvians, when they became polished, adored the sun. Either Mango Capac had made them believe that he was the sun of that planet, or a dawn of reason made them believe that they owed some acknowledgement to the planet which animated nature. In order to know how these different doctrines and superstitions gained

ground, it seems to me necessary to follow the career of human understanding left alone without a guide.—The inhabitants of a village, who are little better than savages, perceive the fruits which should nourish them perish: an inundation carries away some cabins; others are destroyed by thunder. Who has done them this mischief? It could be none of their fellow-citizens, for they have equally suffered. It is therefore some secret power that has afflicted them, and must therefore be appeased. How is it to be effected? By using it as they do those whom they are desirous of pleasing; in making it some small presents. There is a serpent in the neighbourhood; it is very likely the serpent: they offer him milk near the cavern whither he retires; and from that time he becomes sacred: he is invoked when they are at war with the neighbouring village, who, on their side, have chosen another protector.

Other little colonies find themselves in the same situation. But there being no object near them to excite their terror and adoration, they call in general the being whom they suspect has done them mischief, the master, the lord, the chief, the ruler.

The idea of this being more conformable than the others to the dawn of reason, which increases and strengthens with time, possesses every one's head when the nation is become more numerous. Thus, we find that many nations have had no other God than their master, their lord. Such was Adonai among the Phenicians; Baal, Milkom, and Adad, with the people of Syria. All these names signified nothing more than, "The lord," "The powerful."

This was doubtless the origin of that opinion, which so generally and so long prevailed, that every people was protected by the divinity they had chosen. This idea was so deeply rooted in men, that in after-times it was adopted by the Jews themselves.

Nothing was more common than to adopt strange gods. The Greeks acknowledged those of the Egyptians ; not Apis's bull and Anubis's dog, but Ammon, and the twelve great gods. The Romans adored all the gods of the Greeks. Except in the time of war and bloody fanaticism, all nations were well satisfied that their neighbours had their own particular gods, and imitated frequently the worship and ceremonies of strangers. The Jews themselves imitated the circumcision of the Arabs and Egyptians ; they often adored the Baal and Belphegor of their neighbours.

The most polished people of Asia, on this side the Euphrates, adored the planets. The Chaldeans, before the time of Zoroaster, paid homage to the sun ; as did afterwards the Peruvians in another hemisphere. This error must be very natural to man, as it had so many followers in Asia and America. A small and half savage tribe has but one protector. Does it become more numerous ? The number of its gods is increased. The Egyptians began by adoring Isbeth or Isis, and they at last adored cats. The first homage the rustic Romans paid was to Mars ; that of the Romans, masters of Europe, was to the goddess of marriage and to the god of thieves. Yet Cicero, all the philosophers, and those initiated, acknowledged a supreme and omnipotent God. They were all brought

back to that point of reason from whence savage men had departed by instinct.

The Apotheosis could not have been devised till long after the first kinds of worship. It is not natural immediately to make a god of a man whom we saw born like ourselves ; suffer like us, maladies, chagrin, the miseries of humanity ; subject to the same humiliating wants ; die, and become food for worms. But this is what happened to all nations, after the revolution of several ages.

A man who had done great things, who had been serviceable to human nature, could not in truth be looked upon as a god by those who had seen him tremble with the ague, and seek for clothing ; but enthusiasts persuaded themselves, that, being possessed of eminent qualities, he had them from a god, and that he was the son of a god. In the same manner gods produced children all over the world ; Bacchus, Perseus, Hercules, Castor and Pollux, were sons of gods. Romulus was a son of a god ; Alexander was proclaimed a son of a god in Egypt ; Odin with us northern nations, was a son of a god ; Mango Capac was son of the sun in Peru. The historian of the Moguls, Abulgazi, relates, that one of the grandmothers of Gingiskan, named Alanku, when a girl, was impregnated by a celestial ray. Gingiskan himself passed for the son of God. And when Pope Innocent sent brother Asulin to Batouken, grandson to Gengis, this monk, who could not be presented but to one of the viziers, said he came from the vicar of God ; the minister replied, " Is this vicar ignorant that he should pay homage and tribute

to the son of God, the great Ba-toukan his master?"

With men fond of the marvellous, there is no great distance between a son of god, and god. After two or three generations, the son partakes of the father's dominion. Thus temples were raised to all those who were supposed to be born from the supernatural correspondence of the Divinity with our wives and daughters.

From hence we may conclude, that the majority of mankind were for a long time in a state of insensibility and imbecility; and that, perhaps, the most insensible of all were those who wanted to discover a signification in those absurd fables, and to ingraft reason upon folly.---*Voltaire.*

RELIGION AND TOLERATION OF THE ROMANS.—The Romans adopted or allowed the doctrines of every other people, after the example of the Greeks; and, in reality, the Senate and the Emperors always acknowledged one supreme God, as well as the greatest part of the philosophers and poets of Greece.---The toleration of all religion was a natural law, engraven on the hearts of all men. For what right can one created being have to compel another to think as he does? But when a people are united, when religion is become a law of the state, we should submit to that law. Now the Romans, by their law, adopted all the gods of the Greeks, who themselves had altars for the gods unknown.---The twelve tables ordained, *Separatim nemo haberet deos neve advenas nisi publice adscitos*; "That no one should have foreign new gods without the public sanction." This sanction was given to many doctrines; and all the others

were tolerated. This association of all the divinities in the world, this kind of divine hospitality was the law of nations from all antiquity, except one or two small nations.

As there were no dogmas, there was no religious war. It is also very remarkable, that, amongst the Romans, no one was ever persecuted for his way of thinking. There is not a single example, from the time of Romulus down to Domitian; and amongst the Greeks Socrates is the only exception.---It is incontestable that the Romans, as well as the Greeks, adored one supreme God, *Deus optimus maximus*. With this knowledge of one God, with this universal indulgence, which are every where the fruits of cultivated reason, were blended innumerable superstitions; which were the ancient fruits of reason, erroneous and in its dawn. The sacred fowls, the goddess Pertunda, and the goddess Cloacina, were ridiculous.---Why did not the conquerors and legislators of so many nations abolish such nonsense? Because, being ancient, it was dear to the people, and was no way prejudicial to the government. Scipios, the Paulus Emilius's, the Ciceros, the Catos, the Casars, had other employment than that of combating popular superstition.---When an ancient error is established, policy avails itself of it, as a bit which the vulgar have put into their own mouth, till such time as another supersition arises to destroy it; and policy profits of this second error, as it did of the first.---*Voltaire.*

RELIGIONS, THE INFLUENCE OF, ON THE MORAL CONDUCT OF MANKIND.---Men of more piety than knowledge, have imagined, that the virtues of a nation, its humanity, and the refine-

ments of its manners, depend on the purity of its worship. The hypocrites, interested in propagating this opinion, have published without believing it; and the common people believed it without examination. This error, once asserted, has been almost everywhere received as a certain truth.

---Experience and history teach us, however, that the prosperity of a people does not depend on the purity of their worship, but on the excellence of their legislation. Of what importance, in fact, is their belief? That of the Jews was pure; and the Jews were the dregs of nations: they have never been compared either to the Egyptians or the ancient Persians.---It was under Constantine that Christianity became the ruling religion. It did not, however, restore the Romans to their primitive virtues. There was not seen a Decius who devoted himself for the good of his country; or a Fabricius, who preferred seven acres of land to all the riches of the empire.---At what period did Constantinople become the sink of all the vices? At the very time the Christian religion was established. Its worship did not change the manners of its sovereigns; their piety did not make them better. The most Christian Kings have not been the greatest of monarchs. Few of them have displayed on the throne the virtues of Titus, Trajan, or Antonius. There are in every country a great many sound believers, and but few virtuous men. Why? Because religion is not virtue. All belief, and all speculative opinions, have not commonly any influence on the conduct and probity of man. The dogma of fatality is almost the general opinion of the East: it

was that of the Stoics. This dogma, it is said, is destructive of all virtue. The Stoics, however, were not less virtuous than the philosophers of other sects; nor are the Mahometan princes less faithful to their treaties than the Catholic; nor the fatalist Persian less honest in his commerce than the French or Portuguese Christian. Purity of manners is therefore independent of purity of doctrines. The Pagan religion, with regard to its morality, was founded, like every other, on what they call the law of nature. With regard to its theologic or mythologic part, it was not very edifying. We cannot read the history of Jupiter and his loves, and especially the treatment of his father Saturn, without allowing that the gods did not preach virtue by example.---Yet Greece and ancient Rome abounded in heroes and virtuous citizens; while modern Greece and Rome produce, like Brazil and Mexico, none but vile slothful wretches, without talents, virtue, or industry. Now, if, since the establishment of Christianity in the monarchies of Europe, the sovereigns have not been more vigilant or intelligent; if the people have not had more knowledge and humanity; if the number of patriots has not been in any degree augmented; of what use, then, are religions? Why place, then, so much importance in the belief of certain revelations, that are frequently contestable, and always contested? What does the history of religions teach us? That they have every where lighted up the torch of intolerance, strewed the plains with carcasses, embued the fields with blood, burned cities, and laid waste empires; but that they have never made men better.

Their goodness is the work of the laws. Punishment and contempt restrain vice. Religion regulates our belief, and the laws our manners and our virtues. What is it that distinguishes the Christian from the Jew, the Guebar, and the Mussulman? Is it an equity, a courage, an humanity, a beneficence, particular to one and not known to the others? No; they are known by their several professions of faith.

Let not, therefore, honesty ever be confounded with orthodoxy. In every country the orthodox is he that believes such particular doctrines; and throughout the whole earth, the virtuous man is he that does such actions as are humane, and conformable to the general interest. The evils that arise from false religions are real; the good imaginary. Of what use, in fact, can they be? Their precepts are either contrary, or conformable, to the law of nature; that is, to what mature reason dictates to societies for their greatest happiness. In the first case, the precepts of such religion must be rejected as contrary to the public welfare. In the second, they must be admitted.--- But then, of what use is a religion which teaches nothing that sound sense does not teach without it?--- The precepts of reason, it may be said, when consecrated by a revelation, will at least appear more respectable. Yes, in the first moments of fervor; for then maxims believed to be true, because they are supposed to be revealed, act more forcibly on the imagination: but that enthusiastic spirit is soon dissipated.--- A revelation, merely from its being uncertain and contestable, far from fortifying the demonstration of a moral principle,

must, in time, obscure its evidence. Truth and falsehood are two heterogeneous beings: they never go together. Besides, all men are not actuated by religion: all have not faith. An honest man will always obey his reason in preference to revelation; for it is, he will say, more certain that God is the author of human reason, that is, of the faculty in man of distinguishing the true from the false, than that he is the author of any particular book. It is more criminal in the eyes of a wise man to deny our own reason, than to deny any revelation whatever. The conduct of men and nations is rarely consistent with their belief, or even their speculative principles. Duelling was for a long time fashionable in Europe, especially in France. Religion forbade it, yet they fought every day. Luxury has since softened the manners of the French: duelling is punished with death. The delinquents are almost all obliged to fly their country. There is no longer any duelling. From whence arises the security of Paris? From the devotion of its inhabitants?--- No; but from the regularity and vigilance of the police. The Parisians of the last age were more devout and greater thieves. Virtue, therefore, is the work of the laws, and not of religion.--- Suppose we would increase the number of thieves, what must be done? Augment the taxes and the wants of the people; oblige every tradesman to travel with a purse of gold; place fewer patrols on the highways; and, lastly, abolish the punishment for robbery. We should then soon see impunity multiply transgressions. It is not, therefore, on the truth of a revelation

or the purity of a worship, but solely on the sagacity or absurdity of the laws, that the virtues or vices of the citizens depend. In short, it is reason improved by experience, that alone can demonstrate to nations the interests they have to be just, humane, and faithful to their promises. Superstition does not in this case produce the effects of reason. The religious system destroys all proportion between the rewards decreed for the actions of men, and the utility of those actions to the public.---*Helvetius*.

RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES, THE INFLUENCE OF, ON THE CONDUCT OF MANKIND.

---It is certain, from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems.---

A man's natural inclination works incessantly upon him; it is for ever present to the mind; and mingles itself with every view and consideration: whereas, religious motives, where they act at all, operate only by starts and bounds; and it is scarcely possible for them to become altogether habitual to the mind.---

Another advantage of inclination, it engages on its side all the wit and ingenuity of the mind; and when set in opposition to religious principles, seeks every method and art of eluding them; in which it is almost always successful. Who can explain the heart of man, or account for those strange salvos and excuses with which people satisfy themselves when they follow their inclinations in opposition to their religious duty? This is well understood in the world; and none but fools ever repose less trust in a

man, because they hear, that, from study and philosophy, he has entertained some speculative doubts with regard to theological subjects.--- And when we have to do with a man who makes a great profession of religion and devotion, has this any other effect upon several, who pass for prudent, than to put them on their guard, lest they be cheated and deceived by him? We must further consider, that philosophers, who cultivate reason and reflection, stand in less need of such motives to keep them under the restraint of morals: and that the vulgar, who alone may need them, are utterly incapable of so pure a religion as represents the Deity to be pleased with nothing but virtue in human behaviour. The recommendations to the Divinity are generally supposed to be either frivolous observances, or rapturous ecstasies, or a bigotted credulity. We need not run back into antiquity, or wander into remote regions, to find instances of this degeneracy.--- Amongst ourselves, some have been guilty of that atrociousness unknown to the Grecian and Egyptian superstitions, of declaiming, in express terms, against morality; and representing it as a sure forfeiture of the divine favour, if the least trust or reliance be laid upon it. But even though superstition or enthusiasm should not put itself in direct opposition to morality, the very diverting of the attention, the raising up a new and frivolous species of merit, the preposterous distribution which it makes of praise and blame, must have the most pernicious consequences, and weaken extremely men's attachment to the natural motives of justice and humanity. Such a principle of action likewise,

not being any of the familiar motives of human conduct, only acts by intervals on the temper, and must be roused by continual efforts in order to render the pious zealot satisfied with his own conduct, and make him fulfill his devotional task.--- Many religious exercises are entered into with seeming fervour, where the heart at the time feels cold and languid. A habit of dissimulation is by degrees contracted; and fraud and falsehood become the predominant principle.---Hence the reason of that vulgar observation, That the highest zeal in religion and the deepest hypocrisy, so far from being inconsistent, are often, or commonly united in the same individual character.---The steady attention alone to so important an interest as that of eternal salvation, is apt to extinguish the benevolent affections, and beget a narrow, contracted selfishness. And when such a temper is encouraged, it easily eludes all the general precepts of charity and benevolence.

Thus the motives of vulgar superstition have no great influence on general conduct; nor is their operation very favourable to morality, in the instances where they predominate.---*Hume.*

RELIGION (THE STATE OF) IN PENNSYLVANIA.---In Pennsylvania there is no religion established by government: each one adopts that he likes best. The priest is no charge to the state. The individuals provide them as they find it convenient, and tax themselves accordingly. The priest is there like a merchant, maintained at the expence of the consumer. He who has no priest, and consumes no part of the commodity he deals in, pays no part of his expence. Pennsylvania is a

proper model for other nations.---*Helvetius.*

RELIGIONS OF THE ANCIENTS.---When we consider the compound nature of man, neither a merely sensitive being, nor yet a merely intellectual or moral agent; it will afford no small entertainment to let our thoughts wander over the various ways that the different religions of the Greeks, Romans, and other nations of antiquity, were calculated to act upon and occupy all the senses and the imagination, as well as the understanding, of the people. Even the ancient Jewish religion was not ill-constructed for this purpose, by its pompous and magnificent feasts, its music, its sacrifices, its numerous ceremonies, and their frequency. The ancients seem to have grounded themselves upon a persuasion, that all this external of things, this feasting, and occupation of the senses, was indispensably necessary for the bulk of mankind; whose situations in life utterly disqualified them for philosophy, subtile calculations and deductions; and who could be but little affected, and that but for a very short time, by any set of abstract speculative opinions; which, by despising the toys and puppet-show work of superstition and weakness, would leave nothing to amuse the weak and ignorant, who are very numerous, and not always confined to the lower class. Their religions were accordingly constructed in such a manner, as to afford a general pursuit and occupation, which grew up with every man, at the same time that he was pursuing his particular avocation of life; and those who were disappointed in these particular pursuits, found an asylum and resource in the matter

with which religion was amply stored, and with which they could fill up the vacancy of their minds, thus sickened and forsaken by its other prospects.---**

RELIGION, UNIVERSAL.---An universal religion cannot be founded but on principles eternal and invariable, that are drawn from the nature of man and things; and that, like the propositions of geometry, are capable of the most rigorous demonstration. Are there such principles, and can they be equally adapted to all nations? Yes, doubtless: or if they vary, it will be only in some of their applications to those different countries where chance has placed the different nations. Heaven requires that man by his reason should co-operate to his own happiness, and that of the numerous societies of the earth.

God has said to man, I have created thee, I have given thee sensations, memory, and consequently reason. It is my will that thy reason, sharpened at first by want, and afterward enlightened by experience, shall provide thee food, teach thee to cultivate the land, to improve the instruments of labour, of agriculture; in a word, of all the sciences of the first necessity. It is also my will, that by cultivating this same reason, thou mayest come to the knowledge of my moral will; that is, of thy duties towards society, of the means of maintaining order, and lastly, of the best legislation possible.

This is the only natural religion to which mankind should elevate their minds, that only which can become universal, that which is alone worthy of God, which is marked with his seal, and that of the truth. All others must bear the impression

of man, of fraud and falsehood. The will of God, just and good, is, that the children of the earth should be happy, and enjoy every pleasure compatible with the public welfare. ---*Helvetius.*

RELIGIOUS OPINIONS, IN, EVERY MAN THINKS HIMSELF RIGHT.---We meet every day with people so sceptical with regard to history, that they assert it impossible for any nation ever to believe such absurd principles as those of Greek and Egyptian Paganism; and at the same time so dogmatical with regard to religion, that they think the same absurdities are to be found in no other communion. Cambyses entertained like prejudices, and very impiously ridiculed, and even wounded, Apis, the great god of the Egyptians, who appeared to his profane senses nothing but a large spotted bull. But Herodotus judiciously ascribes this sally of passion to a real madness or disorder of the brain. Otherwise, says the historian, he never would openly affront any established worship. For on that head, continues he, every nation are best satisfied with their own, and think they have the advantage over every other nation.---It must be allowed that the Roman Catholics are a very learned sect; and that no one communion, but that of the church of England, can dispute their being the most learned of all the Christian churches: yet Averroes, the famous Arabian, who, no doubt, heard of the Egyptian superstitions declares, that of all religions, the most absurd and nonsensical is that, whose votaries eat, after having created, their deity.---There is, indeed, no tenet in all Paganism, which can give so fair a scope to ridicule as this of the *real pre-*

sence. It is so absurd, that it eludes the force of all arguments. But to these doctrines we are so accustomed, that we never wonder at them; though in a future age, it will probably become difficult to persuade some nations that any human two-legged creature could ever embrace such principles. And it is a thousand to one but these nations themselves shall have something full as absurd in their own creed, to which they will give a most implicit and most religious assent.---I lodged once at Paris, in the same hotel with an ambassador from Tunis, who, having passed some years at London, was returning home that way. One day I observed his Moorish excellency diverting himself under the porch with surveying the splendid equipages that drove along; when there chanced to pass that way some *Capuchin* friars, who had never seen a Turk; as he, on his part, though accustomed to the European dresses, had never seen the grotesque figure of a *Capuchin*: and there is no expressing the mutual admiration with which they inspired each other. Had the chaplain of the embassy entered into a dispute with these Franciscans, their reciprocal surprise had been of the same nature. Thus all mankind stand staring at one another; and there is no beating it out of their heads, that the turban of the African is not just as good or as bad a fashion as the cowl of the European. *He is a very honest man* said the prince of Sallee, speaking of De Ruyter; *it is a pity he were a Christian*.---How can you worship leeks and onions? we shall suppose a *Sarboonnist* to say to a priest of Sais. If we worship them, replies the latter, at least we do not

eat them at the same time. But what strange objects of adoration are cats and monkies? says the learned doctor. They are at least as good as the relics and rotten bones of martyrs, answers his no less learned antagonist. Are you mad, insists the Catholic, to cut one another's throats about the preference of a cabbage or cucumber? Yes, says the Pagan, I allow it, if you will confess that those are still madder, who fight about the preference among volumes of sophistry, ten thousand of which are not equal in value to one cabbage or cucumber.

Every by-stander will easily judge (but unfortunately the by-standers are few) that if nothing more were requisite to establish any popular system, but exposing the absurdities of other systems, every votary of every superstition could give a sufficient reason for his blind and bigoted attachment to the principles in which he has been educated. It is with our religion, as with our watches; those of others go either too fast or too slow, ours only gives the true hour of the day.---*Hume*.

RELIGIONS, ABSURDITY ESSENTIAL TO POPULAR.---Popular theology, especially the scholastic, has a kind of appetite for absurdity and contradiction. If that theology went not beyond reason and common sense, her doctrines would appear too easy and familiar. Amazement must of necessity be raised; mystery affected; darkness and obscurity sought after; and a foundation of merit afforded the devout votaries who desire an opportunity of subduing their rebellious reason.---Ecclesiastical history sufficiently confirms these reflections. When a controversy is started, some people pretend always with certainty to fore-

tel the issue. Whichever opinion, say they, is most contrary to plain sense, is sure to prevail; even where the general interest of the system requires not that decision. Though the reproach of heresy for some time be bandied about among the disputants, it always rests at last on the side of reason. Any one, it is pretended, that has but learning enough of this kind to know the definition of Arian, Pelagian, Erastian, Socinian, Sabellian, Eutychian, Nestorian, Monothelite, &c. not to mention Protestants, whose fate is yet uncertain, will be convinced of the truth of this observation.—To oppose the torrent of scholastic religion by such feeble maxims as these, *That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, that the whole is greater than a part, that two and three make five*, is pretending to stop the ocean with a bullrush. Will you set up prophane reason against sacred mystery? No punishment is great enough for your impiety. And the same fires which were kindled for heretics, will serve also for the destruction of philosophers.—*Hume.*

RELIGIONS, THE BAD INFLUENCE OF MOST POPULAR, ON MORALITY.—It is certain, that, in every religion, however sublime the verbal definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries, perhaps the greater number, will still seek the Divine favour, not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable to a perfect Being, but either by frivolous observances, by intemperate zeal, by rapturous ecstasies, or by the belief of mysterious and absurd opinions. The least part of the Sadder, as well as the Pentateuch, consists in precepts of morality; and we may be assured

always, that that part was also the least observed and regarded. When the old Romans were attacked with a pestilence, they never ascribed their sufferings to their vices, or dreamed of repentance and amendment. They never thought that they were the general robbers of the world, whose ambition and avarice made desolate the earth, and reduced opulent nations to want and beggary. They only created a dictator *clavis figendæ causæ*, in order to drive a nail into a door; and by that means, they thought that they had sufficiently appeased their incensed deity.—If we should suppose, what seldom happens, that a popular religion were found, in which it was expressly declared, that nothing but morality could gain the Divine favour; if an order of priests were instituted to inculcate this opinion, in daily sermons, and with all the arts of persuasion; yet so inveterate are the peoples' prejudices, that, for want of some other superstition, they would make the very attendance on those sermons the essentials of religion, rather than place them in virtue and good morals. The sublime prologue of Zaleucus's laws inspired not the Locrians, so far as we can learn, with any sounder notions of the measures of acceptance with the Deity than were familiar to the other Greeks.

This observation, then, holds universally: but still one may be at some loss to account for it. It is not sufficient to observe, that the people every where degrade their Deities into a similitude with themselves. This will not remove the difficulty. For there is no man so stupid, as that, judging by his natural reason, he would not esteem virtue and honesty the most valuable qualities

which any person could possess. Why not ascribe the same sentiment to his Deity? Why not make all religion, or the chief part of it, to consist in these attainments?---Nor is it satisfactory to say, that the practice of morality is more difficult than that of superstition; and is therefore rejected. For, not to mention the excessive penances of the Brachmins and Talapoins, it is certain, that the Rhamadan of the Turks, the four Lents of the Muscovites, and the austerities of some Roman Catholics, must be more severe than [the practice of any moral duty, even to the most vicious and depraved of mankind. In short, all virtues, when men are reconciled to it by ever so little practice, is agreeable. All superstition is for ever odious and burdensome.---Perhaps the following account may be received as a true solution of the difficulty. The duties which a man performs as a friend or parent, seem merely owing to his benefactor or children; nor can he be wanting to these duties, without breaking through all the ties of nature and morality. A strong inclination may prompt him to the performance: a sentiment of order and moral beauty joins its force to these natural ties: and the whole man, if truly virtuous, is drawn to his duty without any effort or endeavour. Even with regard to the virtues which are more austere, and more founded on reflection, such as public spirit, filial duty, temperance, or integrity; the moral obligation, in our apprehension, removes all pretence to religious merit; and the virtuous conduct is deemed no more than what we owe to society and ourselves. In all this a superstitious man finds nothing which he has properly per-

formed for the sake of his Deity, or which can peculiarly recommend him to the Divine favour and protection. He considers not, that the most genuine method of serving the Divinity is by promoting the happiness of his creatures. He still looks out for some more immediate service of the Supreme Being, in order to allay those terrors with which he is haunted. And any practice, recommended to him, which either serves to no purpose in life, or offers the strongest violence to his natural inclinations; that practice he will more readily embrace, on account of those very circumstances which should make him absolutely reject it. It seems the more purely religious, because it proceeds from no mixture of any other motive or consideration; and if, for its sake, he sacrifices much of his ease and quiet, his claim of merit appears still to rise upon him in proportion to the zeal and devotion which he discovers. In restoring a loan, or paying a debt, his Divinity is no-wise beholden to him; because these acts of justice are what he was bound to perform, and what many would have performed, were there no God in the universe. But if he fast a day, or give himself a sound whipping; this has a direct reference, in his opinion, to the service of God. No other motives could engage him to such austerities:---Hence the greatest crimes have been found, in many instances, compatible with a superstitious piety and devotion. Hence it is justly regarded as unsafe to draw any certain inference in favour of a man's morals from the fervour or strictness of his religious exercises, even though he himself believes them sincere. The greatest and truest zeal gives us no security against hypocrisy.---*Hume.*

RELIGIONS, BARBARITY AND CAPRICE

ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY IN POPULAR.—Barbarity and caprice; these qualities, however nominally disguised, we may universally observe, form the ruling character of the Deity in popular religions. How is the Deity disfigured in our representations of him! What absurdity and immorality are attributed to him! How much is he disregarded even below the character, which we should naturally, in common life, ascribe to a man of sense and virtue. Even priests, instead of correcting these depraved ideas of mankind, have often been found ready to foster and encourage them. The more tremendous the Divinity is represented, the more tame and submissive do men become to his ministers. And the more unaccountable the measures of acceptance required by him, the more necessary does it become to abandon our natural reason, and to yield to their ghostly guidance and direction. Thus it may be allowed, that the artifices of men aggravate our natural infirmities and follies of this kind, but never originally beget them. Their root strikes deeper into the mind, and springs from the essential and universal properties of human nature. After the commission of crimes, there arise remorse and secret horrors, which give no rest to the mind, but make it have recourse to religious rites and ceremonies as expiations of its offences. Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame, promotes the interests of superstition. While we abandon ourselves to the natural undisciplined suggestions of our timid and anxious hearts, every kind of barbarity is ascribed to the Supreme Being from the terrors with which we are agitated; and every kind of caprice

from the methods which we embrace in order to appease him.—*Hume*.

RELIGION, THE TERRORS OF, PREVAIL ABOVE ITS COMFORTS.—It is allowed that men never have recourse to devotion so readily as when dejected with grief, or depressed with sickness. Is not this a proof, that the religious spirit is not so nearly allied to joy as to sorrow?

Men may sometimes find consolation in religion when they are afflicted; but it is natural to imagine, that they will form a notion of those unknown beings suitable to the present gloom and melancholy of their temper, when they betake themselves to the contemplation of them. Accordingly, we find the tremendous images to predominate in all religions, and we ourselves, after having employed the most exalted expression in our descriptions of the Deity, fall into the flattest contradiction, in affirming, that the damned are infinitely superior in number to the elect.

There never was a popular religion which represented the state of departed souls in such a light, as would render it eligible for human kind that there should be such a state. These fine models of religion are the mere product of philosophy. For as death lies between the eye and the prospect of futurity, that event is so shocking to nature, that it must throw a gloom on all the regions that lie behind it; and suggest to the generality of mankind the idea of Cerberus and furies, devils, and torrents of fire and brimstone.

It is true, both fear and hope enter into religion; because both these passions, at different times, agitate the human mind, and each of them forms a species of divinity suitable to itself. But when a man is in a

cheerful disposition, he is fit for business, or company, or entertainment of any kind; and he naturally applies himself to these, and thinks not of religion. When melancholy and dejected, he has nothing to do but brood upon the terrors of the invisible world, and to plunge himself deeper in affliction. It may indeed happen, that after he has in this manner engraved the religious opinions deep into his thoughts and imagination, there may arrive a change of health and circumstances which may restore his good-humour; and raising cheerful prospects of futurity, make him run into the other extreme of joy and triumph. But still it must be acknowledged, that as terror is the primary principle of religion, it is the passion which always predominates in it, and admits but of short intervals of pleasure.

Not to mention, that these fits of excessive, enthusiastic joy, by exhausting the spirits, always prepare the way for equal fits of superstitious terror and dejection; nor is there any state of mind so happy as the calm and equable. But this state it is impossible to support, where a man thinks that he lies in such profound darkness and uncertainty, between an eternity of happiness and an eternity of misery. No wonder that such an opinion disjoins the ordinary frame of the mind, and throws it into the utmost confusion. And though that opinion is seldom so steady in its operation as to influence all the actions; yet it is apt to make considerable breach in the temper, and to produce that gloom and melancholy so remarkable in all devout people.---*Hume.*

REVELATION.---There is one sort of propositions that challenge the highest degree of our assent upon bare

testimony, whether the thing proposed agree or disagree with common experience and the ordinary course of things, or no. The reason whereof is, because the testimony is of such an one as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is, of God himself. This carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond exception. This is called by a peculiar name, *revelation*; and our assent to it, *faith*; which as absolutely determines our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering, as our knowledge itself; and we may as well doubt that of our being, as we can whether any revelation from God be true. So that faith is a settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and leaves no manner of room for doubt or hesitation. Only we must be sure that it be a divine revelation, and that we understood it right; else we shall expose ourselves to all the extravagancy of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles, if we have faith and assurance in what is not divine revelation. And therefore, in those cases, our assent can be rationally no higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expressions it is delivered in. If the evidence of its being a revelation, or that this is its true sense, be only on probable proofs, our assent can reach no higher than an assurance or diffidence, arising from the more or less apparent probability of the proofs.

---*Locke.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---If revelation be as liable to be misunderstood as arguments drawn from reason, it is no surer guide to mankind. If it need reason's assistance to explain it, it is weaker. If it do not open our understandings, so as to make

us argue more clearly and on better grounds, it is not a greater light. If it confound reason, it can never produce rational conviction. If it have not plainly the advantage of reason, when compared with that alone, it is not superior to reason; or if reason have the advantage of revelation, when compared, revelation is inferior to reason. If we can know nothing truly by revelation without reason, revelation is no true light at all. Revelation must be entirely true, perfectly plain and easy to be understood; intrinsically pure, just, consistent, and harmonious: its precepts and doctrines must all tend to make men wiser, better, and happier: without these qualifications, it wants the proofs of a divine original; it seems to be given in vain, and cannot be the revelation of perfect wisdom: and men of sense, devoid of the prejudices of education, will conclude it to be no extraordinary light; and that nothing more is necessary to direct the faith and practice of mankind, than adhering in judgment to reason only, freed from all enthusiasm and imposture; and, in practice, to virtue alone, freed from all superstition.---**

REVELATION NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST REASON. -- In propositions whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, attained either by immediate intuition, as in self-evident propositions, or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations, we need not the assistance of revelation, as necessary to gain our assent, and introduce them into our minds; because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of

any thing, unless where God immediately reveals it to us; and there, too, our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is, that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing, I think, can, under that title, shake or over-rule plain knowledge, or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our own faculties, by which we receive such revelations, can exceed, if equal, the certainty of our intuitive knowledge, we can never receive for a truth any thing that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge: *v. g.* the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree, and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement, that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once, however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation: since the evidence, first, that we deceive not ourselves in ascribing it to God--secondly, that we understand it right, can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once: and therefore no proposition can be received for divine revelation, or obtain the assent due to all such, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge; because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge, evidence, and assent whatsoever; and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood, no measures of credible and incredible in the world, if doubtful propositions shall take place before self-evident; and

what we certainly know, give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions, therefore, contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent, under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our knowledge; because, though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us; yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation, greater than our knowledge; since the whole strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it; which, in this case, where the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason, will always have this objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God, the bountiful Author of our being, which, if received for true, must overturn all the principles and foundations of the knowledge he has given us, render all our faculties useless, wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship, our understandings, and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light, less conduct, than the beast that perisheth: for if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of any thing to be a divine revelation, as it has of the principles of its own reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason, to give a place to a proposition whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.

Thus far a man has use of reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in immediate and original revelation, where it is supposed to be made to himself: but to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation, but are required to pay obedience and to receive the truths revealed to others, which, by the tradition of writings or word of mouth, are conveyed down to them; reason has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation, and nothing else, faith, as we use the word, (called commonly divine faith) has to do with no propositions but those which are supposed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who made revelation alone the sole object of faith, can say, that it is a matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such a book, is of divine inspiration; unless it be revealed, that that proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such a revelation, the believing or not believing that proposition or book to be of divine authority, can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason; which can never require or enable me to believe that which is contrary to itself; it being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable.

In all things therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge; and reve-

lation, though it may in consenting with it confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases invalidate its decrees: nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of faith; which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason.---*Locke.*

REVENUES OF THE STATE.---The revenues of the state are sacred; it is not only the most infamous theft, but actual treason, to misapply them or pervert them from their own original destination. It reflects a great dishonour on Rome, that the integrity of Cato the censor was something so very remarkable; and that an emperor, on rewarding the talents of a singer with a few crowns, thought it necessary to observe, that the money came from his own private purse, and not from the public treasury. But if we find few Galbas, where shall we look for a Cato? For when vice is no longer dishonourable, what chiefs will be so scrupulous as to abstain from touching the public revenues left to their discretion, and even not to affect in time to confound their own expensive and scandalous dissipations with the glory of the state, and the means of extending their own influence with that of augmenting its power? It is particularly with regard to this delicate part of the administration that virtue alone is the only efficacious instrument, and that the integrity of the minister is the only rein capable of restraining his avarice. Books of accounts, instead of serving to expose frauds, tend only to conceal them; for prudence is never so ready to conceive new precautions as knavery is to

elude them. Never mind account-books and papers, therefore; but place the management of the finances in honest hands: this is the only way to have them well employed, however they are accounted for.---*Rousseau.*

REVENUES OF THE CHURCH.---The revenue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may arise from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed, of the general revenue of the state, which is thus diverted to a purpose very different from the defence of the state. The tithe, for example, is a real land tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute so largely towards the defence of the state as they otherwise might be able to do. The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the sole fund, and, according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies, the exigencies of the state must be ultimately supplied. The more of this fund that is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the state. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that, all other things being supposed equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either the sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and in all cases, the less able must the state be to defend itself. In several Protestant countries, particularly in all the Protestant cantons of Switzerland, the revenue which anciently belonged to the Roman Catholic church, the tithes and church-lands, has been found a fund sufficient not only to afford competent salaries to the established clergy, but to defray, with little or no addition, all the other expences of the state. The

magistrates of the powerful canton of Berne, in particular, have accumulated out of the savings from this fund a very large sum, supposed to amount to several millions; part of which is deposited in a public treasure, and part is placed at interest in what are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe; chiefly in those of France and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the whole expense which the church either of Berne or of any other Protestant canton, costs the state, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of Scotland, including their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manses or dwelling-houses, estimated according to a reasonable valuation, amounted only to 68,514*l.* 1*s.* 5*d.* This very moderate revenue affords a decent subsistence to nine hundred and forty-four ministers. The whole expence of the church, including what is occasionally laid out for the building and reparation of churches, and of the manses of ministers, cannot well be supposed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a-year. The most opulent church in Christendom does not maintain better the uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the spirit of order, regularity, and austere morals in the great body of the people, than this very poorly-endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious, which an established church can be supposed to produce, are produced by it as completely as by any other. The greater part of the Protestant churches of

Switzerland, which in general are not better endowed than the church of Scotland, produce those effects in a still higher degree. In the greater part of the Protestant cantons, there is not a single person to be found who does not profess himself to be of the established church. If he professes himself to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton. But so severe, or rather indeed so oppressive a law, could never have been executed in such free countries, had not the diligence of the clergy before-hand converted to the established church the whole body of the people, with the exception of perhaps a few individuals only. In some parts of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a Protestant and Roman Catholic country, the conversion has not been ~~so~~ complete: both religions are not only tolerated, but established by law.

The proper performance of every service seems to require that its pay or recompence should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of the service. If any service is very much underpaid, it is very apt to suffer by the meanness and incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed in it. If it is very much overpaid, it is apt to suffer perhaps still more by their negligence and idleness. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be his profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation. But, in a clergyman, this train of life not only consumes the time which ought to be employed

in the duties of his function; but in the eyes of the common people destroys almost entirely that sanctity of character which can alone enable him to perform those duties with proper weight and authority.
—*A. Smith.*

RIGHT, WHATEVER IS, IS.—To deny that there is any evil in the world, may be said as a banter by a Lucullus, full of health, and feasting in his saloon with his mistress; but only let him look out of the window, and he will see some unhappy people, and a fever will make the great man himself so.

Lactantius, in his 13th chapter on the Divine anger, puts the following words in the mouth of Epicurus: "Either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he has both the power and will. If he has the will and not the power, this shows weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God: if he has the power and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary to his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, it is both weakness and malignity: if he be both willing and able (which alone is consonant to the nature of God) how came it that there is evil in the world?" To this argument Lactantius replies, "That God wills evil, but that he has given us wisdom for acquiring good." This answer must be allowed to fall very short of the objection; as supposing that God, without producing evil, could not have given us wisdom: if so, our wisdom is a dear bargain.

The origin of evil has ever been an abyss; the bottom of which lies

beyond the reach of human eyes: and many philosophers, in their perplexity, had recourse to two principles; one good, the other evil. Typhon was the evil principle among the Egyptians, and Arimannus among the Persians. This divinity is well known to have been espoused by the Manicheans.

Amidst the absurdities which swarm in the world, and may be classed among its evils, it is no slight error to have supposed two almighty beings struggling for the mastery, and making an agreement together, like Moliere's two physicians. Allow me the puke, and I will allow you the bleeding.

Basilides, from the Platonics, affirmed, so early as the first century of the church, that God gave our world to be made by the lowest angels; and that by their ignorance things are as they are. This theological fable falls to pieces before the terrible objection, that it is not in the nature of an infinitely wise and powerful God to cause a world to be constructed by ignorant architects, who know not how to conduct such a task. Simon, aware of this objection, obviates it by saying, that the angel who acted as surveyor is damned for his bungling: but this bungling of the angel does not mend our case.

Neither does the Grecian story of Pandora solve the objection any better. The box with all evils in it, and Hope remaining in the bottom, is indeed a charming allegory; but this Pandora was made by Vulcan purely to be revenged of Prometheus, who had formed a man of mud.

The Indians are not in any respect nearer the mark: God, they say, in creating man, gave him a

drug, by which he was to enjoy perpetual health: the man put this drug on his ass; the ass, being thirsty, the serpent showed it the way to a spring; and whilst the ass was drinking, the serpent made off with the drug.

The Syrians had a conceit, that the man and the woman having been created in the fourth heaven, they took a fancy to eat a bit of cake, instead of ambrosia, their natural regale.—Ambrosia perspired through the pores; but, after eating the cake, they had a motion to go to stool; and they asked an angel the way to the privy. Do you see, said the angel, yon little planet, scarce visible? That is the privy of the universe; make the best of your way thither. They marched; and there they were left to continue; and, ever since this, our world has been what it is.

But the Syrians know what to answer, when they are asked, Why God permitted man to eat of the cake, and why it should be productive of such dreadful evil to us?

The hypothesis, That *whatever is, is right*, is favoured and supported by Bolingbroke, Pope, and Shaftsbury. In the treatise of Shaftsbury, entitled *The Moralist*, are these words, "Much is alleged in answer, to show why nature errs, and why she became thus impotent, and erring from an unerring hand. But I deny she errs—it is, on the contrary, from this order of inferior and superior things, that we admire the world's beauty, founded thus on contrarieties; whilst from such various and disagreeing principles an universal concord is established."

"Thus, in the several orders of

terrestrial forms a resignation is required, a sacrifice and yielding of natures one to another. The vegetables by their death sustain the animals; and animal bodies dissolved enrich the earth, and raise again the vegetable world. Numerous insects are reduced again by the superior kinds of birds and beasts; and these again are checked by man; who, in his turn, submits to other natures, and resigns his form a sacrifice in common to the rest of things. And if, in natures so little exalted and pre-eminent above each other, the sacrifice of interest can appear so just; how much more reasonably may all inferior natures be subjected to the superior nature of the world! The central powers, who hold the last-ing orbs in their just poise and movement, must not be controlled to save a fleeting form, and rescue from the precipice a puny animal, whose brittle frame, however protected, must of itself soon dissolve. The ambient air, the inward vapours, the impending meteors, or whatever else is nutritive or preservative of the earth, must operate in a natural course; and other constitutions must submit to the good habit and constitution of the all-sustaining globe." This hypothesis is not more satisfactory than the others. Their *whatever is, is right*, imports no more than that all is directed by immutable laws; and who knows not that? Flies are produced to be devoured by spiders, by swallows, &c. &c. We see a clear and stated order throughout every species of creatures; in short, there is order in all things.

Had we no feeling, no objection would lie against such a system:

but that is not the point ; what we ask is, Whether there are no sensible evils, and whence they have originated ? Pope, in his 4th epistle, on *Whatever is, is right*, says, " There is no evil, or partial evil is universal good." An odd general good, indeed, composed of the gout, stone, pains, afflictions, crimes, sufferings, death and damnation !

The system of, *whatever is, is right*, represents the Author of nature merely as powerful ; as a cruel king, who, if he does but compass his designs, is very easy about the death, distresses, and afflictions of his subjects.

Were our first parents to be driven out of Paradise, where they were to have lived for ever, had they not eaten an apple ? Were they in wretchedness to beget children loaded with a variety of wretchednesses, and making others as wretched as themselves ?—Were they to undergo such diseases ? to feel such vexations ? to expire in pain ? and, by way of refreshment, to be burned through all the ages of eternity ? Will these sufferings prove, that *whatever is, is right* ? So very far is the opinion of the best world possible from being consolatory, that it puzzles those very philosophers who embrace it ; and the question of good and evil remains an inexplicable chaos to candid inquirers.
---*Voltaire*.

RIGHT AND WRONG, STANDARD OF.—

The different principles sought for in different times, by different men, as standards of right and wrong, may be reduced to the following.

1. The principle of the Monks ; or, as it is called, Asceticism, or

the Ascetic Principle. See the article MONKS.

2. The principle of sympathy and antipathy. See the article SYMPATHY.

3. The principle of utility. See the article UTILITY.

The *theological* principle ; means that principle which professes to recur for the standard of right and wrong to the revealed will of God, more closely examined, seems to be never any thing more or less than one or other of the three before-mentioned principles, presenting itself under another shape.

The happiness of the individuals, of whom a community is composed, that is, their pleasures and their security, being the end, and the sole end which the legislator ought to have in view ; and the sole standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be *made* to fashion his behaviour, none but the principle of utility, and the only one which is capable of being constantly pursued, can be the proper standard of right and wrong, and the true foundation of a wise code of laws
—*J. Bentham*.

ROMAN REPUBLIC, CAUSE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF.—When the interest of a state is changed, and the laws, which, at the first foundation, were useful, are become prejudicial ; those very laws, by the respect constantly preserved for them, must necessarily draw the state to its ruin. Who doubts that the destruction of the Roman republic was the effect of a ridiculous veneration for the ancient laws, and that this blind respect forged the fetters with which Cæsar loaded his country. After the destruction of

Carthage, when Rome attained the summit of her glory, the Romans, from the opposition they then found between their interests, their manners, and their laws ought to have foreseen the revolution with which the empire was threatened; and to have been sensible, that, to save the etate, the republic in a body ought to have pressed the making those reformatations which the times and circumstances required; and above all to hasten the prevention of those changes which personal ambition, the most dangerous to the legislature, might introduce. The same laws which raised the Romans to the highest elevation, could not support them in that state; an empire, like a vessel which has been driven by the winds to a certain latitude, where, being opposed by other winds, it is in danger of being lost, if, to avoid shipwreck, the pilot does not speedily change his course. This political truth was well known to Mr. Locke, who, on the establishment of the legislature of Georgia, proposed that his laws should be in force only one century; and at that time being expired, they should become void, if they were not afresh examined and confirmed. He was sensible that a military or commercial government supposed very different laws; and that a legislation proper to favour commerce and industry, might one day become fatal to that colony if its neighbours entered into a war among themselves, and circumstances made it necessary for that people to become more warlike than commercial.—*Helvetius.*

ROMAN CHURCH, THE POLICY OF THE.

—The policy of the court of Rome has been commonly much admired;

and men, judging by success, have bestowed the highest eulogies on that prudence by which a power, from such slender beginnings, could advance, without force of arms, to establish an universal and almost absolute monarchy in Europe. But the wisdom of such a long succession of men who filled the Papal throne, and who were of such different ages, tempers, and interests, is not intelligible, and could never have place in nature. The instrument, indeed, with which they wrought, the ignorance and superstition of the people, is so gross an engine, of such universal prevalence, and so little liable to accident or disorder, that it may be successful even in the most unskilful hand; and scarce any indiscretion can frustrate its operations. While the court of Rome was openly abandoned to the most flagrant disorders, even while it was torn with schisms and factions, the power of the church made daily a sensible progress in Europe. The clergy, feeling the necessity of protection against the violence of princes or the vigour of the laws, were well pleased to adhere to a foreign head, who, being removed from the fear of the civil authority, could freely employ the power of the whole church in defending their ancient or usurped properties and privileges, when invaded in any particular country. The monks, desirous of an independence on their diocesans, professed still a more devout attachment to the triple crown; and the stupid people possessed no science or reason which they could oppose to the most exorbitant pretensions. Nonsense passed for demonstration: the most criminal means were sanctified by the piety of the end.

Treaties were supposed not to be binding where the interests of God were concerned: the ancient laws and customs of state had no authority against a divine right: impudent forgeries were received as ancient monuments of antiquity: and the champions of the holy church, if successful, were celebrated as heroes; if unfortunate, were worshipped as martyrs: and all events thus turned out equally to the advantage of clerical usurpations.---*Hume*.

ROMAN CHURCH, THE.---Few ecclesiastical establishments have been fixed upon a worse foundation than that of the church of Rome, or have been attended with circumstances more hurtful to the peace and happiness of mankind. The large revenues, privileges, immunities, and power of the clergy, rendered them formidable to the civil magistrates, and armed with too extensive authority an order of men who always adhere closely together, and who never want a plausible pretence for their encroachments and usurpations. The higher dignities of the church served indeed to the support of gentry and nobility; but, by the establishment of monasteries, many of the lowest vulgar were taken from the useful arts, and maintained in those receptacles of sloth and ignorance. The supreme head of the church was a foreign potentate, who was guided by interests always different, sometimes contrary, to those of the community. And as the hierarchy was necessarily solicitous to preserve a unity of faith, rites, and ceremonies, all liberty of thought ran a manifest risk of being extinguished; and violent persecutions, or, what

was worse, a stupid and abject credulity, took place every where. To increase these evils, the church, though she possessed large revenues, was not contented with the her acquisitions, but retained a power of practising further on the ignorance of mankind. She even bestowed on each individual priest a power of enriching himself by the voluntary oblations of the faithful, and left him still a powerful motive for diligence and industry in his calling. And thus the church, though an extensive and burthensome establishment, was liable to many inconveniences which belong to an order of priests, who trusted entirely to their own art and invention for attaining a subsistence. The advantages attending the Romish hierarchy were but a small compensation for its inconveniences. The ecclesiastical privileges during the barbarous times, had served as a check to the despotism of kings: The union of all the western churches under the supreme Pontiff facilitated the intercourse of nations, and tended to bind all the parts of Europe into a close connection with each other: And the pomp and splendour of worship which belonged to so opulent an establishment, contributed in some respects to the encouragement of the fine arts, and began to diffuse a general elegance of taste, by uniting it with religion.---*Hume*.

ROMAN CHURCH, THE POWER OF, AND ITS DECLINE.---In the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the episcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election;

and while they did retain it, they almost always acted under the influence of the clergy, who in such spiritual matters appeared to be their natural guides. The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them, and found it easier to elect their own bishops themselves. The abbot, in the same manner, was elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in the greater part of abbas. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices comprehended within the diocese were collated by the bishop, who bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church-preferments were in this manner in the disposal of the church. The sovereign of the country did not possess any direct or sufficient means of managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to pay court, not so much to his sovereign, as to his own order, from which only could he expect preferment.

Through the greater part of Europe the Pope gradually drew to himself, first, the collation of almost all bishoprics and abbas, or of what were called consistorial benefices, afterwards, by various machinations and pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehending within each diocese; little more being left to the bishop than what was barely necessary to give him a decent authority over his own clergy. By this arrangement the conduct of the sovereign was still worse than it had been before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed into a sort of spiritual army; dispersed in different quarters indeed, but of

which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular country might be considered a particular detachment of that army, of which the operations could easily be supported and seconded by all the other detachments quartered in the different countries round about. Each detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in which it was maintained, but dependant upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all the other detachments.

Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the ancient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures, the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the common people, which that of the great barons gave them over their respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had bestowed upon the church, jurisdictions were established of the same kind with those of the great barons; and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace without the support or assistance either of the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor any other person could keep the peace there without the support and assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their particular baronies or manors, were

equally independent, and equally exclusive of the authority of the king's courts, as those of the great temporal lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and therefore liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to give fight in any quarrel in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the rents of those estates, the clergy possessed, in the tythes, a very large portion of the rents of all the other estates in every kingdom of Europe. The revenues arising from both these species of rents were, the greater part of them, paid in kind; in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, &c. The quantity exceeded greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and there were neither arts nor manufactures for the produce of which they could exchange the surplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most extensive charity. Both the hospitality, and the charity of the ancient clergy, accordingly, are said to have been very great. They not only maintained almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy the hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were often as numerous as those of the greatest lay-lords; and the retainers of the clergy taken together

were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all the lay-lords. The former were under a regular discipline and subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy, therefore, had both together been less numerous, yet their union would have rendered them more formidable. The hospitality and charity of the clergy too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force, but increased very much the weight of their spiritual weapons. Those virtues procured them the highest respect and veneration among all the inferior ranks of people, of whom many were constantly, and almost all occasionally, fed by them. Every thing belonging or related to so popular an order, its possessions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared sacred in the eyes of common people; and every violation of them, whether real or pretended, the highest act of sacrilegious wickedness and profaneness. In this state of things, if the sovereign frequently found it difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the great nobility, we cannot wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the united force of the clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the clergy of all the neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances the wonder is, not that he was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he was ever able to resist.

The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us who live in the present times ap-

pear the most absurd) their total exemption from the secular jurisdiction, or what in England was called the benefit of the clergy, were the natural or rather the necessary consequences of this state of things. How dangerous must it have been for the sovereign to attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his own order were disposed to protect him, and to represent either the proof as insufficient for the convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion. The sovereign could, in such circumstances, do no better than leave him to be tried by the ecclesiastical courts; who, for the honour of their own order, were interested to restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from committing enormous crimes, or even from giving occasion to such gross scandal as might disgust the minds of the people.

In the state in which things were through the greater part of Europe during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some time both before and after that period, the constitution of the church of Rome may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was formed against the authority and security of civil government, as well as against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind; which can flourish only where civil government is able to protect them. In this constitution the grossest delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner by the private interests of so great a number of people, as put them out of all danger from any assault of hu-

man reason: because, though human reason might perhaps have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common people, some of the delusions of superstition; it could never have dissolved the ties of private interest. Had this constitution been attacked by no other enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, it must have endured for ever. But that immense and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was by the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part destroyed; and is now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps, to crumble into ruins altogether.

The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed in the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal power of the clergy. In the produce of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found something for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby discovered the means of spending the whole revenues upon their own persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people. Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal or less profuse. Their retainers became consequently less numerous, and by degrees dwindled away altogether. The clergy too, like the great barons, wished to get a better rent from their landed estates, in order to spend it in the same manner, upon the gratification of their own private va-

nity and folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by granting leases to their tenants, who thereby became in a great measure independent of them. The ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were in this manner gradually broken and dissolved. They were even broken and dissolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to the great barons; because the benefices of the church being the greater part of them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its revenue upon his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute command which they once had over the great body of the people, was very much decayed. The power of the church was by that time very nearly reduced, through the greater part of Europe, to what arose from her spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy. The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order, as they had done before, as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity, luxury, and expence of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their own pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of the poor.—*A. Smith.*

SCIENCE AND VIRTUE, THE CONNECTION OF.—Good morals and knowledge are almost inseparable in every age, though not in every individual. Whatever we may imagine concerning the usual truth and sincerity of men who live in a rude and barbarous state, there is much more falsehood, and even perjury, among them than among civilized nations; and virtue, which is nothing but a more enlarged and more cultivated reason, never flourishes to any degree, nor is founded on steady principles of honour, except where a good education becomes general; and men are taught the pernicious consequences of vice, treachery, and immorality. Even superstition, though more prevalent among ignorant nations, is but a poor supply for the defects of knowledge and education; and our European ancestors, who employed every moment the expedient of swearing on extraordinary crosses and relics, were less honourable in all engagements than their posterity, who from experience have omitted those ineffectual securities.—*Hume.*

SECURITY, POLITICAL.—A government which excludes all persons except one, or a very few, from having access to the chief magistracy, or from having votes in the choice of magistrates, and which keeps all the power of the state in the same hands, or the same families, is easily marked out, and is the extreme of political slavery. For such is the state of mankind, that persons possessed of unbounded power will generally act as if they forgot the proper nature and design of their station, and pursue their own interest, though it be opposite to that of the community at large.

Provided those who make laws submit to them themselves, and, with respect to taxes in particular, so long as those who impose them bear an equal share with the rest of the community, there will be no complaint. But in all cases, when those who lay the tax upon others exempt themselves, there is tyranny; and the man who submits to a tax of a penny, levied in this manner, is liable to have the last penny extorted from him. Men of equal rank and fortune with those who compose the British House of Commons, have nothing to fear from the imposition of taxes, so long as there is any thing like rotation in that office; because those who impose them are liable to pay them themselves, and are no better able to bear the burden. But persons of lower rank, and especially those who have no votes in the election of members, may have reason to fear, because an unequal part of the burden may be laid upon them: they are necessarily a distinct order in the community, and have no direct method of controuling the measures of the legislature. Our increasing game-laws have all the appearance of the haughty decrees of a tyrant, who sacrifices every thing to his own pleasure and caprice. Upon these principles, it is evident, that there must have been a gross inattention to the very first principles of liberty, to say no worse, in the first scheme of taxing the inhabitants of America in the British Parliament.--*Priestly.*

SENSATION.--Thoughts seem to us something strange; but sensation is no less wonderful; a divine power equally shows itself in the sensation of the meanest insect as

in Newton's brain. We receive our first knowledge from our sensations, and our memory is no more than a continued sensation: a man born without any of his five senses would, could he live, be totally void of any ideas. It is owing to our senses that we have even our metaphysical notions: for how should a circle or a triangle be measured, without having seen or felt a triangle? How can we form an idea, imperfect as it is, of infinitude, but by enlarging boundaries? And how can we throw down boundaries, without having seen or felt them? An eminent philosopher, in his *Traité des Sensations*, tom. ii. p. 128, says, Sensation includes all our faculties.--*Voltaire.*

SENSE, COMMON.--There is sometimes to be found in idiomatical and vulgar expressions, an image of what passes in the hearts of all mankind. *Sensus communis* signified among the ancient Romans, not only common sense, but also humanity and sensibility. As we are much inferior to the Romans, it signifies with us only the half of its import with them. It means only common understanding, a simple capacity of reason, the mere comprehension of ordinary things, a kind of mean between stupidity and genius. To say that a man wants common sense, is a gross affront. To say that he does not want common sense, is an affront also; as it is as much as to say, that although he is not altogether stupid, he has neither genius nor wit. But whence comes this expression Common Sense, if not from the senses? In the invention and use of this term, mankind plainly confess, that nothing enters

into the mind but through the senses; would they, else, have used the word sense, to signify common understanding? We sometimes say, that common sense is very rare. What is the meaning of that phrase? Certainly no more than that the progress or exercise of reason is interrupted in some men by their prejudices and prepossessions. Hence we see a man capable of reasoning very justly on one subject, err most grossly in arguing upon another. An Arabian, who may be an exact calculator, an ingenious chemist, and a good astronomer, believes nevertheless that Mahomet could put one-half of the moon in his sleeve. Wherefore is it that he is superior to mere common sense in judging of these three sciences, and inferior to it in his conception of the half-moon in Mahomet's sleeve? In the first place, he sees with his own eyes, and judges with his own understanding; in the second, he sees with the eyes of others, shutting his own, and perverting that understanding which nature gave him.

In what manner can this strange perversion of reason be effected? How can these ideas which succeed each other so regularly and constantly in our contemplations on numerous other objects, be so miserably confused in our reflecting upon another a thousand times more obvious and palpable? The capacity of the man, that is, his principles of intelligence, being still the same, some of his organs, therefore, must be depraved: as we sometimes see in the nicest epicure, a vitiated taste with regard to some species of viands. But how came the organ of the Arab,

who sees an half-moon in Mahomet's sleeve, to be thus depraved? By fear. He hath been told that, if he does not believe in this story of the half-moon and sleeve, his soul in passing over the narrow bridge, immediately after his death, will be tumbled into the gulph beneath, there to perish eternally. Again, he is further told, that if he should doubt the truth of the sleeve, one dervise will accuse him of impiety; a second will prove him to be destitute of common sense, in that having all possible motives of credibility laid before him, yet he refuses to submit his proud reason to the force of evidence; a third will have him brought before the petty divan of a petty province, and get him legally impaled. All this strikes a panic into the good Arabian. He does not want for sense in judging of other matters; but his conceptions are hurt in regard to this particular. But does the Arab really believe this story of Mahomet's sleeve? No. He endeavours to believe it; he says to himself, it is impossible, but it is true: I believe what I do not believe. Thus a confused heap of ideas are formed in his brain, which he is afraid to unravel; and this causes him to want common sense in reasoning upon this subject.—*Voltaire.*

SLAVES (THE LABOUR OF) DEARER TO THEIR MASTERS THAN THAT OF FREE MEN.—The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expense of his master; but that of a free servant is at his own expence. The wear and tear of the latter, however, is in reality, as much at the expence of his master as that of the former. The wages paid to the journeymen, and ser-

vants of every kind, must be such as will enable them one with another to continue the race of journeymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminishing, or stationary demand of the society may happen to require. But though the wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his master, it generally costs him much less than that of a slave. The fund destined for replacing or repairing, if I may say so, the wear and tear of a slave, is commonly managed by a negligent master or careless overseer. That destined to perform the same office with regard to the free man, is managed by the free man himself. The disorders which generally prevail in the œconomy of the rich, naturally introduce themselves into the management of the former. The strict frugality and parsimonious attention of the poor, as naturally establish themselves in that of the latter. Under such different management, the same purpose must require different degrees of expence to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all ages and nations, I believe; that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are so very high.--*A. Smith.*

SLAVES AND SLAVERY, CONSIDERATIONS ON.---In the ancient state of Europe, the occupiers of land were all tenants at will. They were all slaves; but their slavery was of a milder kind than that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our West Indian colonies. They were supposed to belong more

directly to the land than to their master. They could, therefore, be sold with it, but not separately. They could marry, provided it was with the consent of their master; and he could not afterwards dissolve the marriage by selling the man and wife to different persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them, he was liable to a penalty, though generally but to a small one. They were not, however, capable of acquiring property. Whatever they acquired was acquired to their master, and he could take it from them at pleasure. Whatever cultivation and improvement could be carried on by means of such slaves, was properly carried on by their master. It was at his expence. The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry were all his. It was for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing but their daily maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself, therefore, that in this case occupied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own bondmen. This species of slavery still subsists in Russia, Poland, Hungary, and other parts of Germany. It subsisted in Bohemia and Moravia, till lately that it was abolished by the present Emperor Joseph II. It is only in the western and southern provinces of Europe that it has gradually been abolished altogether.

But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great proprietors, they are least of all to be expected when they employ slaves for their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I believe, demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of

any. A person who can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In ancient Italy, how much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable it became to the master, when it fell under the management of slaves, is remarked both by Pliny and Columella. In the time of Aristotle it had not been much better in ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal republic described in the laws of Plato, to maintain five thousand idle men (the number of warriors supposed necessary for its defence) together with their women and servants, would require, he says, a territory of boundless extent and fertility, like the plains of Babylon.

The pride of man makes him love to domineer; and nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. The planting of sugar and tobacco can afford the expence of slave-cultivation. The raising of corn, it seems, in the present times, cannot. In the English colonies, of which the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is done by freemen. The late resolution of the Quakers in Pensylvania to set at liberty all their negro slaves, may satisfy us that their number cannot be very great. Had they made any considerable part of their

property, such a resolution could never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies, on the contrary, the whole work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a very great part of it. The profits of a sugar-plantation in any of our West Indian colonies are generally much greater than those of any other cultivation that is known either in Europe or America: and the profits of tobacco plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are superior to those of corn, as has already been observed. Both can afford the expence of slave cultivation, but sugar can afford it still better than tobacco. The number of negroes accordingly are greater, in proportion to that of the whites, in our sugar than in our tobacco colonies.

To the slave cultivators of ancient times, gradually succeeded a species of farmers known at present in France by the name of *Metayers*. They are called in Latin, *Coloni Partiarum*. They have been so long in disuse in England, that at present I know no English name for them. The proprietor furnished them with the seed, cattle, and instruments of husbandry; the whole stock, in short, necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce was divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after setting aside what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, which was restored to the proprietor when the farmer either quitted, or was turned out of the farm.

Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the expence of the proprietor, as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however, one very essential difference between them. Such te-

nants, being freemen, are capable of acquiring property, and having a certain proportion of the produce of the land, they have a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order that their own proportion may be so. A slave, on the contrary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance, consults his own ease by making the land produce as little as possible over and above that maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account of this advantage, and partly upon account of the encroachments which the sovereign, always jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their vassals to make upon their authority, and which seem at last to have been such as rendered this species of servitude altogether inconvenient, that tenure in villenage gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe. The time and manner, however, in which so important a revolution was brought about, is one of the most obscure points in modern history. The church of Rome claims great merit in it; and it is certain that so early as the twelfth century, Alexander III. published a bull for the general emancipation of slaves. It seems, however, to have been rather a pious exhortation, than a law to which exact obedience was required from the faithful. Slavery continued to take place almost universally for several centuries afterwards, till it was gradually abolished by the joint operation of the two interests above mentioned; that of the proprietor on the one hand, and that of the sovereign on the other. A villain enfranchised, and at the same time allowed to continue in possession of the land,

having no stock of his own, could cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to him, and must therefore have been what the French call a *Metayer*.

In all European colonies the culture of the sugar-cane is carried on by negro slaves. The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate climate of Europe, could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the sugar-cane, as it is managed at present, is all hand labour, though, in the opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great advantage. But, as the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of those cattle; so the profit and success of that which is carried on by slaves, must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves; and in the good management of their slaves, the French planters, I think it is generally allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives some weak protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In every country, where the unfortunate law of slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects the slave, intermeddles, in some measure, in the management of the private property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is, perhaps either a member of the colony assembly, or an elec-

tor of such member, he dares not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for him to protect the slave. But in a country where the government is in a great measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the magistrate to intermeddle even in the management of the private property of individuals, and to send them, perhaps, a *lettre de cachet*, if they do not manage it according to his liking, it is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave; and common humanity naturally disposes him to do so. The protection of the magistrate renders the slave less contemptible in the eyes of his master, who is thereby induced to consider him with more regard, and to treat him with more gentleness. Gentle usage renders the slave not only more faithful, but more intelligent, and therefore, upon a double account, more useful. He approaches more to the condition of a free servant, and may possess some degree of integrity and attachment to his master's interest; virtues which frequently belong to free servants, but which can never belong to a slave, who is treated as slaves commonly are in countries where the master is perfectly free and secure.

That the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than under a free government, is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations. In the Roman history, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to protect the slave from the violence of his master, is under the emperors.—When Veditius Pollio, in the presence of Augustus, ordered one of

his slaves, who had committed slight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his fish-pond in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the others that belonged to him. Under the republic no magistrate could have had authority to protect the slave, much less to punish the master.—

A. Smith.

SLEEP.—Every thing relating to sleep is a very puzzling phenomenon, on the supposition of the distinction between the soul and the body; especially on the little evidence that can be pretended of the soul being employed at all in a state of really sound sleep, exclusive of dreaming. And surely, if there be a soul distinct from the body, and it be sensible of all the changes that take place in the corporeal system to which it is attached, why does it not perceive that state of the body which is termed sleep; and why does it not contemplate the state of the body and brain during sleep, which might afford matter enough for reasoning and reflection? If no new ideas could be transmitted to it at that time, it might employ itself upon the stock which it had acquired before, if they had really adhered in it and belonged to it. All this we should naturally expect if the soul was a substance really distinct from the body, and if the ideas properly belonged to this substance, so that it was capable of carrying them all away with it, when the body was reduced to dust. The soul, during the sleep of the body might be expected to approach to the state in which it would be when the body was dead, death being often compared to a

more sound sleep. For if it be capable of thinking and feeling when the powers of the body shall entirely cease, it might be capable of the same kind of sensation and action when those powers are only suspended.—*Priestley.*

SOCIETY, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN.—Whether the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another, be one of those original principles in human nature, of which no further account can be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either of a man or of another animal,

it has no other means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam; and a spaniel endeavours, by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts with his brethren; and when he has no other means of engaging them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours, by every servile and fawning attention, to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren; and it is in vain for him to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in their favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we

obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity, but to their self-love; and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow citizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence: but though this principle ultimately provides him with all the necessities of life which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food; the old clothes which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion.

As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives occasion to the division of

labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours; who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own labour which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have occasion for, encourages every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and bring to perfection whatever talent or genius he may possess for that particular species of business.

The difference of natural ta-

lents in different men, is in reality much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause as the effect of the division of labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street-porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were very much alike; and neither their parents nor play-fellows could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of; and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do; and there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents.

As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents so remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same disposition which renders that difference useful. Many

tribes of animals acknowledged to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much more remarkable distinction of genius than what, antecedent to custom and education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street-porter as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species, are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd's dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged to support and defend itself separately and independently, and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another: the different produces of their respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the produce of other men's talents he has occasion for.—*A. Smith.*

SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT, THE ORIGIN OF.—Man, thrown as it were by chance, upon this globe; surrounded by all the evils of nature; obliged continually to defend and protect his life against the storms and tempests of the air, against the inundations of water, against the fire of volcanos, against the intemperature of frigid and torrid zones, against the sterility of the earth which refuses him aliment, or its baneful fecundity which makes poisons spring up beneath his feet: in short, against the claws and teeth of savage beasts, who dispute with him his habitation and his prey; and attacking his person, resolved to render themselves rulers of this globe, of which he thinks himself to be the master: Man, in this state, alone and abandoned to himself, could do nothing for his preservation. It was necessary therefore that he should unite himself and associate with his like, in order to bring together their strength and intelligence in common stock. It is by this union that he has triumphed over so many evils, that he has fashioned this globe to his use, restrained the rivers, subjugated the seas, insured his subsistence, conquered a part of the animals, in obliging them to serve him; and driven others, far from his empire, to the depths of deserts or of woods, where their number diminishes from age to age. What a man alone would not have been able to effect, men have executed in concert, and all together they preserve their work. Such is the origin, such the advantage,

and the end of all society. Government owes its birth to the necessity of preventing and repressing the injuries which the associated individuals had to fear from one another. It is the sentinel who watches in order that the common labours be not disturbed.—Thus society originates in the wants of men; government in their vices. Society tends always to good, government ought always to tend to the repressing of evil. Society is the first, it is in its origin independent and free; government was instituted for it, and is but its instrument. It is for one to command, it is for the other to obey. Society created the public power; government, which has received it from society, ought to consecrate it entirely to its use. In short, society is essentially good; government, as is well known, may be, and is but too often, evil. It has been said, that we were all born equal; that is not so: that we had all the same rights; that is unintelligible nonsense. What are rights where there is an inequality of talents or of strength, and no security nor sanction? It has been said, that nature offered to us all the same dwelling and the same resources; that is not so: that we were all endowed with the same means of defence; that is not so: nor can it be true, in any sense, that we all enjoy the same qualities of mind and body. There is amongst men an original inequality which nothing can remedy. It must last for ever; and all that can be obtained by the best legislation, is, not to

destroy it, but to prevent the abuse of it. But in making distinctions between her children like a stepmother, in creating some children strong and others weak, has not nature herself formed the germ or principle of tyranny? I do not think it can be denied; especially if we look back to a time anterior to all legislation; a time in which man will be seen as passionate and as void of reason as a brute.

What then have founders of nations, what have legislatures proposed to themselves, to obviate all the disasters arising from this germ, when it is expanded by a sort of artificial equality, which might reduce all the members of a society, without exception, under an impartial, sole authority? It is a sword which moves gently, equably, and indifferently over every head: but this sword was ideal; it was necessary that there should be a hand, a corporeal being, who should hold it.—What has resulted thence? Why, that the history of civilized man is but the history of his misery. All the pages of it are stained with blood; some with the blood of the oppressors, others with the blood of the oppressed.—In this point of view, man appears more wicked and more miserable than a beast. Different species of beasts subsist on different species; but societies of men have never ceased to attack each other. Even in the same society, there is no condition but devours and is devoured, whatever may have been or are the forms of the government or artificial equality

which have been opposed to the primitive and natural inequality.

—But are these forms of government, supposing them made by the choice, and the free choice, of the first settlers in a country, and whatever sanction they may have received, whether that of oaths, or of unanimous accord, or of their duration; are they obligatory upon their descendants? There is no such thing: if the people are happy under their form of government, they will keep it; if they are unhappy, the impossibility of suffering more and longer will determine them to change it: that is the just exercise of a natural and unalienable right of the man who is oppressed, and even of the man who is not oppressed.—A man wills and chooses for himself; he cannot will nor choose for another; and it would be a madness to will and to choose for him who is yet unborn, for him who will not exist for ages. There is no individual but who, discontented with the form of the government of his country, may go elsewhere to seek a better. There is no society but which has the same right to change as their ancestors had to adopt their form of government. Upon this point it is with societies as if they were at the first moment of their civilization. Without which there would be a great evil; nay, the greatest of evils would be without a remedy. Millions of men would be condemned to misery without end.

The conclusions naturally following from these principles are, That there is no form of govern-

ment which has the prerogative to be immutable:—No political authority, which, created yesterday or a thousand years ago, may not be abrogated in ten years time or to-morrow:—No power, however respectable, however sacred, that is authorized to regard the state as its property. All authority in this world has begun either by the consent of the subjects or by the power of the master. In both one and the other case it may justly end. There is no prescription in favour of tyranny against liberty.

The truth of these principles is so much the more essential, because all power by its very nature tends to despotism. —The public happiness is the first law of nations as the first duty. The first obligation of these great bodies is with themselves; they owe, before all other things, liberty and justice to the members which compose them. Every child which is born to the state, every new citizen who comes to breathe the air of the country he has chosen or nature given him, is entitled to the greatest happiness he can enjoy. Every obligation which cannot be reconciled with that is broken; every contrary claim is a wicked attempt upon his rights: Such a claim is opposite to all the ideas of policy and order, and violates every principle of morality.—*Raynal.*

SOVEREIGN, THE DUTIES OF A.—

The sovereign is completely discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always be exposed to in-

numerable delusions, and for the proper performance of which no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards the employments most suitable to the interest of the society. According to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number of individuals, though it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.—*A. Smith.*

SOUL, THE ORIGIN OF THE POPULAR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE.—The notion of the soul of man being a substance distinct from the body hath not been known to the writers of the Scriptures, and especially those of the Old Testament. According to the

uniform system of revelation, all our hopes of a future life are built upon another, and a seeming opposite foundation, viz. that of the resurrection of something belonging to us that dies and is buried; that is, the body, which is always considered as the man. This doctrine is manifestly superfluous, on the idea of the soul being a substance so distinct from the body as to be unaffected by its death, and able to subsist, and even to be more free and happy, without the body. This opinion, therefore, not having been known to the Jews, and being repugnant to the scheme of revelation, must have had its source in heathenism; but with respect to the date of its appearance, and the manner of its introduction, there is room for conjecture and speculation. This opinion is evidently not the growth of Greece and Rome; but was received by the philosophers of those countries either from Egypt, or the countries more to the East. The Greeks in general refer it to the Egyptians, but Pausanias gives it to the Chaldeans or the Indians. Though every thing relating to so very obscure a subject, must be in a great measure conjectural; yet it seems reasonable to think with Mr. Toland, that this doctrine was derived from the Egyptians, and that it might possibly have been suggested to them by some of their known customs respecting the dead, whom they preserved with great care, and disposed of with a solemnity unknown to other nations; though it might have arisen among them from

other causes, without the help of those peculiar customs.—The authority of Herodotus, the old Greek historian, who had himself travelled in Egypt, is very express to this purpose. He says, that “the Egyptians were the first who maintained that the soul of man is immortal; that when the body dies, it enters into that of some other animal; and when it has transmigrated through all terrestrial, marine, and flying animals, it returns to the body of a man again. This revolution is completed in three thousand years.” He adds, that “several Greeks, whose names he could not mention, had published that doctrine as their own.”

It is, however, probable, that the notion of there being something in man distinct from his body, and the cause of his feeling, thinking, and willing, and his other mental operations and affections, might very well occur in these rude ages without such a step as this: though, no doubt, the custom above-mentioned would much contribute to it. Nothing is more common than to observe how very ready all illiterate persons are to ascribe the cause of any difficult appearance to an invisible agent, distinct from the subject on which the operation is exerted: But the notion of a proper immaterial being, without all extension or relation to place, did not appear till of late years in comparison; what the ancients meant by an immaterial substance being nothing more than an attenuated matter, like air, ether, fire, or light, considered as fluids, be-

yond which their idea of incorporeity did not go. Psellus says, that the ancient heathens, both Greeks and others, called only the grosser bodies (*Ta pachutena ton somaton*) corporeal.—Indeed the vulgar notion of a soul or spirit, wherever it has been found to exist, has been the same in all ages; and in this respect even the learned of ancient times are only to be considered as the vulgar.—We gather from Homer, that the belief of his time was, that the ghost bore the shape of, and exactly resembled, the deceased person to whom it belonged; that it wandered upon the earth, near the place where the body lay, till it was buried; at which time it was admitted to the shades below. In both these states it was possessed of the entire consciousness, and retained the friendships and enmities of the man.—We learn from Ossian, that it was the opinion of the times in which he lived, that the souls of heroes went immediately after death to the hills of their country, and the scenes which they had frequented in the most happy times of their lives. It was thought, too, that dogs and horses saw the ghosts of the deceased. They also imagined, that the ghosts shrieked near the place where a death was to happen soon after; from which circumstances, as well as several others, it is evident, that, in their idea, the soul was material, something like the *Eidolon* of the Greeks. All the Pagans of the East, says Loubiere, do truly believe that “there remains something of a man after his death, which sub-

sists independently and separately from his body. But they give extension and figure to that which remains; and attribute to it all the same members, all the same substances, both solid and liquid, which your bodies are composed of. They only suppose, that souls are of a matter subtle enough to escape being seen or handled.”—We find it also to be one of the oldest opinions in heathen antiquity, that the heavenly bodies were animated as well as men. This opinion was held by Origen and other philosophising Christians.

Upon the whole, we may conjecture with some probability, that this doctrine was derived from the Egyptians; but how far the Egyptians really carried their notions concerning the state of human souls before or after death, doth not distinctly appear, because we have no Egyptian writings. But it is probable, that their ideas never ripened into such a system as was afterwards found in the East, on account of their empire and civil polity having been so soon overturned, and the country having undergone such a number of revolutions. Accordingly we find, that those who introduced as much of this system as was received in Greece, did in general travel into the East for it.—*Priestley.*

SOUL, THE.—The powers of sensation or perception and thought, as belonging to man, have never been found but in conjunction with a certain organized system of matter. Had we formed a judgment, therefore, concerning the necessary seat of thought, by the circumstances that uni-

versally accompany it, which is our rule in all other cases, we could not but have concluded, that in man it is a property of the nervous system, or rather of the brain; because, as far as we can judge, the faculty of thinking, and a certain state of the brain, always accompany and correspond to one another—which is the very reason why we believe that any property is inherent in any substance whatever. There is no instance of any man retaining the faculty of thinking when his brain was destroyed; and whenever that faculty is impeded or injured, there is sufficient reason to believe that the brain is disordered in proportion; and therefore we are necessarily led to consider the latter as the seat of the former.

Moreover, as the faculty of thinking, in general, ripens and comes to maturity with the body, it is also observed to decay with it; and if, in some cases, the mental faculties continue vigorous when the body in general is enfeebled, it is evidently because, in those particular cases, the brain is not much affected by the general cause of weakness: but, on the other hand, if the brain alone be affected, as by a blow on the head, by actual pressure within the skull, by sleep, or by inflammation, the mental faculties are universally affected in proportion. Likewise, as the mind is affected in consequence of the affections of the body and brain, so the body is liable to be reciprocally affected by the affections of the mind, as is evident in the visible

effects of all strong passions—hope or fear, love or anger, joy or sorrow, exultation or despair. These are certainly irrefragable arguments, that it is properly no other than one and the same thing that is subject to these affections, and that they are necessarily dependent upon one another. In fact, there is just the same reason to conclude, that the powers of sensation and thought are the necessary result of a particular organization, as that sound is the necessary result of a particular concussion of the air; for in both cases equally the one constantly accompanies the other, and there is not in nature a stronger argument for a necessary connection of any cause and any effect. Dr. Haller has observed, in his discourses, “That the powers of thought, speech, and motion, appear equally to depend upon the body, and run the same fate in case of men’s declining in old age. When a man dies through old age, I perceive his powers of speech, motion, and thought, decay and die together, and by the same degrees. The moment he ceases to move and breathe, he appears to cease to think too. When I am left to mere reason, it seems to me that my power of thought as much depends upon my body as my power of sight or hearing. I could not think in infancy. My powers of thought, of sight, and of feeling, are equally liable to be obstructed by the body. A blow on the head has deprived a man of thought, who could yet see, and feel, and move; so that naturally the power of thinking

seems as much to belong to the body as any power of man whatsoever. Naturally there appears no more reason to suppose that a man can think out of the body than he can hear sounds or feel cold out of the body."

It is true, that we have a very imperfect idea of what the *power of perception* is; and it may be as naturally impossible that we should have a clear idea of it as that the eye should see itself: but this very ignorance ought to make us cautious in asserting with what other properties it may or may not exist. Nothing but a precise and definite knowledge of the nature of perception and thought can authorize any person to affirm, whether they may not belong to an extended substance, which has also the properties of attraction and repulsion. It is very unaccountable in Mr. Locke to suppose as he did, and as he largely contends, that, for any thing that we know to the contrary, the faculty of thinking may be a property of the body; and yet to think it more probable that this faculty inhered in an immaterial soul. A philosopher ought to have been apprised, that we are to suppose no more *causes* than are necessary to produce the *effects*: and therefore that we ought to conclude that the whole man is material, unless it should appear that he has some powers or properties absolutely incompatible with matter. That the faculty of thinking necessarily depends, for its exercise, at least, upon a stock of ideas, about which it is always conversant, will hardly be questioned by any

person; but there is not a single idea of which the mind is possessed but what may be proved to have come to it from the bodily senses, or to have been consequent upon the perceptions of sense. Could we, for instance, have any idea of colour, as red, blue, &c. without the eyes and optic nerves; of sound, without the ears; of smell, without the nostrils, &c. &c. It is even impossible to conceive how the mind could have become possessed of any of its present ideas without just such a body as we have; and consequently, judging from present appearances (and we have no other means of forming any judgment at all) without a body of some kind or other, we could have had no ideas at all, any more than a man without eyes could have any particular ideas belonging to colours. The notion, therefore, of the *possibility* of thinking in man without an organized body, is not only destitute of all evidence from actual appearances, but is directly contrary to them; and yet these appearances ought alone to guide the judgment of philosophers. It is a great advantage to the system of materialism, that we thereby get rid of a great number of *difficulties*; such, for instance, as these: *What becomes of the soul during sleep; in a swoon; when the body is seemingly dead, (as by drowning or other accidents) and especially after death?—also, What was the condition of it before it became united to the body; and at what time did that union take place? &c. &c.*

If the soul be immaterial, and the body material, neither the generation nor the destruction of the body can have any effect with respect to it. This foreign principle must have been united to it either at the time of conception or at birth; and must either have been created at the time of such union, or have existed in a separate state prior to that union. Must the divine power be necessarily employed to produce a soul whenever the human species copulate? Or must some of the pre-existent spirits be obliged, immediately upon that event, to descend from the superior regions to inhabit the new-formed embryo? These are suppositions hardly to be considered at all, without being immediately rejected as extremely improbable, if not absurd.

If a *man* be actuated by a principle distinct from his body, every brute animal must have an immaterial soul also; for they differ from us in *degree* only, and not at all in *kind*, having all the same mental as well as corporeal powers and faculties that we have, though not in the same extent; and they are possessed of them in a greater degree than those of our race that are idiots, or that die infants. Are these souls of brutes originally and naturally the same beings with the souls of men? Have they pre-existed, and are they to continue for ever? If so, *how* and *where* are they to be disposed of after death? and are they also to be re-united to their present bodies as well as the souls of men? These are

only a few of the difficulties which must occur to any person who adopts the opinion of the immateriality of the soul.

It is contended, that spirit and body can have no common properties; and when it is asked, How then can they act upon one another; and how can they be so intimately connected as to be continually and necessarily subject to each other's influence? it is acknowledged to be a difficulty and a mystery that we cannot comprehend. But had this question been considered with due attention, what has been called a difficulty, would have been deemed an impossibility. It is impossible to conceive even the possibility of mutual action, without some common property, by means of which the things that act and re-act upon each other may have some connection. A substance that is hard may act upon, and be acted upon, by another hard substance, or even one that is soft; but it is certainly impossible that it should affect, or be affected by a substance that can make no resistance at all. But, admitting that substances which have no common property can nevertheless affect and be affected by each other, to be no more than a difficulty, it is, however, a difficulty of such magnitude, as far to exceed that of conceiving that the principle of sensation may possibly consist with matter; and therefore, if, of two difficulties, it be most philosophical to take the least, we must of course abandon the hypothesis of two *heterogeneous* and incompatible principles in man.

which is clogged with the greater difficulty of conception, and admit that of the *uniformity of his nature*, which is only attended with a less difficulty.

If the operations ascribed to mind may result from the powers of matter, why should we suppose a being which is useless, and which solves no difficulty? It is easy to see, that the properties of matter do not exclude those of intelligence; but it cannot be imagined how a being, which has no property besides intelligence, can make use of matter. In reality, how can this substance, which bears no relation to matter, be sensible of it, or perceive it? In order to see things, it is necessary that they make an impression upon us, that there be some relation between us and them; but what can be this relation? It is affirmed, that we have as clear an idea of spirit as we have of matter, each being equally the unknown support of known properties; matter of extension and solidity, and spirit of sensation and thought.—But still, since the substance is confessedly *unknown* to us, it must also be *unknown* to us what properties it is capable of supporting; and therefore, unless there be a real inconsistency in the properties themselves, those which have hitherto been ascribed to both substances may belong to either of them. For this reason, Mr. Locke, who maintains the immateriality of the soul, and yet maintains that, for any thing we know to the contrary, mat-

ter may have the property of thought added to it, ought to have concluded that this is really the case; since, according to the rules of philosophising, we ought not to multiply causes without necessity.—*Priestley.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—It is maintained in the schools, That *as thought does not belong to extension and matter*, it is evident that the soul is spiritual. What in fact is the meaning of the word thought? Either it is void of meaning, or, like the word *motion*, it merely expresses a mode of a man's existence. Now, to say that a mode or manner of being is not a body, or has no extension, nothing can be more clear: but to make of this mode a being, and even a spiritual being, nothing is more absurd.—*Helvetius.*

SOUL, IMMORTALITY OF THE.—The horror mankind have for death and annihilation, would have been sufficient, without the aid of revelation, to have made them invent the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Man would be immortal in his present state: and would believe himself so, if all the bodies that surround him did not every instant prove the contrary.—Forced to yield to this truth, he has still the same desire of immortality. Esau's cauldron of rejuvenescence proves the antiquity of this desire. To make it perpetual, it was necessary to found it on some probability at least: to effect this, they made the soul of a matter extremely subtle; they supposed it an in-

destructible atom that survived the dissolution of all the other parts; in a word, a principle of life. The being, under the name of soul, was to preserve after death all the affections of which it was susceptible during its union with the body. This system supposed, men doubted the less of the immortality of the soul, as neither experience nor observation could contradict such belief; for neither of them can form any judgment of an imperceptible atom. Its existence, indeed, was not demonstrated; but what proof do we want of what we wish to believe, and what demonstration is strong enough to prove the falsity of a favourite opinion? It is true we never meet with any souls in our walks; and it is to show the reason of this that men, after having created souls, thought themselves obliged to create a country for their habitation. Each nation, and even each individual, according to his inclinations and the particular nature of his wants, has formed a particular plan. Sometimes the savage nations placed this habitation in a vast forest, full of wild-fowl, and watered with rivers stocked with fish: sometimes they placed it in an open level country, abounding in pasture, in the middle of which rose a bed of strawberries as large as a mountain; different parts of which they portioned off for the nourishment of themselves and families. People less exposed to hunger, and, besides, more numerous and better instructed, placed on this spot all that is

delightful in nature, and gave it the name of Elysium. Covetous mortals formed it after the plan of the garden of Hesperides; and stocked it with trees, whose golden branches were loaded with fruits of diamonds. The more voluptuous nations placed in it trees of sugar and rivers of milk, and furnished it with delicious animals. Imagination, directed by different wants and inclinations, operated every where in the same manner. Each people furnished the country of souls with what was on earth the object of their desires.—*Helvetius*.

SOUL, THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE.—If it be asked, Whether the soul be a spiritual or a material substance? it must be granted, that neither opinion is capable of demonstration; and consequently, that, by weighing the reasons on both sides, balancing the difficulties, and determining in favour of the greater number of probabilities, we should form only conditional judgments. It is the fate of this problem, as it hath been of many others, to be resolvable only by the assistance of the calculation of probabilities. —Whatever may have been affirmed by the Stoics, Seneca was not fully convinced of the spirituality of the soul: “Your letter (says he to one of his friends) came at an improper time, being delivered to me when I was taking a walk in the temple of Hope. There I freed myself from all doubts with regard to my soul’s immortality. My imagination, gently warmed by the reasoning of some great men, firmly believed in that im-

mortality which they promise more than they prove. I began to be displeased with my existence, and to despise the remains of an unhappy life, when I had opened to myself with delight the gates of eternity; but your letter awakened me, and of so pleasing a dream left me only the regret of knowing it was a dream!" A proof, says Mr. Deslandes in his *Critical History of Philosophy*, that formerly neither the immortality nor immateriality of the soul were believed, is, that in the time of Nero, the people of Rome complained that the introduction of the new-fangled doctrine of the other world enervated the courage of the soldiers, and rendered them timorous; that it deprived the unhappy of their principal consolation, and added double terror to death, by threatening them with new sufferings after this life. Without examining if it be the interest of the public to admit the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, it may be observed, that at least this dogma has not always been regarded as politically useful. It took its rise in the schools of Plato: but Ptolemy Philadelphus king of Egypt, thought it so dangerous, that he forbid it to be preached in his dominions on pain of death.—*Helvetius*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—Newton, like almost all true philosophers, was persuaded that the soul is an incomprehensible substance; that we have not a sufficient knowledge of nature for us to dare to affirm, that it is impossible for God to add the gift of thought to any extended substance what-

soever. But the great difficulty is, rather to know how matter can become cogitative. Thought, indeed, seems to have nothing in common with the known attributes in that extended being which we call body. But are we acquainted with all the properties of bodies? Does it not seem very bold to say to God, You have been able to give a being motion, gravitation, vegetation, and life, but cannot give it thought?

They who say, that if matter could receive the gift of cogitation, the soul would not be immortal, seem to have drawn an unfair consequence. Is it more difficult to preserve than to make? Besides, if an undivisible atom be eternal, why shall not the faculty of cogitation it enjoys last as long? If I am not mistaken, they who deny God to have the power of annexing ideas to matter, are forced to say, that what we call spirit is a being whose essence is to think exclusive of any extended being whatsoever. Now, if it be the nature of spirit to think essentially, then it thinks necessarily and thinks incessantly, as every triangle has necessarily and always three angles, independently of God. How! on God's creating something that is not matter, must that something absolutely think? Weak and bold as we are, do we know whether God has not formed millions of beings, with neither the properties of spirits nor matter as known to us? We are like a herdsman, who, having seen no other beasts than oxen, should say, *If God pleases to make any other*, they must have horns and

chew the cud. Which will be thought more reverential to the Deity, to affirm that there are beings without the divine attribute of cogitation abstractedly from him, or to apprehend that God can grant that attribute to any being he shall please to choose? It must be observed, that Newton was very far from venturing to define the soul, as so many others have presumed to do; he thought it was possible there might be millions of other thinking beings, whose nature might be entirely different from that of our soul; so that the division of all nature into matter and spirits seems the definition of a deaf and blind man defining the senses, without any idea or conception of sight or hearing. How indeed can any one say, that God has not filled the immense space with an infinity of substances, having nothing in common with mankind?

Most ancient nations conceived nothing beyond matter, and looked on ideas in our understanding as the impression of the seal on wax. This perplexed opinion was rather a rude instinct than ratiocination. Succeeding philosophers, who were for proving that matter thinks of itself, have erred still more. The vulgar were mistaken without any previous reasoning: these erred from principles; not one of them being ever able to discover any thing in matter that tended to prove it was intelligent. Locke alone appears to have removed the contradiction between matter and thought; recurring at once to the Creator of all thought and of all matter, and

modestly saying, "Cannot he who can do every thing, give cogitation to a material being, to an atom, to an element of matter?" He stopped at this possibility, as became a man of his wisdom. To affirm that matter does actually think because God can impart such a faculty to it, would be the highest presumption; but is it less to assert the contrary?

The most generally received opinion, is that which considers the soul and body as two distinct and quite different substances, created by God to act on each other. The only proof of this reciprocal action is the experience which every one believes to have of it. We feel our bodies sometimes obeying our will, and sometimes tyrannizing over it: we conceive that they in reality act on each other because we feel it, and we cannot carry our investigations further. An objection, however, lies to this system not easily removed. An external object, for instance, communicates a vibration to the nerves; which motion either extends to the soul or not: if it reaches the soul, it imparts motion to it, which would suppose the soul corporeal; if it does not, there is no longer any action. All the answer that can be given is, this action is one of those things the mechanism of which will for ever remain unknown: a sad conclusion, but almost the only one becoming man in more than one point of metaphysics.—*Voltaire.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT. — *Know Thyself*, is an excellent precept, which God alone can practise.

Who but he can know his essence?

We call soul that which animates; and so contracted is our understanding, that we know little more of it. Three-fourths of our species do not go that length, and little concern themselves about the thinking being; the other fourth is seeking what nobody has found, or ever will find.

Thou, poor pedant, seest a vegetating plant; and thou sayest vegetation, or even vegetative soul. Thou observest bodies have and give motion, and this with thee is strength. Thy hound's aptness in learning to hunt under thy instruction thou callest instinct, sensitive soul; and thou hast combined ideas, that thou termost spirit.

What is to be understood by these words, This flower vegetates? Is there a real being named vegetation? One body impels another; but is there in it a distinct being called strength? This hound brings thee a partridge; but is there a being called instinct? Should we not laugh at a philosopher who should tell us all animals live; therefore there is in them a being, a substantial form, which is life.

The first philosophers, both Chaldeans and Egyptians, said there must be something in us that produces our thoughts. This something must be very subtle; it is a breath, it is a fire, it is æther, it is a light, it is an entelechia, it is a number, it is harmony. According to the divine Plato, it is a compound of the same and of the other; and Epi-

curus, from Democritus, has said, that it is thinking atoms in us. But how does an atom think? It is said, that the soul is an immaterial being; and that its nature is to think, because it does think. But on this subject we seem to be as ignorant as Epicurus. The nature of a stone is to fall, because it falls; but what makes it fall still remains a question.

We know a stone has no soul; we know that a negative and affirmative are not divisible, are not parts of matter: but matter, otherwise unknown to us, has qualities that are not divisible, as gravitation towards a centre, given it by God. This gravitation has no parts, is not divisible. The motory force of bodies is not a being composed of parts; neither can it be said, that the vegetation of all organized bodies, their life, their instinct, are distinct or divisible beings. You can no more cut in two the vegetation of a rose, the life of a horse, the instinct of a dog, than you can cut in two a sensation, a negation, or an affirmation. Thus the argument taken from the indivisibility of thought proves nothing. Our idea of the soul is no other than of a power unknown to us of feeling and thinking.

But is this power of feeling and thinking the same as that by which we digest and walk? It certainly is not. The Greeks were well aware that thought often had no concern with the play of our organs. Instead of those organs they substituted a sensitive soul; and for the thoughts a more fine and more subtle soul. But it is certain

this sensitive soul has no existence; it is nothing but the motion of our organs; nor does our reason afford us any more proof of the existence of the other soul.

Let us take a view of the fine systems which philosophy has struck out concerning souls.—One says, that the soul of a man is part of the substance of God himself; another, that it is part of the great All; a third, that it has been created from all eternity; a fourth, that it is made, and not created. Others affirm, that God makes them as they are wanted; and that they come at the instant of copulation. One cries, They are lodged in the seminal animalcules: Not at all, says another, they take up their residence in the Fallopian tubes. Some affirm, that the soul stays six weeks till the foetus be formed, and then possesses itself of the pineal gland; but if the germ prove addle, it goes away to whence it came till a better opportunity. The last opinion makes its abode to be in the callous body of the brain. If any man has discovered a ray of light in this region of darkness, perhaps it is Mallebranche, notwithstanding the general prejudices against his system. It does not differ greatly from that of the Stoics; and who knows but these two opinions, properly rectified, come nearest the truth? There is something very sublime in that ancient notion:—*We exist in God; our thoughts, our sentiments, are derived from the Supreme Being.*

It must, however, be con-

fessed, that we know little concerning the soul but only by faith. We live upon this earth in the same manner as the man in the iron mask spent his days in the prison, without knowing his original, or the reason of his being confined. We are born, we live, we act, we think, we sleep, we wake, without knowing how. God has given us the faculty of thinking as he has given us all our other appurtenances; and had he not come, at the time appointed by his providence, to inform us that we had an immaterial and immortal soul, we should have been without any proof of it.—*Voltaire.*

SOUL, IMMATERIALITY OF THE.—

In meditating on the nature of man, we may discover two distinct principles; the one raising him to the study of eternal truths, and bearing him aloft to the regions of the intellectual world; the other debasing him even below himself, and subjecting him to the slavery of sense and the tyranny of the passions. From hence we may conclude that man is not one simple and individual substance.

By the word substance is here meant, a being possessed of some primitive quality, abstracted from all particular and secondary modifications. Now, if all known primitive qualities may be united in one and the same being, we have no need to admit of more than one substance: but if some of these qualities are incompatible with and necessarily exclusive of each other, we must admit of the existence of as many different substances as there are such in-

compatible qualities. Notwithstanding what Mr. Locke hath said on this subject, we need only to know that matter is extended and divisible to be assured that it cannot think. Attraction is one of the laws of nature, the mystery of which may possibly be impenetrable: but we are at least capable of conceiving, that gravity, acting in the ratio of the quantity of matter, is neither incompatible with extension or divisibility. Can we conceive the same of thought and sentiment? The sensible parts are extended, but the sensitive being is single and indivisible; it is either entirely itself or nothing: The sensitive being therefore is not a body.

A mere machine is evidently incapable of thinking; it has neither motion nor figure productive of reflection: whereas, in man there exists something perpetually prone to expand, and to burst the fetters, by which it is confined. Space itself affords not bounds to the human mind: the whole universe is not extensive enough for him: his sentiments, his desires, his anxieties, and even his pride, take rise from a principle different from that body within which he perceives himself confined.

No material being can be self-active, but man perceives himself self-active: and this sentiment carries with it a stronger conviction than any reason which can ever be brought against it. He hath a body on which other bodies act, and which act reciprocally on them. This reciprocal action is

indubitable; but the will is independent of the senses. It can neither consent to or resist their impressions; and we perceive clearly within ourselves when we act according to our wills, and when we submit to be governed by our passions.

If the soul be immaterial, it may survive the body. Were there no other proof of the immateriality of the soul than the oppression of the just and the triumph of the wicked in this world, that alone would be a sufficient proof of it. So shocking a discord amidst the general harmony of things would make us look out for the cause, and we should infer from thence, that we do not cease to exist with this life, but that every thing resumes its order after death. When the union of the body and soul is broken, it is conceivable that the one may be dissolved and the other preserved entire. Why should the dissolution of the one necessarily bring on that of the other? On the contrary, being so different in their natures, their state of union is a state of violence; and when it is broken, they both return to their natural situation: the active and living substance regains all the force it had employed in giving motion to the passive and dead substance to which it had been united. The failings and infirmities of man make us sensible that man is but half alive, and that the life of the soul commences at the death of the body.

But what is that life? Is the soul immortal in its own nature? A limited comprehension is in-

capable of conceiving any thing that is unlimited. Whatever we call *infinite* is beyond human conception. We can neither deny nor affirm: we can employ no arguments on subjects we cannot conceive. Nothing is more probable than that the soul survives the body so long as is necessary to justify Providence in the good order of things: every rational man will adopt that as an article of faith, but who knows that the soul will survive the body for ever? We may readily conceive how material bodies wear away and are destroyed by the separation of their parts—but we cannot conceive a like dissolution of a thinking being: and hence, as we cannot imagine how it can die, we may presume it cannot die at all.—*Rousseau.*

SOUL, IMMATERIALITY OF THE.—

Soul is an invented word, faintly and obscurely denoting the spring of human life. All animals have a motion, and this ability to move is called active force; but this force is no distinct being whatever. We have passions, memory, and reason: but these passions, this memory, and reason, are surely not separate things; they are not beings existent in us; they are not diminutive persons of a particular existence; they are generical words invented to fix our ideas. Thus the soul itself, which signifies our memory, our reason, our passions, is only a bare word. Whence then motion in nature? from God. Whence vegetation in the plant? from God.—Whence motion in animals? from God. Whence cogitation

in man? from God. Were the human soul a diminutive person, inclosed within our body, to direct its motions and ideas, would not that betray in the eternal Maker of the world an impotence and an artifice quite unworthy of him? He then must have been incapable of making automata, which shall have the gift of motion and thought in themselves. When I learned Greek, I read Homer, where Vulcan appears to me an excellent smith, when he makes golden tripods going of themselves to the counsel of the gods; but had this same Vulcan concealed within these tripods one of his boys, to make them move without being perceived, I should think him but a bungling cheat. Wherefore should God put two springs to a work when one will do? That God can animate that so little known being which we call matter, must not be denied. Why then should he make use of another agent to animate it? Further, What may that soul be which you are pleased to give to our body? From whence did it come? When did it come? Must the Creator of the universe be continually watching the copulation of men and women? Closely observe the moment when a germ issues from a man's body, and passes into that of a woman, and then quickly inject a soul into this germ? And if this germ dies, what becomes of its soul? Either it must have been created ineffectually, or must wait another opportunity.

This is really a strange employment for the Sovereign of

the universe. And it is not only in the copulation of the human species that he must be continually intent, but must observe the like vigilance and celerity with all animals whatever: for, like us, they have memory, ideas, and passions; and if a soul be necessary for the formation of these sentiments, these ideas, these passions, and this memory, God must be perpetually at work about souls for elephants and fleas, for fish and for bonzes. What idea doth such a notion give of the Architect of so many millions of worlds, thus obliged to be continually making invisible props for perpetuating his work?—*Voltaire.*

SOUL, THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMMORTALITY OF THE, AMONG THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, BARBARIANS, AND JEWS.—The writings of Cicero represent in the most lively colours the ignorance, the errors, and the uncertainty of the ancient philosophers with regard to the immortality of the soul. When they are desirous of arming their disciples against the fear of death, they inculcate, as an obvious, though melancholy position, that the fatal stroke of our dissolution releases us from the calamities of life; and those can no longer suffer who no longer exist. Yet there were a few sages of Rome who had conceived a more exalted, and in some respects, a juster idea of human nature; though it must be confessed, that, in the sublime inquiry, their reason had been often guided by their imagination, and that their imagination had been prompted by their vanity. When they viewed with

complacency the extent of their own mental powers; when they exercised the various faculties of memory, of fancy, and of judgment, in the most profound speculations, or the most important labours; and when they reflected on the desire of fame, which transported them into future ages, far beyond the bounds of death and the grave; they were unwilling to confound themselves with the beasts of the field, or to suppose that a being, for whose dignity they entertained the most sincere admiration, could be limited to a spot of earth and to a few years of duration.

With this favourable prepossession, they summoned to their aid the science, or rather the language, of metaphysics. They soon discovered, that as none of the properties of body will apply to the operations of the mind, the human soul must consequently be a substance distinct from the body, pure, simple, and spiritual, incapable of dissolution, and susceptible of a much higher degree of virtue and happiness after the release from its corporeal prison. From these specious and noble principles, the philosophers who trod in the footsteps of Plato deduced a very unjustifiable conclusion; since they asserted not only the future immortality but the past eternity of the soul; which they were too apt to consider as a portion of the infinite and self-existing spirit which pervades and sustains the universe. A doctrine thus removed beyond the senses and experience of mankind, might serve to amuse the leisure of a philosophic mind; or, in the silence of

solitude, it might sometimes impart a ray of comfort to desponding virtue ; but the faint impression which had been received in the schools, was soon obliterated by the commerce and business of active life.

We are sufficiently acquainted with the eminent persons who flourished in the age of Cicero and of the first Cæsars, with their actions, their characters, and their motives, to be assured that their conduct in this life was never regulated by any serious conviction of the rewards or punishments of a future state. At the bar and in the senate of Rome, the ablest orators were not apprehensive of giving offence to their hearers, by exposing that doctrine as an idle and extravagant opinion, which was rejected with contempt by every man of a liberal education and understanding. Since, therefore, the most sublime efforts of philosophy can extend no further than feebly to point out the desire, the hope, or at most the probability of a future state, there is nothing except a divine revelation that can ascertain the existence and describe the condition of the invisible country which is destined to receive the souls of men after their separation from the body.

But we may perceive several defects inherent to the popular religions of Greece and Rome, which rendered them very unequal to so arduous a task. 1. The general system of their mythology was unsupported by any solid proofs ; and the wisest among the Pagans had already disclaimed its usurped authority.

2. The description of the infernal regions had been abandoned to the fancy of painters and poets ; who peopled them with so many phantoms and monsters, who dispensed their rewards and punishments with so little equity, that a solemn truth, the most congenial to the human heart, was oppressed and disgraced by the absurd mixture of the wildest fictions. 3. The doctrine of a future state was scarcely considered among the devout polytheists of Greece and Rome as a fundamental article of faith. The providence of the gods, as it related to public communities rather than to private individuals, was principally displayed on the visible theatre of the present world. The petitions which were offered on the altars of Jupiter and Apollo, expressed the anxiety of their worshippers for temporal happiness, and their ignorance and indifference concerning a future life. The important truth of the immortality of the soul was inculcated with more diligence as well as success in India, in Assyria, in Egypt, and in Gaul ; and since we cannot attribute such a difference to the superior knowledge of the Barbarians, we must ascribe it to the influence of an established priesthood, which employed the motives of virtue as the instruments of ambition.

We might naturally expect, that a principle so essential to religion would have been revealed in the clearest terms to the chosen people of Palestine, and that it might safely have been entrusted to the hereditary priesthood of Aaron. It is in-

cumbent on us to adore the mysterious dispensations of Providence, when we discover, that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul is omitted in the law of Moses; it is darkly insinuated by the prophets; and, during the long period which elapsed between the Egyptian and the Babylonian servitudes, the hopes as well as the fears of the Jews appear to have been confined within the narrow compass of the present life. After Cyrus had permitted the exiled nation to return to the promised land, and after Ezra had restored the ancient records of their religion, two celebrated sects, the Sadducees and Pharisees, insensibly arose at Jerusalem. The former, selected from the more opulent and distinguished ranks of society, were strictly attached to the literal sense of the Mosaic law; and they piously rejected the immortality of the soul as an opinion that received no countenance from the divine book which they revered as the only rule of their faith. To the authority of Scripture, the Pharisees added that of tradition; and they accepted, under the name of traditions, several speculative tenets from the philosophy or religion of the eastern nations. The doctrines of fate and predestination, of angels and spirits, and of a future state of rewards and punishments, were in the number of these new articles of belief; and as the Pharisees, by the austerity of their manners, had drawn into their party the body of the Jewish people, the immortality of the soul became the prevailing sentiment of the

synagogue under the reign of the Asmonæan princes and pontiffs. The temper of the Jews was incapable of contenting itself with such a cold and languid assent as might satisfy the mind of a polytheist; and as soon as they admitted the idea of a future state, they embraced it with the zeal which has always formed the characteristic of the nation. Their zeal, however, added nothing to its evidence, or even probability: and it was still necessary that the doctrine of life and immortality, which had been dictated by nature, approved by reason, and received by superstition, should obtain the sanction of divine truth from the authority and example of Christ.—*Gibbon.*

SOUL, IMMORTALITY OF THE.—By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the immortality of the soul; the arguments for it are commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or moral, or physical. But in reality it is the gospel, and the gospel alone, that has brought *life and immortality to light.*

I. Metaphysical topics suppose that the soul is immaterial, and that it is impossible for thought to belong to a material substance. But just metaphysics teach us, that the notion of substance is wholly confused and imperfect; and that we have no other idea of any substance, than as an aggregate of particular qualities inhering in an unknown something. Matter, therefore, and spirit, are at bottom equally unknown; and we cannot determine what qualities inhere in the one or in the other. They likewise teach us, that nothing

can be decided *a priori* concerning any cause or effect; and that experience, being the only source of our judgments of this nature, we cannot know from any other principle, whether matter, by its structure or arrangement, may not be the cause of thought. Abstract reasonings cannot decide any question of fact or existence. But admitting a spiritual substance to be dispersed throughout the universe, like the ethereal fire of the Stoics, and to be the only inherent subject of thought, we have reason to conclude from *analogy*, that nature uses it after the manner she does the other substance, *matter*. She employs it as a kind of paste or clay; modifies it into a variety of forms and existences: dissolves after a time each modification, and from its substance erects a new form. As the same material substance may successively compose the bodies of all animals, the same spiritual substance may compose their minds: their consciousness, or that system of thought which they formed during life, may be continually dissolved by death, and nothing interests them in the new modification.

The most positive assertors of the mortality of the soul never denied the immortality of its substance; and that an immaterial substance, as well as a material, may lose its memory or consciousness, appears in part from experience, if the soul be immaterial. Reasoning from the common course of nature, and without supposing any new interposition of the Supreme Cause, which ought always to

be excluded from philosophy, *what is incorruptible must also be ingenerable*. The soul therefore, if immortal, existed before our birth; and if the former existence no ways concerned us, neither will the latter. Animals undoubtedly feel, think, love, hate, will, and even reason, though in a more imperfect manner than men: Are their souls also immaterial and immortal?

II. Let us now consider the moral arguments, chiefly those derived from the justice of God, which is supposed to be further interested in the future punishment of the vicious, and reward of the virtuous. But these arguments are grounded on the supposition that God has attributes beyond what he has exerted in this universe, with which alone we are acquainted. Whence do we infer the existence of these attributes? It is very safe for us to affirm, that whatever we know the Deity to have actually done is best; but it is very dangerous to affirm, that he must always do what to us seems best. In how many instances would this reasoning fail us with regard to the present world? But if any purpose of nature be clear, we may affirm, that the whole scope and intention of man's creation, so far as we can judge by natural reason, is limited to the present life. With how weak a concern from the original inherent structure of the mind and passions, does he ever look further?—What comparison either for steadiness or efficacy, betwixt so floating an idea and the

most doubtful persuasion of any matter of fact that occurs in common life? There arise, indeed, in some minds, some unaccountable terrors with regard to futurity; but these would quickly vanish were they not artificially fostered by precept and education. And those who foster them, what is their motive? Only to gain a livelihood, and to acquire power and riches in this world. Their very zeal and industry, therefore, are an argument against them.

What cruelty, what iniquity, what injustice in nature, to confine all our concern, as well as all our knowledge, to the present life, if there be another scene still waiting us of infinitely greater consequence? Ought this barbarous deceit to be ascribed to a beneficent and wise being? Observe with what exact proportion the task to be performed and the performing powers are adjusted throughout all nature. If the reason of man gives him great superiority above other animals, his necessities are proportionably multiplied upon him: his whole time, his whole capacity, activity, courage, and passion, find sufficient employment in fencing against the miseries of his present condition; and frequently, nay, almost always, are too slender for the business assigned them. A pair of shoes, perhaps, was never yet wrought to the highest degree of perfection which that commodity is capable of attaining; yet it is necessary, at least very useful, that there should be some politicians and moralists; even some geometers,

poets, and philosophers among mankind. The powers of men are no more superior to their wants, considered merely in this life, than those of foxes and hares are, compared to *their* wants, and to their period of existence. The inference from parity of reason is therefore obvious.

On the theory of the soul's mortality, the inferiority of women's capacity is easily accounted for. Their domestic life requires no higher faculties either of mind or body. This circumstance vanishes and becomes absolutely insignificant on the religious theory: the one sex has an equal task to perform as the other; their powers of reason and resolution ought also to have been equal, and both of them infinitely greater than at present. As every effect implies a cause, and that another, till we reach the first cause of all, which is the Deity; every thing that happens is ordained by him, and nothing can be the object of his punishment or vengeance. By what rule are punishments and rewards distributed? What is the divine standard of merit and demerit? Shall we suppose that human sentiments have place in the Deity? How bold that hypothesis! We have no conception of any other sentiments. According to human sentiments, sense, courage, good manners, industry, prudence, genius, &c. are essential parts of personal merits. Shall we therefore erect an elysium for poets and heroes like that of the ancient mythology? Why confine all

rewards to one species of virtue? Punishment, without any proper end or purpose, is inconsistent with *our* ideas of goodness and justice; and no end can be served by it after the whole scene is closed. Punishment, according to *our* conception, should bear some proportion to the offence. Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail a creature as man? Can any one approve of Alexander's rage, who intended to exterminate a whole nation because they had seized his favourite horse Bucephalus?

Heaven and hell suppose two distinct species of men, the good and the bad; but the greatest part of mankind float betwixt vice and virtue. Were one to go round the world with an intention of giving a good supper to the righteous and a sound drubbing to the wicked, he would frequently be embarrassed in his choice, and would find that the merits and the demerits of most men and women scarcely amount to the value of either. To suppose measures of approbation and blame different from the human confounds every thing. Whence do we learn that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from our own sentiments?—What man who has not met with personal provocation or what good-natured man who has) could inflict on crimes, from the sense of blame alone, even the common, legal, frivolous punishments? And does any thing steel the breasts of judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity but reflection on necessity and public interest? By the Roman law, those who had been guilty of parricide, and confessed their crime, were put into a sack along with an

ape, a dog, and a serpent, and thrown into the river. Death alone was the punishment of those who denied their guilt, however fully proved. A criminal was tried before Augustus, and condemned after a full conviction; but the humane emperor, when he put the last interrogatory, gave it such a turn as to lead the wretch into a denial of his guilt. "You surely (said the prince) did not kill your father?" This lenity suits our natural ideas of *right* even towards the greatest of all criminals, and even though it prevents so inconsiderable a sufferance. Nay, even the most bigotted priest would naturally without reflection approve of it, provided the crime was not heresy or infidelity; for as these crimes hurt himself in his *temporal* interest and advantages, perhaps he may not be altogether so indulgent to them. The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the interests of human society. Ought these interests, so short, so frivolous, to be guarded by punishment eternal and infinite? The damnation of one man is an infinitely greater evil in the universe than the subversion of a thousand millions of kingdoms. Nature has rendered human infancy peculiarly frail and mortal, as it were on purpose to refute the notion of a probationary state; the half of mankind die before they are rational creatures.

III. The physical arguments from the analogy of nature are strong for the mortality of the soul; and are really the only philosophical arguments which ought to be admitted with regard to this question, or indeed any question of fact.—Where any two objects are so

closely connected that all alterations which we have ever seen in the one are attended with proportionable alterations in the other, we ought to conclude, by all rules of analogy, that, when there are still greater alterations produced in the former, and it is totally dissolved, there follows a total dissolution of the latter. Sleep, a very small effect on the body, is attended with a temporary extinction, at least a great confusion in the soul. The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death. The last symptoms which the mind discovers, are disorder, weakness, insensibility, and stupidity; the forerunners of its annihilation. The further progress of the same causes encreasing, the same effects totally extinguish it. Judging by the usual analogy of nature, no form can continue when transferred to a condition of life very different from the original one in which it was placed. Trees perish in the water, fishes in the air, animals in the earth. Even so small a difference as that of climate is often fatal. What reason then to imagine, that an immense alteration, such as is made on the soul by the dissolution of its body, and all its organs of thought and sensation, can be effected without the dissolution of the whole? Every thing is in common betwixt soul and body. The organs of the one are all of them the organs of the other; the existence, therefore, of the one must be dependent on that of the

other. The souls of animals are allowed to be mortal; and these bear so near a resemblance to the souls of men, that the analogy from one to the other forms a very strong argument. Their bodies are not more resembling, yet no one rejects the argument drawn from comparative anatomy. The Metempsychosis is therefore the only system of this kind that philosophy can hearken to.

Nothing in this world is perpetual; every thing, however seemingly firm, is in continual flux and change: the world itself gives symptoms of frailty and dissolution. How contrary to analogy, therefore, to imagine that one single form, seemingly the frailest of any, and subject to the greatest disorders, is immortal and indissoluble?—What daring theory is that! how lightly, not to say how rashly, entertained! How to dispose of the infinite number of posthumous existences ought also to embarrass the religious theory. Every planet in every solar system we are at liberty to imagine peopled with intelligent mortal beings, at least we can fix on no other supposition. For these, then, a new universe must every generation be created beyond the bounds of the present universe, or one must have been created at first so prodigiously wide as to admit of this continual influx of beings. Ought such bold suppositions to be received by any philosophy, and that merely on the pretext of a bare possibility? When it is asked, Whether Agamemnon, Thersites, Hannibal, Varro, and every stupid clown that ever existed in Italy, Scythia, Bactria, of Guinea, are now alive, can any man think, that a scrutiny of

nature will furnish arguments strong enough to answer so strange a question in the affirmative? The want of argument without revelation sufficiently establishes the negative. --- *Quanto facilius*, says Pliny, *certiusque sibi quemque credere, ac specimen securitatis antige-
ne tali sumere experimento*. Our insensibility before the composition of the body seems to natural reason a proof of a like state after dissolution.---Were our horrors of annihilation an original passion, not the effect of our general love of happiness, it would rather prove the mortality of the soul: for, as nature does nothing in vain, she would never give us a horror against an impossible event. She may give us a horror against an unavoidable event, provided our endeavours, as in the present case, may often remove it to some distance. Death is in the end unavoidable; yet the human species could not be preserved had not nature inspired us with an aversion towards it. All doctrines are to be suspected which are favoured by our passions; and the hopes and fears which gave rise to this doctrine are very obvious.

It is an infinite advantage in every controversy to defend the negative. If the question be out of the common experienced course of nature, this circumstance is almost if not altogether decisive. By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of existence which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles any that ever was seen? Who will repose such trust in any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony the reality of so marvellous a scene? Some new species of logic is requi-

site for that purpose, and some new faculties of the mind, that may enable us to comprehend that logic.

Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obligations which mankind have to divine revelation, since we find that no other medium could ascertain this great and important truth---*Hume*.

SOUL, THE, THINKS NOT ALWAYS.---

We know certainly by experience that we sometimes think; and thence draw this infallible consequence, that there is something in us that has a power to think; but whether that substance perpetually thinks or no, we can be no further assured than experience informs us. For to say that actual thinking is essential to the soul, and inseparable from it, is to beg what is in question, and not to prove it by reason; which is necessary to be done, if it be not a self-evident proposition. But whether this, *that the soul always thinks*, be a self-evident proposition that every body assents to at first hearing, I appeal to mankind. It is doubted whether I thought all last night or not. The question being about a matter of fact, it is begging it to bring as a proof of it an hypothesis, which is the very thing in dispute, by which way one may prove any thing: and it is but supposing that all watches, whilst the balance beats, think; and it is sufficiently proved, and past doubt, that my watch thought all last night.

I grant that the soul in a waking man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake: but whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's

told. This I would willingly be satisfied in, whether the soul, when it thinks thus apart, and as it were separate from the body, acts less rationally than when conjointly with it or no? If its separate thoughts be less rational, then the soul owes the perfection of rational thinking to the body; if it does not, it is a wonder that our dreams should be for the most part so frivolous and irrational, and that the soul should retain none of its more rational soliloquies and meditations.

The *dreams* of sleeping men are all made up of the waking man's ideas, though for the most part oddly put together. It is strange, if the soul has ideas of its own that it derived not from sensation or reflection (as it must have if it thought before it received any impression from the body), that it should never, in its private thinking (so private that the man himself perceives it not) retain any of them the very moment it wakes out of them, and then make the man glad with new discoveries. Who can find it reasonable, that the soul should, in its retirement during sleep, have so many hours thoughts, and yet never light on any of those ideas it borrowed not from sensation or reflection; or at least preserve the memory of none but such, which being occasioned by the body, must needs be less natural to a spirit? It is strange the soul should never once in a man's whole life recall over any of its pure native thoughts, and those it had before it borrowed any thing from the body; never bring into the waking man's view any other ideas but what have a tang of the cask, and manifestly derive their original from

that union. If it always thinks, and so had ideas before it was united, or before it received any from the body, it is not to be supposed but that, during sleep, it recollects its native ideas; and during that retirement from communicating with the body whilst it thinks by itself, the ideas it is busied about should be, sometimes at least, those more natural and congenial ones which it had in itself, underrived from the body or its own operations about them: which since the waking man never remembers, we must from this hypothesis conclude, either that the soul remembers something that the man does not, or else that memory belongs only to such ideas as are derived from the body, or the mind's operations about them.

But how do men come to know that they themselves think when they themselves do not perceive it? To know without perceiving is a confused notion, taken up to serve an hypothesis; and none of those clear truths, that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny: for the most that can be said of it is, that it is possible the soul may always think, but not always retain it in memory. And it is as possible that the soul may not always think, and much more probable that it should sometimes not think, than it should often think, and that a long while together, and not be conscious to itself the next moment that it had thought.

They who tell us that the soul always thinks, do never say that a man always thinks. Can the soul think, and not the man? or a man think, and not be conscious of it?

If they say, the man thinks always, but is not always conscious of it; they may as well say, his body is extended without parts, as that any thing *thinks without being conscious of it*, or perceiving that it does so. They may as well assert, that a man is always hungry, but that he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious to himself of thinking. I ask how they know it? Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind. Can another man perceive that I am conscious of any thing when I perceive it not of myself? No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience. Wake a man out of a sound sleep, and ask him what he was that moment thinking on! If he himself be conscious of nothing he thought on, he must be a notable diviner of thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking: may he not with more reason assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond philosophy; and it cannot be less than revelation that discovers to another thoughts in my mind, when I can find none there myself; and they must needs have a penetrating sight, who can certainly see that I think when I cannot perceive it myself, and when I declare that I do not; and yet can see that dogs and elephants do not think, when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable, except only telling us that they do so. This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosicrucians; it seeming easier to make one's self invisible to others, than to make another's thoughts visible to me which are

not visible to himself. But it is but defining the soul to be a substance that always thinks, and the business is done. If such definition be of any authority, I know not what it can serve for, but to make men suspect that they have no souls at all, since they find a good part of their lives pass away without thinking: for no definitions that I know, no suppositions of any sect, are of force enough to destroy constant experience; and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world.---*Locke.*

SPIRITS KNOWABLE, THE EXISTENCE OF.---The having the ideas of spirits does not make us know that any such things do exist without us; or that there are any finite spirits, or any other spiritual beings but the eternal God. We have ground from revelation, and several other reasons, to believe with assurance that there are such creatures; but our sense not being able to discover them, we want the means of knowing their particular existences. For we can no more know that there are finite spirits really existing by the idea we have of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist: and therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith; but universal certain propositions concerning this matter are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, v. g. that all the intelligent spirits that God ever created do still exist, yet it can never make a part of our

certain knowledge. These and the like propositions we may assent to as highly probable; but are not, I fear, in this state capable of knowing. We are then not to put others upon demonstrating, nor ourselves upon search, of universal certainty, in all those matters wherein we are not capable of any other knowledge but what our senses give us in this or that particular.---*Locke.*

SUBSTANCE.---The word *substance*, according to its etymology, signifies somewhat which stands under or supports something; and therefore the philosophers define it as a being subsisting of itself. The idea of a being is the most general and abstracted idea we can form: and *being* by philosophers is divided into substance and the qualities of substance, which they call accidents or modes. By these modes *alone* we have ideas conveyed to our minds of any objects whatsoever: but, as it is impossible they should exist without substance to support them, we are as sure of the existence of substance as modes; but what this substance is, we can never determine. We see but the outside and actions of substance; but what the essence of it is, we know not. We find in ourselves reason, love, hope, and other mental powers; but are we not quite ignorant of the substance in which these powers reside? The pen I am now writing with hath many constituent parts; the barrel, the pith, the plumage, all of different qualities and consistence; but are these several parts of the same or of a different substance? Sir Isaac Newton hath offered it as a conjecture, that all the original constituent particles of matter *may* be of the same substance, and even of

the same form; and that the vast variety we see in the world may arise from the different combinations and motions of these original particles. But even supposing this were proved, which is far from being the case, we are still at as great a loss as ever: for who could yet say what is the substance of these particles? We have no principles to go upon in an inquiry after a solution of that question.

It was the opinion of Spinoza, that there is but one substance in the universe; that it hath existed always, and will exist for ever; and that the vast variety of beings in it are only different modifications of this substance: and this ^{to us} or one substance he calleth *God*. This scheme of his, though supported with great subtilty and wit, is really so full of absurdities, that it is now most justly exploded. But he is thought to have taken it up from the abstruse and endless disputes which have been carried on in the world for very many centuries, whether the Son of God be of the same substance with the Father. For he is supposed to argue thus with himself: If, according to the prevailing hypothesis, two distinct intelligent beings can be of one and the same substance, why may not three? if three, why may not four? if four, why may not four thousand? and so on any number *ad infinitum*? What absurd disputes have been carried on amongst philosophers and Christians of all sects and denominations, concerning subjects which all acknowledge at the same time to be inexplicable! And *that* concerning substance is surely one of these.---*Robertson.*

SUICIDE.---One considerable advantage that arises from Philosophy consists

in the sovereign antidote which it affords to superstition and false religion. All other remedies against that pestilent distemper are vain, or at least uncertain. Plain good sense, and the practice of the world, which alone serve most purposes of life, are here found ineffectual! History as well as daily experience furnish instances of men endowed with the strongest capacity for business and affairs, who have all their lives crouched under slavery to the grossest superstition. Even gaiety and sweetness of temper, which infuse a balm into every other wound, afford no remedy to so virulent a poison; as we may particularly observe of the fair sex, who, though commonly possessed of these rich presents of nature, feel many of their joys blasted by this importunate intruder. But when sound Philosophy has once gained possession of the mind, superstition is effectually excluded; and one may fairly affirm that her triumph over this enemy is more complete than over most of the vices and imperfections incident to human nature. Love or anger, ambition or avarice, have their root in the temper and affections, which the soundest reason is scarce ever able fully to correct; but superstition being founded on false opinion, must immediately vanish, when true philosophy has inspired juster sentiments of superior powers. The contest is here more equal between the distemper and the medicine; and nothing can hinder the latter from proving effectual but its being false and sophisticated.

It will here be superfluous to magnify the merits of Philosophy by displaying the pernicious ten-

dency of that vice of which it cures the human mind. The superstitious man, says Tully, is miserable in every scene, in every incident in life; even sleep itself, which banishes all other cares of unhappy mortals, affords to him matter of new terror; while he examines his dreams, and finds in those visions of the night prognostications of future calamities. I may add, that though death alone can put a full period to his misery, he dares not fly to this refuge, but still prolongs a miserable existence, from a vain fear lest he offend his Maker, by using the power with which that beneficent Being has endowed him. The presents of God and nature are ravished from us by this cruel enemy; and notwithstanding that one step would remove us from the regions of pain and sorrow, her menaces still chain us down to a hated being, which she herself chiefly contributes to render miserable.

It is observed by such as have been reduced by the calamities of life to the necessity of employing this fatal remedy, that if the unseasonable care of their friends deprive them of that species of death which they proposed to themselves, they seldom venture upon any other, or can summon up so much resolution a second time as to execute their purpose. So great is our horror of death, that when it presents itself under any form besides that to which a man has endeavoured to reconcile his imagination, it acquires new terrors, and overcomes his feeble courage: but when the menaces of superstition are joined to this natural timidity, no wonder it quite deprives men of all power over their lives; since even many

pleasures and enjoyments, to which we are carried by a strong propensity, are torn from us by this inhuman tyrant. Let us here endeavour to restore men to their native liberty, by examining all the common arguments against suicide, and showing that that action may be free from every imputation of guilt or blame, according to the sentiments of all the ancient philosophers.

If suicide be criminal, it must be a transgression of our duty to either God, our neighbour, or ourselves. To prove that suicide is no transgression of our duty to God, the following considerations may perhaps suffice. In order to govern the material world, the Almighty Creator has established general and immutable laws, by which all bodies, from the greatest planet to the smallest particle of matter, are maintained in their proper sphere and function. To govern the animal world, he has endowed all living creatures with bodily and mental powers; with senses, passions, appetites, memory, and judgment, by which they are impelled or regulated in that course of life to which they are destined. These two distinct principles of the material and animal world continually encroach upon each other, and mutually retard or forward each other's operation. The powers of men, and of all other animals, are restrained and directed by the nature and qualities of the surrounding bodies; and the modifications and actions of these bodies are incessantly altered by the operation of all animals. Man is stopped by rivers in his passage over the earth; and rivers, when properly directed, lend their force to the motion of machines which serve to the use of

man. But though the provinces of the material and animal powers are kept entirely separate, there results from thence no discord or disorder in the creation; on the contrary, from the mixture, union, and contrast of all the various powers of inanimate bodies, and living creatures, arises that sympathy, harmony, and proportion, which affords the surest argument of Supreme Wisdom. The providence of the Deity appears not immediately in any operation; but governs every thing by those general and immutable laws which have been established from the beginning of time. All events, in one sense, may be pronounced the action of the Almighty; they all proceed from those powers with which he has endowed his creatures. A house which falls by its own weight, is not brought to ruin by his providence more than one destroyed by the hands of men; nor are the human faculties less his workmanship than the laws of motion and gravitation. When the passions play, when the judgment dictates, when the limbs obey; this is all the operation of God; and upon these animate principles, as well as upon the inanimate, has he established the government of the universe.—Every event is alike important in the eyes of that infinite Being, who takes in at one glance the most distant regions of space, and remotest periods of time. There is no event, however important to us, which he has exempted from the general laws that govern the universe, or which he has peculiarly reserved for his own immediate action and operation. The revolution of states and empires depends upon the smallest caprice or passion of

single men ; and the lives of men are shortened or extended by the smallest accident of air or diet, sunshine or tempest. Nature still continues her progress and operation ; and if general laws be ever broke by particular volitions of the Deity, it is after a manner which entirely escapes human observation. As, on the one hand, the elements, and other inanimate parts of the creation carry on their action without regard to the particular interest and situation of men ; so men are entrusted to their own judgment and discretion in the various shocks of matter, and may employ every faculty with which they are endowed, in order to provide for their ease, happiness, or preservation. What is the meaning then of that principle, that a man who, tired of life, and haunted by pain and misery, bravely overcomes all the natural terrors of death, and makes his escape from this cruel scene ; that such a man, I say, has incurred the indignation of his Creator, by encroaching on the office of divine providence, and disturbing the order of the universe ? Shall we assert, that the Almighty has reserved to himself in any peculiar manner the disposal of the lives of men, and has not submitted that event, in common with others, to the general laws by which the universe is governed ? This is plainly false : the lives of men depend upon the same laws as the lives of all other animals ; and these are subjected to the general laws of matter and motion. The fall of a tower, or the infusion of a poison, will destroy a man equally with the meanest creature ; an inundation sweeps away every thing without distinction that comes within the reach of

its fury. Since therefore the lives of men are for ever dependant on the general laws of matter and motion, is a man's disposing of his life criminal, because, in every case it is criminal to encroach upon these laws or disturb their operation ? But this seems absurd : All animals are entrusted to their own prudence and skill for their conduct in the world ; and have full authority, as far as their power extends, to alter all the operations of nature. Without the exercise of this authority they could not subsist a moment ; every action, every motion of man, innovates on the order of some parts of matter, and diverts from their ordinary course the general laws of motion. Putting together therefore these conclusions, we find that human life depends on the general laws of matter and motion, and that it is no encroachment on the office of Providence to disturb or alter these general laws : Has not every one, of consequence, the free disposal of his own life ? And may he not lawfully employ that power with which nature has endowed him ? In order to destroy the evidence of this conclusion, we must show a reason why this particular case is excepted. Is it because human life is of such great importance, that it is a presumption for human prudence to dispose of it ? But the life of a man is of no greater importance to the universe than the life of an oyster. And were it of ever so great importance, the order of human nature has actually submitted it to human prudence, and reduced us to the necessity, in every incident, of determining concerning it.

Were the disposal of human life so much reserved as the peculiar

province of the Almighty, that it were an encroachment on his right for men to dispose of their own lives, it would be equally criminal to act for the preservation of life as for its destruction. If I turn aside a stone which is falling upon my head, I disturb the course of nature; and I invade the peculiar province of the Almighty, by lengthening out my life beyond the period which by the general laws of matter and motion he had assigned it.

A hair, a fly, an insect, is able to destroy this mighty being whose life is of such importance. Is it an absurdity to suppose that human prudence may lawfully dispose of what depends on such insignificant causes? It would be no crime in me to divert the Nile or Danube from its course, were I able to effect such purposes. Where then is the crime of turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channel?—Do you imagine that I repine at Providence, or curse my creation, because I go out of life, and put a period to a being which, were it to continue, would make me miserable? Far be such sentiments from me. I am only convinced of a matter of fact which you yourself acknowledge possible, that human life may be unhappy; and that my existence, if further prolonged, would become ineligible: but I thank Providence, both for the good which I have already enjoyed, and for the power with which I am endowed of escaping the ills that threaten me. To you it belongs to repine at Providence, who foolishly imagine that you have no such power; and who must still prolong a hated life, though loaded with pain and sickness, with shame and poverty.—Do not you teach, that when any ill

befalls me, though by the malice of my enemies, I ought to be resigned to Providence; and that the actions of men are the operations of the Almighty, as much as the actions of inanimate beings? When I fall upon my own sword, therefore, I receive my death equally from the hands of the Deity as if it had proceeded from a lion, a precipice, or a fever. The submission which you require to Providence, in every calamity that befalls me, excludes not human skill and industry, if possibly by their means I can avoid or escape the calamity.—And why may I not employ one remedy as well as another? If my life be not my own, it were criminal for me to put it in danger, as well as to dispose of it; nor could one man deserve the appellation of *hero*, whom glory or friendship transports into the greatest dangers; and another merit the reproach of *wretch* or *miscreant*, who puts a period to his life from the same or like motives. There is no being which possesses any power or faculty, that it receives from its Creator; nor is there any one, which by ever so irregular an action, can encroach upon the plan of his providence, or disorder the universe. Its operations are his works equally with that chain of events which it invades; and whichever principle prevails, we may for that very reason conclude it to be most favoured by him. Be it animate or inanimate; rational or irrational; it is all the same case: its power is still derived from the Supreme Creator, and is alike comprehended in the order of his providence. When the horror of pain prevails over the love of life; when a voluntary action anticipates the

effects of blind causes; it is only in consequence of those powers and principles which he has implanted in his creatures. Divine Providence is still inviolate, and placed far beyond the reach of human injuries. It is impious, says the old Roman superstition, to divert rivers from their course, or invade the prerogatives of nature. It is impious, says the French superstition, to inoculate for the small-pox, or usurp the business of Providence, by voluntarily producing distempers and maladies. It is impious, says the modern European superstition, to put a period to our own life, and thereby rebel against our Creator: and why not impious, say I, to build houses, cultivate the ground, or sail upon the ocean? In all these actions we employ our powers of mind and body to produce some innovation in the course of nature; and in none of them do we any more. They are all of them therefore equally innocent, or equally criminal. *But you are placed by Providence, like a sentinel, in a particular station: and when you desert it without being recalled, you are equally guilty of rebellion against your Almighty Sovereign, and have incurred his displeasure.*—I ask, why do you conclude that Providence has placed me in this station? For my part, I find that I owe my birth to a long chain of causes, of which many depended upon voluntary actions of men. *But Providence guided all these causes, and nothing happens in the universe without its consent and co-operation.* If so, then neither does my death, however voluntary, happen without its consent; and whenever pain or sorrow so far overcome my pati-

ence, as to make me tired of life, I may conclude that I am recalled from my station in the clearest and most express terms. It is Providence surely that has placed me at this present moment in this chamber: but may I not leave it when I think proper, without being liable to the imputation of having deserted my post or station? When I shall be dead, the principles of which I am composed will still perform their part in the universe, and will be equally useful in the grand fabric, as when they composed this individual creature. The difference to the whole will be no greater than betwixt my being in a chamber and in the open air. The one change is of more importance to me than the other; but not more so to the universe.

It is a kind of blasphemy to imagine that any created being can disturb the order of the world, or invade the business of Providence! It supposes, that that being possesses powers and faculties which it received not from its Creator, and which are not subordinate to his government and authority. A man may disturb society, no doubt, and thereby incur the displeasure of the Almighty: but the government of the world is placed far beyond his reach and violence. And how does it appear that the Almighty is displeased with those actions that disturb society? By the principles which he has implanted in human nature, and which inspire us with a sentiment of remorse, if we ourselves have been guilty of such actions, and with that of blame and disapprobation, if we ever observe them in others.—Let us now examine, according to the method proposed,

whether Suicide be of this kind of actions, and be a breach of our duty to our *neighbour* and to *society*.

A man who retires from life, does no harm to society: he only ceases to do good; which, if it is an injury, is of the lowest kind.---All our obligations to do good to society seem to imply something reciprocal. I receive the benefits of society, and therefore ought to promote its interests; but when I withdraw myself altogether from society, can I be bound any longer? But allowing that our obligations to do good were perpetual, they have certainly some bounds; I am not obliged to do a small good to society at the expence of a great harm to myself: why then should I prolong a miserable existence, because of some frivolous advantage which the public may perhaps receive from me? If upon account of age and infirmities, I may lawfully resign any office, and employ my time altogether in fencing against these calamities, and alleviating as much as possible the miseries of my future life; why may I not cut short these miseries at once by an action which is no more prejudicial to society?---But suppose that it is no longer in my power to promote the interest of society; suppose that I am a burden to it; suppose that my life hinders some person from being much more useful to society: in such cases, my resignation of life must not only be innocent, but laudable. And most people who lie under any temptation to abandon existence, are in some such situation; those who have health, or power, or authority, have commonly better reason to be in humour with the world.

A man is engaged in a conspiracy for the public interest; is seized upon suspicion; is threatened with the rack; and knows from his own weakness that the secret will be extorted from him. Could such a one consult the public interest better than by putting a quick period to a miserable life? This was the case of the famous and brave Strozi of Florence.---Again, suppose a malefactor is justly condemned to a shameful death; can any reason be imagined why he may not anticipate his punishment, and save himself all the anguish of thinking on its dreadful approaches? He invades the business of Providence no more than the magistrate did, who ordered his execution; and his voluntary death is equally advantageous to society, by ridding it of a pernicious member.

That Suicide may often be consistent with interest and with our duty to ourselves, no one can question, who allows that age, sickness, or misfortune, may render life a burden, and make it worse even than annihilation. I believe that no man ever threw away life while it was worth keeping. For such is our natural horror of death, that small motives will never be able to reconcile us to it; and though perhaps the situation of a man's health or fortune did not seem to require this remedy, we may at least be assured, that any one who, without apparent reason, has had recourse to it, was curst with such an incurable depravity or gloominess of temper as must poison all enjoyment, and render him equally miserable as if he had been loaded with the most grievous misfortunes.---If Suicide be sup-

posed a crime; it is only cowardice can impel us to it. If it be no crime, both prudence and courage should engage us to rid ourselves at once of existence when it becomes a burden. It is the only way that we can then be useful to society, by setting an example, which, if imitated, would preserve to every one his chance for happiness in life, and would effectually free him from all danger of misery.

---Hume.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---The rage of suicide will never become epidemic. Nature has sufficiently guarded against it; and hope and fear are the powerful curbs she makes use of to stop the hand of the wretch uplifted to be his own executioner.

There is one thing indeed which may cause some surprise, and which deserves to be seriously discussed; which is, that almost all the great heroes among the Romans, during the civil wars, killed themselves when they lost a battle; and that we do not find an instance of a single leader or great man in the disputes of the League, the Fronde, or during the troubles of Italy and Germany, who put an end to his life with his own hand. It is true that these latter were Christians, and there may be a great difference between a Christian soldier and a Pagan; and yet how comes it that those very men who were so easily withheld by Christianity from putting an end to their own lives, should be restrained neither by that nor any other consideration, when they had a mind to poison, assassinate, or publicly execute a vanquished enemy? Does not the Christian religion forbid the manner of taking away the life of a fellow-creature, if possible,

more than that of our own? The advocates for suicide tell us, that it is very allowable to quit our house when we are weary of it. Agreed: but most men had rather lie in a bad house than sleep in the open fields.---If it be required clearly to demonstrate that it is allowable for a man to kill himself, it may be answered, that there is nothing to prove, and that we have only to examine if we prefer death to life.

But then let us ask---Why Cato, Brutus, Cassius, Anthony, Otho, and so many others, gave themselves death with so much resolution, and that our leaders of parties suffered themselves to be taken alive by their enemies, or waste the remains of a wretched old age in a dungeon? Some refined wits pretend to say, that the ancients had no real courage; that Cato acted like a coward in putting an end to his own life, and that he would have showed more greatness of soul in crouching beneath the victorious Caesar. This may be very well in an ode, or as a figure in rhetoric: but it is very certain there must be some courage to resign a life coolly by the edge of a sword; some strength of mind thus to overcome the most powerful instinct of nature; in a word, that such an act shows a greater share of ferocity than weakness. When a sick man is in a phrenzy, we cannot say he has no strength, though we may say it is the strength of a madman.

Self-murder was forbid by the Pagan as well as by the Christian religion. There was even a place allotted in hell to those who put an end to their own lives. Witness these lines of the Poet:

*Proxima deinde tenet mæsti loca, qui sibi
lethum*

*Infantes peperere manu, lucemque perosi
Projecere animas; quam vellent æthere in
alto*

*Nunc et pauperiem, et duras perferre
labores!*

*Fata obstant, tristisque Palus inamabilis
unda*

Aaligat, et novies Styx interfusa coerces.

VIRGIL, *Æneid.*

This was the religion of the Heathens; and, notwithstanding the torments they were to meet with in the other world, it was esteemed an honour to quit this by giving themselves death by their own hands: so contradictory are the manners of men! Is not the custom of duelling still unhappily accounted honourable amongst us, though prohibited by reason, by religion, and by all laws divine and human? If Cato and Cæsar, Anthony and Augustus, did not challenge each other to a duel, it was not that they were less brave than ourselves. If the Duke of Montmorenci, Marechal Marillac, De Thou, Cinq-Mars, and many others, rather chose to be dragged to execution like the vilest miscreants, than put an end to their own lives like Cato and Brutus, it was not that they had less courage than those Romans: the true reason is, that it was not then the fashion at Paris to kill one's self on such occasions; whereas it was an established custom with the Romans.

The women on the Malabar coast throw themselves alive into the flames in which the bodies of their dead husbands are burning. Is it because they have more resolution than Cornelia? No; but the custom of the country is for wives to burn themselves.

Custom and fancy oft our fate decide,
And what is this man's shame is t'other's
pride. VOLTAIRE.

A DIALOGUE ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

A. I cannot comprehend how a man should be so mad as to blow out his brains; and the bare idea of it shocks me.

W. What right has any man, in speaking of an action, immediately to pronounce that it is mad, or wise, or good, or bad? What is meant by all this? Have you carefully examined the interior motives for the action? Have you fairly unfolded all the reasons which gave rise to it, and which made it necessary? If you did all this, you would not be so quick with your decision.

A. However, you will allow some actions are criminal, whatever were the motives for committing them.

W. Granted; but still there are more exceptions to make. Theft is a crime; but the man who is driven to it by extreme poverty, with no design but to save himself and his family from perishing for want, must he too be punished? and is he not rather an object of our compassion? Who shall throw the first stone at a husband that, in the first heat of just resentment, sacrifices a faithless wife and her perfidious seducer? or at a young girl whom love only has led astray? Even our laws, our pedantic laws, our old cruel laws, relent and withdraw their punishment.

A. These examples are very different; because a man, under the influence of violent passion, is incapable of reflection, and is looked upon as drunk or out of his senses.

W. Oh! you people of sound understandings are very ready to pro-

nounce sentence, and talk of extravagance, and madness, and intoxication; you are quiet, and care for nothing; you avoid the drunken man, and detect the extravagant; you pass on the other side like the Priest, and like the Pharisee you thank God that you are not like one of them. I have more than once experienced the effects of drinking; my passions have always bordered upon extravagance, and I am not ashamed to own it. Do I not find that those superior men, who have done any great or extraordinary action, have in all times been treated as if they were intoxicated or mad?—And in private life, too, is it not insufferable, that if a young man does any thing uncommonly noble or generous, the world immediately says he is out of his senses? Take shame to yourselves, ye people of discretion! take shame to yourselves, ye sages of the earth!

A. This is one of your extravagant flights; you always go beyond the mark: and here you are most undoubtedly in the wrong, to compare suicide, which is in question, with great actions; for it can only be looked upon as a weakness. It is much easier to die than to bear a life of misery with fortitude.

W. You call this weakness; beware of being carried away by sounds! Suppose a people groaning under the yoke of tyranny; do you call them weak, when, at length, they throw it off and break their chains? The man who, to rescue his house from the flames, exerts all his powers, lifts burdens with ease that he could scarcely move when his mind was at peace; he who attacks and puts to flight half a score of his enemies; are these

weak people? My good friend, if resistance is a mark of strength, can the highest degree of resistance be called a weakness?

A. Begging your pardon, I don't think the examples you have brought have any relation to the subject in question.

W. That may very likely be; for I have been often told, that my own way of combining things appeared extravagant. But let us try to set the matter in another light: let us examine what is the situation of a man who resolves to free himself from the burden of life—a burden that is in general so much desired ---and let us enter into his feelings; for we cannot otherwise reason fairly on the subject. Human nature has certain limits; there is a degree of joy, grief, pain, which it is able to endure; and beyond that degree it is annihilated. We are not, therefore, to inquire whether a man is weak or strong; but whether he can pass the bounds of nature, and the measure of his sufferings, either of mind or body: and I think it is as absurd to say that a man who destroys himself is a coward, as to call a man a coward who dies of a malignant fever.

A. Paradox, all Paradox! my friend.

W. Not so paradoxical as you imagine. You will allow that we call a disease mortal; in which nature is so severely attacked, that what remains is not sufficient to raise her up, and set her a-going again.---Let us apply this to the mind; let us see how ideas work, and how impressions fix upon it, till at length a violent passion takes entire possession, destroys all the powers it possessed when at ease, and entirely subdues it.---It is in

vain that a man of sound understanding and cool temper sees the miserable situation of a wretch in such circumstances; it is in vain that he counsels him. It is like the man in health, who sits by the bed of his dying friend, but is unable to communicate to him the smallest portion of his strength.

A. I think what you say is too general.

W. Do you recollect the circumstances of the girl who lately drowned herself?—A good young creature, so accustomed to the narrow sphere of domestic labour, and the business of the week, that she knew of no pleasure but taking a walk in the fields on a Sunday, dancing once perhaps in the holidays, and the rest of her time only talking with her next neighbour of the news and little quarrels of the village. At length her heart feels new and uncommon wishes; all that used to please her, now by degrees becomes tasteless, till she meets with a man to whom a new affection invisibly attaches her; the whole surrounding world is forgotten by her; she sees, hears, desires nothing but him; he alone occupies all her thoughts. Her heart having never felt the baneful pleasure arising from light vanity, her wishes tend immediately to the object of them; she hopes to belong to him, and in eternal bonds expects to enjoy all the desires of her heart, and to realize the ideas of happiness which she has formed. His repeated promises confirm her hopes; his fondness increases her passion; her whole sole is lost and drowned in pleasure; her heart is all rapture. At length she stretches out her arms to embrace the object of her vows—all is van-

ished away; her lover forsakes her.

-----Amazed! petrified! she stands senseless before the abyss of misery she sees before her: all around is darkness; for her there is no prospect, nor hope, nor consolation: she is forsaken by him in whom her life was bound up; and in the wide universe which is before her, and among so many who might repair her loss, she feels alone and abandoned by the whole world. Thus blinded, thus impelled, by the piercing grief which wrings her heart, she plunges into the deep to put an end to her torments. Such, my dear friend, is the history of many men: and is it not a parallel case with illness? Nature has no way to escape: her powers exhausted, and contending powers to struggle with, death must be the consequence. Wo unto the man who could hear this situation described, and who could say, "Ah, foolish girl! why did not she wait till time had worn off the impression? Her despair would have been softened, and she would have found another lover to comfort her." One might as well say, "A fool! he died of a fever. Why did he not wait till he had recovered his strength, till his blood was calm? then all would have been well, and he would have been alive now."

A. I cannot allow the comparison to be just: You only bring the example to a simple and innocent girl; but I cannot comprehend how a man of sense, whose views are more enlarged, and who sees such various consolations, should ever suffer himself to fall into such a state of despair.

W. My good friend, whatever is the education of a man, whatever is his understanding, still he is

a man; and the little reason he possesses, either does not act at all, or acts very feebly, when the passions are let loose, or rather when the boundaries of human nature close in upon him---But we will talk of this another time---Alas! my heart is full, and I see we must part without conviction on either side---How rarely do men understand one another!

* * *

ON THE SAME SUBJECT. --- One lifts up the curtain; one passes to the other side---that is all!----And why all these delays? why all these fears?----- Because we know not what is behind---because there is no returning---and we suppose all is darkness and confusion where there is uncertainty.

* * *

SUPERSTITION. --- No man can cast a penetrative look on the various superstitions of the world, without conceiving the greatest contempt for the human race in general, and for himself in particular. What! he will say; were thousands of years necessary to convince men equally intelligent with myself of the folly of Paganism? Do the Jews and the Guebres still persist in their errors? Do the Mussulmans still believe in Mahomet; and may it be thousands of years before they are convinced of the falsity of the Koran? Man must certainly be a very weak and credulous animal; and in short, this planet of ours must be, as a wise man said, the madhouse of the universe. ---*Helvetius*.

SUMPTUARY LAWS SUPERFLUOUS.---As frugality increases, and prodigality diminishes, the public capital--so the conduct of those whose expense equals their revenue, without

either accumulating or encroaching, neither increases nor diminishes it. Some modes of expense, however, seem to contribute more to the growth of public opulence than others.

The revenue of an individual may be spent either in things in which one day's expense can neither alleviate nor support that of another; or it may be spent in things more durable, which can therefore be accumulated, and in which every day's expense may, as he chooses, either alleviate or support and heighten the effect of that of the following day. A man of fortune, for example, may either spend his revenue in a profuse and sumptuous table, and in maintaining a great number of menial servants, and a multitude of dogs and horses; or, contenting himself with a frugal table and few attendants, he may lay out the greater part of it in adorning his house or his country villa, in useful or ornamental buildings, in useful or ornamental furniture, in collecting books, statues, pictures: or in things more frivolous, jewels, baubles, ingenious trinkets of different kinds; or, what is most trifling of all, in amassing a great wardrobe of fine clothes, like the favourite and minister of a great prince who died a few years ago. Were two men of equal fortune to spend their revenue, the one chiefly in the one way, and the other in the other; the magnificence of the person whose expense had been chiefly in durable commodities, would be continually increasing, every day's expense contributing something to support and heighten the effect of that of the following day: that of the other, on the contrary, would be no greater

at the end of the period than at the beginning. The former too, would, at the end of the period, be the richer man of the two: he would have a stock of goods of some kind or other, which, though it might not be worth all that it cost, would always be worth something. No trace or vestige of the expence of the latter would remain; and the effects of ten or twenty years profusion would be as completely annihilated as if they had never existed.

As the one mode of expence is more favourable than the other to the opulence of an individual, so it is likewise to that of a nation. The houses, the furniture, the cloathing of the rich, in a little time become useful to the inferior and middling ranks of people: they are able to purchase them when their superiors grow weary of them; and the general accommodation of the whole people is thus gradually improved when this mode of expence becomes universal among men of fortune. In countries which have long been rich, you will frequently find the inferior ranks of people in possession both of houses and furniture perfectly good and entire; but of which neither the one could have been built, nor the other have been made for their use. What was formerly a seat of the family of Seymour, is now an inn upon the Bath road. The marriage-bed of James I. of Great Britain, which his queen brought with her from Denmark, as a present fit for a sovereign to make to a sovereign, was a few years ago the ornament of an ale-house at Dunfermline. In some ancient cities, which either have been long stationary or have

gone somewhat to decay, you will sometimes scarce find a single house which could have been built for its present inhabitants. If you go into those houses too, you will frequently find many excellent, though antiquated pieces of furniture, which are still very fit for use, and which could as little have been made for them. Noble palaces, magnificent villas, great collections of books, statues, pictures, and other curiosities, are frequently both an ornament of honour, not only to the neighbour, but to the whole country to which they belong. Versailles is an ornament and an honour to France, Stowe and Wilton to England. Italy still continues to command some sort of veneration by the number of monuments of this kind which it possesses, though the wealth which produced them has decayed, and though the genius which planned them seems to be extinguished, perhaps from not having the same employment.

The expence, too, which is laid out in durable commodities is favourable, not only to accumulation, but to frugality. If a person should at any time exceed in it, he can easily reform without exposing himself to the censure of the public. To reduce very much the number of his servants, to reform his table from great profusion to great frugality, to lay down his equipage after he has once set it up, are changes which cannot escape the observation of his neighbours, and which are supposed to imply some acknowledgement of preceding bad conduct. Few, therefore, of those who have once been so unfortunate as to launch out too far into this sort of expence, have

afterwards the courage to reform, till ruin and bankruptcy oblige them. But if a person has at any time been at too great an expence in building, in furniture, in books, or pictures, no imprudence can be inferred from his changing his conduct. These are things in which further expence is frequently rendered unnecessary by former expence; and when a person stops short, he appears to do so, not because he has satisfied his fancy.

The expence, besides, that is laid out in durable commodities, gives maintenance commonly to a greater number of people than that which is employed in the most profuse hospitality. Of two or three hundred weight of provisions which may sometimes be served up at a great festival, one half perhaps is thrown to the dunghill; and there is always a great deal wasted and abused: but if the expence of this entertainment had been employed in setting to work masons, carpenters, upholsterers, mechanics, &c. a quantity of provisions of equal value would have been distributed among a greater number of people, who would have bought them in penny-worths and pound weights, and not have lost or thrown away a single ounce of them. In the one way, besides, this expence maintains productive, in the other unproductive hands. In the one way, therefore, it increases; in the other it does not increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the country.

I would not, however, by all this be understood to mean, that the one species of expence always betokens a more liberal or generous spirit than the other. When a man

of fortune spends his revenue chiefly in hospitality, he shares the greater part of it with his friends and companions; but when he employs it in purchasing such durable commodities, he often spends the whole upon his own person, and gives nothing to any body without an equivalent. The latter species of expence therefore, especially when directed towards frivolous objects, the little ornaments of dress and furniture, jewels, trinkets, gewgaws, frequently indicates, not only a trifling but a base selfish disposition. All that I mean is, that the one sort of expence, as it always occasions some accumulation of valuable commodities, as it is more favourable to private frugality, and consequently to increase of the public capital, and as it maintains productive rather than unproductive hands, conduces more than the other to the growth of public opulence.—*A. Smith.*

SYMPATHY, THE PRINCIPLE OF, AND ANTIPATHY, NOT A PROPER STANDARD OF RIGHT AND WRONG.—By the principle of sympathy and antipathy, I mean that principle which approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to augment the happiness, nor yet on account of their tending to diminish the happiness, of the party whose interest is in question; but merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: holding up that approbation as a sufficient reason for itself, and disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any intrinsic ground.

It is manifest that this is rather a principle in name than reality: it is not a positive principle of itself, so much as a term employed to

signify the negation of all principle. What one expects to find in a principle, is something that points out some external consideration, as a means of warranting and guiding the internal sentiments of approbation and disapprobation: This expectation is but ill fulfilled by a proposition, which does neither more nor less than hold up each of those sentiments as a ground and standard for itself.

In looking over the catalogue of human actions (says a partisan of this principle), in order to determine which of them are to be marked with the seal of disapprobation, you need but to take counsel of your own feelings: whatever you find in yourself a propensity to condemn, is wrong for that very reason. For the same reason it is also meet for punishment: in what proportion it is adverse to utility at all, is a matter that makes no difference. In that same *proportion*, also it is meet for punishment; if you hate much, punish much; if you hate little, punish as you hate. If you hate not at all, punish not at all: the fine feelings of the soul are not to be overborne and tyrannized by the harsh and rugged dictates of political utility.

The principle of sympathy and antipathy is most apt to err on the side of severity. It is for applying punishment in many cases which deserve none: in many cases which deserve some, it is for applying more than they deserve. There is no incident imaginable, be it ever so trivial, and so remote from mischief, from which this principle may not extract a ground for punishment. Any difference in taste; any difference in opinion; upon one subject as well as upon another;

no disagreement so trifling which perseverance and altercation will not render serious: each becomes in the other's eyes an enemy, and, if laws permit, a criminal. This is one of the circumstances by which the human race is distinguished (not much indeed to its advantage) from the brute creation.

King James I. of England had conceived a violent antipathy against Arians; two of whom he burnt. This gratification he procured himself without much difficulty: the notions of the times were favourable to it. He wrote a furious book against Vorstius, for being what was called an *Arminian*; for Vorstius was at a distance. He also wrote a furious book called *A Counterblast to Tobacco*, against the use of that drug, which Sir Walter Raleigh had then lately introduced. Had the notions of the times co-operated with him, he would have burnt the Anabaptist and the smoker of tobacco in the same fire. However, he had the satisfaction of putting Raleigh to death afterwards, though for another crime.

Disputes concerning the comparative excellence of French and Italian music have occasioned very serious bickerings at Paris. One of the parties would not have been sorry (says Mr. D'Alembert) to have brought government into the quarrel. Pretences were sought after and urged. Long before that a dispute of a like nature, and of at least equal warmth, had been kindled at London upon the comparative merits of two composers at London; where riots between the approvers and disapprovers of a new play are at this day not unfrequent. The ground off quarrel

between the Big-endians and the Little-endians in the fable, was not more frivolous than many an one which has laid empires desolate. In Russia, it is said, there was a time when some thousands of persons lost their lives in a quarrel, in which the government had taken part, about the number of fingers to be used in making the sign of the cross. This was in days of yore: the Ministers of Catherine II. are better instructed than to take any other part in such disputes, than that of preventing the parties concerned from doing one another a mischief.

There are two things which are very apt to be confounded, but which it imports us carefully to distinguish:---The motive or cause which, by operating in a man's mind, is productive of any act; and the ground or reason which warrant a legislature, or other bystander, in regarding that act with an eye of approbation. When the act happens, in the particular instance in question, to be productive of effects which we approve of, much more if we happen to observe that the same motive may frequently be productive in other instances of the like effects, we are apt to transfer our approbation to the motive itself, and to assume, as the just ground for the approbation we bestow on the act, the circumstance of its originating from that motive. It is in this way that the sentiment of antipathy has often been considered as a just ground of action. Antipathy, for instance, in such or such a case, is the cause of an action which is attended with good effects: but this does not make it a just ground of action in that case, any more than in any other. Still

further: Not only the effects are good, but the agent sees before hand that they will be so. This may make the action indeed a perfectly right action; but it does not make antipathy a right ground of action. For the same sentiment of antipathy, if implicitly deferred to, may be and very frequently is productive of the very worst effects. Antipathy therefore can never be a right ground of action. No more therefore can resentment, which is but a modification of antipathy. The only right ground of action that can possibly subsist is, after all, the consideration of utility, which, if it is a right principle of action and of approbation in any one case, is so in every other. Other principles in abundance, that is, other motives may be the reasons why such and such an act *has* been done; that is, the reasons or causes of its being done: But it is this alone that can be the reason why it might or ought to have been done. Antipathy or resentment requires always to be regulated, to prevent its doing mischief: To be regulated by what? Always by the principle of utility. The principle of utility neither requires nor admits of any other regulation than itself.—*J. Bentham.*

TAXES.---The foundation of the social contract is property; and its first condition, that every one should be maintained in the peaceful possession of what belonged to him. It is true, that by the same treaty every one tacitly consents to be assessed toward the public wants: but this engagement being incapable of hurting the fundamental law, and supposing that the evidence of such wants must appear to every one who contributes

to them, it is plain that such assessment, in order to be lawful, should be voluntary; not indeed particularly so, as if it were necessary to have the consent of each individual, and that he should give no more than just what he pleased; but so far voluntary as it should be done by the consent of the majority of the citizens, and upon an equitable and impartial footing.

That taxes cannot be lawfully established but by the consent of the people or their representatives, is a truth generally admitted by all philosophers and civilians of any reputation. If any of them also have established maxims apparently contradictory, their particular motives for it may be easily seen through; and, besides, they introduce so many conditions and restrictions, that the argument comes at the bottom to the very same thing: for whether the people have it in their power to refuse, or the sovereign ought not to exact, is a matter of indifference with regard to right; and if the point in question be only with regard to power, it is mighty useless to inquire whether it be lawful or not.

We are told in the Spirit of Laws, that a capitation tax is most conformable to slavery, and a real tax is most agreeable to liberty. It might indeed be so, if the circumstances of every person were equal; for otherwise nothing can be more disproportionate than such a tax, and it is in the observations of exact proportions that consists the spirit of liberty. But if a capitation tax were exactly proportioned to the state and circumstances of individuals, it would be the most equitable, and of conse-

quence the most conformable, of all others to freemen.

These propositions appear at first very easy to be observed; because, as they relate to the rank which every one holds in life, the indications of it are always public: but it is rare that a proper regard is paid to all the elements that should enter into such a calculation, setting aside the deception arising from avarice, fraud, and interest. In the first place, should be considered the relation of quantities; according to which, every thing else being equal, the person who has ten times the property of another man ought to pay ten times as much to the state. Secondly, the relation of custom, that is to say, the distinction between necessities and superfluities. He who possesses only the common necessities of life should pay nothing at all, while the tax on him who is in possession of superfluities might be justly extended to every thing beyond mere necessities. To this the latter will possibly object, in regard to rank, that may be superfluous to a man of inferior station is necessary to him. But this is false; for a peer of the realm has two legs as well as a cow-herd, and he has but one belly any more than a clown. Besides, these pretended necessities are really so little necessary with regard to rank, that if he should renounce them on any worthy occasion, he would only be the more honoured and respected. The populace would be ready to adore a Minister who would walk to council on foot, because he sold off his equipage to supply an exigence of state.

A third relation, which is never accounted any thing, and which

ought to be accounted the chief, is the utility which every person derives from the social confederacy, which powerfully protects the immense possessions of the rich, and hardly leaves the poor the quiet possession of the cottage he builds with his own hands. Almost all the advantages of society are for the rich and powerful. All the lucrative employments are in their hands; all the privileges and exemptions are reserved for them alone, while the public authority is ever partial in their favor. There is another remark no less important, viz. the losses of the poor are much less reparable than those of the rich; and that the difficulty of acquisition always increases in proportion to the necessity of it. *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, is as true in politics as in physics. Money is the seed of money; and the first guinea is sometimes more difficult to be acquired than the second million. Add to all this, that what is paid by the poor is for ever lost to them and remains in, or returns to, the hands of the rich; and as among those only who share in the government or their dependents, sooner or later all the produce of the taxes must pass, so in paying their share they have always a sensible interest in augmenting them. Putting all these considerations carefully together, we shall find that, in order to levy taxes in a truly equitable and proportionable manner, the tax ought not to be in the simple ratio of the property of the contributors, but in a ratio compounded of the difference of their conditions and the superfluity of their possession.---*Rousseau*.

TAXES, THEIR SOURCES AND PROPERTIES.—The private revenue of in-

dividuals arises ultimately from three different sources—rent, profit, and wages. Every tax must finally be paid from one or other of those three different sorts of revenue, or all of them indifferently. The four following maxims, with regard to taxes, seem to be essential.

1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the individuals of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to their respective interests in the estate. In the observation of neglect of this maxim consists, what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every tax, it must be observed once for all, which falls finally upon only one of the three sorts of revenue above-mentioned, is necessarily unequal, insofar as it does not affect the other two.

2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or less in the power of tax-gatherers; who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation en-

courages the insolence and favours the corruption of an order of men who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty.

3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the rent of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay; or when he is most likely to have wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty, too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable inconvenience from such taxes.

4. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it brings into the treasury of the state.

A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose

salaries may eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of business which might give employment to great multitudes. Thirdly, by the forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have received from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a great temptation to smuggling: but the penalties of smuggling must arise in proportion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles of justice, first creates the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to it; and it commonly enhances the punishment too in proportion to the very circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit the crime. Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly speaking, expence, it is certainly equivalent to the expence at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in some one or other of these four different ways that taxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign.

The evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims have recommended them more or less to

the attention of all nations. All nations have endeavored, to the best of their judgement, to render their taxes as equal as they could contrive; as certain as convenient to the contributor, both in the time and the mode of payment; and, in proportion to the revenue which they brought to the people.

A. Smith.

TESTIMONY, HEARSAY.—Hearsay is a testimony weakened by its removal from the first source; it is liable from its very nature to important objections, which generally diminish its authority. Very few persons impose upon themselves such strict laws of veracity, that every word which drops from them in conversation can be regarded as a judicial testimony. Vanity, self-interest, love of talkativeness, a variety of motives, even the most frivolous, make people indulge themselves in fictions and they think themselves the more secure, both as a detection is not attended with any important consequences, and as their companions never dream of sifting their story, or examining circumstances so as to render their detection possible.—*Lord Mansfield.*

TESTIMONY, HUMAN.---There is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. Our assurance, in any argument of this kind, is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree; were not men, in general, inclined

to truth and probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood; were not these qualities discovered by *experience* to be inherent in human nature, we should never repose confidence in human testimony, and as the evidence derived from it is founded on past experience; so it varies with the experience, and is regarded as a *proof* or a *probability*, according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of objects has been found to be constant or variable. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, with the same opposition and mutual destruction of arguments as in every other kind of evidence. We hesitate; we balance opposite circumstances; and incline to that side on which we discover a superiority, but with a diminution of assurance in proportion to the source of its antagonist. This contrariety of evidence may originate from various causes; from the opposition of contrary testimony; from the character or number of the witnesses; from the manner of their delivering their testimony; or from the union of all these circumstances. We suspect a matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other; when they are but few, or of a suspicious character; when they have an interest in what they affirm: when they deliver their testimony with doubt and hesitation; or, on the contrary, with too violent asseverations, &c.

If the fact, which the testimony endeavours to establish, partake of the extraordinary and marvellous, the evidence is more or less credible in proportion as the fact is

more or less unusual. The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians, is not derived from any connection which we perceive *a priori* between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them. But when the fact attested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two opposite experiences. Experience, which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact to be established; from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise, a mutual destruction of authority. If the fact affirmed be really miraculous, and the testimony, considered apart and in itself, amount to an entire proof, in that case, there is proof against proof, of which the most forcible must prevail; but still with a diminution of its force in proportion to that of its antagonist. When any one tells me he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more propable that this person should either deceive or be deceived; or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates, then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or opinion. But there is not to be found, in all history, any miracle to be attested by a sufficient number of men, of such

unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity, as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind, as to have a great deal to lose in case of being detected in any falsehood; and at the same time attesting facts, performed in such a public manner, and in so celebrated a part of the world, as to render the detection unavoidable: all which circumstances are requisite to give us full assurance in the testimony of men.---*Hume.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---The judgment must be employed to discern the truth or falsehood of assertions, by attending to the credibility and consistency of the different parts of the story; and the veracity and character of witnesses in other respects; by comparing the assertions with accounts received from other witnesses, who could not be ignorant of the same facts; and, lastly, by bringing the whole to the test of a comparison with known and admitted facts.---*Mansfield.*

THEOCRACY.---It seems the greater part of the ancient nations were governed by a kind of theocracy. To begin by India, you there find the Bramins have long been sovereigns: in Persia, the Magi have the greatest authority. The story of Smerdis's ears may very probably be a fable; but it will always follow that he was a Magus upon the throne of Cyrus. Several Egyptian priests had so great a dominion over their kings, that they went so far as to prescribe to them how much they should eat and drink, brought up their children,

tried them after their deaths, and often made themselves kings.

If we come down to the Greeks, however fabulous their history may be, do we not learn therefrom, that the prophet Chalcas had sufficient power in the army to sacrifice the daughter of the king of kings? Come still lower to the savage nations since the Greeks, the Druids governed the Gauls.

It does not seem to have been possible, that in the first colonies there could have been any other than a theocratic government; for as soon as a nation has chosen a tutelar god, this god has priests, these priests reign over the minds of the people; they cannot govern but in the name of the god; they, therefore, always make him speak; they retail his oracles; and it is by an express order from god that every thing is done.

China is the only one of all the ancient states which has not been under sacerdotal subjection. As to the Japanese, they submitted to the laws imposed upon them by a priest six hundred years before we were in being. Almost every where theocracy is so much established; so deeply rooted, that the first histories are those of gods, who became incarnated to come and govern men. The gods, said the people of Thebes and Memphis, have reigned twelve thousand years in Egypt.

Brama incarnated himself to reign in India, Samonocodom at Siam, the god Adad governed Syria, the goddess Cybele had been sovereign of Phrygia, Jupiter of Crete, Saturn of Greece and Italy. The same spirit runs through all these fables; it consists in a confused idea which men had, that the gods

formerly descended on earth.---
Voltaire.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—Some have doubted whether the science of God, theology, be in fact a science. All science, they say, supposes a observations. Now, what observations can be made on a Being that is invisible and incomprehensible? Theology therefore is no science. In fact, what do we understand by the word God? The unknown cause of order and motion. Now, what can we say of an unknown cause? If we attach our ideas to the word God, we shall fall, as Mr. Robinet has shown, into a thousand contradictions. No one doubts, say the Chinese Letters, that there is in nature a *ruling power, though he is ignorant what it is*: but when we conjecture the nature of this unknown power, *the creation of a God is then nothing more than the deification of human ignorance.* I do not entirely agree with these Letters, though I am forced to own with them, that theology, the science of God, or the Incomprehensible, is not a separate science. What is theology? I do not know.---*Helvetius.*

THINKING IS THE ACTION, not THE ESSENCE, OF THE SOUL.---That there are ideas, some or other, always present in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him; though the mind employs itself about them with several degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on the contemplation of some objects, that it turns their ideas on all sides, remarks their relations and circumstances, and views every part so nicely, and with such intention, that it shuts out all other

thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impression made then on the senses, which at another season would produce very sensible perceptions; at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them; and at other times, it lets them pass almost quite unregarded, as faint shadows that make no impression.

This difference of *intention* and *remission* of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experienced in himself. Trace it a little further, and you find the mind asleep, retired as it were from the senses, and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very vivid and sensible ideas. I need not seek for this instance in those who sleep out whole stormy nights without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the mind from the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of *thinking*, which we call *dreaming*: and last of all, sound sleep closes the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experienced in himself; and his own observation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would further conclude from hence, is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at several times, several degrees of thinking; and be, sometimes even in a waking man, so remiss as to have thoughts dim and

obscure to that degree that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last in the dark retirements of sound sleep loses the sight perfectly of all *ideas* whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience, I ask, whether it be not probable, that thinking is the action, and not the essence of the soul? Since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission; but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation.---*Locke*.

TIME, REFLECTIONS ON THE GOOD OLD.---From whence can proceed the frenzy of exalting the past ages at the expence of blackening the age in which we live?---Undoubtedly from self-love, which finds a double satisfaction in this conduct: first, from the comparison which we form between ourselves and the men whom we condemn; and, secondly, from that still more strikingly marked superiority, which assigns to us a knowledge of preceding times, whilst we appear in some measure to assimilate with them, by pronouncing their eulogy. We apply to antiquity those ideas which we have entertained of consanguinity. The eldest imagine themselves more nearly related to it by a degree; they lay claim to a share of its honours, and cry it up before the rising generation. We are but seldom jealous of the virtues of our ancestors: by knowing them, we suppose ourselves to be more enlightened; by praising them, we conceive that we are more wise. On the contrary, we are dazzled by the virtues of our own age, and seem afraid of facing them.---*Chattellur*.

TITHES IN ENGLAND, THE ORIGIN

OF---The Ecclesiastics, in the reign of Ethelwolf, the father of Alfred the Great, made very rapid advances in the acquisition of power and grandeur: and in those days of ignorance, inculcating the most absurd and most interesting doctrines, though they met sometimes, from the contrary interest of the laity, with an opposition which it required time and address to overcome, they found no obstacle in their reason and understanding. Not content with the donations of land made them by the Saxon princes and nobles, and with the temporary oblations from the devotion of the people, they had cast a wishful eye on a vast revenue, which they claimed as belonging to them by a divine, indefeasible, and inhererent title.---However little versed in the Scriptures, they had been able to discover, that the priests under the Jewish law possessed a tenth of all the produce of land; and, forgetting what they themselves taught, that the moral part only of that law was obligatory on Christians, they insisted, that this donation was a perpetual property conferred by heaven on those who officiated at the altar.---During some centuries, the whole scope of sermons and homilies was directed to this purpose; and one would have imagined, from the general tenor of these discourses, that all the practical parts of Christianity were comprehended in the exact and faithful payment of tithes to the Clergy.---Encouraged by their success in inculcating these doctrines, they ventured farther than they were warranted by the Levitical law, and pretended to draw the tenth of all industry, merchandize, wages of labourers, and pay of

soldiers; nay, some canonists went so far as to affirm, that the clergy were entitled to the tithe of the profits made by the courtézans in the exercise of their profession.---Though parishes had been instituted in England by Honorius Archbishop of Canterbury nearly two centuries before, the ecclesiastics had never been able to get possession of the tithes; and they therefore seized the favourable opportunity of making that acquisition, when a weak, superstitious prince was on the throne, and when the people, discouraged by their losses from the Danes, and terrified with the fear of future invasions, were susceptible of any impression which bore the appearance of religion.---*Hume.*

TOLERATION, THE UNIVERSAL SPIRIT OF, IN ANCIENT ROME.---The policy of the emperors and the senate of Rome, as far as it concerned religion, was happily seconded by the reflections of the enlightened, and by the habits of the superstitious part of their subjects. The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful: and thus toleration produced not only mutual indulgence, but even religious concord.---The superstition of the people was not embittered by any mixture of theological rancour, nor was it confined by the chains of any speculative system. The devout Polytheist, though fondly attached to his national rites, admitted with implicit faith the different religions of the earth. Fear, gratitude, and curiosity, a dream or an omen, a singular disorder, or

a distant journey, perpetually disposed him to multiply the articles of his belief, and to enlarge the list of his protectors. The thin texture of the Pagan mythology was interwoven with various but not discordant materials. As soon as it was allowed that sages and heroes, who had lived or who had died for the benefit of their country, were exalted to a state of power and immortality, it was universally confessed that they deserved, if not the adoration, at least the reverence of mankind. The deities of a thousand groves, and a thousand streams, possessed, in peace, their local and respective influence; nor could the Roman who deprecated the wrath of the Tiber, deride the Egyptian who presented his offering to the beneficent genius of the Nile. The visible powers of nature, the planets and the elements, were the same throughout the universe. The invisible governors of the moral world were inevitably cast in a similar mould of fiction and allegory. Every virtue, and even vice, acquired its divine representative; every art and profession its patron, whose attributes, in the most distant ages and countries, were uniformly derived from the character of their petular votaries. A republic of gods of such opposite tempers and interests required in every system, the moderating hand of a supreme magistrate; who, by the progress of knowledge and flattery, was gradually invested with the sublime perfections of an eternal parent and an omnipotent monarch. Such was the mild spirit of antiquity, that the nations were less attentive to the difference, than to the

resemblance, of their religious worship. The Greek, the Roman, and the Barbarian, as they met before their respective altars, easily persuaded themselves, that under various names, and with various ceremonies, they adored the same deities. The elegant mythology of Homer gave a beautiful, and almost a regular form, to the polytheism of the ancient world.

The philosophers of Greece deduced their morals from the nature of man, rather than from that of God. They meditated, however, on the divine nature as a very curious and important speculation; and in the profound inquiry, they displayed the strength and weakness of the human understanding. Of the four most celebrated schools, the Stoics and the Platonists endeavoured to reconcile the jarring interests of reason and piety. They have left us the most sublime proofs of the existence and perfections of the first Cause; but, as it was impossible for them to conceive the creation of matter, the workman in the Stoic philosophy was not sufficiently distinguished from the work; whilst, on the contrary, the spiritual God of Plato and his disciples resembled an idea rather than a substance. The opinions of the Academics and Epicureans were of a less religious cast; but whilst the modest science of the former induced them to doubt, the positive ignorance of the latter urged them to deny, the Providence of a Supreme Ruler. The spirit of inquiry, prompted by emulation, and supported by freedom, had divided the public teachers of philosophy into a variety of contending sects; but the ingenuous youth, who, from every part, resorted to Athens

and the other seats of learning in the Roman empire, were alike instructed in every school to reject and despise the religion of the multitude. How, indeed, was it possible, that a philosopher should accept, as divine truths, the idle tales of the poets, and the incoherent traditions of antiquity; or that he should adore as gods those imperfect beings whom he must have despised as men! Against such unworthy adversaries Cicero condescended to employ the arms of reason and eloquence; but the satire of Lucian was a much more adequate, as well as efficacious weapon. We may be well assured, that a writer conversant with the world, would never have ventured to expose the gods of his country to public ridicule, had they not already been the objects of secret contempt among the polished and enlightened orders of society.

Notwithstanding the fashionable irreligion which prevailed in the age of the Antonines, both the interest of the priests, and the credulity of the people, were sufficiently respected. In their writings and conversation, the philosophers of antiquity asserted the independent dignity of reason; but they resigned their actions to the commands of law and of custom. Viewing with a smile of pity and indulgence the various errors of the vulgar, they diligently practised the ceremonies of their fathers; devoutly frequented the temples of the gods; and sometimes, condescending to get a part on the theatre of superstition, they concealed the sentiments of an Atheist under the sacerdotal robes. Reasoners of such a temper were scarcely inclined to wrangle about their respective modes of faith and

worship. It was indifferent to them what shape the folly of the multitude might choose to assume; and they approached, with the same inward contempt, and the same external reverence, the altars of the Libyan, the Olympian, or the Capitoline Jupiter. It is not easy to conceive from what motives a spirit of persecution could introduce itself into the Roman counsels. The magistrate could not be actuated by a blind, though honest bigotry, since the magistrates were philosophers, and the schools of Athens had given laws to the senate. They could not be impelled by ambition or avarice, as the temporal and ecclesiastical powers were united in the same hands. The pontiffs were chosen among the most illustrious of the senators; and the office of supreme pontiff was constantly exercised by the emperors themselves. They knew and valued the advantages of religion as it is connected with civil government. They encouraged the public festivals, which humanize the manners of the people. They managed the arts of divination as a convenient instrument of policy; and they respected, as the firmest bond of society, the useful persuasion, that either in this or in a future life, the crime of perjury is most assuredly punished by the avenging gods. But whilst they acknowledged the general advantages of religion, they were convinced, that the various modes of worship contributed alike to the same salutary purposes; and that in every country, the form of superstition which had received the sanction of time and experience, was the best adapted to the climate and to its inhabitants. Avarice and taste very frequently despoiled the

vanquished nations of the elegant statues of their gods, and the rich ornaments of their temples: but in the exercise of the religion which they derived from their ancestors, they uniformly experienced the indulgence, and even protection, of the Roman conquerors. The province of Gaul seems, and indeed only seems, an exception to this universal toleration. Under the specious pretext of abolishing human sacrifices, the emperors Tiberius and Claudius suppressed the dangerous power of the Druids: but the priests themselves, their gods, and their altars, subsisted in peaceful obscurity till the final destruction of Paganism. Rome, the capital of a great monarchy, was incessantly filled with strangers and subjects from every part of the world, who all introduced and enjoyed the favourite superstitions of their native country. Every city in the empire was justified in maintaining the purity of its ancient ceremonies; and the Roman senate, using the common privilege, sometimes interposed to check this inundation of foreign rites. The Egyptian superstition, of all the most contemptible and abject, was frequently prohibited; the temples of Serapis and Isis demolished, and their worshippers banished from Rome and Italy. But the zeal of fanaticism prevailed over the cold and feeble efforts of policy. The exiles returned, the proselytes multiplied, the temples were restored with increasing splendour, and Isis and Serapis assumed their place among the Roman deities. Nor was this indulgence a departure from the usual maxims of government. In the purest ages of the commonwealth, Cybele and Æsculapius had been invited by

solemn embassies; and it was customary to tempt the protectors of besieged cities, by promise of more distinguished honours than they possessed in their native country. Rome gradually became the common temple of her subjects; and the freedom of the city was bestowed on all the gods of mankind.
—Gibbon.

TOLERATION, REASONS FOR AND AGAINST.—The practice of persecution is the scandal of all religion; and the theological animosity, so fierce and violent, far from being an argument of men's conviction in their opposite tenets, is a certain proof of the contrary; and they have never reached any serious persuasion with regard to these remote and sublime subjects. Even those who are the most impatient of contradiction in other controversies, are mild and moderate in comparison of polemical divines; and wherever a man's knowledge and experience give him a perfect assurance of his own opinion, he regards with contempt, rather than anger, the opposition and mistakes of others. But while men zealously maintain what they neither clearly comprehend, nor entirely believe, they are shaken in their imagined faith by the opposite persuasion or even doubts of other men; and vent on their antagonists that impatience which is the natural result of so disagreeable a state of the understanding. They then embrace easily any pretence for representing opponents as impious and profane; and if they can also find a colour for connecting this violence with the interests of civil government, they can no longer be restrained from giving uncontrolled scope to vengeance and resentment.

But surely never enterprise was more unfortunate than that of founding persecution on policy, or endeavouring, for the sake of peace, to settle an entire uniformity of opinion, in questions which, of all others, are least subjected to the criterion of human reason. The universal and uncontradicted prevalence of one opinion in religious subjects, can only be owing at first to the stupid ignorance and barbarism of the people, who never indulge themselves in any speculation and inquiry; and there is no other expedient for maintaining that uniformity, so fondly sought after, but by banishing for ever all curiosity and all improvement in science and cultivation. It may not appear, indeed, difficult to check, by a steady severity, the first beginnings of controversy; but besides that this policy exposes for ever the people to all the abject terrors of superstition, and the magistrate to the endless encroachments of ecclesiastics, it also renders men so delicate, that they can never endure to hear of opposition; and they will sometimes pay dearly for that false tranquillity in which they have been so long indulged.--As healthful bodies are ruined by too nice a regimen, and are thereby rendered incapable of bearing the unavoidable incidents of human life, a people who never were allowed to imagine that their principles could be contested, fly out into the most outrageous violence, when any event (and such events are common) produces a faction among their clergy, and gives rise to any difference in tenet or opinion. But whatever may be said in favour of suppressing, by persecution, the first beginnings of heresy, no solid

argument can be alleged for extending severity towards multitudes, or endeavouring, by capital punishments, to extirpate an opinion which has diffused itself through men of every rank and station. Besides the extreme barbarity of such an attempt, it proves commonly ineffectual to the purpose intended; and serves only to make men more obstinate in their persuasion, and to increase the number of their proselytes. The melancholy with which the fear of death, torture, and persecution inspires the sectaries, is the proper disposition for fostering religious zeal; the prospect of eternal rewards, when brought near, overpowers the dread of eternal punishments: the glory of martyrdom stimulates all the more furious zealots, especially the leaders and preachers; where a violent animosity is excited by oppression, men pass naturally from hating the persons of their tyrants, to a more violent abhorrence of their doctrines; and the spectators, moved with pity towards these supposed martyrs, are naturally seduced to embrace those principles which can inspire men with a constancy that appears almost supernatural. Open the door to toleration, the mutual hatred relaxes among the sectaries; their attachment to their particular religion decays; the common occupations and pleasures of life succeed to the acrimony of disputation; and the same man, who in other circumstances would have braved flames and tortures, is engaged to change his religion from the smallest prospect of favour and advancement, or even the frivolous hopes of becoming more fashionable in his principles. If any exception can

be admitted to this maxim of toleration; it will only be where a theology altogether new, nowise connected with the ancient religion of the state, is imported from foreign countries, and may easily, at one blow, be eradicated without leaving the seeds of future innovations. But as this instance would involve some apology for the ancient Pagan persecutions, or for the extirpation of Christianity in China and Japan; it ought surely, on account of this detested consequence, to be rather buried in eternal silence and oblivion, especially as no human depravity can equal revenge and cruelty covered with the mantle of religion.

Though these arguments appear entirely satisfactory, yet such is the subtilty of human wit, that the enemies to toleration are not reduced to silence; and they still find topics on which to maintain the controversy. The doctrine, say they, of liberty of conscience, is founded on the most flagrant impiety, and supposes such an indifference among all religions, such an obscurity in theological doctrines, as to render the church and magistrate incapable of distinguishing, with certainty, the dictates of Heaven from the mere fictions of human imagination. If the Divinity reveals principles to mankind, he will surely give a criterion by which they may be ascertained; and a prince, who knowingly allows these principles to be perverted or adulterated, is infinitely more criminal than if he gave permission for the vending of poison, under the shape of food, to all his subjects. Persecution may, indeed, seem better calculated to make hypocrites than converts; but experience teaches us, that the habits of

hypocrisy often turn into reality; and the children, at least, ignorant of the dissimulation of their parents, may happily be educated in more orthodox tenets. It is absurd, in opposition to considerations of such unspeakable importance, to plead the temporal and frivolous interests of civil society; and if matters be thoroughly examined, even that topic will not appear so universally certain in favour of toleration as by some it is represented. Where sects arise, whose fundamental principle on all sides is to execrate, and abhor, and damn, and extirpate each other, what choice has the magistrate left but to take part, and by rendering one sect entirely prevalent, restore, at least for a time, the public tranquillity? The political body, being here sickly, must not be treated as if it were in a state of sound health; and an affected neutrality in the prince, or even a cool preference, may serve only to encourage the hopes of all the sects, and keep alive their animosity. The Protestants, far from tolerating the religion of their ancestors, regard it as an impious and detestable idolatry; and during the late minority, when they were entirely masters, they enacted very severe, though not capital, punishments against all exercise of the Catholic worship, and even against such as barely abstained from their profane rites and sacraments. Nor are instances wanting of their endeavours to secure an imagined orthodoxy by the most rigorous executions: Calvin has burned Servetus at Geneva; Cranmer brought Arians and Anabaptists to the stake: and if persecution of any kind be admitted, the most bloody and violent

will surely be allowed the most justifiable, as the most effectual.---Imprisonments, fines, confiscations, whippings, serve only to irritate the sects, without disabling them from resistance: but the stake, the wheel, and the gibbet, must soon terminate in the extirpation or banishment of all the heretics inclined to give disturbance, and in the entire silence and submission of the rest.---*Hume.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---A hierarchy, moderate in its acquisitions of power and riches, may safely grant a toleration to sectaries; and the more it abates the fervour of innovators by lenity and liberty, the more securely will it possess those advantages which the legal establishments bestow upon it. But where superstition has raised a church to such an exorbitant height as that of Rome, persecution is less the result of bigotry in the priests than of a necessary policy; and the rigour of law is the only method of repelling the attacks of men, who, besides religious zeal, have so many other motives, derived both from public and private interest, to engage them on the side of innovation. But though such overgrown hierarchies may long support themselves by these violent expedients, the time comes, when severities tend only to enrage the new sectaries, and make them break through all bounds of reason and moderation. This is the necessary progress of human affairs, and the operation of those principles which are inherent in human nature.---*Hume.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---If we look back into history for the character of the present sects of Christianity, we shall find few that have not in

their turns been persecutors and complainers of persecution. The primitive Christians thought persecution extremely wrong in the Pagans, but practised it on one another. The first Protestants of the church of England blamed persecution in the Romish church, but practised it against the Puritans: these found it wrong in the bishops, but fell into the same practice both at home and in New England. To account for this, we should remember that the doctrine of toleration was not then known, or had not prevailed in the world. Persecution was not therefore so much the fault of the sect as of the times. It was not in those days deemed wrong in itself. The general opinion was only, that those who are in an error ought not to persecute the truth: but the possessors of truth were in the right to persecute error, in order to destroy it. Thus every sect, believing itself possessed of all truth, and that every tenet differing from their's was error, conceived, that when the power was in their hands, persecution was a duty required of them by that God whom they supposed to be offended by heresy. By degrees, more moderate and more modest sentiments have taken place in the Christian world; and among Protestants, particularly, all disclaim persecution, none vindicate it, and few practise it. Toleration in religion, though obvious to common understanding, was not, however, the production of reason, but of commerce. The advantage of toleration for promoting commerce was discovered long before by the Portuguese. They were too zealous Catholics to venture so bold a measure in Portugal, but it

was permitted in Goa; and the inquisition in that town was confined to Roman Catholics.---*Franklin.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---Where shall we find the rule to measure the merit of any particular religion?---Unless we could give all men the same constitutions of body and mind; the same educations, tempers, and talents, we shall in vain expect any general agreement on this subject. Since, then, this diversity of judgment is a circumstance in the nature of things unavoidable, it seems to be alike repugnant to Christianity and common sense, to load any man with obloquy and invective, who happens to differ from us in opinion upon that subject. God, who alone knows the hearts of men, and the extent of their abilities, can estimate the strength of the intellectual faculties, and the force of the natural propensities of each individual; and he alone is the only judge how far any person is in a wilful error. But it is unquestionably the duty and interest of mankind, instead of polluting their principles, and provoking their opponents, by calumnies and reproaches; instead of fancying their tenets alone are accompanied with moral rectitude and wisdom, to distrust their own opinions, to be ready to hear those of others with good temper, and a liberal disposition; to abate in non-essentials a little of their firmness; to make mutual concessions, and thereby to preserve inviolate the peace of civil society, and the bond of Christian charity unbroken.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.---It is universally true, that where the magistrate has the greatest pretence for interfering in religious and moral princi-

ples, his interference (supposing there was no impropriety in it) is the least necessary. If the opinions and principles in question be evidently subversive of all religion and society, they must be evidently false and easy to refute; so that there can be no danger of their spreading, and the patrons of them may safely be suffered to maintain them in the most open manner they choose. The religious and moral principles, perhaps the most destructive to society, are, that there is no God; and, that there is no faith to be kept with heretics. But surely these principles are too absurd to be formidable and alarming; they can have no terrors, but what an ill-judged opposition may give them. Persecution may procure friends to any cause, and perhaps to this; but hardly any thing else can do it. It is a fact, that there are more Atheists and Infidels of all kinds in Roman Catholic states, where religion is so well guarded, than in England. If ever arbitrary power should gain ground in England, it will be by means of the seeming necessity of having recourse to illegal methods in order to come at opinions, or persons, generally obnoxious: but when these illegal practices have once been authorised, and have passed into precedents, all persons, and all opinions, will lie at the mercy of the minister, who will animadvert upon whatever gives him umbrage. This is the method in which despotism has generally been introduced, and is well known to have been the method used by the thirty tyrants at Athens. They first cut off persons the most generally obnoxious, and such as the laws could not reach; and that intelligent

people were not aware, that the very same methods might be employed to take off the worthiest men in the city. Such is the connection and gradation of opinions, that if once we admit there are some which ought to be guarded by civil penalties, it will ever be impossible to distinguish, to general satisfaction, between those which may be tolerated, and those which may not: but a happy circumstance it is for human society, that in religion and morals, there is no necessity to distinguish them at all; the more important will guard themselves by their own evidence, and the less important do not deserve to be guarded. In all modes of religion which subsist among mankind, however subversive of virtue they may be in theory, there is some salvo for good morals; so that, in fact, they enforce the more essential parts, at least, of that conduct which the good order of society requires. When, under pretence of conscience, men disturb the peace of society, and are guilty of a breach of the laws, they ought to be restrained by the civil magistrate. If a man commit murder, let him be punished as a murderer, and let no regard be paid to the plea of conscience for committing the act; but let not the opinion which led to the act be meddled with.--*Priestley*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.--Governments are the judges of actions and not of opinions. If faith be a gift of Heaven, they who have it not, deserve to be pitied; not punished. It is the excess of inhumanity to persecute an unfortunate person. If I advance a gross error, I am punished by ridicule and contempt; but if in conse-

quence of an erroneous opinion I attempt to violate the liberty of other people, it is then I become criminal. If, being a devout adorer of Venus, I burn the temple of Serapis, the magistrate ought to punish me; not as a heretic, but as a disturber of the public peace; as a man unjust, who being in the free exercise of my own worship, would deprive my fellow-citizens of the liberty I enjoy myself.--Wherever several religions and several sects are tolerated, they become insensibly habituated to each other; their zeal loses every day something of its acrimony. Where a full toleration is established there are few fanatics
--*Helvétius*.

TOLERATION NOT A PRIESTLY VIRTUE.

--The long schism which had divided the Latin church for nearly forty years, was finally terminated by the council of Constance; which deposed the pope, John XXIII. for his crimes, and elected Martin V. in his place, who was acknowledged by almost all the kingdoms of Europe. This great and unusual act of authority in the council, gave the Roman pontiffs ever after a mortal antipathy to those assemblies. The same jealousy which had long prevailed in most European countries, between the civil aristocracy and monarchy, now also took place between these powers in the ecclesiastical body. But the great separation of the bishops in the several states, and the difficulty of assembling them, gave the pope a mighty advantage; and made it more easy for him to centre all the powers of the hierarchy in his own person. The cruelty and treachery which attended the punishment of John Huss and Jerome of Prague, the unhappy disciples of

Wickliffe, who, in violation of a safe-conduct, were burned alive for their errors by the council of Constance, prove this melancholy truth, that toleration is none of the virtues of priests in any form of ecclesiastical government.—*Hume*.

TOLERATION, THE CHIEF CAUSES AND ORIGIN OF.—In all former ages, not wholly excepting even those of Greece and Rome, religious sects, and heresies and schisms had been esteemed dangerous, if not pernicious, to civil government, and was regarded as the source of faction, and private combination, and opposition to the laws. The magistrate therefore applied himself directly to the cure of this evil, as of every other; and very naturally attempted, by penal statutes, to suppress those separate communities, and punish the obstinate innovators. But it was found by fatal experience, and after spilling an ocean of blood in those theological quarrels, that the evil was of a peculiar nature, and was both inflamed by violent remedies, and diffused itself more rapidly throughout the whole society. Hence, though late, arose the paradoxical principle and salutary practice of toleration.

The liberty of the press was incompatible with such maxims and such principles of government as then prevailed; and was therefore quite unknown in that age. Besides employing the two terrible courts of star-chamber and high commission, whose powers were unlimited, Queen Elizabeth exerted her authority by restraints upon the press. She passed a decree in her court of star-chamber, that is, by her own will and pleasure, forbidding any book to be printed in any place but in London,

Oxford and Cambridge: and another, in which she prohibited, under severe penalties, the publishing of any book or pamphlet “against the form or meaning of any restraint or ordinance, contained, or to be contained, in any statute or laws of this realm, or any injunction made or set forth by her Majesty or her privy council, or against the true sense or meaning of any letters patent, commissions, or prohibitions under the great seal of England.” James extended the same penalties to the importing of such books from abroad. And to render these edicts more effectual, he afterwards inhibited the printing of any book without a licence from the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Archbishop of York, the Bishop of London, or the Vice-chancellor of one of the universities, or of some person appointed by them.

In tracing the coherence among the systems of modern theology, we may observe, that the doctrine of absolute degrees has ever been intimately connected with the enthusiastic spirit; as that doctrine affords the highest subject of joy, triumph, and security, to the supposed elect, and exalts them, by infinite degrees, above the rest of mankind. All the first reformers adopted these principles; and the Jansenists too, a fanatical sect in France, not to mention the Mahometans in Asia, have ever embraced them. As the Lutheran establishments were subjected to episcopal jurisdiction, their enthusiastic genius gradually decayed, and men had leisure to perceive the absurdity of supposing God to punish, by infinite torments what he himself from all eternity had unchangeably decreed. The king, though at this time his Calvinistic education

had rivetted him in the doctrine of absolute decrees; yet, being a zealous partisan of episcopacy, was insensibly engaged, towards the end of his reign, to favour the milder theology of Arminius. Even in so great a doctor, the genius of the religion prevailed over its speculative tenets; and with the whole clergy gradually dropped the more rigid principles of absolute reprobation and unconditional decrees. Some noise was at first made about these innovations; but being drowned in the fury of factions and civil wars which ensued, the scholastic arguments made an insignificant figure amidst those violent disputes about civil and ecclesiastical power, with which the nation was agitated. And at the restoration, the church, though she still retained her old subscriptions and articles of faith, was found to have totally changed her speculative doctrines, and to have embraced tenets more suitable to the genius of her discipline and worship, without its being possible to assign the precise period in which the alteration was produced.—*Hume*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—Martyrs are productive of proselytes. The execution of a person of that character made more Protestants than Calvin's Institutes. The sixth part of France were Calvinists under Francis II.; as one third of Germany, at least, were Lutherans under Charles V.

There remained only one right way to act; which was, to imitate the example of Charles V. who, after a series of wars, concluded at length with granting

liberty of conscience; and that of Queen Elizabeth, who maintained the established religion, but allowed every body to worship God their own way, provided they behaved as peaceable subjects.

This is the maxim now observed in all those countries heretofore ravaged by religious wars, after having been convinced by repeated, though too fatal experiments, of the rectitude of this measure.

But, before this measure can be pursued, the laws must be in force, and the fury of parties must begin to subside. France was nothing but one continual scene of sanguinary factions from the reign of Francis I. to the happy days of Henry the Great. In those licentious times the laws were trampled upon: and even when the civil wars were at an end, fanaticism survived, and assassinated this monarch, in the bosom of peace, by the hand of a madman, a visionary let loose from a cloister.—*Voltaire*.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—What is toleration? It is a privilege to which human nature is entitled: we are all made up of weakness and errors; it therefore behoves us mutually to forgive one another's follies. This is the very first law of Nature.

Though the Guebre, the Banian, the Jew, the Mahometan, the lettered Chinese, the Greek, the Roman Catholic, the Quaker, traffic together on the Exchange of Amsterdam, London, Surat, or Bassora, the will never offer to lift up a poinard against each other to gain pro-

selytes; wherefore, then, since the first council of Nice, have we been almost continually cutting each other's throats?

Constantine began with issuing an edict allowing the exercise of all religions, and some time after turned persecutor. Before him, all the severe treatment of the Christians proceeded purely from their beginning to make a party in the state. The Romans permitted every kind of worship, even the Jews and Egyptians, both which they so very much despised. How then came Rome to tolerate these forms? It was because neither the Egyptians nor the Jews themselves went about to exterminate the ancient religion of the empire; they did not cross seas and lands to make proselytes; the getting of money was all they minded: whereas, it is indisputable, that the Christians could not be easy unless their religion bore the sway. The Jews were disgusted at the statue of Jupiter being set up at Jerusalem; but the Christians would not so much as allow it to be in the capitol of Rome. St. Thomas candidly owns, that it was only for want of power that the Christians did not dethrone the emperors: they held that all the world ought to embrace their religion; this of course made them enemies to all the world till its happy conversion.

Their controversial points likewise set them at enmity one against another concerning the divinity of Christ: they who denied it, were anathematised as Ebionites; and these ana-

thematised the worshippers of Jesus.

If some would have all goods to be in common, as they alleged was the custom in the Apostles' time, their adversaries call them Nicolaitans, and accuse them of the most horrid crimes. If others set up for a mystical devotion, they are branded with the appellation of Gnostics, and opposed with extreme vehemence and severity. Marcion, for disputing on the Trinity, got the name of an idolator.

Tertullian, Praxeas, Origen, Novatus, Novatianus, Sabellus, and Donatus, were all persecuted by their brethren before Constantine's time; and no sooner had Constantine established the Christian religion, than the Athanasians and Eusebians fell foul of one another; and ever since, down to our own times, the christian church has been deluged with blood.

The jewish people were I own, extremely barbarous and merciless, massacring all the inhabitants of a little wretched country, to which they had no more right than their vile descendants have to Paris or London. However, when Naaman is cured of his leprosy by dipping seven times in the river Jordan, and by way of expressing his gratitude to Elisha, from whom he had the secret of that easy cure, he tells him that he will worship the God of the Jews, he yet reserves to himself the liberty to worship his sovereign's god likewise; and asks Elisha's leave, which the prophet readily grants. The Jews worship-

ped their God; but never were offended at, or so much as thought it strange, that every nation had its own deity. They acquiesced in Chamoth's giving a track of land to the Moabites, provided they would let them quietly enjoy what they held from their God. Jacob made no difficulty of marrying an idolator's daughter; for Laban had another kind of god than he whom Jacob worshipped.—These are instances of toleration among the most haughty, most obstinate, and most cruel people of all antiquity; and we, overlooking what little indulgence was among them, have imitated only their sanguinary rancour.

Every individual persecuting another for not being of his opinion is a monster; this is evident beyond all dispute: but the government! men in power, princes! how are they to deal with those of a different worship from theirs? If foreigners and powerful, it is certain princes will not disdain entering into an alliance with them. Francis I. though his Most Christian majesty, unites with the Mussulmen against Charles V. likewise a Most Christian monarch. Francis supplies the German Lutherans with money to support their revolt against the Emperor; but according to custom, burns them in his own country. Thus from policy he pays them in Saxony; and from policy makes bonfires of them at Paris. But what was the consequence; Persecution ever makes proselytes. France came to swarm with new Protestants; who at first quietly sub-

mitted to be hanged, and afterwards hung others: civil wars came on; and St. Bartholomew's day, or the Massacre of Paris, crowned all. Thus this corner of the world became worse than all that ever the ancients or moderns have said of hell.

Ye fools! never to pay a proper worship to the God who made you! wretches, on whom the example of the Noachidæ, the lettered Chinese, the Persees, and all wise men, have had no influence! monsters! to whom superstitions are as necessary as carrion to crows! You have been already told it, and I have nothing else to tell you; whilst you have but two religions among you, they will be ever at dagger's drawing; if you have thirty, they will live quietly. Turn your eyes to the Grand Seignior; he has among his subjects Guebres, Banians, Greeks, Latins, Christians, and Nestorians. Whoever goes about to raise any disturbance is surely impaled; and thus all live in peace and quietness.—*Voltaire.*

TRADITION.—It is a rule observed in the law of England, that though the attested copy of a record be good proof, yet the copy of a copy ever so well attested, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judicature. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the

decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, *viz.* that any testimony, the farther off it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has. The being and existence of the thing itself is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it, is a good proof: but if another equally credible do witness it from his report, the testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay, is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof: and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. This I thought necessary to be taken notice of, because I find amongst some men the quite contrary commonly practised, who look on opinions to gain force by growing older; and what a thousand years since would not, to a rational man, contemporary with the first voucher, have appeared at all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said it one after another. Upon this ground, propositions, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning, come by an inverted rule of probability to pass for authentic truths; and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors, are thought to grow venerable by age, and are urged as undeniable.

I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of

history: it is all the light we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have, with a convincing evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But this truth itself forces me to say, that no probability can arise higher than its first original. What has no no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness, must stand or fall by his only testimony, whether good, bad, or indifferent; and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, interest, inadvertency, mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd reasons or caprices that men's minds are acted by (impossible to be discovered), may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong. He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers, cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve where the originals are wanting; and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on. This is certain, that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated. But the further still it is from the original, the less valid it is; and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it, than in his from whom he received it. —Locke.

TYRANNY.—By a tyrant, is meant a sovereign who makes his humour the law; who seizes on his subject's substance, and afterwards inlists them to go and give his neighbours the like treatment. These tyrants are not known in Europe.

Tyranny is distinguished into that of one person and of many; a body invading the rights of other bodies, and corrupting the laws that it may exercise a despotism apparently legal, is the latter tyranny; but Europe likewise has none of these tyrants.

Under which tyranny would you choose to live? Under none; but had I the option, the tyranny of one person appears to me less odious and dreadful than that of many. A despot has always some intervals of good humour; which is never known in an assembly of despots. If a tyrant has done me an injury, there is his mistress, his confessor, or his page, by means of whom I may appease him, and obtain redress; but a set of supercilious tyrants is inaccessible to all applications. If they are not unjust, still they are austere and harsh; and no favours are ever known to come from them.

Under one despot, I need only stand up against a wall when I see him coming by; or prostrate myself, or knock my forehead against the ground, according to the custom of the country: but under a body of perhaps a hundred despots, I may be obliged to repeat this ceremony a hundred times a-day; which is not a little troublesome to

those who are not very nimble. Another disagreeable circumstance is, if my farm happens to be in the neighbourhood of one of our great Lords, it is unknown what damages I am obliged to put up with: and if I have a law-suit with a relation of one of their High-mightinesses, it will infallibly go against me. I am very much afraid, that in this world things will come to such a pass, as to have no other option than being either hammer or anvil. Happy he who gets clear of this alternative.—*Voltaire.*

VICIOUS, NO ACTION, UNLESS INJURIOUS TO SOCIETY.—An action not mischievous to any body, neither actually nor probably, directly nor consequentially is no sin. To talk of an action mischievous to God, is impiety and nonsense. An action mischievous to a *man's self* alone is no *sin*, but a piece of folly; and all that is to be said of it is, he must bear the consequences. An action mischievous to *others* is indeed a sin, and as such it must continue: all pretences of making it as if it had never been, are as vain as they are pernicious; it must go to the bad side of a man's character, and there remain: there is but one way of making up for it, which is, to do another as profitable to society as that is mischievous.

The whole affair of atonements is, as Bishop Warburton, after Plutarch, calls it, a foolish business, the dependence of the superstitious. The Almighty, according to Lord Kames, who deems it "the most important

of all truths," admits of no composition for sin. A notion, says he, prevailed in the darker ages of the world, of a substitute in punishment, who undertakes the debt, and suffers the punishment that another merits.—Traces of this opinion are found in the religious ceremonies of the ancient Egyptians, and other heathen nations. Among them the conceptions of a Deity were gross, and those of morality not less so.

VIRTUE.—What is virtue? Doing good to others. How can I give the name of virtue to any one but to him who does me good? I am in want, you relieve me; I am in danger, you come to my assistance; I have been deceived, you tell me the truth; I am ill used, you comfort me; I am ignorant, you instruct me: I must say, then, you are virtuous. But what will become of the cardinal and theological virtues? Let them ever remain in the schools.

What is your temperance to me? It is no more than an observance of a rule of health: you will be the better for it; and much good may it do you. If you have faith and hope, better still: they will procure you eternal life. Your theological virtues are heavenly gifts; and those you call *cardinal*, are excellent qualities for your guidance in life; but relatively to your neighbour, they are no virtues. The prudent man does good to himself; the virtuous to men in general. Very well was it said by St. Paul, that charity is better than faith and hope.

But how! are no virtues to be admitted but those by which others are benefited? No indeed. We live in a society; consequently there is nothing truly good to us, but what is for the good of such society. If a hermit is sober and devout, and, among other mortifications, wears a sackcloth shirt; such a one I set down as a saint: But before I shall style him *virtuous*, let him do some act of virtue which will promote the well-being of his fellow creatures.—Whilst he lives by himself, to us he is neither good nor bad; he is nothing. If St. Bruno reconciled families, and relieved the indigent, he was virtuous; if he prayed and fasted in the desert, he was a saint. Among men virtue is a mutual exchange of kindnesses; and whoever decline such exchanges ought not to be reckoned a member of society. Were that saint to live in the world, probably he would do good in it; but whilst he keeps out of it, the world will only do his saintship justice in not allowing him to be virtuous. He may be good to himself but not to us.

But, say you, if a hermit be given to drunkenness, sensuality, and private debauchery, he is a vicious man; consequently, with the opposite qualities, he is virtuous. That is what I cannot come into. If he has those faults he is a very filthy man; but with regard to society, as it is not hurt by his infamies, he is not vicious, wicked, or deserving of punishment. It is to be presumed, that were he to return into society, he would do much harm,

and prove a very bad man. Of this there is a greater probability, than that the temperate and chaste hermit will be a good man; for in public life faults increase, and good qualities diminish.

A much stronger objection is, that Nero, Pope Alexander VI. and other such monsters, did some good things. I take upon me to answer, that when they did so they were virtuous.

Some divines, so far from allowing that excellent emperor Antoninus to have been a good man, represent him as a conceited Stoic, who, besides ruling over men, coveted their esteem, that in all the good he did to mankind, his own reputation was the end; that his justice, application, and benevolence, proceeded purely from vanity; and that his virtues were a downright imposition on the world. At this I cannot forbear crying out, Oh! my God, be pleased, in thy goodness, often to give us such hypocrites.—*Voltaire.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—Virtue consists in the knowledge of what men owe to each other; and consequently supposes the formation of societies. Before this formation, what good or evil could be done to a society not yet existing? A man of the woods, a man naked and without language, might easily acquire a clear idea of strength and weakness, but not of justice and equity.—A man born in a desert island, and abandoned to himself, would live there without vice or virtue. He could not

exercise either of them. What, then, are we to understand by the words *virtuous* and *vicious*? Actions useful or detrimental to society.

Virtue is nothing more than the desire of public happiness. The general welfare is the object of virtue; and the actions it enjoins, are the means it employs to accomplish that object. The idea of virtue must, therefore, be every where the same.—If in various ages and countries men appear to have formed different ideas of virtue; if philosophers have, in consequence, treated the idea of virtue as arbitrary, it is because they have taken for virtue itself the several means it makes use of to accomplish its object: that is to say, the several actions it enjoins. These actions have certainly been sometimes very different, because the interest of nations change; and, lastly, because the public good may, to a certain degree, be promoted by different means.—The word *virtue* frequently excites in the mind very different ideas, according to our state and situation, the society in which we live, and the age and country in which we were born. If a younger brother, according to the custom of Normandy, should avail himself, like Jacob, of the hunger or thirst of the elder, to divest him of his primogeniture, he would be declared a cheat by all the tribunals. If a man, the example of David, should cause the husband of his mistress to be sacrificed, he would be reckoned, not among the number of the virtuous, but of villains. It would

be to little purpose to say he made a good end; assassins sometimes do the same, but are never proposed as models of virtue.—The entrance of foreign merchandise, permitted to-day in Germany, as advantageous to its commerce, and conformable to the good of the state, may be to-morrow forbid. To-morrow the purchaser may be declared criminal, if by some circumstances that purchase become prejudicial to the national interest. The same actions may, therefore, become successively useful and prejudicial to a nation, and merit by turns the name of *virtuous* and *vicious*, without the idea of virtue suffering any change, or ceasing to be the same.—*Helvetius*.

VIRTUOUS MAN.—The virtuous man is not he who sacrifices his pleasures, habits, and strongest passions, to the public welfare; since it is impossible that such a man should exist. He, who to be virtuous must always conquer his inclinations, must necessarily be a wicked man. The meritorious virtues are never certain and infallible virtues. In the Haram, it is not to the meritorious virtues, but to impotency, that the Grand Seignior instructs his women. It is impossible, in practice, for a man to deliver himself up, in a manner, daily to a war with the passions, without losing many battles. The virtuous man is he whose strongest passions is so conformable to the general interest, that he is almost constantly necessitated to be virtuous. For this reason, he approaches nearer to perfection, and has a greater claim to the name of being a virtuous man,

who requires stronger motives of pleasure, and a more powerful interest, in order to determine him to do a bad action, than are necessary to his performing a good one; and consequently supposes that he has a greater passion for virtue than for vice.

Cæsar was, without doubt, not the most virtuous among the Romans; yet if he would not renounce the title of a good citizen, without taking that of the master of the world, we have not a right to banish him from the class of virtuous men. In fact, among the virtuous, who really deserve that title, how few are there who, if placed in the same circumstances as Cæsar was, would refuse the sceptre of the world; especially if, like Cæsar, they thought they had those superior talents that secure the success of great enterprises? Less abilities would, perhaps, render them better citizens; and a moderate degree of virtue, supported by a greater anxiety for the success, would be sufficient to deter them from engaging in so bold a project. Indeed, sometimes a want of talents preserves us from vice; and frequently to the same defect we owe all our virtues.

We are, on the contrary, less virtuous as less powerful motives lead us to the commission of a crime. Such, for instance, is that of some of the Emperors of Morocco, who, solely from the motive of making a parade of their dexterity, would with one blow of a sabre, in mounting a horse, cut off the head of the groom who held the stirrup.—*Helvetius*.

VIRTUES, FALSITY OF HUMAN—

WHEN the Duke de Rochefoucault had published his *Thoughts on Self-Love*, one M. Esprit, of the Oratory, wrote a captious book, entitled the *Falsity of Human Virtues*. This genius says there is no such thing as virtue; but at the close of every chapter, kindly refers his readers to christian charity: So that, according to M. Esprit, neither Cato, nor Aristides, nor Marcus Aurelius, nor Epictetus, were good men; and a good reason why, these are only found among christians. Again, among christians, the catholics are the only virtuous; and among the catholics the Jesuits, enemies to the Oratorians, should have been excepted: therefore there is scarce any virtue on earth but among the enemies of the Jesuits.

This *Sieur Esprit* sets out with saying, That prudence is not a virtue; and his reason is, because it is often mistaken: which is as much as to say, Cæsar was nothing of a soldier, because he had the worst of it at Dyrrachium.

Had this reverend gentleman been a philosopher, he would not have treated of prudence as a virtue, but as a talent, a happy and useful quality; for a villain may be very prudent, and I have known such. The madness of pretending that virtue is the portion only of us and our partisans!

What is virtue, my friend? It is doing good. Do me some, and that is enough: as for your motive, that you may keep to

yourself. How! According to you, there is no difference between the president de Thou and Ravallac; between Cicero and that wretch Popilius, whose life he had saved, and who yet hired himself to cut off his head. You will pronounce Epictetus and Porphyry to be rascals, because they did not hold with our doctrines. Such insolence is quite shocking; but I have done, lest I grow warm.—*Voltaire*.

UNION OF BODY POLITIC.—Union, in a body-politic, is a very equivocal term: true union is such a harmony, as makes all the particular parts, as opposite as they may seem to us, concur to the general welfare of the society, in the same manner as discords in music contribute to the general melody of sound. Union may prevail in a state full of seeming commotions; or, in other words, there may be an harmony from whence results prosperity, which alone is true peace, and may be considered in the same view as the various parts of this universe, which are eternally connected by the action of some and the reaction of others.

In a despotic state, indeed, which is every government where the supreme power is immoderately exerted, a real division is perpetually kindled. The peasant, the soldier, the merchant, the magistrate, and the grandee, have no other conjunction than what arises from the ability of the one to oppress the other without resistance; and if at any time an union happens to be introduced, citizens are not then

united, but like dead bodies laid in the grave contiguous to each other.—*Montesquieu.*

UNITY OF THE DEITY, THE—If men were led into the apprehension of invisible intelligent power by a contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly entertain any conception but of one single Being, who bestowed existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its parts, according to one regular plan and connected system. For though, to persons of a certain turn of mind, it may not appear altogether absurd, that several independent beings, endowed with superior wisdom, might conspire in the contrivance and execution of one regular plan; yet is this a merely arbitrary supposition, which, even if allowed possible, must be confessed neither to be supported by probability nor necessity. All things in the universe are evidently of a piece. Every thing is adjusted to every thing. One design prevails throughout the whole. And this uniformity leads the mind to acknowledge one author; because the conception of different authors, without any distinction of attributes or operations, serves only to give perplexity to the imagination, without bestowing any satisfaction on the understanding. The statue of Laocoon, as we learn from Pliny, was the work of three artists: but it is certain, that were we not told so, we should never have concluded, that a groupe of figures, cut from one stone, and united in one plan, was not the work and

contrivance of one statuary. To ascribe any single effect to the combination of several causes, is not surely a natural and obvious supposition.—*Hume.*

WAR.—Famine, the plague, and war, are the three most famous ingredients in this lower world. Under famine may be classed all the noxious foods which want obliges us to have recourse to; thus shortening our life, whilst we hope to support it.

In the plague are included all contagious distempers: and these are not few in number. These two gifts we hold from Providence: But war, in which all those gifts are concentrated, we owe to the fancy of three or four hundred persons scattered over the surface of this globe, under the name of *princes* and *ministers*; and on this account it may be that, in several dedications, they are called *the living images of the Deity.*

The most hardened flatterer will allow, that war is ever attended with plague and famine, especially if he has seen the military hospitals in Germany, or passed through some villages where some notable feat of arms has been performed.

It is unquestionably a very notable art to ravage countries, destroy dwellings, and, *communibus annis*, out of a hundred thousand men to cut off forty thousand. This invention was originally cultivated by nations assembled for their common good: for instance, the diet of the Greeks sent word to the diet of Phrygia and its neighbours, that they were putting to

sea in a thousand fishing-boats, in order to do their best to cut them off root and branch.

The Roman people, in a general assembly, resolved, that it was their interest to go and fight the Veientes, or the Volscians, before harvest; and some years after, all the Romans being angry with all the Carthaginians, fought a long time both by sea and land. It is otherwise in our time.

A genealogist sets forth to a prince, that he is descended in a direct line from a count, whose kindred, three or four hundred years ago, had made a family compact with a house, the very memory of which is extinguished. That house had some distant claim to a province, the last proprietor of which died of an apoplexy. The prince and his council instantly resolve, that this province belongs to him by divine right. The province, which is some hundred leagues from him, protests that it does not so much as know him; that it is not disposed to be governed by him; that before prescribing laws to them, their consent, at least, was necessary. These allegations do not so much as reach the prince's ears; it is insisted on, that his right is incontestable. He instantly picks up a multitude of men, who have nothing to do, nor nothing to lose; clothes them with coarse blue, white, green, or scarlet cloth, a few *sous* to the ell; puts on them hats bound with coarse white worsted; makes them turn to the right and left; and thus marches away with them to glory.

Other princes, on this armament, take part in it to the best of their ability, and soon cover a small extent of country with more hireling murderers than Gengis-Kan, Tamerlane, and Bajazet had their heels.

People, at no small distance, on hearing that fighting is going forward, and that if they would make one, there are five or six *sous* a-day for them, immediately divide into two bands, like reapers, and go and sell their services to the first bidder.

These multitudes furiously butcher one another, not only without having any concern in the quarrel, but without so much as knowing what it is about.

Sometimes five or six powers are engaged, three against three, two against four, sometimes even one against five, all equally detesting one another; and friends and foes by turns, agreeing only in one thing, to do all the mischief possible.

An odd circumstance in this infernal enterprise is, that every chief of these ruffians has his colours consecrated, and solemnly prays to God before he goes to destroy his neighbour. If the slain in a battle do not exceed two or three thousand, the fortunate commander does not think it worth thanking God for; but if, besides killing ten or twelve thousand men, he has been so far favoured by heaven as totally to destroy some remarkable place, then a verbose hymn is sung in four parts, composed in a language unknown to all the combatants, and besides stuffed with barbarisms. The same song does for marriages

and births as for massacres; which is scarce pardonable, especially in a nation of all others the most noted for new songs.

All countries pay a certain number of orators to celebrate these sanguinary actions; some in a long black coat, and over it a short-docked cloak; others in a gown, with a kind of shirt over it; some, again, over their shirts have two pieces of motley-coloured stuff hanging down.—They are all very long-winded in their harangues; and to illustrate a battle fought in Wetteravia, bring up what passed thousands of years ago in Palestine. At other times, these gentry declaim against vice; they prove by syllogisms and antitheses, that ladies, for slightly heightening the hue of their cheeks with a little carmine, will assuredly be the eternal object of eternal vengeance; that Polyeucte and Athalia are the devil's works; that he whose table on a day of abstinence is loaded with fish to the amount of two hundred crowns, is infallibly saved; and that a poor man, for eating two penny-worth of mutton, goes to the devil for ever and ever.

Among five or six thousand such declamations there may be, and that is the most, three or four written by a Gaul named *Masillon*, which a gentleman may bear to read: but in not one of all these discourses has the orator the spirit to animadvert on war, that scourge and crime which includes all others. These groveling speakers are continually prating against love, mankind's only solace, and the only

way of repairing it: not a word do they say of the detestable endeavours of the mighty for its destruction.

Bourdaloue! a very bad sermon hast thou made against impurity; but not one, either bad or good, on those various kinds of murders; on those robberies, on those violences, that universal rage by which the world is laid waste! Put together all the vices of all ages and places, and never will they come up to the mischiefs and enormities of only one campaign.

Ye bungling soul-physicians? to bellow for an hour and more against a few flea-bites, and not say a word about that horrid distemper which tears us to pieces. Burn your books, ye moralising philosophers! Whilst the humour of a few shall make it an act of loyalty to butcher thousands of our fellow-creatures, the part of mankind dedicated to heroism will be the most execrable and destructive monsters in all nature. Of what avail is humanity, benevolence, modesty, temperance, mildness, discretion and piety! when half a pound of lead, discharged at the distance of six hundred paces, shatters my body! when I expire at the age of twenty under pains unspeakable, and amidst thousands in the same miserable condition? when my eyes, at their last opening, see my native town all in a blaze; and the last sounds I hear, are the shrieks and groans of women and children expiring among the ruins; and all for the pretended interest of a man who is a stranger to us.

The worst is, that war appears

WAR

to be an unavoidable scourge: for, if we observe it, the god Mars was worshipped in all nations; and among the Jews, *Sabbaoth* signifies the god of armies; but in Homer, Minerva calls Mars a furious hair-brained infernal deity.—*Voltaire*.

WAR, CALAMITIES OF.—War impedes the course of every salutary plan, exhausts the sources of prosperity, and diverts the attention of governors from the happiness of nations. It even suspends sometimes every idea of justice and humanity. In a word, instead of gentle and benevolent feelings, it substitutes hostility and hatred, the necessity of oppression, and the rage of desolation.

The first idea that occurs to me, when I reflect on the origin of most wars, is, that those great combinations of politics which have so often kindled the torch of discord, and occasioned so many ravages, have very seldom merited all the admiration that has been so lavishly bestowed upon them. At least I might venture to say, that when a state is arrived at an illustrious height of power, it is owing to the want of a comprehension sufficiently extensive, and to an incompetent knowledge of its resources, that continual anxieties are entertained, and the duration of the public tranquillity made to depend on such a variety of uncertain speculations. I might even venture to observe, moreover, that in such nations it is a real misfortune for the people, when, by a kind of imitative spirit, their government has been accustomed to contemplate the

WAR

strength of states in those exterior connections only, the texture and combination of which form what is called *political science*. Then the most subtle ideas concerning the balance of power become the predominant principles, and incessantly engross the attention. Hence arise those frequent wars of competition, of which the first renders a second more probable: for in proportion as a state has been weakened by a war, it is so much the more apt to become jealous again; because the sensations of jealousy are excited only by comparison; and in a course of years, it is sometimes one power, and sometimes another, that attracts political observation. Thus, the history of all ages exhibits nations incessantly endeavouring to reduce each other to the same state of humiliation to which they had themselves been reduced by their own political mistakes. On the contrary, were every state to be sparing of its strength, to cultivate a proper knowledge of its resources, and to render them respectable by a wise administration, it would arrive, without effort, to that height of superiority it is so anxious to attain.

I must likewise observe, that this kind of superiority is the only one of which the relative consequences, if I may so express myself, are universal. The triumphs of war exalt you no doubt above the nation you may conquer; but as these triumphs commonly require long efforts and great sacrifices, the exhausted state resulting thence necessarily alters the proportion which existed between your

strength and that of the great powers who were not engaged in your quarrel, and whose prosperity increased under the protection of that peace which they enjoyed.

In a word, it cannot be denied, that the height of greatness to which a nation may arrive by the wisdom of its administration is the most commanding, and the most conducive to secure the respect of other nations. These are much more jealous of the most insignificant acquisitions which are proposed to be gained by war or negotiation, than of the augmentation of greatness of which order is the foundation. And this sentiment is natural: for that prosperity, which originates in the wise conduct of a sovereign, renders his virtues also more conspicuous; exhibiting them at the same time as a security against any abuse which he might make of his augmented power.

Of late years it has been, for the sake of commerce in particular, that such scenes of bloodshed have been recorded. Commerce, that loose and indeterminate idea adds new lustre to political speculations; and the public opinion, excited by a word that indicates an universal interest, is often misled itself in its decisions. I would fain ask those who, from such motives, are ever ready to be the advocates for war; Do you know the balance of the commerce of your country? Have you studied its elements? Have you sufficiently examined, whether the trade in which you desire to par-

ticipate, will increase the national opulence? Do you well discern the causes and consequences of that opulence? Have you balanced the advantages you expect from war, against the injury which commerce will sustain from the augmented rate of interest, occasioned by the multiplication of the government loans, and the dearness of labour, which is a necessary consequence of the increase of taxes? Are you certain, that while you endeavour to obtain a new branch of commerce by the sword, you may not lose another, either through that difference which you will be obliged to pay to your ancient allies, or those concessions that your new ones may require? In a word, are you sufficiently acquainted with the whole extent of your present prosperity; and have you formed an estimate of all the sacrifices which the very end of your ambition may deserve? Nothing is more simple than the word *commerce* in its vulgar acceptance; nothing more complicated, when it is applied to the universality of exchanges, to the importance of some, the inutility of others; the disadvantage of many; to political views; in short, to labour, taxes, and all the unexpected combinations which war and great events produce. Deliberate and deep reflection is necessary then, before we determine to kindle the flames of war for a commercial advantage. And it ought never to be forgotten, that in time of peace, a diminution of certain duties, a bounty on some exportations, a privilege obtained

from some foreign nations, and many other advantages resulting from a wise administration, are often of far greater value than the object which is proposed to be gained by fleets and armies.

Nations, in their savage state, were actuated by blind and unruly passions; and these passions have been softened in some measure by the effect of civilization.—But the multiplicity and confusion of different interests, which the ideas of money, commerce, national riches, and the balance of power have introduced, have become other causes of hostility and jealousy; and as the science of government has not improved in proportion to the contradictions it had to reconcile, and the difficulties it had to overcome, mankind still enjoy but imperfectly the change in their conditions.

I would here submit to reflection, a consideration with which I have ever been forcibly struck. Most governments appear satisfied, if, at the conclusion of a bloody and expensive war, they have made an honourable peace. Undoubtedly such a termination may satisfy a state, which having been unjustly attacked, was reduced to the necessity of repelling force by force. But that nation which might have avoided the enmity of other powers by more circumspect proceedings, and that also which has undertaken a war from mere political speculations, cannot be ignorant, that an estimation of the advantages which they derive from the treaty of peace is not the only calculation worthy of their atten-

tion. Each is also to consider what would have been its situation at the period when the treaty was concluded, if war had not interrupted the course of its prosperity.

Such comparisons might have been often useful to all the potentates in Europe; and Great Britain, in particular, might have received the most important instructions from them: but as it is not in my power to enter into such an extensive detail, I shall confine myself to such reflections as are applicable to France.

Let us suppose a war in which this kingdom should be obliged to alienate from fifty to sixty millions of its annual revenue (from 2,187,500*l.* to 2,625,000*l.* sterling) in order to pay the interest of the loans, which the preparations for war, the expenses of each campaign, and the liquidation of debts had rendered necessary; and let us next take a cursory view of the different uses to which government might have applied such a revenue, not only for the advancement of the national happiness, but for the augmentation of the military force.

The distribution which I am going to make of this revenue, does not indicate my absolute opinion on the subject. But, in a calculation of this kind, I would anticipate objections, by showing how the different wishes that are formed in a monarchy, with respect either to happiness or power, might have been perfectly accomplished.

In the first place I find, that with eighteen millions (787,500*l.* sterling), of that annual revenue,

the regimental companies might have been completed to their full complement, and the army augmented by 50,000 infantry, and ten or twelve thousand horse.

I find, in the next place, that two millions of that revenue (87,500*l.* sterling) which in time of peace would pay the interest of a loan of forty millions (1,750,000*l.* sterling) would have added to our navy thirty men of war, and a proportionable number of frigates; and this augmentation might have been maintained by four millions yearly (175,000*l.* sterling).—Thus we see twenty-four millions (1,050,000*l.* sterling) of that revenue devoted solely to the military service.

Let us now apply the surplus to the various parts of administration, and let us consider the result.

With eighteen millions (787,500*l.* sterling) yearly, the price of salt might have been rendered uniform throughout the kingdom, by reducing it one-third in the provinces of little gabels (an excise on salt) and two-thirds in those of the great; and not increasing the charges of the privileged provinces.

With from four to five millions (from 175,000*l.* to 218,750*l.* sterling) annually, the interior parts of the kingdom might have been freed from all custom-house duties, without raising those levied on the exports and imports of the kingdom, or carrying to account the improvements I suggested when treating on this subject.

With 2,500,000 livres (109,

375*l.* sterling) serving to pay the interest of successive loans, to the amount of fifty millions (2,187,500*l.* sterling) all the necessary canals might have been executed that are still wanting in the kingdom.

With one million more per annum (43,750*l.* sterling) government might be enabled to bestow sufficient encouragement on all the establishments of industry that can advance the prosperity of France.

With 1,500,000 livres (65,625*l.* sterling) the sums annually destined to give employment to the poor might be doubled; and, while great advantages would thus accrue to the inhabitants of the country, the neighbouring communications might be multiplied.

With the same sum the prisons throughout the kingdom might, in a few years, be improved, and all the charitable institutions brought to perfection.

And with two millions annually (87,500*l.* sterling) the clearing of the waste lands might proceed with incredible vigour.

These distributions amount to thirty-one millions (1,356,250*l.* sterling) which joined to twenty-four millions (1,050,000*l.* sterling) for military expences, make together the annual revenue of fifty-five millions employed as above (2,406,250*l.* sterling;) a sum equal to that which I have supposed to be alienated for the disbursements of the war.

The distributions which I have thus suggested, it is evident,

may be modified in many different ways: but it is sufficient to perceive the immense advantages which this simple statement exhibits; whether with respect to the strength and prosperity of the kingdom, or for the assistance and solace of the indigent class of people.

This is not all; for if we estimate the diminution of commerce which results from a war of five or six years duration, it will be found, that the kingdom is deprived of a considerable increase of riches.

In fine, war, and the loans which it occasions, create a very sensible rise in the rate of interest. On the contrary, peace, under a wise administration, would lower it annually, were it only in consequence of the increase of specie, and of the influence of the stated reimbursements. This successive reduction of interest is likewise a source of inestimable advantages to commerce, agriculture, and the finances.

Let these effects be now compared with the advantages which a fortunate war, (and all wars are not so) would give to a kingdom arrived at that height of prosperity by which France is now distinguished; and let this comparison be made, not in a desultory manner, but by the aid of reflection and science; and it will be found, for the most part, that ten seeds have been sown, in order to gather the fruit of one.

Undoubtedly, with so many powerful means, a government may expect, with great probability, to humble its rivals and

extend its dominions. But to employ its resources for the happiness of its subjects; to command respect without the assistance and dangers of an ever restless policy; this is a conduct, which alone can correspond to the greatness of its situation; and which displays at once a knowledge of its ascendancy, and of the advantages to be derived from it. By such a conduct, a government imitates those beneficent rivers whose rapid current cannot be impeded, but which, in their majestic course, encourage navigation, facilitate commerce, and fertilise the country without injury or devastation.

It is not war, but a wise and pacific administration, that can procure all the advantages of which France may be yet in want.

The quantity of specie in the kingdom is immense; but the want of public confidence very often occasions the greatest part of it to be hoarded up.

The population of the kingdom is immense; but the excess and nature of the taxes impoverish and dishearten the inhabitants of the country. In a state of misery the human species is weakened; and the number of children, who die before their strength can be matured, is no longer in a natural proportion.

The revenue of the sovereign is immense: but the public debt consumes two-fifths of it; and nothing can diminish this burden but the fruits of a prudent economy, and the lowering of the rate of interest.

The contributions of the nation, in particular, are immense;

WAR

but it is only by the strengthening of public credit that government can succeed in finding sufficient resources in extraordinary emergencies.

Finally, the balance of commerce in favour of the kingdom is an immense source of riches; but war interrupts the current. Hence results an important reflection; namely, that the nation which derives the most considerable advantages from peace, makes also the greatest sacrifices whenever it renounces that state of quiet and prosperity.—*Necker.*

WARS, RELIGIOUS, ARE A LESS FATAL SCOURGE THAN THAT OF THE INQUISITION; WITH A SUCINCT HISTORY OF THIS TRIBUNAL.—A militia of 500,000 monks and friars, fighting with spiritual arms under the standard of Rome could not hinder one half of Europe from shaking off the yoke of that court: And the Inquisition has had no other effect than to deprive the pope of some more provinces, witness the united Netherlands; or to commit unhappy wretches, without answering any purpose, to the flames.

You may remember, that in the wars against the Albigenses, and about the year 1200, Pope Innocent III. established this tribunal, which takes cognisance of human thoughts; and that in contempt of the bishops, the natural judges in matters of doctrine, it was entrusted to the care of the Dominicans and Cordeliers.

Those first inquisitors had the power of summoning and excommunicating heretics; of granting indulgencies to every

WAR

prince that would exterminate them when condemned; of reconciling penitents to the church; of taxing their sins, and receiving sums of money by way of surety for their repentance.

It was a very droll instance of the absurd contradictions to which human policy is oftentimes reduced, that the most inveterate enemy of the see of Rome happened to be the most strenuous defender of this tribunal.

Frederick II. accused by the pope, one time, of being a Mahometan, another time of Atheism, imagined he should wipe off this reproach by taking the inquisitors under his protection. He even went so far as to publish four edicts at Pavia in 1244, whereby he laid an injunction on the magistrates, to commit those to the flames whom the inquisitors should condemn as obstinate heretics, and to imprison those for life whom this tribunal should declare repentant.

Notwithstanding this political step, Frederick II. was persecuted as much as before; and the popes afterwards turned the arms he had put into their hands against the rights and privileges of the empire.

Pope Alexander III. established the Inquisition in France in 1255, under St. Lewis. The guardian of the Cordeliers at Paris, and the provincial of the Dominicans, were grand inquisitors. By the bull of Pope Alexander, they were to consult, but not to be dependent on the bishops. The giving of this strange jurisdiction to men, who by vows had renounced the

world, set both clergy and laity against them. An inquisitor of the order of Cordeliers assisted at the trial of the knights Templar; but the public were soon so dissatisfied, that those friars had nothing more left than an empty title.

In Italy the popes had more credit; because, though disobeyed at Rome, from whence they had been long absent, they were still at the head of the faction of the Guelphs against the Gibellines. They made use of this inquisition against the partisans of the empire: For in 1302, Pope John XXII. made the monkish inquisitors proceed against Matthew Visconti, a Milanese nobleman, whose sole crime was his attachment to the Emperor Lewis of Bavaria. The vassal's fidelity to his paramount was declared heresy; the house of Este, as also that of Malatesta, were treated in the same manner, and for the same reason; and if the sentence was not put in execution, it was because at that time it was easier for the pope to find inquisitors than armies.

The more this tribunal gained ground, the more strenuously it was claimed by the bishops, who saw themselves stripped of a privilege which seemed to belong to their order. The popes at length joined them in commission with the monkish inquisitors, who exercised a full authority almost in every state of Italy; the bishops being properly no more than their assessors.

Venice had received the Inquisition towards the end of the thirteenth century in 1289; every where else it was depend-

ent on the pope; but in the Venetian dominions it became subject to the senate. The wisest precaution they took, was, that the fines and confiscations should not belong to the inquisitors. They thought to moderate the zeal of those men by removing the temptation of enriching themselves: But as the passion of pride and ambition is more preponderating with mankind than avarice, the restless spirit of the Inquisition obliged the senate, a long time after, that is, in the sixteenth century, to enact a law, that the Inquisition should never proceed without the assistance of three senators. In consequence of this regulation, and several others of the like good policy, the authority of this tribunal was in a manner abolished at Venice by being eluded.

One would have imagined that the Inquisition should have been introduced with the greatest ease, and settled in the firmest manner, in the kingdom of Naples; yet it never reached this part of Italy. The sovereigns of Naples and Sicily thinking themselves intitled, in consequence of papal concessions, to the enjoyment of ecclesiastic jurisdiction, the Roman pontiff and the king were constantly disputing who should nominate the inquisitors; which was the reason of their not being appointed; and the people, for the first time, benefited by the quarrel of their masters. Yet there were fewer heretics in Naples and Sicily than in other countries. The religious tranquillity of those kingdoms, shows very plainly, that the Inquisition

WAR

was not so much the bulwark of religion, as a scourge designed for the disturbance of the human species.

At length, it was established in Sicily, after it had been received in Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1478: but in Sicily, rather more than in Castile, it was a prerogative of the crown, and not a Roman tribunal; for in Sicily the king is pope.

The Inquisition had long before gained admittance into Arragon; it was there in a languid state as well as in France, without jurisdiction or order, and almost entirely forgot.

But it was not till after the conquest of Granada, that it exerted throughout the kingdom of Spain such vigour and severity as had been never observed in the ordinary courts of justice. The Spaniards must at that time have had something in their nature more severe and unrelenting than other nations. This appears by the barbarities which they so wantonly exercised in the new world; and especially by the cruelties which they introduced into a jurisdiction, wherein the Italians, its inventors, behave with some lenity. The court of Rome had erected those tribunals out of policy; but they became more odious by the barbarity of the Spanish inquisitors.

After Mahomet II. had subdued Constantinople, both he and his successors permitted the conquered Greeks to enjoy their religion in peace: and when the Arabians were masters in Spain, they never compelled the chris-

WAR

tian natives of that country to embrace the Koran. But after the taking of Granada, Cardinal Ximenes, whether induced by religious zeal, or by the ambition of extending his primacy, would have all the Moors turn christians. This was an enterprise diametrically contrary to the treaty by which the Moors had submitted; and it required some time to bring it to bear. But Ximenes would fain convert the Moors as quick as he had taken Granada. They were compelled to hear sermons; they were persecuted: they rose up in arms; were quelled, and forced to submit to baptism. Ximenes obliged 50,000 Moors to receive this sign of a religion which they did not believe to be true.

The Jews were included in the treaty with the kings of Granada, but did not meet with more indulgence than the Moors. They were very numerous in Spain, where they followed the business of brokerage, as in all other countries. This profession, far from giving any umbrage, is founded on peace. There are above 28,000 Jews tolerated by the pope in Italy; and there are above two hundred and four-score synagogues in Poland. The city of Amsterdam alone contains 15,000 Jews; though surely it can trade without them. The Jews did not seem to be more dangerous in Spain; and the taxes that might be laid on them, would have been sure resources to the government. It was therefore difficult to account by the maxims of sound policy for the persecution they underwent.

WAR

The inquisition proceeded against the Jews and the Mussulmen. We have already observed, what a number of Mahometan and Jewish families chose rather to retire from Spain, than to be subject to the cruelty of this tribunal; which deprived Ferdinand and Isabella of a multitude of subjects. Surely there was least danger from those people, since they preferred to be fugitives rather than rebels. Those who staid behind pretended to be christians. But the grand inquisitor, Torquemada, made Queen Isabella look upon all those sham christians, as people that deserved to lose there lives and estates.

This Torquemada was a dominican, and afterwards cardinal; he settled the form of proceeding in the Spanish court of Inquisition; a form contrary to all human laws, and which subsists notwithstanding, to this very day. In fourteen years he brought near fourscore thousand men to their trial, and caused six thousand to be burnt with all the pomp and ceremony usual on the greatest solemnities. The accounts given us of people who sacrificed human victims to the Deity, fall greatly short of the executions of the Inquisition. Against those bloody rites the Spaniards did not conceive sufficient horror, because they were sacrificing their inveterate enemies, and the Jews. But they soon became victims themselves: For when Lutheranism began to spread, the few Spaniards suspected of embracing that doctrine were made a sacrifice. The form of

WAR

proceeding was an infallible way to destroy whomsoever the inquisitors pleased. The prisoners are not confronted with their accusers; and there is no informer ever so base but they listen to: A public criminal, an infamous person, a child, a prostitute, are good evidence; even a son may inform against his father, a wife against her husband. In short, the prisoner is obliged to accuse himself; to guess, and to confess the crime he is supposed to be guilty of, and of which he is frequently ignorant. This strange manner of proceeding struck a terror into the whole kingdom of Spain: a general jealousy and suspicion took possession of all ranks of people: friendship and sociability were at an end: brothers were afraid of brothers; fathers, of their children. Hence silence is become the characteristic of a nation, endowed with all the vivacity natural to a warm and fruitful climate. The most artful endeavoured to be bailiffs to the Inquisition, under the name of *familiars*; choosing rather this servile office, than to be exposed to such cruelties.

To this tribunal we must likewise attribute that ignorance of sound philosophy, in which Spain lies buried; while Germany, England, France, and even Italy, have discovered such a multitude of truths, and enlarged the sphere of knowledge. Never is human nature so debased, as when ignorance is armed with power.

But these melancholy effects of the Inquisition are a trifle, in comparison to those public sacri-

fices called *Auto da Fe*, or acts of faith, and to the shocking barbarities that precede them.

A priest in a white surplice, or a monk who has vowed meekness and humility, causes his fellow-creatures to be put to the torture in a dismal dungeon. A stage is erected in the public market-place, where the condemned prisoners are conducted to the stake, attended with a train of monks and religious confraternities. They sing psalms, say mass, and butcher mankind. Were a native of Asia to come to Madrid upon the day of an execution of this sort, it would be impossible for him to tell whether it was a rejoicing, a religious feast, a sacrifice, or a massacre; and yet it is all this together. The kings, whose presence alone in other cases is the harbinger of mercy, assist at this spectacle uncovered, lower seated than the inquisitors, and behold their subjects expiring in the flames. The Spaniards reproached Montezuma with immolating his captives to his gods; what would he have said, had he beheld an *Auto da Fe*.

These executions are more rare at present. But reason, whose rays with difficulty pervade the darkness of fanaticism, has not as yet been able to abolish them.

The Inquisition was not introduced into Portugal till towards the year 1557, before this country fell under the Spanish yoke. At first it met with all the opposition its very name ought naturally to inspire: But at length it forced its way; and now it is under the same form of govern-

ment at Lisbon as at Madrid. The grand inquisitor is nominated by the king, and confirmed by the pope. The particular courts of this office, to which they give the name of *holy*, are subordinate both in Spain and Portugal, to the tribunal of the capital. In both these kingdoms the Inquisition is distinguished by the same severity and by the same zeal in extending its power.

In Spain, after the decease of Charles V. they presumed to seize on that emperor's father-confessor Constantine Pontius: The poor man died in a dungeon; and his effigy was burnt after his death at an *Auto da Fe*.

In Portugal, John of Braganza, having rescued his country from the Spanish yoke, would have been glad to deliver it from the Inquisition; but he could do no more than deprive the inquisitors of the confiscated estates. After his decease they declared him excommunicated; and the queen his widow was obliged to desire they would absolve the dead corpse. By this absolution, equally ridiculous and disgraceful, he was acknowledged to have been guilty.

When the Spaniards made settlements in America, they carried the Inquisition along with them. And the Portuguese introduced it into the East Indies, after it had been authorised at Lisbon.

Every body has heard of the Inquisition of Goa. This jurisdiction in other countries is contrary to the law of nature, but at Goa it is repugnant to good policy. The Portuguese

WAR

sail to the East Indies merely for the sake of trade. Now trade and the Inquisition are incompatible. Were it to be established at London or at Amsterdam, those cities would neither be so populous nor so opulent. We find, that when Philip II. would fain introduce it into the Netherlands, the interruption of commerce was one of the principle causes of the revolution of that country. France and Germany have been happily preserved from this scourge. They have indeed experienced religious wars: but wars must sometimes have an end; while the Inquisition, when once established, becomes eternal.

It is not at all surprising, that so detestable a tribunal should have been charged with excesses of cruelty and insolence which it never committed. We find in several writers, that the above mentioned Constantine Pontius, confessor to Charles V. had been accused before the Holy Office with having dictated the emperor's will, wherein there was not a sufficient number of pious legacies; that both the confessor and the will were condemned to be burnt; and at length that Philip II. could obtain no more, but that the sentence should not be executed in regard to the will. This whole story is evidently false. Constantine Pontius had not been successor for sometime to Charles V. when he was imprisoned; and that prince's will was respected by Philip II. who had too great abilities and power to suffer the commencement of his reign, and

WAR

his father's glory, to be thus dishonoured.

We read likewise in several books written against the Inquisition, that the King of Spain, Philip III. assisting at an *Auto da Fe*, and seeing several of his subjects, Jews, Mahometans, and heretics, or suspected heretics in the flames, he cried out; "Poor wretches, indeed, to suffer death because they could not change their opinion!" It is very probable that a king might have entertained such sentiments, and that those words might have dropped from him. Only it is cruel he did not spare those whom he pitied. But they add, that these words having been carried to the grand inquisitor, he charged the king with them, and had the impudence to demand a reparation of the honour of the holy office: that the king was so mean as to submit; and that this reparation consisted in his being let blood, which the grand inquisitor ordered to be burnt by the common hangman. Philip III. was a shallow prince, but not so excessively weak. A story of this nature is not credible of any prince; it is related only in anonymous pieces in the Lives of the Popes, and in those false memoirs printed in Holland under so many spurious titles. Besides, it must be very weak policy to calumniate the Inquisition, and to try to wound her with the arms of falsehood and imposture.

This tribunal, designed for the extirpation of heresy, is the very thing that keeps the Protestants at the greatest distance from the

Church of Rome. They view it as an object of horror; they would rather die than submit to it; so that the sulphurous shirts of the holy office are the standard against which they will ever unite.—*Voltaire.*

WICKED AND WICKEDNESS.—We are perpetually told that human nature is essentially perverse; that man is born a child of the devil. Now nothing can be more imprudent: for, my friend, in preaching to me that all the world is born in wickedness, thou informest me that thou art born so, and that it behoves me to beware of thee as I would of a fox or crocodile. O! not at all, sayest thou, I am regenerated: I am no unbeliever or heretic; I may be trusted: so then, the remainder of mankind being either heretics, or what thou callest *infidels*, will be a mere herd of monsters; and whenever thou art speaking to a Lutheran or a Turk, thou shouldest conclude that they are for robbing and murdering thee, for they are the devil's spawn: one is not regenerated, and the other is degenerated.

Much more rational and much more handsome would it be to say to men, "You are all born good; consider how dreadful it would be to defile the purity of your being." Mankind should be dealt with as individuals. If a prebendary leads a scandalous life, a friend says to him, is it possible that you can thus disgrace the dignity of a prebendary? A counsellor or judge is reminded that he has the honour of being counsellor to the king, and that it is his duty to be an

example of virtue. The encouragement to a soldier is, Remember you belong to the regiment of Champagne. And every individual should be told, Remember your dignity as a man.

Say or do what you will, this must at length be the case; for what can mean this saying, so common among all nations, reflect within thyself? Now, were you born a child of the devil; were your origin criminal; were your blood formed of an infernal liquor; to bid you reflect within yourself would import, Consult your diabolical nature, and follow its suggestions; cheat, rob, murder; it is your father's law.

Man is not born wicked; he becomes so, as he falls sick.—Should some physicians come and tell him, you are born sick; it is certain that these physicians, whatever they might say or do, will not cure him if his disease be inherent in his nature; and these reasoners are themselves very sick.

Bring together all the children of the universe, you will see nothing in them but innocence, gentleness, and fear. Were they born wicked, spiteful, and cruel, some signs of it would come from them, as little snakes strive to bite, and little tygers to tear. But Nature having been as sparing of offensive weapons to man as to pigeons and rabbits, it cannot have given them an instinct to mischief and destruction.

So man is not born wicked! How comes it then that so many are infected with the pestilence of wickedness? It is because

they who bear rule over them having caught the distemper, communicate it to others; as a woman, having the distemper which Christopher Columbus is said to have brought from America, has spread the venom all over Europe. By the first ambitious man was the world corrupted.

You will say, that this first monster only fecundated that germ of pride, rapine, fraud, and cruelty, which is in all men. I own that, in general, the greater part of our brethren easily contract these qualities: but has every body the putrid fever, the stone, and gravel, because every body is liable to those distempers?

There are whole nations which are not wicked; the Philadelphians, the Banyans, have never shed human blood. The Chinese, the people of Tonquin, Lao, Siam, and even of Japan, have lived in the most profound tranquillity for these hundred years past. In the space of ten years scarce any of those enormities at which human nature stands astonished, is heard of in the cities of Rome, Venice, Paris, London, and Amsterdam: cities where yet cupidity, the mother of all crimes, is flagrant.

If men were essentially wicked, and all born under the sway of a being as malignant as wretched, who, in revenge for his punishment, inspired them with all his rage, we should every morning hear of husbands being murdered by their wives, and fathers by their children, just as fowls are found killed by a pole-eat,

who came in the night and sucked their blood.

If we suppose there are ten hundred millions of men upon the earth, it is a great many: and this makes about five hundred millions of women, who sew and spin, feed their little ones, keep the house or hut clean, and backbite their neighbours a little. I do not see any great harm these poor simpletons do on earth. Of this number of inhabitants on the globe, there are at least two hundred millions of children, who certainly neither kill nor plunder, and about as many who, through age and sickness, are not capable of those crimes. Thus there remains, at most, but a hundred millions whom youth and vigour qualify for the commission of crimes. Of these hundred millions, we may say, that ninety are continually taken up with prodigious labour, in forcing the earth to furnish them with food and raiment: now these have scarce time to perpetrate outrages.

In the remaining ten millions will be included idlers and jocund companions, who love peace and festivity; the men of talents, who are taken up with their several professions; magistrates and priests, who it manifestly behoves to lead an irreproachable life, at least in appearance: so that the real wicked men are reduced to some few politicians, either secular or regular, who will always be for disturbing the world; and some thousands of vagrants who hire their services to those poli-

ticians. Now never is a million of these wild beasts employed at once, and among these I reckon highwaymen: so that at most, and in the most tempestuous times, there is but one man of a thousand who may be called wicked; and he is not so always.

Thus is wickedness on earth infinitely less than is talked of and believed. To be sure, there is still too much misfortune, distress, and horrible crimes; but the pleasure of complaining and magnifying is such, that at the least scratch you cry out, the earth is deluged with blood. If you have been cheated, then the world is full of perjury. An atrabilious mind, on having been wronged, sees the universe covered with damned souls: as a young rake, seated at supper with his doxy after the opera, does not dream that there are any distressed objects.—*Voltaire*.

WITNESSES, CREDIBILITY OF.—

Every man of common sense, that is, every one whose ideas have some connection with each other, and whose sensations are conformable to those of other men, may be a witness: but the credibility of his evidence will be in proportion as he is interested in declaring or concealing the truth.

Hence it appears, how frivolous is the reasoning of those who reject the testimony of women on account of their weakness: how puerile it is, not to admit the evidence of those who are under sentence of death, because they are dead in law; and how irrational to exclude persons branded with in-

famy; for in all these cases they ought to be credited, when they have no interest in giving false testimony. The credibility of a witness, then, should only diminish in proportion to the hatred, friendship, or connections, subsisting between him and the delinquent. One witness is not sufficient; for whilst the accused denies what the other affirms, truth remains suspended, and the right that every one has to be believed innocent, turns the balance in his favour. The credibility of a witness is the less as the atrociousness of the crime is greater, from the improbability of its having been committed. In cases of wanton cruelty, the presumption is always against the accuser; for no man is cruel without some interest, without some motive of fear or hatred. There are no spontaneous or superfluous sentiments in the heart of man; they are all the result of impressions on the senses. The credibility of a witness may also be diminished, by his being a member of a private society, whose customs and principles of conduct are either not known, or are different from those of the public. Such a man has not only his own passion, but those of the society of which he is a member. The credibility of a witness is null when the question relates to the words of a criminal; for the tone of voice, the gesture, all that precedes, accompanies, and follows, the different ideas which men annex to the same words, may so alter and modify a man's discourse, that it is almost impossible to repeat them precisely

in the manner in which they were spoken. Violent and uncommon actions, such as real crimes, leave a trace in the multitude of circumstances that attend them, and in their effects; but words remain only in the memory of the hearers, who are commonly negligent and prejudiced. It is infinitely easier, then, to found an accusation on the words, than on the actions of a man; for in these, the number of circumstances urged against the accused, afford him variety of means of justification.

—*Beccaria.*

WOMEN.—In a republic, the condition of citizens is limited, equal, mild, and agreeable: every thing partakes of the benefit of public liberty. An empire over the woman cannot amongst them be so well exerted; and, where the climate demands this empire, it is most agreeable to the government of a single person. This is one of the reasons why it has always been difficult to establish a popular government in the east.

On the contrary, the slavery of women is perfectly conformable to the genius of a despotic government, which delights in treating all with severity. Thus at all times have we seen in Asia domestic slavery and despotic government walk hand in hand with an equal pace.—*Montesquieu*

WORSHIP.—In the reign of Arcadius, Logomacos, a theologue of Constantinople, went into Scythia, and stopped at the foot of mount Caucasus, in the fetile plains of Zephirim, bordering on Colchis. The good old man

Dondindac was, after a light repast, kneeling in his large hall, between his vast sheepfold and his ample barn, with his wife, his five sons and five daughters, some of his kindred and his domestics, all chaunting the praises of the Bounteous Giver of all good things. Ho! What art thou about idolater? said Logomacos to him. I am no idolater, said Dondindac. An idolater thou must be, said Logomacos to him, as being a Scythian, or at least no Greek. Well, and what wast thou gabbling in thy Scythian jargon? All languages are alike in God's ear, answered the Scythian: we were singing his praises. Very extraordinary indeed, replied the theologue, a Scythian family worshipping God without any previous instruction from us? He soon entered into a conversation with Dondindac; for the theologue had a smattering of the Scythian, and the other understood a little Greek. This conversation is lately come to light in a manuscript kept in the imperial library at Constantinople.

Log. I will see whether thou knowest thy catechism: why prayest thou to God?

Don. Because it is just and proper to worship the Supreme Being; as of him we hold all we have.

Log. Pretty well, for a barbarian: and what askest thou of him?

Don. I thank God for the good things he gives me, and even for the crosses with which he tries me: but as for asking of him any thing, that is what I never presume to do; he knows what we

stand in need of better than ourselves: besides, I should be afraid to ask for sunshine, when rain would better suit my neighbour.

Log. Ah! I apprehended we should soon have some nonsense or other from him. Let me take a retrospect of things; who told thee there is a God?

Don. All Nature?

Log. That is nothing; what idea hast thou of God?

Don. That he is my Creator, my master; who will reward me if I do well, and punish me if I do amiss.

Log. That is but trivial and low; let us come to the essential. Is god infinite *secundum quid*, or in his essence?

Don. I do not understand you.

Log. Stupid dolt! is God in a place, or out of all place, or is he every where?

Don. I know nothing of that; it may be just as you please.

Log. Ignorant wretch! Well; can he make what has been not to have been, or that a stick shall not have two ends? Is futurity to him as future, or as present? How does he do to bring nothing into existence, and to annihilate existence?

Don. I never bestow a thought on those things.

Log. What an oaf is this! Well, I must let myself down, I must suit myself to the meanness of his intellects. Tell me, friend, believest thou that matter can be eternal?

Don. What is it to me whether it exists from eternity or not? I did not exist from eternity. God

is always my master and instructor. He has given me the knowledge of justice, and it is my duty to act accordingly.—I do not desire to be a philosopher, let me be a man.

Log. What a plague it is to have to do with such thick-headed creatures! I must proceed gradually with him. What is God?

Don. My sovereign, my judge, my father.

Log. That is not what I ask you; what is his nature?

Don. To be powerful and good.

Log. But whether is he corporeal or spiritual?

Don. How should I know.

Log. What! not know what a spirit is!

Don. Not I in the least; and what should I be the better for such knowledge? will it mend my morals, make me a better husband, a better father, a better master, a better member of society?

Log. A man must be absolutely taught what a spirit is, since it is,—it is,—it is—Well, we will let that alone till another time.

Don. I fancy, instead of being able to tell me what it is, you will rather tell me what it is not. But after so much questioning, may I take the freedom to ask you a question? I was formerly in one of your temples, and why do you paint God with a long beard?

Log. That is a very abstruse question; the solution of which would be above your comprehension, without some preliminary instructions,

Don. Before you enter on your instructions, I must tell you a circumstance which I hope never to forget. I had just built a summer-house at the end of my garden; and one day sitting in it, I heard a mole and a chafer descanting on it: a superb edifice it certainly is, said the mole, and of very great parts must that mole have been who built it. A mole, forsooth! quoth the chafer; the architect of that pretty building could be no other than some chafer of an extraordinary genius. This colloquy put me on a resolution never to dispute.—*Voltaire.*

WORSHIP, CORRUPTIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN.—In the long period of twelve hundred years, which elapsed between the reign of Constantine and the reformation of Luther, the worship of saints and relics corrupted the pure and perfect simplicity of the Christian model; and some symptoms of degeneracy may be observed even in the first generations which adopted and cherished this pernicious innovation.

I. The satisfactory experience, that the relics of saints were more valuable than gold or precious stones, stimulated the clergy to multiply the treasures of the church. Without much regard for truth or probability, they invented names for skeletons, and actions for names.—The fame of the Apostles, and of the holy men who had imitated their virtues, was darkened by religious fiction. To the invincible band of genuine and primitive martyrs, they

added myriads of imaginary heroes who had never existed, except in the fancy of crafty, or credulous legendaries; and there is reason to suspect, that Tours might not be the only diocese in which the bones of a malefactor were adored instead of those of a saint. A superstitious practice, which tended to increase the temptations of fraud and credulity, insensibly extinguished the light of history, and of reason, in the Christian world.

II. But the progress of superstition would have been much less rapid and victorious, if the faith of the people had not been assisted by the seasonable aid of visions and miracles, to ascertain the authenticity and virtue of the most suspicious relics. In the reign of the younger Theodosius, Lucian, a presbyter of Jerusalem, and the ecclesiastical minister of the village of Caphargamala, about twenty miles from the city, related a very singular dream, which, to remove his doubts, had been repeated on three successive Saturdays. A venerable figure stood before him, in the silence of the night, with a long beard, a white robe, and a gold rod; announced himself by the name of Gamaliel, and revealed to the astonished presbyter, that his own corpse, with the bodies of his son Abibas, his friend Nicodemus, and the illustrious Stephen, the first martyr of the Christian faith, were secretly buried in the adjacent field. He added, with impatience, that it was time to release himself, and his companions, from their obscure prison; that their appear-

ance would be salutary to a distressed world; and that they had made choice of Lucian to inform the bishop of Jerusalem of their situation, and their wishes. The doubts and difficulties which still retarded this important discovery, were successively removed by new visions; and the ground was opened by the bishop, in the presence of an innumerable multitude. The coffins of Gamaliel, of his son, and of his friend, were found in regular order; but when the fourth coffin, which contained the remains of Stephen, was shown to the light, the earth trembled, and an odour, such as that of Paradise, was smelt, which instantly cured the various diseases of seventy-three of the assistants. The companions of Stephen were left in their peaceful residence of Caphargamala; but the relics of the first martyr were transported, in solemn procession, to a church constructed in their honour, on Mount Sion; and the minute particles of those relics, a drop of blood, or the scrapings of a bone, were acknowledged, in almost every province of the Roman world, to possess a divine and miraculous virtue.—The grave and learned Augustin, whose understanding scarcely admits the excuse of credulity, has attested the innumerable prodigies which were performed in Africa by the relics of St. Stephen; and this marvellous narrative is inserted in the elaborate work of the city of God, which the bishop of Hippo designed as a solid and immortal proof of the truth of Christianity.

Augustin solemnly declares, that he has selected those miracles only which were publicly certified by the persons who were either the objects, or the spectators, of the power of the martyr. Many prodigies were omitted, or forgotten; and Hippo had been less favourably treated than the other cities of the province. And yet the bishop enumerates above seventy miracles, of which three were resurrections from the dead, in the space of two years, and within the limits of his own diocese. If we enlarge our view to all the dioceses, and all the saints, of the Christian world, it will not be easy to calculate the fables and the errors which issued from this inexhaustible source. But we may surely be allowed to observe, that a miracle, in that age of superstition and credulity, lost its name and its merit, since it could scarcely be considered as a deviation from the ordinary and established laws of nature.

III. The innumerable miracles, of which the tombs of the martyrs were the perpetual theatre, revealed to the pious believer the actual state and constitution of the invisible world; and his religious speculations appeared to be founded on the firm basis of fact and experience. Whatever might be the condition of vulgar souls, in the long interval between the dissolution and the resurrection of their bodies, it was evident, that the superior spirits of the saints and martyrs did not consume that portion of their existence in silent and inglorious sleep. It was evident (without presuming

to determine the place of their habitation, or the nature of their felicity) that they enjoyed the lively and active consciousness of their happiness, their virtue, and their powers; and that they had already secured the possession of their eternal reward. The enlargement of their intellectual faculties surpassed the measure of the human imagination; since it was proved by experience, that they were capable of hearing and understanding the various petitions of their numerous votaries; who, in the same moment of time, but in the most distant parts of the world, invoked the name and assistance of Stephen or of Martin. The confidence of their petitioners was founded on the persuasion, that the saints, who reigned with Christ, cast an eye of pity upon earth; that they were warmly interested in the prosperity of the Catholic church; and that the individuals, who imitated the example of their faith and piety, were the peculiar and favourite objects of their most tender regard. Sometimes, indeed, their friendship might be influenced by considerations of a less exalted kind: they viewed, with partial affection, the places which had been consecrated by their birth, their residence, their death, their burial, or the possession of their relics. The meaner passions of pride, avarice, and revenge, may be deemed unworthy of a celestial breast; yet the saints themselves condescended to testify their grateful approbation of the liberality of their votaries: and the sharpest bolts of

punishment were hurled against those impious wretches who violated their magnificent shrines, or disbelieved their supernatural power. Atrocious, indeed, must have been the guilt, and strange would have been the scepticism, of those men, if they had obstinately resisted the proofs of a divine agency, which the elements, the whole range of the animal creation, and even the subtle and invisible operations of the human mind, were compelled to obey. The immediate, and almost instantaneous, effects, that were supposed to follow the prayer, or the offence, satisfied the Christians, of the ample measure of favour and authority which the saints enjoyed in the presence of the Supreme God; and it seemed almost superfluous to inquire, whether they were continually obliged to intercede before the throne of grace; or whether they might not be permitted to exercise, according to the dictates of their benevolence and justice, the delegated powers of their subordinate ministry. The imagination, which had been raised by a painful effort to the contemplation and worship of the Universal Cause, eagerly embraced such inferior objects of adoration, as were more proportioned to its gross conceptions and imperfect faculties. The sublime and simple theology of the primitive Christians was gradually corrupted; and the monarchy of heaven, already clouded by metaphysical subtleties, was degraded by the introduction of a popular mythology, which tended to restore the reign of polytheism.

IV. As the objects of religion were gradually reduced to the standard of the imagination, the rites and ceremonies were introduced that seemed most powerfully to affect the senses of the vulgar. If, in the beginning of the fifth century, Tertullian, or Lactantius, had been suddenly raised from the dead, to assist at the festival of some popular saint or martyr; they would have gazed with astonishment and indignation on the profane spectacle, which had succeeded to the pure and spiritual worship of a Christian congregation. As soon as the doors of the church were thrown open, they must have been offended by the smoke of incense, the perfume of flowers, and the glare of lamps and tapers, which diffused, at noon-day, a gawdy, superfluous, and, in their opinion, a sacrilegious light. If they approached the balustrade of the altar, they must have made their way through the prostrate crowd, consisting, for the most part, of strangers and pilgrims, who resorted to the city on the vigil of the feast; and who already felt the strong intoxication of fanaticism, and, perhaps, of wine. Their devout kisses were imprinted on the walls and pavement of the sacred edifice; and their fervent prayers were directed, whatever might be the language of their church, to the bones, the blood, or the ashes of the saint, which were usually concealed, by a linen or silken veil, from the eyes of the vulgar. The Christians frequented the tombs of the martyrs, in the hope of obtaining, from their

powerful intercession, every sort of spiritual, but more especially of temporal, blessings. They implored the preservation of their health, or the cure of their infirmities; the fruitfulness of their barren wives, or the safety and happiness of their children. Whenever they undertook any distant or dangerous journey, they requested, that the holy martyrs would be their guides and protectors on the road; and if they returned without having experienced any misfortune, they again hastened to the tombs of the martyrs, to celebrate with grateful thanksgivings, their obligations to the memory and relics of those heavenly patrons. The walls were hung round with symbols of the favours which they had received; eyes, and hands, and feet, of gold and silver: and edifying pictures, which could not long escape the abuse of indiscreet or idolatrous devotion, represented the image, the attributes, and the miracles of the tutelar saint. The same uniform original spirit of superstition might suggest, in the most distant ages and countries, the same methods of deceiving the credulity, and of affecting the senses, of mankind: but it must ingenuously be confessed, that the ministers of the Catholic church imitated the profane model which they were impatient to destroy. The most respectable bishops had persuaded themselves, that the ignorant rustics would more cheerfully renounce the superstitions of paganism, if they found some resemblance, some compensation, in the bosom of Christianity. The religion of

Constantine achieved, in less than a century, the final conquest of the Roman empire: but the victors themselves were insensibly subdued by the arts of their vanquished rivals.—*Gibbon.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—At the time when the worship of one Supreme God universally prevailed in Asia, in Europe, and Africa, among all who made a due use of their reason, it was that the Christian religion received its birth.

Platonism greatly promoted the understanding of its dogmas.

The Logos, which in Plato signifies *the Wisdom*, the Reason of the Supreme Being, with us made the Word, and the second person of the Deity. Thus religion was wrapped up in metaphysics, to human reason unfathomable! How Mary was afterwards declared mother of God; how the consubstantiality of the Father and the Word was established, together with the procession of the Pnuma, the divine organ of the divine Logos; two natures and two wills resulting from the Hypostasis; and lastly, the Superior Manducation, in which both soul and body are fed with the members of the Incarnate God, worshipped and eaten in the form of bread, present to the sight, felt by the taste, and yet annihilated; these things we shall not repeat here. All mysteries have ever been sublime.

So early as the second century, the expulsion of devils was performed by pronouncing the name of Jesus; whereas before, the name of Jehovah, or Yhâha, was made use of in such miracles: for

St. Matthew relates, that Jesus's enemies having spread abroad that it was by the name of the prince of the devils that he cast out the devils, he made them this answer: "If I cast out devils by Beelzebub, by whom do your children cast them out?"

At what time the Jews acknowledged Beelzebub, a foreign deity, to be prince of the devils, is not known: but we know, and learn it from Josephus that at Jerusalem there were exorcists, whose immediate province it was to dislodge the devils from the bodies of the possessed; that is, men labouring under uncommon distempers; which, in those times, a great part of the world attributed to malignant genii.

Thus the the demoniacs were relieved by the true pronunciation of the word Jehovah, now lost, together with other ceremonies at present buried in oblivion.

Exorcisms by Jehovah, or other of God's names, continued to be practised even in the early ages of the church. Origen against Celsus, No. 262. says, "If, when invoking God, or swearing by him, he is termed the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, certain things will be done by those names, such being their nature and force, that devils are subject to those who utter them; whereas, if called by any another appellation, as God of the tumultuous sea, or the destroyer, no effect follows. The word *Israel* translated into Greek will do nothing; but on pronouncing it in Hebrew, along

with the other requisite words, the magical operation will take place."

The same Origen. No. 19, has these remarkable words: "there are names of a natural virtue, as those used by the Wise Men in Egypt, the Magi in Persia, and the Brachmans in India, Magic, as it is called, is no vain and chimerical art, as the Stoics and Epicureans pretend; neither were the names of Sabbaoth or Adonai made for created beings, but appertain to a mysterious theology concerning the Creator; hence comes the virtue of these names, when placed in order, and pronounced according to the rules," &c.

Origen, in speaking thus, only relates what was universally believed, and does not deliver his own private opinion. All the religions then known admitted a kind of magic, and with two distinctions, the celestial and infernal magic, necromancy, and theurgy; every nation had its prodigies, divinations, and oracles. The Persians did not deny the Egyptian miracles, nor the the Egyptians offer to discredit the Persians. God was pleased to wink at the first Christians espousing the Sybilline oracles, and some other inconsequential errors, as not corrupting the essentials of religion.

Another very remarkable circumstance is, that the Christians of the two first centuries abhorred temples, altars, and images. This Origen owns, No. 374; but on the church's being modelled into a settled form, its discipline and every thing became altered.

When once a religion comes to be established by law, the magistrates are very vigilant in suppressing most of the things which used to be done by the professors of that religion before it was publicly received. The founders held their private meetings, though forbidden under penalties; now none but public assemblies held under the eye of the law are permitted, and all clandestine associations made punishable. The old maxim was, it is better to obey God than man; now the opposite maxim comes into vogue. To obey God, is to conform to the laws of the land. All places rung with obsessions and possessions, the devil was let loose upon earth; now the devil does not stir out of his den. Prodigies and predictions were necessary then; now a stop is put to them, and they are exploded: he who should openly take upon him to foretel any public calamity, would soon be shown the way to Bedlam. The founders took money underhand from the believers; whereas a man collecting money to dispose of it as he pleases, without any legal warrant, would be taken to task. Thus the whole of the scaffolding used in the construction of the building is taken away.

Next to our holy religion, (to be sure the only good religion) which would be the least bad?

Would it not be the most simple? would it not be that which taught a great deal of morality and few doctrines; that which tended to make men virtuous without making them fools; that

which did not impose the belief of things impossible, contradictory, injurious to the Deity, and pernicious to mankind; and which did not take on itself to threaten with eternal punishments all who had common sense? would it not be that which did not support its articles by executioners, and deluge the earth with blood for unintelligible sophisms? that in which a quibble, a pun, and two or three suppositious maps, would not suffice to make a priest a sovereign and a god, though noted for the most profligate morals and execrable practices? that which did not make kings subject to this priest? would it not be that which taught only the adoration of one God, justice, forbearance, and humanity!

The religion of the Gentiles is said to be absurd in several points, contradictory, and pernicious. But have not its evils and follies been greatly exaggerated! Jupiter's carrying on his amours in the shape of a swan, a bull, with other such doings of the Pagan deities, is certainly the height of ridicule; but let any one, throughout all antiquity, show me a temple dedicated to Leda lying with a swan or a bull. Did Athens or Rome ever hear a sermon to encourage girls to copulate with the swans in their court-yards! Did the collection of fables, so beautifully embellished by Ovid, constitute their religion? are they not like our Golden Legend, or Flower of the Saints! Should some Bramin or Dervise object to us the story of St. Mary, the Egyptian, who, not having wherewith to pay

the sailors who had brought her into Egypt, voluntarily granted to each of them, in lieu of money, what is called *favours*, we should immediately say to the Bramin, You are mistaken, father, the Golden Legend is not our religion.

We taunt the ancients with their prodigies and oracles; but could they return on earth, and were the miracles of our lady of Loretto, and those of our lady of Ephesus, to be numbered, in whose favour would the balance of the account be?

Human sacrifices have been introduced almost among all nations, but very rarely were they practised. Jeptha's daughter, and king Agag, are the only two we meet with among the Jews; for Isaac and Jonathan were not sacrificed. The Grecian story of Iphigenia is not thoroughly verified: human sacrifices are very rarely heard of among the ancient Romans; in a word, very little blood has the Pagan religion shed, and ours has made the earth an *aceldama*. Ours, to be sure, is the only good, the only true religion; but by our abuse of it, we have done so much mischief, that when we speak of other religions it should be with temper and modesty.

If a man would recommend his religion to strangers or his countrymen, should he not go about it with the most winning composure, the most insinuating mildness? If he sets out with saying, that what he declares is demonstrably true, he will meet with strong opposition: and if he takes upon him to tell them that they reject his doctrine, only

because it condemns their passions; that their heart has corrupted their mind; that they have only a false and presumptuous reason: he excites their contempt and resentment, and overthrows what he was for building up.

If the religion which he preaches be true, will passion and insolence add to its truth? Do you storm and rage when you say that men should be mild, patient, benevolent, just, exact in the discharge of all the duties of society? No; here every body is of your mind. Why then such virulent language to your brother, when you are preaching to him metaphysical mysteries? It is because his good sense irritates your self-love. You proudly require that your brother should submit his understanding to yours; and pride disappointed blazes into rage: hence, and hence only, arises your passion. A man who receives ever so many musket-shots in a battle, is never seen to express any anger: but a doctor, at the denial of assent, kindles into implacable fury.—*Voltaire.*

WORSHIP, IDOLATROUS.—Idol comes from the Greek ΕΙΔΟΣ, *a figure*, ΕΙΔΟΛΟΣ, *the representation of a figure*, LATREUEIN, *to serve, to revere, to adore*. The word *adore* is originally Latin, and has various meanings; as to put the hand to the mouth in token of respect, to bend the body, to kneel, to salute, and more commonly to pay a supreme worship.

It is proper to observe here, that the Trevoux Dictionary begins this article with saying, that

all the Pagans were idolaters, and that the Indians are still so. First, nobody was called *Pagan* before the time of Theodosius the younger, when that appellation was given to the inhabitants of the country towns of Italy, *Pagorum Incolæ Pagani*, who retained their ancient religion. Secondly, Indostan is entirely Mahometan, and the Mahometans are implacable enemies to images and idolatry. Thirdly, many people of India, who are of the ancient religion of the Parsees, a certain tribe which admit of no idols, cannot with any propriety be termed idolaters.

It appears that there never was any people on the earth who took to themselves the name of *Idolaters*. It is rather an abusive word, a term of detestation; as the Spaniards formerly used to call the French *Gavachos*, which the French returned by calling the Spaniards *Maranas*. Had the senate of Rome, the areopagus of Athens, the court of the kings of Persia, been asked, "Are you idolaters?" they would hardly have known what the question meant; at least not one of them would have answered, "We worship idols or images." The word *idolater* or *idolatry*, does not occur either in Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, or any Gentile author. Never was there any edict or law ordering idols to be worshipped, to be accounted as deities, or to be considered as such.

The Roman and Carthaginian generals at the making a treaty, called all their gods to witness; it is in their presence, say they,

that we swear to this peace. Now the statues of all these gods, their number being none of the smallest, were not in the general's tent: but they held the gods to be, as it were, present at the actions of men, as witnesses and as judges; and certainly it was not the image which made the deity.

In what light did they then look on the statues of their false deities which stood in the temples? In the same light, if I may be allowed the expression, as we view the images of the objects of our veneration. Their error was not the worshipping a piece of wood or marble, but the worshipping a false deity represented by the wood and marble. The difference between them and us is not that they had images and we had none; but that their images represented imaginary beings, and in a false religion; whereas ours represent real beings, and in a true religion. The Greeks had the statue of Hercules, and we that of St. Christopher; they had Esculapius and his goat, and we St. Roch and his dog; they had Jupiter with his thunder-bolts, and we St. Anthony of Padua, and St. James of Compostella.

When the Consul Pliny, in the exordium of his panegyric on Trajan, addresses his petitions to the immortal gods, he cannot be thought to mean the images, which were far from being immortal.

Neither in the latter nor the most remote times of Paganism one single fact occurs to conclude that they worshipped idols.—Homer mentions only gods

dwelling in lofty Olympus. The Palladium, though it fell from heaven, was no more than a sacred pledge of Pallas's protection; it was the goddess herself who was revered in the Palladium,

But the Romans and Greeks kneeled down before statues, put crowns on them, decked them with flowers, burnt incense to them, and carried them in solemn state through public places. These usages we have consecrated in our religion, and yet we are not idolaters.

In times of drought, the women, after keeping a fast, carried forth the statues of the gods in public, walking bare-footed, with their hair loose; and immediately, according to Petronius, the rain would pour down by pailsful; *Statim urceatim pluebat*. Have we not adopted this rite, which, though an abomination among the Gentiles is doubtless genuine devotion with Catholics? How common is it among us to carry bare-footed the shrines of saints, in order to obtain a blessing from Heaven by their intercession? A Turk, a lettered Chinese, at seeing those ceremonies, might from his ignorance, accuse us of placing our confidence in the images which we thus carry about in procession; but a word or two would undeceive him.

We are surprised at the prodigious number of declamations thundered out in all ages against the idolatry of the Romans and Greeks; and afterwards, our surprise is still greater at finding that they were not idolaters.

Some temples were more privi-

leged than others. The great Diana of Ephesus stood in higher fame than a village Diana; more miracles were performed in the temple of Esculapius at Epidaurus than in any other of his temples. More offerings were made to the statue of Jupiter the Olympian, than to that of the Paphlagonian Jupiter. But since it is proper always to contrast the usages of a true religion to those of a false worship, have not some of our altars, for ages past, been more frequented than others? What are the offerings to our Lady *des Neiges*, in comparison of those made to our Lady of Loretto? It is our business to examine, whether this affords a just pretence for charging us with idolatry.

The original invention was only one Diana, one Apollo, and one Esculapius; not as many Dianas, Apollos, and Esculapiuses, as they had temples and statues. Thus it is evidenced, as far as a point of history can be, that the ancients did not hold a statue to be a deity; that the worship could not relate to the statue or idol; and consequently that the ancients were not idolaters.

A rude superstitious populace, incapable of reflection, either to doubt, or deny, or believe, who flocked to the temples, as having nothing else to do, and because the little are there on a level with the great, who carried their offerings merely out of custom, who were continually talking of miracles, without having ever examined any one, and who were very little above the victims they brought; such a populace, I say, might, at the sight

of the great Diana, and the thundering Jupiter, be struck with a religious horror; and, without knowing it, worship the statue itself. This is no more than what has been the case of our ignorant peasants; and care is accordingly taken to give them to understand, that it is the blessed in heaven they are to invoke for their intercession, and not figures of wood and stone, and that their worship is due to God.

The Greeks and the Romans increased the number of their deities by apotheoses; the Greeks deified illustrious conquerors, as Bacchus, Hercules, and Perseus; Rome raised altars to its emperors. Of a very different kind are our apotheoses; if we have saints answerable to their demi-gods and secondary gods, it is without any regard to rank or conquests. We have erected temples to men, merely for their exemplary virtues, and most of whom would not have been known on earth, had they not been placed in heaven. The apotheoses of the ancients were acts of adulation: ours of respect to virtue. But these ancient apotheoses are another convincing proof that the Greeks and Romans cannot properly be called idolaters. It is manifest that they no more held a divine virtue residing in the statues of Augustus and Claudius than in their medals.

Cicero, in his philosophical works, does not leave us so much as the least suspicion that any mistake could be committed with regard to the statues of the gods, so as to confound them

with the deities themselves.— His speakers inveigh with great acrimony against the established religion, but not one of them dreams of charging the Romans with mistaking marble and brass for deities.

Lucretius, who never gives any quarter to the superstitious, reproaches no body with this folly: I must therefore again say it, this opinion never existed, never was thought of; and never was there any such thing as idolaters.

Horace introduces a statue of Priapus, saying:—

*Olim truncus eram ficulnus,
inutile lignum,
Cum faber incertus scamnum,
faceretne Priapum,
Maluit esse Deum.*

What is to be inferred from this passage! Priapus was one of those petty deities which were given up to the sarcasms of the jocular; and this very joke is as strong a proof as can be, that the figure of Priapus was not greatly revered, being made a scarecrow.

Dacier, commentator-like, has taken care to observe, that Baruch had foretold this business, saying, They shall be whatever the artist pleases. But he might withall have remarked, that the like might be said of all the statues that ever existed.

A tub may be made out of a block of marble, as well as the statue of Alexander or Jupiter, or something still more respectable. The matter of which were formed the cherubims of the Holy of Holies, might have equally served for the meanest purposes. A throne or an altar

lose nothing of the reverence due to them, because the artist might have formed them into a kitchen table.

Dacier, instead of inferring that the Romans worshipped Priapus's image, and that Baruch had predicted it, ought rather to have concluded that the Romans made a jest of it. Look into all the authors who speak of the statues of their gods, not one shall you find mentioning idolatry, but quite the contrary. You read in Martial,

*Qui sinxit sacros auro vel
marmore vultus,
Non facit ille Deos.*

In Ovid,

Colitur pro Jove forma Jovis.

In Statius,

*Nulla autem effigies nulli com-
missa metallo,
Forma Dei mentes habitare ac
numina gaudet.*

In Lucan,

*Estne Dei sedes, nisi terra et
pontus et aer.*

To enumerate all the passages in confirmation that images were accounted images would take up a volume.

The only case which could favour an opinion that images had any thing divine in them, was the oracular images: but certainly the current opinion was, that the gods had chosen some particular altars and particular statues, where they sometimes condescended to reside, giving audience to men, and answering them. In Homer, and the choruses of Greek tragedies, we only meet with prayers addressed to Apollo himself, as delivering his oracles on such a mount, in such a temple, or such a city. All

antiquity throughout has left no vestige of supplications made to a statue.

They who professed magic, who believed it to be a science, or who feigned to believe it, pretended to be possessed of the secret of bringing down the gods into statues; but not the great gods, only the secondary, the genii. This Mercurious Trismegistus used to term *making deities*, and it is refuted by St. Augustin in his City of God. But this very thing evidently shows the images to have had nothing divine in them, as not animated without the art of a magician.—And I fancy few magicians were found so dexterous as to animate a statue so as to make it speak.

In a word, the images of the gods were not gods; it was Jupiter, and not his image, which hurled the thunderbolt; it was not the Statue of Neptune which agitated the sea, nor that of Apollo which diffused light. The Greeks and Romans were Gentiles, Polytheists, but by no means idolaters.—*Voltaire.*

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.—To call those nations who worshipped the sun and stars *idolaters*, is wronging them. For a long time neither images nor temples were known among them: if they were mistaken, it was in paying to the heavenly bodies the homage due only to their Creator. Besides, the doctrine of Zoroaster or Zerdust, as preserved in the Sadder, teaches the existence of a Supreme Being, who punisheth and rewardeth. Now this is very far from idolatry. The Chinese government never admitted idols,

constantly adhering to the simple worship of King-tien, the master of heaven. Gengiskan, among the Tartars, cannot be charged with idolatry, never having had any such thing as images. The Mussulmen of Greece, Asia Minor, Syria Persia, India, and Africa, call the Christians idolaters, *giaours*; imagining that the Christians worship images. Several images which they found at Constantinople in St. Sophia, and in the church of the Holy Apostles, and others, they broke to pieces, converting the churches into mosques. Appearances, as usual, deceived them, and led them to believe that the dedicating of temples to saints who had formerly been men, the worshipping of their images with genuflexion, and the performing of miracles in those temples, were undeniable proofs of the most arrant idolatry yet the furthest from it in the world. The Christians in reality worship only one God, and in the blessed themselves revere only the virtue of God acting in his saints. The Iconoclasts and the Protestants have brought the same charge of idolatry against the church of Rome, and the same answer has been given them.

Men having very seldom precise ideas, and still more seldom expressing their ideas in precise words, clear of all ambiguity, the name of *idolaters* was given to the Gentiles, and especially the Polytheists. Immense volumes have been written, according to the multitude of varying sentiments, on the origin of worshipping God, or several

gods, and under sensible representations. Now this multitude of books and opinions only proves the ignorance of the authors.

We know not who invented any part of our clothing, and yet we would fain know who was the first inventor of idols. What signifies a passage of Sanchoniathon, who lived before the Trojan war? What information does he give us, in saying that the *chaos*, the *mind*, that is the *breath*, being enamoured with its principles, extracted the mud from them: that he made the air luminous: that the wind Colp and his wife Bau begot Eon, and he begot Genos: that Cronos their descendent had two eyes behind as before; that he came to be god, and gave Egypt to his son Jaut? This is one of the most respectable monuments of antiquity.

Orpheus, who was prior to Sanchoniathon, gives us just as much light in his Theogonia, which Damascius has preserved. He represents the mundane principle in the form of a dragon with two heads, one of a bull, and the other of a lion, with a face in the middle, which he terms *god face*, and gilded wings to the shoulders.

Yet these ideas, fantastical as they are, give us an insight into two important truths; one that sensible images and hieroglyphics are derived from the most remote antiquity; the other, that all ancient philosophers acknowledged a primordial principle.

As to polytheism, common sense will tell you, that at the com-

mencement of mankind, that is, of weak creatures, susceptible of reason and folly, subject to every accident, to sickness and death, they soon came to a sense of their weakness and dependence; they easily conceived that there was something superior to themselves; they felt a power in the earth which produced their food, another in the air which often destroyed them, and another in the consuming fire and the submerging water. What could be more natural in men absolutely ignorant, than to fancy that there were beings which presided over those elements? What could be more natural than to revere the invisible power which made the sun and stars to shine? And on proceeding to form an idea of these superior powers, what was again more natural than to represent them in a sensitive way? Or I may even say, how could they go about it otherwise? Judaism, anterior to our religion, and prescribed by God himself, was full of those images under which the Deity is represented. He condescends to speak the language of men in a bush; he makes his appearance on a mountain; the heavenly spirits sent by him all come in a human shape: in a word, the sanctuary itself is filled with cherubims, human bodies, and the wings and heads of beasts. This led Plutarch, Tacitus, and Appian, and so many others, into the ridiculous mistake of upbraiding the Jews with worshipping an ass's head. Thus God, who had forbidden the painting and carving of any figure, has been

pleased nevertheless to accommodate himself to human weakness, which requires the senses to be spoken to by images.

Isaiah, chap. vi. sees the Lord seated on a throne, and his train fill the temple: In chap. i. of *Jeremiah*, the Lord stretches out his hand and touches the prophet's mouth: *Ezekiel*, chap. iii. sees a throne of sapphire, and God appears to him like a man seated on that throne. This imagery does not in the least defile the purity of the Jewish religion, which never made use of pictures, statues, and idols, as public representations of the Deity.

The lettered Chinese, the Parsees, the ancient Egyptians, had no idols: but Isis and Osiris were soon represented in figures; Bell at Babylon was as soon exhibited in a huge Colusus; Brama was in the Indian peninsula a hideous kind of monster. The Greeks above all multiplied the names of the deities, and of course the statues and temples; but ever attributing the supreme power to their Zeus, by the Latins named *Jupiter*, the sovereign of gods and men. The Romans imitated the Greeks: both always place their gods in heaven, without knowing what they meant by heaven and their Olympus; these superior beings could not be supposed to reside in the clouds, which are only water. At first seven of them were placed in the seven planets, among which was reckoned the sun; but afterwards the residence of all the gods was extended to the whole heavenly expanse.

The Romans had twelve great deities, six male, and six female, whom they distinguished by the appellation of *Dii majorum gentium*, Jupiter, Neptune, Apollo, Vulcan, Mars, Mercury: Juno, Vesta, Minerva, Ceres, Venus, Diana. Pluto, was then omitted, and Vesta took his place.

Next were the gods *minorum gentium*, the indigetes or heroes, as Bacchus, Hercules, Esculapius; and the infernal deities, Pluto, Proserpine; the sea gods, as Thetis, Amphitrite; the Nereides, and Glaucus; afterwards the Dryades, the Naiades: the gods of gardens; the pastoral deities: every profession, every action of life, children, maidens, wives, women in childbed, all had their deity: there was even the god *Fart*. Lastly, emperors, were deified; not that these emperors, nor the god *Fart*, nor the goddess *Pertunda*, nor *Priapus*, nor *Rumila* the goddess of Bubbles, nor *Stercutius* the god of genital parts, were accounted the lords of heaven and earth. Some of the emperors indeed had temples; the petty household-gods went without them: but all had their images or their idols.

These were little grotesque figures, set up in a closet by way of ornament; old women and children were highly delighted with them: but never were these figures authorised by any public worship; every one was left to follow his own private superstition. These little idols are still found in the ruins of ancient cities.

Though we cannot fix the

precise time when men began to make idols, they are, however, known to belong to the most remote antiquity. Terah, Abraham's father, used to make them at Ur, in Chaldea. Rachel purloined and carried off Laban's idols. There is no going higher.

But what did the ancient nations think of all those images? what virtue, what power did they attribute to them? Was it thought that the gods quitted heaven to come down and hide themselves in their statues? or that they imparted to them a portion of the divine spirit, or did not impart any thing at all to them? A great deal of useless erudition has been thrown away on this point, it being evident that every one's notions of them were proportioned to his reason, his credulity, or fanaticism.

The priests, we may be sure, would not be wanting to annex to their statues all the divinity they possibly could, in order to draw the more offerings. The philosophers, it is well known, censured these superstitions; the military people made a jest of them; and the commonality, ever ignorant and silly, knew not what they were doing. This is, in a few words, the history of all the nations to whom God has not made himself known.

The premises are applicable to the worship universally paid in Egypt to an ox, and in several cities to a dog, a monkey, a cat, and onions. In all appearance they were at first only emblems. Afterwards a certain ox called *Apis*, a certain dog named

Anubis, were worshipped; still the people went on eating beef and onions; but what the Egyptian old women thought of sacred onions and oxen is not cleared up.

It was not uncommon for idols to speak. On the anniversary of Cybele's festival, the city of Rome commemorated the beautiful distich uttered by the statue on its removal from King Attalus's palace.

*Ipsa pata volui, ne sit mora,
mitte volentem;
Dignus Roma locus, quo Deus
omnis eat.*

"I allowed myself to be carried off: Away with me quickly. Rome is worthy to be the residence of every deity."

The statue of Fortune had spoke; the Scipios, the Ciceros, and Cæsars, indeed, believed nothing of the matter; but the old women, to whom Encolpus gave a crown to buy geese and gods, might very well believe it.

The idols likewise pronounced oracles, the priests concealed within these statues, speaking in the name of the Deity.

Amidst so many gods, so many different theogonies and separate worships, whence is it that no such thing as a religious war was ever known among the people called *idolaters*? This tranquillity was a good springing from an evil, from error itself: for every nation owning several inferior gods, peaceably allowed its neighbours to have theirs likewise. Except Cambyse's killing the ox *Apis*, not one instance is to be found in all pro-

fane history of a conqueror offering any insult to the gods of a vanquished nation. The Gentiles had no exclusive religion; and all the priests minded, was to multiply offerings and sacrifices.

The first offerings were the fruits of the earth; but the priest soon came to want animal food for their table: with their own hands they slew the victims; and as they made themselves butchers, they became sanguinary. At length they introduced the horrible practice of offering human victims, and especially comely boys and girls, abominations never known among the Chinese, the Parsis, or Indians. But at Hieropolis in Egypt, Porphyry tells us it was nothing extraordinary to sacrifice men.

In Tauris strangers were sacrificed; but this savage custom being known, the priests of Tauris, it is to be supposed, did not much business. This execrable superstition prevailed among the most ancient Greeks, the Cypriots, the Phenicians, the Tyrians, and the Carthaginians. The Romans themselves gave into this religious guilt: and, according to Plutarch, sacrificed two Greeks and two Gauls, to expiate the incontinency of three vestals. Procopius, who was contemporary with Theodobert King of the Franks, says that the Franks sacrificed men on their entrance into Italy under that prince. These horrid sacrifices were common among the Gauls and Germans. There is no reading history without being very much displeased with one's own species.

What if, among the Jews, Jephtha sacrificed his daughter, and Saul was going to slay his son? What if they who were devoted to the Lord by anathema could not be redeemed, as beasts were redeemed, but were indispensably put to death? What though Samuel, a Jewish priest, cut to pieces with a consecrated cleaver King Agag prisoner of war whom Saul had spared, and sharply reproved Saul for having treated that king according to the laws of nations? What of all this! God is the Sovereign of mankind, and may take away their lives when he will, as he will, and by whom he will: but men are not to put themselves on a footing with the Lord of life and death, and usurp the prerogatives of the Supreme Being.

Amidst such detestable proceedings, it is some relief to the feeling heart to know, that in almost all those nations called *idolatrous*, there was the sacred theology and popular error, private worship and public ceremonies; the religion of the wise, and that of the vulgar. To those who were initiated in the mysteries, the existence of one only God was preached. Of this a sufficient testimony is the hymn attributed to the elder Orpheus, which was sung in the celebrated mysteries of Ceres Eleusina! "Contemplate the Divine nature, illumine thy mind, govern thy heart, walk in the path of justice, take care that the God of heaven be before thine eyes; there is none but him; he alone is self-existent; all beings derive their existence from him

he upholds them all; never has he been seen by mortals; and he sees all things."

The following passage of the philosopher Maximus of Madaura, in his letter to St. Augustine, is likewise worth attention?

"What man is so dull, so stupid, as to question the existence of an eternal, a supreme, infinite Deity, who has created nothing like himself, and is the common Father of all things!"

A thousand monuments might be produced, that wise men in all times abhorred both idolatry and Polytheism.

Epictetus, that pattern of resignation and patience, so great in so mean a condition, never speaks but of one only God.—One of his maxims is this, "God has created me, God is within me; I carry him about every where. Shall I defile him with obscene thoughts, unjust actions, or infamous desires? My duty is to thank God for every thing, to praise him for every thing: and to thank, praise, and serve him continually, whilst I have life." All Epictetus's ideas turn on this principle.

Marcus Aurelius, who perhaps was on the throne of the Roman empire not less great than Epictetus in servitude, does indeed often mention gods, in conformity to the current phraseology, or to express intermediate beings between the Supreme Essence and men; but in how many passages does he show, that in reality he acknowledges only one eternal infinite God? "Our souls," says he, "are an emanation of the Deity; my body my spirits, proceed from God."

The Stoics, the Platonists, held one Divine and Universal Nature; the Epicureans denied it. The priests, in their mysteries, spoke only of one God.—

Where, then, were the idolaters?

Besides, it is one of the greatest mistakes in Moreri's Dictionary, to say, that in the time of Theodosius the younger, no idolaters remained but in the remote parts of Asia and Africa. There were still, and even down to the seventh century, many Gentile nations in Italy. All Germany north of the Weser were strangers to Christianity in Charlemagne's time; and long after him Poland, and the wole North, continued in what is called *idolatry*. Half Africa, all the realms beyond the Granges, Japan, the innumerable commonality of China, a hundred Tartarian hords, retain their ancient worship; whereas, in Europe, this religion is to be found only among some Laplanders, Samoides, and Tartars. To conclude, in the time which we distinguish by the appellation of the middle age, the Mahometan's were called Pagans: a people who execrate images were branded as idolaters and image-worshippers; and it must be frankly owned, that the Turks, seeing our churches crowded with images and statues, are more excusable in calling us idolaters.—*Voltaire*.

WORSHIP, SUPERSTITIOUS.—Whatever goes beyond the adoration of one Supreme Being, and a submission of the heart to his eternal order, is generally superstition; and a most danger-

ous superstition is the annexion of the pardon of crimes to certain ceremonies.

*Et nigras mactant pecudes, et
manibus divis
Inferias mittunt,
O faciles nimium qui tritria
crimina cadis
Fluminea tolli posse putatis
aqua!*

“You imagine that God will forget your having killed a man, only for your washing yourself in a river, sacrificing a black sheep, and some words having been said over you.” Of course, then, a second murder will be forgiven you at the same easy rate, and so a third; and a hundred murders will only cost you a hundred black sheep, and a hundred ablutions! Poor mortals! away with such conceits; the best way is, commit no murder, and so save your black sheep.

How scandalous is it to imagine that a priest of Isis and Cybele can reconcile you to the Deity, by playing on cymbals and castinets! And what is this priest of Cybele, this vagrant gelding, who lives by your weakness, that he shall set up to be as a mediator between heaven and you? Has he any commission from God? He takes money from you only for muttering some strange words; and can you think that the Being of beings ratifies what this hypocrite says!

Some superstitions are innocent; you dance on Diana or Pomona's festivals, or those of

your calendar: be it so; dancing is pleasant, healthy, and exhilarating; it hurts nobody—but do not take it into your head that Pomona and Vertumnus are mightily pleased at your having frolicked in honour of them; and that, should you fail to do so, they would make you smart for it. The gardener's spade and hoe are the only Pomona and Vertumnus. Do not be so weak as to think that your garden will be destroyed by a tempest if you omit dancing the Pyrrhic or the Cordax.

There is another superstition which is perhaps excusable, and even an incentive to virtue; I mean, deifying great men who have been signal benefactors to their own species. To be sure it would be better only to look on them as venerable personages, and especially to endeavour to imitate them; therefore revere, without worshipping, a Solon, a Thales, a Pythagoras; but by no means pay thy adorations to Hercules for having cleansed Augea's stables, and lying with fifty girls in one night.

Especially forbear setting up a worship for wretches without any other merit than ignorance, enthusiasm, and nastiness; who made a vow of idleness and beggary, and gloried in such infamy; fit subjects indeed for deification after their death, who were never known to do the least good when living!

Observe that the most superstitious times have ever been noted for the greatest enormities.—*Voltaire.*

ZEAL, FANATICAL.—Fanatic zeal is

to superstition what a delirium is to a fever, and fury to anger! he who has ecstasies and visions, who takes dreams for realities, and his imaginations for prophecies, is an enthusiast; and he who sticks not at supporting his folly by murder, is a fanatic.—Bartholomew Diaz, a fugitive at Nuremberg, who was firmly convinced that the pope is the Antichrist in the Revelations, and that he has the mark of the beast, was only an enthusiast? whereas his brother, who set out for Rome with the godly intention of murdering him, and who actually did murder him for God's sake, was one of the most execrable fanatics that superstition could form.

Polieuctes, who, on a Pagan festival, went into the temple, pulling down and breaking the images and other ornaments, showed himself a fanatic, less horrible, indeed, than Diaz, but equally rash and imprudent. The murderers of Francis duke of Guise, of William prince of Orange, of the kings Henry III. and Henry IV. and of so many others, were demoniacs, agitated by the same evil spirit as Diaz.

The most detestable instance

of fanatic zeal is that of the citizens of Paris, who on the feast of St. Barthomew could massacre their fellow-citizens for not going to mass.

Some are fanatics in cool blood, these are the judges who can sentence people to death without any other guilt than for not being of their way of thinking! these judges are the more guilty, and the more deserving of universal execration, as not being under a fit of rage like the Clements, the Chatels, the Ravallacs, the Gerads, the Damiens, One would think they might listen to reason.

When once this kind of zeal has touched the brain, the distemper is desparate. I have seen Convulsionists, who in speaking of the miracles of St. Paris, grew hot involuntarily! their eyes glared, they trembled in all their limbs, their countenance was quite disfigured with rancour, and they unquestionably would have killed any one who had contradicted them.

As to our holy religion having been so often corrupted by these infernal impulses, it is the folly of men that is to be blamed.—*Voltaire.*

FINIS.

